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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the preparation of 
political decisions, and the role of advice in decision-making processes, in 
the context of the European Union (EU). Generally, such practices remain 
undocumented and take place outside of public and political scrutiny. Yet, 
they form the groundwork for compromises. A deeper and more nuanced 
awareness of the informal stages of decision-making is therefore necessary 
to appreciate political negotiation and compromise-building. It is pre-
eminently within these preparatory stages that advice is offered to 
politicians. The study focuses on the EU context and examines in-house 
political advice in the European Parliament (EP). This introduction 
contextualises the research question (I), reviews the relevant existing 
literature (II), discusses the scope and approach of the study (III), and 
proposes the potential theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
dissertation (IV).  
 
I.  Context of the research question 
The contextualisation of the politics of advice  
What is the role of advice in legislative decision-making processes? That is 
the broad topic that this dissertation deals with. How legislators are advised 
is part of a wider phenomenon that has remained rather eclipsed in the 
academic debate (Pegan, 2015). In shaping their views and decisions, 
politicians rely on (expert) advice that is presented to them in many shapes 
and forms. This assumption stems from the broadly accepted notion that 
elected actors simply do not have the time or the knowledge to master all 
issues in detail (e.g. Arnold, 1987; Hammond, 1984 and 1996). But is the 
advisor a Rasputin who calls the shots behind the scenes and pursues his 
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or her own agenda, or merely a puppet that carries out the instructions of 
the politician?  
 
The question how political decisions come about is not new. A substantial 
body of literature addresses the input by staff in the context of the US 
Congress, and more recently, the role of officials in other legislatures has 
also been explored. Scholars who address the issues tend to focus on 
exploring what drives the behaviour of actors and how elected actors (can) 
control the behaviour of non-elected actors (Hammond, 1984 and 1996; 
Arnold, 1987; Patterson, 1970; Moe, 2005; Olson, 2006; Page and Jenkins, 
2005; and Gailmard and Patty, 2012). Although interpretations are 
abundant, political delegation is generally explained through efficiency 
reasons and a required degree of continuity in policy-making (Peters, 
2009). The implications of what then constitutes delegation, and how it 
plays out in practice, vary significantly.  
 
This study draws on the evidence provided by the existing literature that 
advice to legislators potentially has political implications (Fouilleux et al, 
2005; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 
2014; and Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). A (potential) political dimension 
of advice raises important questions about the legitimacy of decision-
making. Advisors operate in the ‘background’ (Wodak, 2009). As said 
above, their activities have been subject of debate since the 1980s. Further 
on in this introduction, a general review of the literature is included, 
discussing political delegation and the role of advice in various institutional 
settings. In the case of the European Union (EU), however, the issue of 
accountability is particularly sensitive with widespread critique of a 
‘democratic deficit’ (Smismans, 2013; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007). 
As a supranational polity, the EU faces several democratic ‘challenges’ in 
relation to transparency and popular support (Ripoll Servent, 2018; Burns, 
2013; Héritier, 2003). The empowerment of both the EP and national 
 
 
 
parliaments in EU decision-making was the response to this critique (see 
Rittberger, 2003 regarding the EP; and Christiansen et al, 2014 regarding 
national parliaments).  
 
Relevant to the context of this study is that the role of ‘back-stage’ advisors 
has given rise to a normative debate regarding their influence or capacity 
to have an impact on EU policymaking (e.g. Neunreither, 2002; 
Christiansen, 2002; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 
2014; and Winzen, 2011 and 2014). A policy-shaping role by non-elected 
experts raises concerns for legitimacy prompted by the fact that their 
actions are secluded from scrutiny and public oversight (see e.g. Radaelli, 
1999). This study sets out to contribute to a broader understanding of the 
politics of advice. Uncovering the role of advisors in the preparation of 
decisions and their day-to-day activities is instrumental for both the 
empirical and normative assessment of the political implications of their 
actions.  
 
The role of advice pre-eminently manifests itself during the informal, 
preparatory stage of decision-making. During this process political positions 
and decisions are prepared outside of the formal structures of a legislative 
institution, thus outside of public and political scrutiny. These practices 
remain relatively unchartered territory, yet, are essential to explaining how 
decisions come about. The dissertation tries to fill that gap and shed light 
on the informal preparation of decision-making. To that end, it addresses 
questions like what defines and guides political advice, and what 
circumstances may enable or restrict advice.  
 
In this respect, the dissertation makes three key contributions. First, the 
analytical framework developed in chapter 2 conceptualises a ‘political’ role 
of advice as part of informal decision-making. In this way, the framework 
contributes to theory building within the scope of legislative organisation 
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and informal governance. Second, the empirical analysis regarding the 
provision of political advice in the EP increases our knowledge of the 
informal stages of decision-making. It is in the informal arena that the 
groundwork for compromises is laid down (Reh, 2012). A deeper and more 
nuanced awareness of the activities that support decision-makers 
contributes to an enhanced appreciation of political negotiation and 
compromise-building dynamics. Third, the findings offer novel insights that 
may evolve the normative assessment of the legitimacy of (informal) EU 
decision-making. 
 
Gaining a better understanding of the politics of advice is increasingly 
significant against the backdrop of a changing public policy landscape. The 
advent of post-factual politics and the emergence of populist right-wing 
parties as mainstream have created a crisis of trust (Brack and Startin, 
2015). Under the banner of ‘alternative facts’, the fading trust in expertise 
or objective knowledge substitutes rational proof with emotional appeals 
(Barbieri, 2018). This development is illustrated by the election of President 
Trump in the United States, the Brexit vote in the UK, Russian propaganda, 
and the electoral success of populist movements across Europe (Barbieri, 
2018). These examples furthermore demonstrate a deteriorating sense of 
trust in the political establishment and a rise of anti-EU sentiments. In the 
context of the EU the decline is explained as a result from the economic, 
financial, and migration crises (Brack and Startin, 2015). These 
developments on the one hand raise the importance of the legitimacy of 
advice. On the other hand, internal resources that cater to the politician’s 
information needs become ever more important for the navigation through 
a complex arena. The latter is illustrative of the trade-off between efficiency 
and legitimacy that characterises EU decision-making, as discussed below.  
 
 
 
 
EU informal decision-making: a trade-off between efficiency and 
legitimacy? 
As the EU gained more competences, the extent to which EU decision-
making can be considered democratic and legitimate became an important 
issue of discussion (Smismans, 2013; Bovens et al, 2010; Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger, 2007). The so-called ‘democratic deficit’ relates to the transfer 
of powers from the national to the supranational level without appropriate 
democratic control. Not uncommon to multi-level governance systems, it 
often remains unclear who should be held responsible for what decisions. 
The complexity, informality, and consensus-oriented nature of EU decision-
making not only hampers the identification of decision-makers and policy 
alternatives, but also falls short of a political forum that articulates the 
arguments in favour or against given policy choices (Brack and Costa, 2018; 
Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013; Reh, 2012, 2014; Heisenberg, 2005). 
These features of the EU system negatively affect the understanding and 
support of the public and aggravate the perception of backroom deals. The 
various treaty changes reflect the attempts to address these issues. A key 
solution that is envisioned lies in the gradual institutionalisation of the 
principles of a representative democracy (Rittberger, 2012). Since the 
inception of the EP, therefore, calls have been made to empower the 
institution (Rittberger, 2014). Not in the least, the EP itself has engaged in 
such appeals (Ripoll Servent, 2018; Burns, 2013). 
 
With each new treaty the EP’s legislative and supervisory powers have been 
strengthened (Rittberger, 2012). This gradual extension culminated in the 
Lisbon Treaty (2009) that designates co-decision between the Council of 
Ministers and the EP as the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ (Corbett et al, 
2011: 5). The evolution of the EP’s legislative powers turned the EU political 
system into a bicameral legislature (Bressanelli et al, 2016; Rasmussen, 
2011). The widened scope of co-decision has extended the dialogue 
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between the three institutions through ‘trilogue meetings’ to now cover 
virtually all policy domains. The European Commission (EC) represents the 
supranational interest and puts forward proposals for EU policy or 
legislatives initiatives. The Parliament and the Council constitute the 
legislative bodies, respectively representing the voice of the people and the 
national governments (Corbett et al, 2011: 4-7).  
 
The intensified inter-institutional interaction has increased the informal 
dimension of decision-making. This is illustrated by the upward trend of so-
called ‘early agreements’ (Ripoll-Servent, 2018). The possibility for the co-
legislators to ‘fast track’ the legislative procedure and come to an 
agreement in first reading was introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). 
In the 7th Parliamentary term (1999-2014) 85 per cent of legislative files 
were concluded at first reading (EPRS, 2016). This move towards a secluded 
form of decision-making in which only a restricted number of actors are 
involved has given rise to an academic debate that does not paint a very 
positive outlook for the EP (Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Häge and Kæding, 
2007; Héritier and Reh, 2012; Häge and Naurin, 2013; Bressanelli et al, 
2016). With co-decision becoming the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, 
efficiency became a ‘coping strategy’ to deal with the increased, complex 
workload (Reh, 2012). Informal agreements are positively assessed for 
their problem-solving capacity. Decision-making through trilogues is said to 
reduce transaction costs and speed up the process (Reh, 2012). However, 
it appears to have come with a democratic cost (Farrell and Héritier, 2003, 
2004; Rasmussen and Reh, 2013). The negotiations behind closed doors 
undermine transparency, accountability, and open debate (Reh, 2012; 
Burns, 2013; Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013; Brack and Costa, 2018). Due 
to the informal and secluded nature, the bargaining process is largely 
untraceable to the wider public. It thus not only affects public scrutiny, it 
also dilutes political contestation and public-opinion formation as policy 
choices remain unclear (Reh, 2012). For the EP, having predicated its calls 
 
 
 
for empowerment upon its status as a democratically elected body, the 
repercussions of informal decision-making practices are particularly 
tenuous (Burns, 2013; Ripoll Servent, 2018; Brack and Costa, 2018). 
Although heralded as a means to strengthen democratic legitimacy (Burns, 
2013), the increase in powers has not been matched with strengthened 
(popular) legitimacy as the turnout in EU elections continues to drop (Brack 
and Costa, 2018). Moreover, the loss of transparency corrodes the practice 
of open decision-making that the institution proclaims. 
 
When it comes to the normative assessment of informal governance, the 
evolution of the EP renders a mixed picture. On the one hand, the 
empowerment of the institution, finally formalised through treaty reform, is 
a product of ‘unwritten rules’ (Shackleton, 2000). Through its internal Rules 
of Procedure, the EP has managed to formalise informal practices that 
enhance both the efficiency and democratic accountability of EU decision-
making (Ripoll-Servent, 2018). Kleine (2013) has provided a systematic 
analysis of the parallel development of formal rules and informal norms in 
the EU. She concludes that the combination reduces the EU’s democratic 
deficit because it allows negotiators to take on board those interests that 
are specifically relevant to, or affected by, the decisions they have to make.  
 
On the other hand, the ensuing trend of early agreements is considered 
questionable from a democratic governance perspective. While previous 
studies in relation to ‘early agreement’ have concentrated on the democratic 
consequences and power shifts within and between the institutions, we still 
know little about the intra-organisational preparations of the inter-
institutional negotiations. Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood (2015) made 
an important contribution in this respect. In their article, they disentangled 
the various informal processes that up until then were grouped under the 
general banner of ‘trilogues’. The scholars identify three layers of trilogues, 
i.e. political, technical, and bilateral preparations. Their ‘technical’ layer 
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suggests representation at staff level in the pre-negotiations, which can also 
be derived from the EP Rules of Procedure. The Code of Conduct that was 
adopted in 2008 as a way to ‘formalise’, or at least structure, the 
institution’s participation in trilogues, stipulates that all party groups shall 
be represented in these negotiations, ‘at least at staff level’. Moreover, it 
refers to an ‘administrative support team’. This suggests the involvement 
of EP staff in the negotiations.  
 
The academic awareness of the importance of the informal dimension of 
politics is increasing (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013; Kleine, 2013). In the 
literature on EU governance, several studies have addressed the role of 
staff in decision-making (Christiansen, 2002; Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 
2011; Egeberg et al, 2013; Busby, 2013; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; 
Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014; Michon, 2014; Pegan, 2015). In these 
discussions, the study of political advisors so far has only received marginal 
scholarly consideration. The developments put forward above raise the 
value of such advice. Moreover, the trend towards informal decision-making 
elevates the importance of understanding the intra-institutional preparatory 
dynamics. With that in mind, this dissertation aims to unravel the backstage 
preparation of decisions by examining advice provided to Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) through a conceptual, empirical, and 
normative lens. 
 
Unravelling political advice in the context of the European 
Parliament 
The dissertation sets out to examine the politics of advice in the context of 
the EP by addressing the question whether and under which conditions 
group advisors can assume a political role. Group advisors are hired to serve 
and contribute to the ideological priorities and objectives of a political party. 
As such, they constitute a distinct type of actor that is also encountered in 
 
 
 
national parliaments and that, up until now, has only received marginal 
scholarly attention. The EP is deemed a particularly suitable setting for the 
study of the politics of advice for several reasons, briefly set out below.  
 
First of all, the nature of the institution and its position in the EU political 
system amount to a consensual style of decision-making characterised by 
intensive intra-parliamentary coordination. The EP comprises elected 
representatives from the 28 Member States emanating from over 200 
national political parties. This fact alone illustrates that EP decision-making 
is an intricate balancing act. Since the European Union does not have a 
government-opposition structure, no systematic support or stable coalitions 
emerge from Parliament. Instead, coalitions are struck on a case-by-case 
basis and each vote in Parliament requires a new quest for a majority. 
Moreover, the party groups do not rest on a collective electoral mandate, 
which further motivates the common practice to seek widespread 
agreement (Corbett et al, 2011). The process of compromise building 
between the EP party groups takes place prior to the actual negotiations 
and decision-making. Gaining insight into the informal dynamics within and 
between the groups is essential for the understanding of how decisions at 
EU level come about.  
 
The legislative empowerment of the EP and ensuing trend of so-called early 
agreements make intra-parliamentary political coordination ever more 
crucial (EPRS, 2016). Not only does the expanded workload mean that there 
simply is more to coordinate, the EP’s negotiation position vis-à-vis the 
Council hinges on the extent to which a unified position is reached. The 
augmented inter-institutional dialogue on the one hand politicises EU 
decision-making while at the same time it causes concern for a secluded 
form of decision-making in which only a small fraction of MEPs is closely 
involved (Bressanelli et al, 2016; Brandsma, 2015; Rasmussen et al, 2013; 
Reh et al, 2013; Héritier and Reh, 2012; Judge and Earnshaw, 2011; Farrell 
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study of the politics of advice for several reasons, briefly set out below.  
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augmented inter-institutional dialogue on the one hand politicises EU 
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and Héritier, 2004; Häge and Kæding, 2007). These developments illustrate 
the need and urgency for extensive intra-parliamentary coordination, which 
is further considered in chapter 1.  
 
The significance of disclosing informal intra-parliamentary mechanisms can 
also be viewed in light of the current renewed EU integration efforts. In the 
aftermath of the Brexit vote and in view of economic recovery, there seems 
to be momentum for a sense of optimism (Eichengreen, 2018). In March 
2017, the EC published a vision for the future setting out five scenarios for 
the EU by 2025. The scenarios range from maintaining the status quo 
(scenario 1) to a significant increase in integration (scenario 5). In the face 
of internal and external challenges, the Commission calls upon the leaders 
of the 27 Members States – thus excluding the United Kingdom – to decide 
on the way forward in a spirit of solidarity (European Commission, 2017a). 
The renewed optimism notably resonated in the State of the Union address, 
delivered by EC President Juncker to the EP on 13 September 2017. He 
claimed that ‘the wind is back in Europe’s sails’ producing a renewed 
capacity for the bloc to face its many challenges (European Commission, 
2017b). The process of redefining the Union’s direction (further) politicises 
the EU governance debate and with that the role of the EC. Such 
politicisation has the potential to (further) increase the value of the EP party 
groups as vehicles of political contestation (Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). 
 
Since its inception, the EP has evolved significantly in terms of political 
authority, legislative powers, and hence in workload and internal 
organisation (Corbett et al, 2011: 3). In recent years, it has devoted 
particular attention to developing its in-house resources to deal with its 
changing role and to increase the overall transparency of EP decision-
making (EPRS, 2017). An important explanation for the seemingly strong 
reliance on internal resources in relation to policy advice lies in safeguarding 
the institution’s independence from the executive (Ringe, 2010; Dobbels 
 
 
 
and Neuhold, 2014). In this regard, the formation of the European 
Parliament Research Service (EPRS) was aimed at strengthening the 
internal policy support structures (EP Secretary General, 2013). In the 
context of a cumulative extension of the legislative powers of the EP, 
scholars turned to exploring its internal organisation and structures (e.g. 
Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002; Héritier and Reh, 2012; Ripoll Servent, 
2012). Discussions for example reflect on MEP voting patterns (Hix and 
Noury, 2009) and political cleavages between the party groups (Hix et al, 
2007). Driven by the need for efficiency and coordination, the growing 
impact on legislative outcomes augmented the role of the EP party groups 
(Raunio, 1999; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999). In the early 2000s we 
therefore see academic consideration shifting from the national political 
parties to the transnational party groups as central actors in the EP 
organisation (Hix et al, 2007). Examinations of the workings of the EP 
administration considered the form of legislative assistance (Neunreither, 
2002; Pegan, 2015) and the role of parliamentary committees (Neuhold, 
2001; Neuhold and Settembri, 2007; Yordanova, 2013).  
 
This study construes political advice as advice offered to politicians by non-
elected actors. In the context of the EP various internal and external sources 
of such advice are conceivable. The focus on internal mechanisms and thus 
on internal political advice is motivated through the expectation that EP 
staff act as gatekeepers for information from the outside world (cf. Busby, 
2013; Corbett et al, 2016). In the preparation of legislation and policy, MEPs 
rely on three major internal sources of advice (Neunreither, 2002; Egeberg 
et al, 2013; Busby, 2013, Pegan, 2015; Corbett et al, 2016; Ripoll Servent, 
2018):  
(i) The EP General Secretariat  
(ii) The group secretariats  
(iii) Their personal assistants  
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Chapter 3 of the dissertation provides a more in-depth discussion of these 
sources of political advice (see 3.1.1). Yet, to highlight the distinct role of 
group advisors it is important to note the following findings here. 
Neunreither (2002) found that they have a specific intermediary role to 
play. The EP General Secretariat, on the one hand, constitutes the 
‘independent non-partisan service’ and acts in the general interest of the 
institution. MEPs’ personal assistants, on the other hand, look out for the 
specific interests of MEPs. Egeberg and colleagues (2013) conclude that 
group advisors are more likely to facilitate compromises within the EP than 
other supporting staff. Moreover, EP party groups are at the heart of 
majority-building processes and considered the pivotal centres of influence 
(Corbett et al, 2011; Hix et al, 2007). The internal organisation and division 
of labour is structured around the groups. By extension, group advisors’ 
involvement in intra-parliamentary coordination mechanisms is expected to 
be substantial.  
 
Although studies have identified group advisors and MEP assistants as the 
political sources MEPs turn to for support, the political dimension of such 
support calls for further conceptualisation. In addition to exploring the 
contribution of political advice to the preparation of decisions, the research 
aim is to examine the discretion and room for improvisation that advisors 
have, and the circumstances at play that enable or restrict their role. Before 
elaborating on the approach and scope of the study a review is presented 
of the literature that considers the relationship between elected and non-
elected actors, and the function and nature of advice.   
 
II.  State of play: review of the literature on political 
delegation and advice 
To address the research question the dissertation develops an analytical 
framework in chapter 2. The concepts that are defined in the framework 
 
 
 
draw and build on the scholarly debate on political delegation and the role 
of non-elected actors. As part of this introduction, therefore, a general 
discussion of this literature is presented below.  
 
Delegation and bureaucratic control have been recurring themes in the 
political sciences and public administration literature. The notion that 
politicians rely on advice stems from the unequivocal reality that they lack 
the time and knowledge to master all issues in detail (see e.g. Arnold, 
1987). Already in the 1970s the significance of the contribution of officials 
is recognised among scholars, as Hammond’s review of the literature on 
legislative staff in the US Congress demonstrates (1984 and 1996). Officials 
do more than simply process information and are designated as ‘important 
intervening variables in the legislative process’ (Hammond, 1984).  
 
From the discussion, it can be inferred that delegation is generally tied to 
the information needs of legislators and motivated through a lack of 
resources, notably time and expertise. Both aspects are addressed in 
further detail below. First, the academic debate on the relationship between 
elected and non-elected actors is reviewed. Next, the function and nature 
of advice are considered in relation to legislators’ need for information and 
expertise. 
 
The relationship between elected and non-elected actors 
A traditional rationalist premise that follows from delegation is the notion 
that political actors try to control or monitor the actions and behaviour of 
their non-elected advisors (e.g. Arnold, 1987; Moe, 2005). However, in 
practice time limits prevent politicians from closely watching officials’ every 
move (e.g. Arnold, 1987). Closely related, a large body of literature 
discusses what drives actors, setting out to theorise and compare the 
motivations and ‘preferences’ of the politician versus those of the official 
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(principal-agent theory). A third important element of the context of 
delegation lies in what is thought acceptable in the eyes of the elected 
politician and his or her electorate. In sum, academic studies on the 
relationship between elected and non-elected actors discern questions or 
concerns around accountability, preferences, and control. Each of these 
approaches to delegation is briefly reviewed below. 
 
In the study of public administration and accountability Max Weber’s 
analysis of bureaucratic organisation is generally taken as the starting 
point. In the Weberian model bureaucratic design ensures equal treatment 
of citizens and administration of records (Weber in: Peters 2009). Moreover, 
the civil service is theorised to be stable and predictable whereas politicians 
come and go. In line with this view, delegation theory first of all justifies 
the position of officials in public administration for efficiency reasons. 
Furthermore, the bureaucracy is said to ensure a certain degree of 
continuity and therefore reduce arbitrariness in policy-making.  
 
Rational-choice theory studies the strategic interaction between individuals 
and gives predictions about their behaviour. Actors’ preferences and 
objectives are perceived as fixed and the ultimate goal is to maximise or 
optimise one’s own interests (Hague and Harrop, 2010). Rationalist scholars 
discussing the principal-agent relationship build on the assumption that 
both actors have and act according to a set of ‘fixed, exogenous, and 
commonly known ideal outcomes’ (e.g. Gailmard and Patty, 2012). 
Principals grant more discretion to agents whose ‘ideal outcomes’ lie close 
to or converge with their own, which basically means that politicians’ 
objective is to ensure that ‘administrative decisions’ remain as close as 
possible to their own values and ideas (Arnold, 1987). The sociological 
institutionalist logic of appropriateness rejects such rationalist assumptions 
and argues instead that actors have multiple and endogenous preferences. 
They rely on socially constructed roles and institutional rules and ask what 
 
 
 
the appropriate course of action is in a given situation. Following this school 
of thought, political tasks are delegated not as a result of functional logic 
(or ‘consequentialism’), but rather because it is widely accepted as 
legitimate or appropriate (Hague and Harrop, 2010).  
 
Principal-agent theory is aimed at explaining how politicians exercise 
control over the behaviour of their supporting staff. Information is 
considered a source of ‘bureaucratic power’ and studies set out to examine 
how political principals can overcome the ‘information asymmetry’ (Arnold, 
1987; Moe, 2005; and Gailmard and Patty, 2012). From a more optimistic 
perspective, information is approached as a service that officials provide 
and on which politicians rely (Hammond, 1984 and 1996). In this view, 
officials contribute to the efficiency and legislative capacity of Parliament, 
which as an independent institution cannot rely on the executive for 
information and expertise. From the rationalist line of reasoning that builds 
on Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy in which behaviour is determined by 
utility, the issue of who is in control leads to a continuous struggle between 
politicians and their technical experts. In contrast, emulating the 
institutionalist logic of appropriateness, Olsen (2006) argues that public 
administration should not only be assessed as the ‘rational tool’ for 
executing politicians’ instructions. Instead, he argues that ‘codes of 
appropriate behaviour’ guide actions and that public servants are expected 
to use their expertise and experience in the performance of their tasks. 
Along similar lines, Page and Jenkins (2005) argue that UK ministry officials 
pro-actively seek political control (‘invited authority’). The scholars reject 
Weber’s definition of a bureaucracy characterised by a strict hierarchical 
organisation and determined by structures and rules. Alternatively, their 
claim is that officials anticipate the preferred line of action (‘cue-taking’). In 
his discussion of the role of staff in Congressional committees, Patterson 
(1970) correspondingly upholds that to be effective officials must learn to 
predict the reactions of the committee chair.  
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In sum, the academic debate on the influence of officials appears to 
concentrate on (questioning) the control and authority of elected actors with 
limited attention for the potential positive effects of political delegation. 
First, discussions tend to emphasise officials’ influence on outcomes rather 
than their contribution to the process leading up to a decision. Moreover, 
there appears to be an overall perceived competition for power where the 
increased influence of officials implies a decreased influence of politicians. 
Consequently, legislative organisation studies generally take a defensive 
stance in legitimising the role of staff through the resources they provide, 
i.e. tying their contribution to informational advantages, problem-solving 
capacities, increased efficiency, and secured continuity and stability 
(Hammond, 1984 and 1996). In the discussion so far there has been little 
consideration for the idea that influential officials might strengthen the 
position of the legislator and vice versa. This study proposes that political 
advice does not amount to a power struggle. Instead, the relationship 
between the advisor and the politician is construed to be of an 
interdependent nature, where advisors’ role is linked to the position 
(reputation or authority) of the politician they represent. In reverse, they 
can reinforce the position of the politician by providing tailored information 
or expertise.  
 
The reviewed literature on the relationship between elected and non-elected 
actors offers useful insights into the context of political delegation. 
Legislators’ prevailing needs for expertise or information are found to 
determine the role of advisors.  How this affects the function and nature of 
advice is addressed below. Previous studies have shown that officials 
anticipate priorities and preferences of the politician and base their actions 
on these insights (Patterson, 1970; Page and Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 2006). 
The anticipation logic theorises that advisors construct their role according 
to what the circumstances demand. It is therefore expected that multiple 
(political) roles exist and that the adoption of a given role depends on 
 
 
 
several personal and contextual factors. The institutionalist theory 
regarding role construction and adoption thus allows for the investigation 
of how advisors deal with delegated political responsibilities and what 
factors may play a role in this process. The rationalist approach is more 
limited in that sense and concentrates on individual (fixed) interests and 
outcomes while paying less attention to the process of achieving such 
outcomes. Not only would it be hard to verify individual interests or 
preferences, studying the informal process of role construction and adoption 
allows for comparison of various institutional settings, or of different 
political processes within the same institution.  
 
The function and nature of advice 
According to the logic of appropriateness theory, actors choose their role 
based on what specific situations may require (Busby, 2013: 99). Drawing 
on the assumption that the activities of officials are determined by 
politicians’ information needs, a clearer understanding and categorisation 
of these needs is necessary to explore the (multiple) role(s) from which 
advisors can choose. Policy advice is provided in different institutional 
settings. The following literature review defines the state of play that this 
dissertation builds on. The discussion entails studies that set out to 
understand the role of officials at the executive level (Page and Jenkins, 
2005; Peters, 2009), in the US Congress (Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971; Fox 
and Hammond, 1977; Burks and Cole, 1978; Hammond, 1984 and 1996;), 
in EU Member State parliaments (Blischke, 1981; Campbell and Laporte, 
1981; Ryle, 1981; Winzen, 2014; and Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015); in 
the Council of Ministers (Christiansen, 2002; Tallberg, 2004; Fouilleux et al, 
2005), and in the EP (Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels 
and Neuhold, 2013; Busby, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014). 
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Peters (2009) categorises the activities of civil servants at the executive 
level into five roles from which officials given the circumstances select the 
appropriate response. The ‘Bureaucrat’ simply implements policies or 
instructions in a loyal and predictable manner. The ‘Manager’ focuses on 
efficiency and providing direction to others. The ‘Policy-Maker’ role relates 
to officials’ involvement in policy-making by giving advice to their political 
superiors. Here Peters notes that public servants have considerable 
discretion to the extent that it has spurred bureaucratic control. The 
‘Negotiator’ is a mediating role through which officials build and maintain 
relationships with the public sector and form the linking pin between 
decentralised and central processes. In negotiating and managing these 
relationships they are a stable point of contact to third parties. Finally, the 
‘Democrat’ role is linked to (increasing) public participation and implies the 
official being aware and in touch with the broader interests at stake.  
 
Page and Jenkins (2005) made an important contribution to the mapping of 
the types of activities officials engage in with their examination of what 
officials working in UK ministries actually do and how they do it. They 
describe ‘bureaucrats’ as generalists overviewing the whole process of 
policy and decision-making and categorise ‘policy work’ by the type of 
activity. These activities range from drafting documents (production role), 
managing the implementation of policies (maintenance role), to offering 
advice in terms of knowledge and skills to the policy makers (service role). 
The scholars argue that each role involves different ‘decisions’ and that 
officials choose to adopt a role on the basis of ‘improvised expertise’ and 
‘invited authority’, stressing the informality of the organisational structure. 
According to this view expertise is not ‘subject-based’ or ‘technical’. Civil 
servants are generalists and possess a set of ‘transferable skills’. They are 
experts in signalling and recognising political and administrative cues to 
anticipate ministerial intent. 
 
 
 
 
The (large) body of literature discussing the position and influence of 
officials in the US Congress offers valuable insights as to how academia has 
been approaching the topic over the past decades (e.g. Patterson, 1970; 
Price, 1971; Fox and Hammond, 1977; Burks and Cole, 1978; Hammond, 
1984 and 1996). Although not directly employed by the Republican or 
Democratic Parties, Congressional staff members are known to generally 
hold strong political affiliation and directly answer to Congress members 
(European Parliament, 2000). Because expertise has to be independent 
from the Executive, a range of Congressional offices provides expertise 
throughout the pre-legislative, legislative, and oversight cycles. Among 
these are the ‘Research Service’ that provides policy-oriented briefings to 
the members; the ‘Office of the Legislative Counsel’ that can support in the 
drafting of proposed legislation; and the ‘Office of the Parliamentarian’ that 
provides advice on parliamentary rules and procedures (European 
Parliament, 2000). 
 
Hammond’s review of the literature on legislative staff in Congress (1984 
and 1996) concludes that legislators need to be informed and maintain an 
independent position from the executive. As their workload increases, so 
does the need for advice and assistance. At the end of the 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s, research on legislative staff shifted towards the 
analysis of staff influence and their role in the legislative process. Hammond 
explores various typologies regarding the role of staff in the US Congress. 
An important contribution to this body of literature is Patterson’s discussion 
of the role of staff in Congressional committees (Hammond, 1984). Based 
on a set of interviews, he categorises the contribution of ‘professional staff’ 
according to four ‘capabilities’: (1) Intelligence – professional staff takes 
care of the processing and distribution of information; (2) integration – 
close collaboration and interplay at staff level contributes to intra-
institutional as well as inter-institutional integration, avoiding that certain 
committees, chambers or institutions work in isolation; (3) innovation – 
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officials have the opportunity to initiate policy or to help shape policy; and 
(4) influence – officials are influential because they gather and analyse 
information upon which policy is based, organise public hearings, and draft 
legislation (Patterson, 1970). According to Patterson, intelligence is the 
central element of their role. Although officials are well aware of their 
delegated influence, they realise that they need to work within the general 
guidance of the politician in charge.  
 
Price (1971) builds on Patterson’s ‘innovation capability’ and distinguishes 
three staff orientations: (1) ‘Pure policy entrepreneurs’ are construed as 
partisan officials who actively go in search of opportunities to take initiative; 
(2) ‘professionals’ are understood to be non-partisan, neutral and reactive 
officials who analyse and present policy alternatives; and (3) ‘mixed‘ 
officials can still push for proposals but have less room for manoeuvre. 
Burks and Cole (1978) further explore the ‘entrepreneur-professional’ role 
orientations in congressional policy-making. By way of a survey probing 
officials’ perception of their role, the authors conclude that a mixture of the 
two types prevails and that officials perceive themselves particularly 
influential in organising ‘floor support’ for committee legislation (Burks and 
Cole in: Hammond, 1984). Drawing from a survey among US Senate staff, 
Fox and Hammond (1977) identify a range of ‘activity patterns’ that they 
find to be ‘typical staff positions’ for the US Congress. These categories 
include ‘Interactors’ who meet with lobbyists or interest groups and 
‘Supporters’ who are responsible for legislative research and drafting 
speeches (Fox and Hammond, 1977). 
 
The literature discussing EU Member States’ parliamentary staff is limited, 
overall descriptive and generally focuses on how members of parliament 
are provided with information independent from government. It does, 
however, offer some insights into common activities and confirm the 
presence of ‘political advisors’ in these parliaments (e.g. Blischke, 1981; 
 
 
 
Campbell and Laporte, 1981; and Ryle, 1981 who respectively discuss 
legislative staff in the German Bundestag, French Assemblée Nationale, and 
the British House of Commons). In EU national parliaments, officials are 
subdivided into research staff and committee staff (European Parliament, 
2000). The first group is organised thematically and prepares studies that 
‘do not contain any political value judgements’ (Blischke, 1981). In the 
Bundestag administration, committee staff is responsible for organising the 
committee meetings and providing members of parliament with information 
regarding the issues under discussion. These officials hold a ‘double status’ 
in the sense that they are (neutral) civil servants while at the same time 
they are assigned to a committee chair. In the UK, the principal roles of 
parliamentary officials are to provide ‘advice on parliamentary procedure’, 
‘administrative services’, and ‘research’ (Ryle, 1981). In France the role of 
committee staff is to assist rapporteurs in their examination of legislative 
proposals. The administration of national parliaments is typically non-
partisan and their role is expected to be neutral (Campbell and Laporte, 
1981). 
 
Different, however, is the role of personal assistants and political party staff 
members. Members of parliament traditionally have personal assistants 
who share the same political orientation.  In addition, political parties 
employ their own staff. A study by the EP on organisational and 
administrative arrangements in EU national parliaments (2000) reports the 
practice of political group staff in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Staff members are 
recruited by the political groups and assist group members in their daily 
‘political work’. The party secretariats are usually financed by annual 
contributions from Parliament and assigned office space.   In the German 
Bundestag, party officials either assist a member of the party leadership or 
are ‘subject specialists’ attached to one working group. According to 
Blischke (1981), they provide ‘personal’, ‘substantive’, and ‘political’ 
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advice’, categories which are not particularised in the article. Parliamentary 
party officials are expected to take initiative and have considerable 
discretion in the preparation of motions, interpellations and questions to the 
federal government. As part of their ‘political task’ they cooperate with the 
extra-parliamentary party organisation. Political parties in the House of 
Commons also have a small staff, consisting of research staff, 
administrators, and secretaries (Ryle, 1981). For opposition parties, these 
services are financed by annual grants. The EP report provides no 
information as to staff working for political groups in Italy and Luxembourg 
and indicates that Irish political parties do not employ their own staff 
(European Parliament, 2000). 
 
Högenauer and Neuhold (2015) raise the question of the extent to which 
parliamentary administrations play an active part in the scrutiny of EU 
affairs with a particular emphasis on whether their tasks are purely 
‘technical’ or have the potential to shape the actual outcome. From the 
literature on delegation and administrative roles and from their data 
gathered through interviews, the scholars develop five ideal-typical roles. 
The ‘Administrative Assistant’ simply gathers and forwards (summarised) 
information. The ‘Analyst’ offers legal and procedural advice. The ‘Advisor’ 
provides content-related advice and interpretation. Both the ‘Analyst’ and 
the ‘Advisor’ can draft documents. The distinction between the two roles is 
tied to whether the drafting takes place based on the debate (Analyst) or if 
the document concerns information presented before a debate (Advisor). 
The latter evidently offers more room to ‘steer’ the political discussion. The 
fourth role of ‘Agenda Shaper’ involves the pre-selection of information. And 
finally, the ‘Coordinator’ role relates to a liaison or mediation function with 
other institutions.  
 
In the EU governance context, we find legislative staff in the Council of 
Ministers and in the EP. In the context of a study probing the role of 
 
 
 
‘unelected legislators’, Christiansen (2002) finds that Council secretariat 
officials can play an important mediating function in the search for 
compromise between member states. Cooperation and the exchange of 
information between the Council secretariat and Commission officials 
facilitate the process. In an advising capacity (to the Council Presidency), 
they are in a good position to mediate different positions taken by the 
national delegations.  
 
Drawing from general bargaining theory and rational choice 
institutionalism, Tallberg (2004) presents a theory of the demand for, and 
supply of, brokerage by the chair to explain the influence of the Council 
Presidency. He claims that the involvement of a third party – a broker – is 
the functional solution to the amplified ‘bargaining problem’ that follows 
from the multilateral setting where the exchange of preferences between a 
large number of actors is complex. Brokerage by the Presidency is facilitated 
by the Council Secretariat’s expertise, which he describes as a ‘set of 
informational and procedural resources’. 
 
Fouilleux and colleagues (2005) examine the interaction of national civil 
servants and ministers in Council working groups – the arenas in which 
negotiations on draft legislation take place and ‘sites for inter-member 
state, inter-institutional and ideological mediation’. They find that officials 
in working groups can negotiate compromises that form the basis of Council 
decisions. 
 
In the context of the EP, Winzen (2011) points to the efficiency problems 
of EU decision-making, showing parliamentarians need administrative 
capacity to deal with the ‘information overload’. Similarly, Busby (2013) 
argues MEP assistants act as an ‘information interface’, filtering information 
and liaising with other stakeholders. Winzen (2011) contends parliamentary 
officials in the EP committee secretariats contribute to the shaping of ‘the 
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information foundation’ of EP positions and identifies two types of activities 
in which EP officials are involved. First, ‘Process Managers’ referring to 
officials’ role of managing the policy process, structuring the agenda and 
organising meetings. Second, ‘Informants’ relays to the function of 
providing information and expertise regarding the substantive content of 
policy proposals. Political aspects of their activities include the pre-selection 
of relevant issues and actor involvement.  
 
Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) build on Page and Jenkins’ categorisation of a 
production, maintenance, and service role. To explore the role of EP officials 
in the committee secretariats, they add a fourth ‘steering’ or ‘policy-making’ 
role that goes beyond the production or service roles in the sense that 
officials can perform policy-shaping tasks. For example, they argue, in 
policy areas where MEPs have not yet built up a certain amount of expertise 
or where the political stake might be lower than in other policy areas. 
 
In a proposal to reform legislative assistance in the EP, then EP Vice-
President James Provan distinguishes between political and administrative 
roles, categorising the assistance as follows: (1) ‘technical-administrative’ 
assistance, including organisational support for meetings; (2) ‘technical-
substantive’ assistance, such as advice on procedures, legal issues, and 
document drafting; (3) ‘research’ assistance, e.g. background information, 
impact assessment; and (4) ‘political’ assistance, referring to policy 
definitions, political coordination within the political group, with other 
groups, national delegation, party constituency, and suchlike (Provan in: 
Neunreither, 2002).  
 
The review confirms that the officials’ input into the legislative process can 
take various forms. Previous studies have shown that officials can perform 
tasks that go beyond the technical or administrative sphere of activity in 
the US Congress (Hammond, 1984 and 1996), in the Council of Ministers 
 
 
 
(Christiansen, 2002), in the EP (Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and 
Dobbels, 2014), and in the case of EU Member State parliaments (Winzen, 
2014; and Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). Yet, for the study of political 
advice several issues call for additional consideration. First, the analytical 
delineation of what is construed as overtly ‘technical’ or ‘political’ requires 
further examination in order to come up with a definition of what exactly 
characterises ‘political advice’. Second, some of the categories appear to 
unite several activities in one ‘role’. For example, Provan’s category ‘political 
assistance’ entails the formulation of policy definitions as well as the 
coordination of political positions. Although these activities both entail 
political elements, they are likely to require very different things from the 
advisor. Winzen’s ‘Informant’ comprises the processing of information as 
well as the provision of substance-related expertise. Again, this may call for 
different skills or efforts on the part of the advisor. Third, the literature 
review shows that in exploring the role of staff, the emphasis lies on officials 
who are deemed to fulfil a neutral or administrative role. The ‘political 
advisor’ forms a distinct type of actor who can neither be classified as a civil 
servant nor as a political actor. Further tied to the fact that this particular 
group of actors has remained rather eclipsed in the academic debate, no 
fitting theory to study this type of advice exists. To tackle these issues, and 
build on the reviewed body of literature, a framework is developed for the 
study of political advice as a separate category in which technical and 
political functions ‘meet’.  
 
III.  Scope & Approach: analytical framework for 
political advice 
The study sheds light on informal intra-parliamentary compromise building 
and the role of advice therein. Legislative unity is something that has to be 
‘manufactured’ and the ability to form and maintain a position in inter-
institutional negotiations is determined by the contribution of the 
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institution’s internal organisation (Bowler and Farell, 1995). The focus lies 
on political coordination in the EP, which is needed for the construction of a 
unified position. Political coordination is understood as processes in which 
decisions are prepared and priorities are defined as part of a bargaining 
practice between different groups of actors. It therefore encompasses all 
coordination efforts within and between the party groups that take place 
prior to any vote in committee or plenary. In this informal and exploratory 
setting the role of advice is expected to be most prominent. The scope of 
the dissertation is limited to the legislative function of the EP, leaving the 
control and budgetary powers aside. As such, the parliamentary activities 
in the standing EP committees take centre stage. It is within the scope of 
these arenas that positions on legislation or policy are coordinated. Chapter 
1 discusses intra-EP coordination and decision-making in further detail. 
 
The purpose of the study is to analyse the function and nature of advice 
and the circumstances that may affect its provision. Measuring or 
determining the influence of political advisors, as well as questioning (final) 
authority are all issues that fall outside the defined scope. The starting point 
is the assumption that while advisors have a certain influence on the 
political process, MEPs have the final say. The emphasis thus lies on the 
politician’s delegation of the process to the advisor, not on the delegation 
of the decision (cf. Page and Jenkins, 2005: ‘delegation of policymaking 
rather than the implementation of policy goals’). This remains a relatively 
unexplored field in the literature on the role of staff. This process-oriented 
approach sets out to identify activity and behaviour patterns in the provision 
of advice, rather than focusing on individual differences between advisors. 
 
‘Political advisors’ form a distinct subset of officials who are explicitly 
employed to play a partisan role. In discussions of legislative organisation 
they remain an understudied group of actors. These advisors form part of 
a larger phenomenon: non-elected actors who are employed to assist in 
 
 
 
articulating and securing political positions. In this role, they negotiate with 
other actors (political and non-political) regarding these positions. The 
‘political role’ of advisors differentiates them from the ‘neutral’ officials or 
civil servants that are expected to serve the general interest of the 
institution. In addition, these advisors as a rule do not work for one specific 
politician, which sets them apart from personal advisors who may also 
perform political roles. Although the analysis centres on advisors working 
within the EP party group secretariats (from now on referred to as ‘advisors’ 
or ‘group advisors’), the developed framework is designed in such a way 
that it can be applied to other legislator-advisor relationships. Since the 
data collection took place in the period 2013-2014, the empirical analysis 
only covers the seven political groups represented in Parliament at that 
time.1 A detailed description of the methods is included in chapter 2.  
 
As was inferred from the literature review, a conceptual approach to the 
politics of advice first of all requires the definition of what the concept 
entails. In this respect, political advice is considered as an alternative 
category that unites technical and political functions. As chapter 2 will 
address, the analytical separation of these functions is more than a 
difference in responsibility and tasks alone. It comprises the anticipation of 
ideological priorities or desired outcomes and involves the use of tactics to 
formulate and execute strategies to realise these desired outcomes. Political 
advice is theorised to manifest itself in three incremental modes of 
discretion – routine, reactive, and pro-active – according to the degree to 
which activities are guided by a mandate (instructed) or by the advisor’s 
interpretation and judgement (improvised).  
                                   
1 Group of the European People’s Party (EPP), Group of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE), European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), Group of the 
Greens/ European Free Alliance, Con-federal Group of the European United Left – Nordic 
Green Left (GUE/NGL), Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD). 
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The discussion on the function and nature of advice furthermore 
demonstrated the need for clearly defined analytical categories. Building on 
the reviewed classifications of the role of staff, a typology of political advice  
therefore developed that translates into four non-exclusive ideal-type roles: 
Process Manager, Information Manager, Policy Expert, and Broker. The 
proposition is that advisors may adopt all four roles depending on what the 
circumstances require. To explore the circumstances that enable or restrict 
the adoption of a political role seven factors that affect political delegation 
are distilled from the literature. A combination of the personal and 
contextual factors is expected to affect the likelihood that advisors assume 
the roles, or the inclination of politicians to delegate. The idea is that the 
factors are instrumental in predicting the (optimal) circumstances in which 
political advice may be provided. 
 
The framework is then implemented to explore how political advice 
contributes to the informal process of coordinating political positions and 
decisions in the EP. This is done by way of applying the collected 
quantitative and qualitative data to the concepts of the framework. This 
amounts to the following analytical steps for each of the ideal-type roles: 
First, the collection of data is applied to establish whether the technical and 
political functions of the role are indeed assumed. Second, the political 
scope of the role is considered by examining advisors’ mandate and the 
extent to which they have room to improvise in the provision of political 
advice. Third, the extent to which the factors affect role construction and 
adoption is assessed.  
 
IV.  Theoretical and empirical contributions of the study 
As introduced above, the study of ‘political advice’ raises valuable 
theoretical questions. The existing literature has demonstrated that policy 
advice can entail a variety of activities (Page and Jenkins, 2005), and that 
 
 
 
depending on the circumstances, these activities may involve political 
aspects. Nonetheless, studies attempting to delineate what are overtly 
‘technical’ or ‘political’ tasks have shown that the two spheres are difficult 
to disentangle (Fouilleux et al, 2005; Winzen, 2011). The dissertation builds 
on these studies and approaches political advice as an intermediate, 
separate category (Romanyshyn and Neuhold, 2013). In this way, it adds a 
new dimension to the scholarly debate on the role of officials by 
conceptualising what a ‘political role’ by advisors might entail. The 
developed framework draws on the body of literature examining the role of 
officials in a legislative setting. It explores the input provided by officials 
working for a political group in Parliament, a type of actor that thus far has 
only received marginal scholarly attention. The theoretical part of the 
dissertation introduces ‘political advice’ as a distinct category, defined as a 
mixed sphere of activity in which technical and political functions meet. It 
builds a theory to study this type of advice in a structured manner. The 
conceptualisation includes a typology of advice and the delineation of three 
incremental modes of discretion (routine, reactive and pro-active) 
depending on the advisor’s mandate and room for improvisation in the 
provision of advice. Along the lines of anticipation logic, advisors are 
believed to base their actions, or construct their role, on what the 
circumstances demand. Both the context and the personality of the advisor 
will affect this assessment. The empirical analysis applies the framework 
and draws conclusions regarding the circumstances that facilitate or restrict 
the provision of political advice. Potential theoretical implications of the 
framework for political advice are conceivable in the sense that it is 
designed in such a way that it allows for the study of, or comparison 
between, role construction and adoption in various legislative contexts. 
 
A second novelty lies in the process-oriented approach of the inquiry. While 
scholars have offered valuable insights into the political structures and 
outcomes in the context of the EP, a thorough understanding of informal 
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practices related to the preparation of political negotiations and 
compromises in the EP calls for a process-oriented approach. The empirical 
evidence regarding the internal organisation of the EP tends to narrow its 
focus on explaining outcomes and has not yet uncovered how political 
coordination takes place at the everyday level (Busby, 2013). Whereas 
previous research has explored voting behaviour, the structure of party 
politics, the relationship with and influence of national political parties, as 
well as the EP’s position relative to the other EU institutions, the (informal) 
dynamics related to these issues are largely overlooked. Nonetheless, 
academic attention for the informal dimension of politics is increasing, 
notably in relation to the practice of trilogues (e.g. Shackleton and Raunio, 
2003; Huber and Shackleton, 2013; Roederer-Rynning et al, 2015). And 
several studies have addressed the role of staff in EU decision-making 
(Christiansen, 2002; Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011; Egeberg et al, 
2013; Busby, 2013; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 
2014; Michon, 2014; Pegan, 2015). Yet, the input into the informal 
decision-making process by way of political advice remains rather 
unchartered territory. A second key contribution of the dissertation 
therefore emanates from the empirical analysis that puts the role of advice 
in the informal intra-parliamentary coordination process under a magnifying 
glass. The developed framework offers a new way of explaining the informal 
aspects of intra-parliamentary decision-making. And the findings shed light 
on how the politics of advice play out in practice.  
 
For compromise deals to be acceptable to the other institutions, cooperation 
in pursuit of broad consensus appears to be the norm. Given this consensual 
style of EP decision-making, a caveat in research regarding EP decision-
making appears to be that the votes on the final outcomes are taken as a 
measure when in fact these are votes on compromises struck beforehand. 
This makes the final vote in the House a difficult yardstick for measuring 
influence in Parliament or explaining the dynamics of political negotiations. 
 
 
 
These issues underline the empirical importance of studying the 
organisation and functioning of the intra-parliamentary process in practice. 
 
Finally, the study contributes to the normative debate about the impact of 
informal governance on the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making. 
Political coordination, for the greater part, remains unrecorded and takes 
place outside the formal parliamentary structures of committee meetings 
and the plenary. By definition, advisors operate in the shadows of decision-
makers. This calls for a broader understanding of what guides the behaviour 
of advisors. The developed analytical framework offers the analytical tools 
to assess the scope of delegation and the likelihood that the politician 
accepts political advice. It furthermore adds to the academic debate on the 
role of staff by theorising a positive relation between the contribution of the 
advisor on the one hand and the position of his/her political superior on the 
other hand. Previous studies have shown that officials anticipate priorities 
and preferences of the politician and base their actions on these insights 
(Patterson, 1970; Page and Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 2006). The dissertation 
advances the anticipation logic by demonstrating a relationship of 
interdependent strength. Not only is the role of the advisor tied to the 
position and authority of the politician, advisors can in reverse reinforce the 
position of the politician by providing expertise tailored to his or her needs. 
 
V. Outline of the study 
Chapter 1 provides the contextual setting and discusses the evolution of 
the EP’s legislative powers (1.1), the key parliamentary structures and 
actors (1.2), and the intra-parliamentary coordination process (1.3).  It 
demonstrates that the pursuit for compromise and the strengthened 
position of the EP in the inter-institutional triangle highlight the significance 
of intra-parliamentary coordination. In the (informal) preparation of these 
compromises (group) advisors are expected to play an important role. 
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Chapter 2 develops an analytical framework for the study of political 
advice. As part of the framework, the concept of political advice is defined 
(2.1), a typology of four analytical categories of advice is conceptualised 
(2.2), and a set of factors hypothesised to enable or restrict the provision 
of political advice is distilled from the literature (2.3). The chapter concludes 
with a section on methodology (2.5). Chapter 3 operationalises political 
advice for the specific case of the EP. It first discusses the major potential 
sources of political advice at the disposal of MEPs. This is then followed by 
a presentation of the acquired background information on the profile, 
knowledge, skills, and experience of EP group advisors, which is discussed 
in relation to the various concepts of the theoretical framework. Chapters 
4-7 present the empirical analysis by applying the collected qualitative and 
quantitative data to the analytical framework. Consecutively, each of the 
ideal-type roles is examined in detail: Process Management (chapter 3), 
Policy Expertise (chapter 4), Information Management (chapter 5), and 
Brokering (chapter 6). The analysis is built around the following steps: First, 
the data are applied to the four roles to establish whether each of the ideal-
types is indeed assumed. Second, the political scope of the role is 
considered by examining advisors’ mandate and the extent to which they 
have room to improvise in the provision of political advice. Third, the extent 
to which the seven identified factors impact role construction and adoption 
is assessed. Finally, chapter 8 offers the overall conclusion by 
synthesising the findings and reflecting on the theoretical and empirical 
contributions and implications.   
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CHAPTER 1. THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING: 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT STRUCTURES 
In order to shed light on the backstage practices that precede any legislative 
outcome in the European Parliament (EP), a general understanding of the 
functioning of intra-parliamentary coordination and decision-making is 
required. This chapter therefore presents background information regarding 
the evolution of the EP’s legislative powers (1.1), the key parliamentary 
structures and actors (1.2), and the intra-parliamentary coordination 
process (1.3).   
 
The first section discusses the EP’s development from merely a consultative 
assembly to the current position of full-fledged co-legislator (1.1.1). Next, 
the conception and consolidation of the EP party groups is addressed 
(1.1.2), followed by a brief reflection on the internal power balance between 
the groups (1.1.3).  
 
The second section introduces a number of key organisational structures 
along with the key actors at the political level. First, the election and duties 
of the EP leadership structures are discussed (1.2.1). Next, the formation, 
leadership structures and activities of the EP party groups are presented 
(1.2.2). And, the relevance, composition, and legislative activity of the 
parliamentary committees are explored (1.2.3). In this chapter the focus 
lies on formal structures and actors. Chapter 3 introduces the supporting 
staff at the disposal of these key actors. The empirical findings in regards 
the informal practices are further addressed in chapters 4-7.  
 
The final section of the chapter presents the intra-parliamentary 
coordination process and demonstrates that the institution’s strengthened 
position in the EU political system and expanded workload increase both 
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the significance and amount of political coordination in the EP. The various 
levels of coordination are considered, presenting the existing literature and 
prevailing working methods for intra-group (1.3.1), inter-group 
negotiations (1.3.2), and inter-institutional coordination (1.3.3). Finally, 
the main stages of the intra-parliamentary coordination process are 
discussed (1.3.4).  
 
1.1  The evolution of the European Parliament 
Since its inception in the 1950s, the Parliament has evolved significantly in 
terms of political authority, legislative powers, and hence in workload and 
internal organisation. The institution that once started out as a consultative 
assembly, with delegates appointed from the national parliaments, has now 
turned into a full-fledged co-legislator (Corbett et al, 2011: 3; Ripoll 
Servent, 2018).  
 
Sparked by the cumulative extension of the EP’s legislative powers, scholars 
turned to its internal organisation and structures in the 1990s. An important 
question is how the institution is dealing with its new powers and what has 
been done to fully exploit the potential of its role. Studies for example show 
that as the impact of the EP on legislative outcomes grew, the role of the 
political party groups augmented driven by the need for efficiency and 
coordination (Hix and Lord, 1997; Raunio, 1999; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 
1999). In the early 2000s we therefore see a shift in academia previously 
focusing on national political parties to the contemporary focus on the 
transnational party groups as central actors in the EP organisation (Hix et 
al, 2007).  
 
In order to allow for a general understanding of how the EP operates and 
to grasp the (potential) impact of EP party groups, the section provides a 
global historical overview of the incremental increase of the legislative role 
 
 
 
of the Parliament in the EU political system (1.1.1); the consolidation of the 
party groups as key organisational actors (1.1.2); and the institution’s 
political spectrum (1.1.3). 
 
1.1.1 The powers and position of the EP in an institutional context 
The history and evolution of the EP’s powers have been explored extensively 
(see e.g. Ripoll Servent, 2018; Corbett et al, 2016; Hix et al, 2007; 
Earnshaw and Judge, 2003; Rittberger, 2003). Given that the aim of the 
study is to explore political advice in relation to the coordination of 
legislative texts, the discussion below presents only a global overview of 
the gradually increased legislative function of the institution, leaving its 
budgetary and scrutiny powers aside. 
 
Treaty changes: from consultation to co-decision 
The development of the European Union cannot be separated from the 
ubiquitous debate on the legitimacy and accountability of the institutions 
and its actors (Hix et al, 2007; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007). Efforts 
to address these concerns have strengthened the relative position of the 
EP, which with each Treaty change saw its legislative and supervisory 
powers extended during the thirty years after its first direct elections in 
1979 (Rittberger, 2012). 
 
The founding fathers did not seem to have high aspirations for the EP’s 
forerunner, the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). Established as a platform for exchange and debate in 1952, it 
convened 78 delegates from the national parliaments and was only 
consulted on a minor range of legislative proposals without real impact on 
legislative outcomes (Corbett et al, 2011: 3). The fact that the name change 
to European Parliament (1962) came about on the initiative of the assembly 
itself is just one of the indications that the political forces represented within 
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levels of coordination are considered, presenting the existing literature and 
prevailing working methods for intra-group (1.3.1), inter-group 
negotiations (1.3.2), and inter-institutional coordination (1.3.3). Finally, 
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to European Parliament (1962) came about on the initiative of the assembly 
itself is just one of the indications that the political forces represented within 
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the institution thought otherwise (Kreppel, 2002). In 1979 the first direct 
elections took place and concomitant with several rounds of enlargement 
the number of seats in Parliament increased.  
 
Treaty revisions in the 1980s and 90s steadily expanded the institution’s 
consultative and legislative role. The cooperation procedure added a second 
reading to the traditional consultation procedure. The Council’s position was 
to be referred back to the EP that had three months to approve it. In case 
of rejection the Council was only able to overrule Parliament by a unanimity 
vote. The adoption of this procedure allowed Parliament a position to push 
for the incorporation of EP amendments into the legislative text and was a 
‘stepping stone to the full co-decision procedure’ (Corbett et al, 2011: 263). 
The co-decision procedure gradually replaced the cooperation procedure 
until it was finally abolished in 2009. Co-decision puts the Council and the 
EP on equal footing. As a last resort, a conciliation committee is brought in 
to negotiate a compromise when no agreement has been reached after two 
readings.  
 
The scope of the co-decision procedure was steadily extended and reformed 
in the EP’s favour culminating with the naming of co-decision as the 
‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (Corbett et 
al, 2011: 5). Today, the EP is a fully recognised co-legislator with the ability 
to amend, delay or block legislation in virtually all areas of EU legislative 
competence (Dobbels, 2013: 23-24).2  
 
Position in the EU political system and informal powers 
Owing to its extended legislative role in the EU political system, the EP’s 
political authority continues to grow and the institution has become a 
                                   
2 The Council can still act as the sole legislator regarding e.g. internal market 
exemptions, competition law or common external tariffs.  
 
 
 
political arena where policy objectives are pursued through legislative 
action (Kreppel, 2002). The developments described above have turned the 
EU political system into a bicameral legislature where the EP and the Council 
share the power to adopt and amend legislative proposals (Kreppel, 2018; 
Bressanelli et al, 2016; Rasmussen, 2011). The former represents the voice 
of the people through transnational political party groups. The latter is the 
voice of the Member States, assembling national ministers according to 
policy area. 
 
The designation of co-decision as the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ has 
had a profound effect on inter-institutional relations, both in terms of 
frequency and informality (Burns, 2013). The amount of legislation having 
to be passed in tandem with the Council has led to the common practice of 
the co-legislators working in parallel by way of ‘trilogue’ meetings in which 
representatives of the European Commission (EC) also take part. The 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) introduced the possibility for the co-legislators 
to agree in first reading, the so-called ‘fast track procedure’. Since that 
time, a substantial rise in inter-institutional negotiations is observed. The 
upward trend of first-reading agreement between 1999 and 2014 is 
illustrated by the figures: 85 per cent of legislative files were concluded at 
first reading during the 7th Parliamentary term (EPRS, 2016) compared to 
72 per cent of all co-decision procedures in 6th and only 28 per cent in the 
5th legislature (Corbett et al, 2011: 240-241). Reaching agreement in first 
reading through inter-institutional negotiations is now actually said to have 
become the ‘usual working method for reaching legislative agreements’ 
(European Parliament, 2015) and can be organised at any stage of the 
legislative procedure (see 1.3.4 for a description of the various stages). The 
augmented inter-institutional dialogue throughout the legislative cycle 
politicises EU decision-making while simultaneously causing concern for a 
secluded form of decision-making in which only a small fraction of the 
Members of the EP (MEPs) is closely involved (Farrell and Héritier, 2004; 
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Häge and Kæding, 2007; Héritier and Reh, 2012; Häge and Naurin, 2013; 
Bressanelli et al, 2016). The informal nature of these negotiations faces a 
trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy, which is much debated (see 
Introduction). Section 1.3 discusses how the EP deals with the fast track 
procedure in practice and how the trilogue negotiations are laid down in its 
internal Rules for Procedure (see 1.3.3).    
 
Finally, perhaps the ‘most renowned occasion’ in which the EP has managed 
to strengthen its position in the EU political system is the appointment of 
the EC (Dobbels, 2013: 25). In addition, the terms of office of the EC and 
the EP were aligned in order to strengthen the link between the two 
institutions (Ripoll Servent, 2018). In the 1990s, Parliament had already 
succeeded in formalising its consultative role in the nomination of the EC 
President into a vote of confidence in the entire College of Commissioners 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 293-294). In an attempt to further strengthen the 
accountability of the EC, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) stipulates that Member 
States need to take into account the EP election results in their proposal for 
a new EC President and that the candidate is ‘elected’ by the EP (article 17 
(7)). Although this did not change the procedure in a revolutionary way, 
the EP’s interpretation of the treaty change had significant impact on the 
nature of the 2014 election campaigns and the final nomination of the EC 
President (Christiansen, 2016). Ahead of the elections, EP party groups set 
forth leading candidates for the position of EC President. For the first time 
in history, the European electorate was provided with the opportunity ‘to 
determine not only the composition of the European legislature, but also 
the leadership of the EU’s executive’ (Christiansen, 2016). This 
Spitzenkandidaten model is seen to be a step forward in the further 
democratisation and politicisation of the EU political system (Corbett et al, 
2016: 345-346). However, the creation of a truly parliamentary system 
would require Member States to give up their right to appoint 
Commissioners, something that seems very unlikely (Ripoll Servent, 2018). 
 
 
 
An example of open deliberation between the EP and the Commission is the 
agreement on a set of predetermined political priorities (Christiansen, 
2016). In the EP, these political priorities were agreed at party-group level. 
The conception and consolidation of these groups is discussed next.  
 
1.1.2 The conception and consolidation of the EP party group 
system  
In 1953 the mainstream party families of Western Europe formed the first 
transnational political factions. To structure the activities of what was then 
the ECSC Assembly, Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals from the 
six founding Member States decided to join forces. The formation of 
transnational groups was unprecedented in the tradition of international 
assemblies and at the outset no formal measures were taken to politicise 
the assembly. Instead, structures were created to accommodate potential 
national differences and organisation along national lines rather than 
ideological affiliation (Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002). For that reason 
the delegates were initially seated in alphabetical order and five Vice-
Presidents were nominated to guarantee the representation of each Member 
State in the assembly’s leadership. Yet, shortly after its constitutive 
meeting, the political groups initiated the incorporation in the Assembly’s 
first Rules of Procedure of a committee distribution balanced on nationality 
as well as on political affiliation. The proposal was adopted without debate. 
The Rules furthermore stated that groups of at least nine (out of 78) 
members could be formed according to ‘political persuasion’ (Kreppel, 
2002).  
 
Central importance of EP party groups 
During the following decades the tradition of political groups further 
developed and their position as the main organisational entities of 
Parliament became universally recognised (Kreppel, 2002; Hix et al, 2007). 
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Scholars have offered several explanations for the reasons behind the 
establishment of the party groups at European level. First, for delegates 
who simultaneously sat in national parliaments it seemed natural to 
cooperate with like-minded politicians from other countries rather than 
fellow nationals pertaining to competing parties at the domestic level 
(Kreppel, 2002).  
 
Second, in consonance with the rational choice theory of legislative 
organisation, it is argued that members advocated a party group structure 
to overcome collective action problems (Hix et al, 2003). Collaboration in 
party groups advances legislators’ opportunities to realise their preferred 
policy outcomes and reduces the transaction costs of coalition formation. It 
is through the groups that political majorities are built (Corbett et al, 2011: 
78). Unlike national political parties, EP party groups do not support or 
oppose a government and coalitions are struck on a case-by-case basis 
(Dinan, 2005). This implies that EP decision-making is characterised by 
continuous and compromise-oriented negotiations between the groups 
(Ripoll Servent, 2018; Burns, 2013). Hix and colleagues found that the 
consolidation of the EP party system has strengthened as the EP’s powers 
expanded. The increased role in the formulation of EU legislation 
simultaneously intensified political group cohesion and ideological 
competition. This finding is in line with the theoretical explanation that 
parties are incentivised to structure and pool their efforts as the potential 
influence on a preferred outcome increases. Recent research on the effect 
of early agreements on legislative behaviour in the EP has suggested that 
‘centrist parties’ (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Liberals) 
invest more in coordination and have become more cohesive (Bressanelli et 
al, 2016). Consequently, the informalisation of co-decision seems to 
strengthen these groups. The process of intra-parliamentary coordination 
is further explored in 1.3. 
 
 
 
 
A third reason for the institutionalisation of the transnational party groups 
is that support for the politicisation of the EP was a symbolic move to 
counter intergovernmentalism (Kreppel, 2002). The politicisation of EP 
processes – based on ideological competition in a consolidated party group 
system – elevates the political authority of the elected institution and is 
therefore considered positive for the democratic level of EP decision-making 
(Pridham and Pridham, 1981). The informalisation of co-decision has 
accentuated the EP’s sense of responsibility to foster transparency and 
accountability of decision-making (see Introduction and 1.1.1). Studies 
have shown that – owing to strengthened intra-parliamentary coordination 
practices – the trilogue negotiations are predicated on specific mandates 
and underpinned by a set of norms, standard operating procedures, 
practices, and oversight mechanisms (Rasmussen 2012; Reh et al. 2013; 
Ripoll Servent 2014; Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015). In this way, 
Parliament is considered to advance ‘norms of public accountability’ and use 
them as leverage over the Council (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 
2015). 
 
Finally, from a practical point of view it is important to note that both 
material and procedural benefits are allotted to the EP party groups. Apart 
from financial support, office space and staff entitlements allocated to the 
party groups, they determine the institution’s internal organisation. Groups 
control the division of labour in the standing parliamentary committees and 
are decisive in the distribution of all influential positions in parliament such 
as the president, vice-presidents, committee chairs and rapporteurs 
(authors of EP positions on pieces of draft legislation). These practices have 
incentivised groups of previously non-attached MEPs to enter into ‘a 
marriage of convenience’, based on technical rather than ideological 
grounds (Dinan, 2005). The central importance of the groups is thus 
illustrated by the ‘powerlessness of those non-attached members’ (Corbett 
et al, 2011: 78). Section 1.2 further discusses the key parliamentary 
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structures and positions including the internal organisation of the party 
groups (see 1.2.3).  
 
In sum, party groups control the EP’s internal organisation and are 
instrumental for influence on EP decision-making. Not surprisingly 
therefore, the evolution of the EP’s position in the EU decision-making 
process went hand-in-hand with the consolidation of the party group 
system. Deduced from a lacking collective electoral mandate and low 
election turnout, it is often pointed out that compared to traditional political 
party systems the EP system is weak (e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 
2002; Brack and Costa, 2018). European elections generally revolve around 
national issues and are marked by a low and ever-declining turnout (Brack 
and Costa, 2018; Burns, 2013). The weak European public sphere makes 
for only a limited shared public debate about European politics (Smismans, 
2013: 344). Nevertheless, a competitive party system with hierarchically 
organised parties behaving in a cohesive way has emerged (see 1.2.3 and 
1.3). Studies have shown voting behaviour in the EP to become increasingly 
structured around the political groups since 1979 (Raunio, 1999; Hix et al, 
2007). The potential impact on legislative outcomes boosted political 
competition, which in turn promoted the role of the groups to aggregate 
ideological preferences and secure policy outcomes that are as close as 
possible to these preferences (Hix et al, 2007). 
 
European party federations 
In addition to the political groups that operate inside the EP, European party 
federations operate outside of the EU institutions. The development of the 
EP party groups preceded the transnational mobilisation of European 
political party federations bringing together national parties with a shared 
ideology. The institutional reforms of the 1980s and 90s that led to a more 
direct impact of the party groups on the EU decision-making process stirred 
 
 
 
the further extra-parliamentary organisation of the federations (Hix and 
Lord, 1997). In addition, the Maastricht Treaty (Article 138a) formally 
recognised political parties at EU level as an important factor for integration 
and the creation of European awareness. Although the change was mainly 
symbolic, most of the European political federations changed their name to 
‘party’ following the entry into force of the treaty. In response to the so-
called ‘Party article’ federations jointly set out to draw up a Political Party 
Statute. Although first attempts failed, the adoption of a European statute 
was included in the Treaty of Nice (2003). Subsequently, Parliament and 
Council agreed on a Regulation on political parties providing for 
transparency and openness of accounts, and access to EP funding that can 
be used to finance campaigns for the European elections, conferences, 
publications, administrative and some other costs. Yet, most significant is 
probably the role of the party federation as a coordination platform (Ripoll 
Servent, 2018). The party summits – a practice established in the 1990s – 
bring together all EU-level actors affiliated to a federation ahead of 
European Council meetings (Corbett et al, 2016: 146-147). For EP group 
leaders this provides an opportunity to interact and align positions with their 
counterparts in the other EU institutions.  
 
1.1.3 The political power balance within the EP 
The EP has several unique features that leave their mark on the internal 
organisation of parliamentary activities (Corbett et al, 2011: 2). It is the 
only directly elected international assembly and has the largest 
transnational electorate in the world. Different to most national parliaments 
and similar to the US Congress the EP knows fixed-term elections that take 
place once every five years. Parliament comprises elected representatives 
from the 28 Member States emanating from over 200 national political 
parties. Unlike traditional western parliamentary democracies, the EU is 
characterised by a separation of powers so as to that no government arises 
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EP party groups preceded the transnational mobilisation of European 
political party federations bringing together national parties with a shared 
ideology. The institutional reforms of the 1980s and 90s that led to a more 
direct impact of the party groups on the EU decision-making process stirred 
 
 
 
the further extra-parliamentary organisation of the federations (Hix and 
Lord, 1997). In addition, the Maastricht Treaty (Article 138a) formally 
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and the creation of European awareness. Although the change was mainly 
symbolic, most of the European political federations changed their name to 
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Statute. Although first attempts failed, the adoption of a European statute 
was included in the Treaty of Nice (2003). Subsequently, Parliament and 
Council agreed on a Regulation on political parties providing for 
transparency and openness of accounts, and access to EP funding that can 
be used to finance campaigns for the European elections, conferences, 
publications, administrative and some other costs. Yet, most significant is 
probably the role of the party federation as a coordination platform (Ripoll 
Servent, 2018). The party summits – a practice established in the 1990s – 
bring together all EU-level actors affiliated to a federation ahead of 
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1.1.3 The political power balance within the EP 
The EP has several unique features that leave their mark on the internal 
organisation of parliamentary activities (Corbett et al, 2011: 2). It is the 
only directly elected international assembly and has the largest 
transnational electorate in the world. Different to most national parliaments 
and similar to the US Congress the EP knows fixed-term elections that take 
place once every five years. Parliament comprises elected representatives 
from the 28 Member States emanating from over 200 national political 
parties. Unlike traditional western parliamentary democracies, the EU is 
characterised by a separation of powers so as to that no government arises 
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directly from the EP elections (Corbett et al, 2016: 141). A majority in 
Parliament is thus not automatically tied to support for the executive, nor 
does a single group hold the absolute majority of seats (Corbett et al, 2016: 
11). The EP is overall characterised by a consensual style of decision-
making (Ripoll Servent, 2018). The lack of government-opposition 
dynamics is said to intensify the ‘spirit of collaboration’ in the EP to advance 
the institutional agenda (Dinan, 2005). The intra-parliamentary process of 
coordinating political positions is further discussed in section 1.3. Below the 
relative numerical strength of the political groups represented in Parliament 
is introduced.  
 
Until 1965 only three groups were represented and – albeit their names and 
composition have changed over time – the Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats, and Liberals continue to exist today. Before the 1979 direct 
elections, Christian Democrats were the principal group in the EP. Between 
the first and the fifth legislature (1979-1999), the Social Democrats (PES 
and later S&D) accounted for the largest number of seats in the assembly. 
Consisting of the mainstream Socialist and Social Democratic parties in all 
Member States, the composition of the group has always been the most 
straightforward of the EP party groups (Corbett et al, 2011: 94). Ever since 
the 1999 elections, the Christian Democrats (EPP) remains the biggest party 
group. The EPP and S&D combined have unceasingly held over 50 per cent 
of the seats and this percentage even raised above 60 per cent between 
1994 and 2014. The Liberals traditionally play a pivotal role within the 
majority-building process as third or fourth largest group. Positioned in the 
centre of the EP political spectrum the group can often determine whether 
a compromise is constructed towards the left (with S&D) or the right (with 
EPP) of the EP spectrum.  
 
Other political families that remain represented in the EP since the first 
legislature are the radical-left – drawing from (former) Communist and left 
 
 
 
Socialist parties – and the European Conservatives although the group 
joined the EPP between 1994 and 2009. A group of European right-wing 
parties was formed after the 1984 elections that apart from the 7th term 
and several changes in name and composition remains a presence in the 
EP. Since 1989 the Greens and regionalist parties collaborate holding a 
steady fourth or fifth position in the House. From 1999 onwards, a 
Eurosceptic group exists emphasising the role of individual nation states 
and opposing further integration. During the 5th and 6th legislature the 
group – respectively EDD and IND/DEM – included several left of centre 
parties. Its successor – Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) – had a 
clear right-wing orientation as does the current Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy group (EFDD). In the current legislature around 98 per 
cent of MEPs sit in one of the eight political groups, while the remainder is 
non-attached. Groups can and do change their formation or name from time 
to time, and national political parties can switch their affinities. Figure 1.1.3 
and Table 1.1 provide an overview of the political groups in the EP between 
1979 and 2016.  
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Table 1.1 Political groups in the EP: 1979-2016 
Group Years active Ideology 
EPP: European People’s Party (EPP) 
EPP and European Democrats (EPP-ED) 
1979-89 / 2009- 
1989-2009 
Centre-right/ 
Christian 
Democrats 
S&D: Socialist Group 
Party of European Socialists (PES) 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) 
1979-1984 
1984-2009 
2009- 
Centre-left/ 
Social 
Democrats 
ECR: European Democratic Group (ED) 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 
1979-1994 
2009- 
Centre-right/ 
‘Eurorealists’  
ALDE: Liberal and Democratic Group 
Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group 
European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) 
1979-1984 
1984-1994 
1994-2004 
Liberals 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 2004-  
GUE/NGL: Communist and Allies 
European United Left (GUE) 
European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
1979-1989 
1989-1999 
1999- 
Far-left 
Greens/EFA: Green Group (V) 
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) 
1989-1999 
1999- 
Left of 
centre 
Right-wing parties: European Right (DR) 
Europe of Nations (EDN) 
Union for Europe of Nations (UEN) 
Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) 
1984-94 
1994-1999 
1999-2009 
2015- 
Far-right/ 
Eurosceptic/ 
nationalists 
EFDD: Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) 
Independence/Democracy Group (IND-DEM) 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) 
1999-2004 
2004-2009 
2009-2014 
2014- 
Eurosceptic 
NB: Progressive Democrats (5% of seats in 1979-84) became European Democratic 
Alliance (4-7% throughout 1984-99) and joined the EPP-ED in 1999. Heterogeneous 
groups that assembled non-attached members (NI): Technical group (respectively 
2.7% and 2.8% of seats in 1979-84 and 1999-2001) and Rainbow group (respectively 
6% and 2.5% of seats in 1984-89 and 1989-94). 
Source: EP website, section ‘past election results’ (consulted, August 2017) 
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Centre-right/ 
‘Eurorealists’  
ALDE: Liberal and Democratic Group 
Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group 
European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) 
1979-1984 
1984-1994 
1994-2004 
Liberals 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 2004-  
GUE/NGL: Communist and Allies 
European United Left (GUE) 
European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
1979-1989 
1989-1999 
1999- 
Far-left 
Greens/EFA: Green Group (V) 
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) 
1989-1999 
1999- 
Left of 
centre 
Right-wing parties: European Right (DR) 
Europe of Nations (EDN) 
Union for Europe of Nations (UEN) 
Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) 
1984-94 
1994-1999 
1999-2009 
2015- 
Far-right/ 
Eurosceptic/ 
nationalists 
EFDD: Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) 
Independence/Democracy Group (IND-DEM) 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) 
1999-2004 
2004-2009 
2009-2014 
2014- 
Eurosceptic 
NB: Progressive Democrats (5% of seats in 1979-84) became European Democratic 
Alliance (4-7% throughout 1984-99) and joined the EPP-ED in 1999. Heterogeneous 
groups that assembled non-attached members (NI): Technical group (respectively 
2.7% and 2.8% of seats in 1979-84 and 1999-2001) and Rainbow group (respectively 
6% and 2.5% of seats in 1984-89 and 1989-94). 
Source: EP website, section ‘past election results’ (consulted, August 2017) 
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1.2  Key parliamentary structures and actors 
The aim of the section is to introduce the institutional machinery of the EP: 
parliamentary structures, rules of procedure and political actors that are 
key to the intra-parliamentary coordination process. This process is 
examined in further detail in the next section (1.3). The main sources of 
advice that the key actors have at their disposal are discussed in chapter 3 
(3.1). 
 
First, the election and duties of the EP leadership structures are discussed 
(1.2.1). Next, the formation, leadership structures and activities of the EP 
party groups are presented (1.2.2). Finally, the relevance, composition, and 
legislative activity of the parliamentary committees are explored (1.2.3).  
 
1.2.1 EP leadership structures 
Parliament organises its work independently and adopts Rules of Procedure, 
acting by a majority of its component members (Article 232 TFEU). At the 
start and midway of each parliamentary term, the EP plenary by absolute 
majority elects its President, 14 Vice-Presidents and five Quaestors. The 
terms of office of the formal office holders thus is two and a half years. The 
EP President is responsible for the day-to-day running of the administration, 
presiding over parliamentary sittings, referring EC proposals to the 
appropriate committees (designated ‘committee responsible’), and ensuring 
that all activities of Parliament and its bodies are conducted properly 
according Rule 22 of the EP Rules of Procedure (RoP). 3  The President 
furthermore has an external, representative role and attends European 
Council meetings. These tasks may be delegated to the Vice-Presidents. 
The Quaestors look after the administrative and financial interests of the 
members, which include a wide range of matters from members’ facilities 
                                   
3 References are to the January 2017 version of the RoP, as published on the EP website.  
 
 
 
and security issues to for example cultural and artistic events sponsored by 
members (RoP, Rule 28).  
 
The groups normally put forward nominations for the EP office holders, but 
a minimum of 40 members may also submit candidates (Corbett et al, 
2011: 136). In addition, the RoP state that in the election of the President, 
Vice-President, and Quaestors ‘account should be taken of the need to 
ensure an overall fair representation of Member States and political views’ 
(Rule 15). Party groups’ nominees are almost always elected and 
customarily the posts are shared out among the groups on account of their 
numerical size using a points system (d’Hondt, see below). Since the third 
legislature (1989-1994), the two largest groups – Socialists and Christian 
Democrats – have struck a deal to alternate the Presidency, much to the 
lament of the smaller groups (Corbett et al, 2011: 137).4  
 
The main decision-making bodies in the EP are the plenary (the total of 
MEPs), the Bureau and the Conference of Presidents. The Bureau consists 
of the President and Vice-Presidents. Quaestors attend meetings in an 
advisory capacity (RoP, Rule 24). The Bureau is responsible for all 
organisational, administrative and financial matters concerning the internal 
organisation of the EP, its members and its bodies (RoP, Rule 25). The 
Conference of presidents (CoP) assembles the EP President and the leaders 
of the EP party groups (RoP, Rule 26). Non-attached members are 
represented by way of an observer without voting rights. This body is 
among others responsible for matters concerning the other institutions. It 
decides on the organisation of the institution’s work and legislative 
planning, the composition and competence of parliamentary committees, 
                                   
4 With the exception of the 5th legislature (1999-2002) – where the EPP for the first time 
won the elections and negotiated a deal with the Liberals – the deal to share the 
presidency still exists today. 
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and the agenda of the plenary (RoP, Rule 27). The CoP also ‘defines the 
general political direction of the institution’ (EPRS briefing, 2014).  
 
Other important bodies for the functioning of Parliament are the Conference 
of Committee Chairs and the Conference of Delegation Chairs.5 Committees 
elect a bureau consisting of a chair and a maximum of four vice-chairs. The 
chairs of the parliamentary standing and special committees usually meet 
once a month to discuss developments in the work of committees based on 
which they may make recommendations to the CoP (Corbett et al, 2011: 
144). They are part of the team representing the EP in inter-institutional 
negotiations (see 1.3.3). 
 
Yardstick for the allocation of leadership positions in the EP is a balanced 
distribution among the groups. This practice is implemented based on the 
d’Hondt method. The party groups choose posts in an order determined 
according to their size. This allocation method ensures a roughly 
proportional distribution, resulting in a situation where the EPP and the S&D 
hold the lion’s share of influential positions (Ripoll Servent, 2018). In 
practice, the groups share out the influential (and less influential) posts 
through an informal ‘package deal’ agreement (Corbett et al, 2011: 148). 
These negotiations are carried out during the month before the first plenary 
session, resulting in a set of nominations for committee chairs and vice-
chairs. The confirmation of these nominees is usually only a formality and 
takes place by a majority vote in the committees’ constituent meetings. 
Internally, the groups follow a similar procedure to divide the positions 
among their respective national delegations. In addition to size, experience 
and expertise of the candidates are considered, as well as the allocation of 
other positions among delegations within the group (Ripoll Servent, 2018; 
                                   
5 Since the focus of this dissertation lies on legislative activities only, the EP delegations 
are not further discussed. 
 
 
 
Corbett et al, 2011). The whole process is repeated mid-term (RoP, Rule 
19). 
  
1.2.2 The organisation of the party groups  
The formation, activities, and legal situation of political groups are laid down 
in the EP Rules of Procedures (EP RoP, Rule 32 and 33).6 Formation is 
according to political affinity and a minimum of 25 members is needed from 
at least one quarter of the Member States. The rules furthermore stipulate 
that party groups are provided with a secretariat, administrative facilities, 
and allocated EP budget appropriations. Party groups and the remaining 
group of non-attached members receive an annual share based on the 
amount of members and languages represented in the group. Other 
resources allocated to the groups include staff entitlements, offices, 
meeting rooms and technical support. The composition and functioning of 
the group secretariats differs significantly both in terms of size and 
responsibilities and is further examined in chapter 3 (see 3.1.1).  
 
Although the internal organisation remains at the discretion of the groups, 
the EP structures laid down in the RoP have a significant effect on how the 
groups operate (EPP, S&D, ALDE and Greens/EFA Rules of procedure; group 
websites, consulted August 2016). The fact that groups are required to 
carry out the tasks specified in the EP RoP obligates them to appoint 
members in predetermined posts, held for two and a half years in line with 
the term of EP office holders. In general, groups’ hierarchy therefore 
comprise a president or chair, several vice-chairs, a bureau that includes 
the group presidency, a treasurer and usually the heads of the various 
national delegations represented in the group. The Greens and EFD groups 
                                   
6 References to the EP’s Rules of Procedure (RoP) refer to the rules adopted for the 8th 
parliamentary term, January 2017 version (available online: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.EN.pdf, consulted March 2018). 
Significant changes to the RoP between the 7th and 8th terms will be cited. 
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6 References to the EP’s Rules of Procedure (RoP) refer to the rules adopted for the 8th 
parliamentary term, January 2017 version (available online: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.EN.pdf, consulted March 2018). 
Significant changes to the RoP between the 7th and 8th terms will be cited. 
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know a tradition of co-chairs and following its constitution in 2015 the ENF 
group also appointed two chairs. Table 1.2 gives an overview of the 
composition of the groups’ central decision-making bodies.  
 
Table 1.2.2 Leadership structures of the groups, 8th parliamentary term 
 Group 
Assembly 
Presidency
* 
Bureau 
EPP 216 
members 
1 chair 
 
10 vice-
chairs 
Presidency, national delegation leaders, 1 
member for every 10 members of a delegation, 
members fulfilling a post in the EP’s governing 
bodies, political coordinators of the 
parliamentary committees, president and 
secretary-general of the European People's Party 
federation. 
S&D 187 
members 
1 chair 
9 vice-chairs 
Presidency and treasurer. 
ECR 73 
members 
1 chair 
6 vice-chairs 
Presidency, national delegation leaders. 
ALDE 69 
members 
1 chair 
8 vice-chairs 
Presidency, national delegation leaders, 
members fulfilling a post in the EP’s governing 
bodies. 
GUE/ 
NGL 
52 
members 
1 chairs 
3 vice-chairs 
Presidency, treasurer, national delegation 
leaders, group’s secretary-general and deputy 
secretaries-general. 
Greens
/EFA 
50 
members 
2 chairs 
7 vice-chairs 
Presidency, group’s secretary-general and 
deputy secretaries-general, EP vice-president 
belonging to the group.  
EFDD 45 
members 
2 chairs 
7 vice-chairs 
Presidency, bureau chair, treasurer, 
representatives from each national delegation. 
ENF 39 
members 
2 chairs 
8 vice-chairs 
Presidency, representatives from each national 
delegation. 
Source: EP and party groups’ websites (consulted, November 2016) 
* Presidency includes a treasurer if not mentioned separately under Bureau. 
 
Group leaders are elected by the group members – referred to as Plenary 
Assembly – and represent the group in the EP’s Conference of Presidents, 
 
 
 
in informal meetings of group chairs in which many deals are struck, and in 
the respective European party federations. Group Bureaux prepare strategic 
and political decisions and deal with the administration and management of 
the group (EPP, S&D, ALDE and Greens/EFA Rules of procedure; group 
websites, consulted August 2016).   
 
Although it varies across the groups, national delegations are considered to 
play an influential role forming the link to the national parties (Ripoll 
Servent, 2018). Despite the institutionalisation of the EP party groups (see 
1.1.2), national parties constitute the main reference point for MEPs 
(Raunio, 1999; Faas, 2003). In order to reach a coherent group position 
compromises therefore need to be negotiated among the national 
delegations. In cases where groups fail to vote cohesively the reason usually 
lies in one or several national delegations opting out of the group’s position 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 139). Nonetheless, studies have shown a high level of 
voting cohesion on account of group members sharing similar values and 
ideals (e.g. Hix et al, 2007). The academic debate on EP party groups shows 
agreement on the authority of the national delegations: Not the group 
leadership but rather national delegations control the division of influential 
posts. The main argument is that the former has no power to control, 
sanction or reward the behaviour of individual MEPs (Hix and Lord, 1997; 
Kreppel, 2002). Therefore, benefits such as positions within the groups’ 
internal structures and within the EP structures are usually shared among 
the constituent national delegations (Corbett et al, 2016: 139; Ripoll 
Servent, 2018).  
 
The extent to which the groups coordinate activities and positions in 
parliament varies considerably (see 1.3.1). However, there are certain 
similarities in the organisational structures of the EPP, S&D and ALDE, which 
appear to be the most sophisticated and subdivide the parliamentary work 
into ‘Working Groups’ (EPP, ALDE) or ‘Units’ (S&D) in which cross-
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committee coordination takes place (ALDE, EPP, and S&D Rules of 
Procedure). In addition to the parliamentary activities, the groups have 
their own political activities. They can for example receive visiting 
delegations from national parties, organise seminars or conferences, 
command studies, and publish newsletters (Corbett et al, 2016: 139). On 
behalf of its national parties, in particular concerning governing parties in 
the Member State that holds the presidency of the Council, groups may 
organise special briefings for ministers or shadow ministers. In this way, 
especially for the smaller Member States, groups offer ‘a valuable 
alternative source of information to national civil servants’ (Corbett et al, 
2016: 139). 
 
However, this project concentrates on intra-parliamentary coordination 
practices aimed at passing and amending EU legislation through co-
decision, discussed in section 1.3. The groups’ activities within the scope of 
the parliamentary committees therefore take centre stage, discussed below 
in 1.2.3.  
 
1.2.3 Parliamentary committees  
EP activities take place in twenty standing committees.7 These committees 
deal with legislative proposals through the adoption of reports. They 
propose amendments to the plenary and appoint a negotiation team to 
conduct negotiations with the Council that are subsequently voted on in the 
plenary. In addition, committees adopt own-initiative reports, organise 
hearings with experts and scrutinise the other EU bodies and institutions 
                                   
7 AFCO (Constitutional Affairs), AFET (Foreign Affairs), AGRI (Agriculture and Rural 
Development), BUDG (Budgets), CONT (Budgetary Control), CULT (Culture and 
Education), DEVE (Development), ECON (Economic and Monetary Affairs), EMPL 
(Employment and Social Affairs), ENVI (Environment, Public Health and Food Safety), 
FEMM (Women’s Rights and Gender Equality), IMCO (Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection), INTA (International Trade), ITRE (Industry, Research and Energy), JURI 
(Legal Affairs), LIBE (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs), PECH (Fisheries), PETI 
(Petitions), REGI (Regional Development), TRAN (Transport and Tourism). 
 
 
 
(EP website, consulted March 2018). The work of committees is supported 
by a secretariat, which is discussed in chapter 3 (see 3.1.1). Overall, the 
bulk of the parliamentary activities relates to drafting legislation 
(Yordanova, 2013: 4; EPRS briefing, 2014). The scope of this study is 
therefore delimited to intra-parliamentary coordination activities aimed at 
passing and amending EU legislation through co-decision – now the 
Ordinary Legislative Procedure (see 1.1.1). Accordingly, this sub-section 
addresses the relevance, composition, and legislative activity of the 
parliamentary committees. The coordination on legislative texts, taking 
place within and between the groups, is explored in the next section (see 
1.3).  
 
Together with the EP party groups, committees are the institution’s key 
organisational structures (Neuhold, 2001; Hix et al, 2003b; Ripoll Servent, 
2018). In the literature, there is broad agreement that in practice the 
Parliament’s positions to a large extent are decided in committee (Bowler 
and Farrell, 1995; Neuhold, 2001; Kreppel, 2002; Hix et al, 2003b; Ringe, 
2010). Committees are the arenas for political deliberation through which 
majorities are developed (Neuhold, 2001). They have agenda-setting power 
and it is uncommon for committee reports to be substantially modified or 
rejected in plenary (Bowler and Farrell, 1995).  
 
The size of committees varies considerably. A committee consists of 
between 25 and 73 full members and an equivalent number of substitutes 
(EP website, consulted March 2018). As described above, groups submit a 
proposal for the distribution of committee seats taking into account the EP 
RoP stipulating that the composition of committees must – ‘as far as 
possible’ – reflect the political configuration of parliament (RoP, Rule 199). 
Overall, MEPs serve on one committee as a full member and on another one 
or two committees as a substitute member. In their capacity as a substitute 
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for an absent member, MEPs enjoy full speaking and voting rights and can 
even be rapporteurs.  
 
EP committees enjoy a high level of autonomy and thus vary a great deal 
in terms of activities, norms of conduct, strength, and prestige (Neuhold, 
2011; Corbett et al, 2016: 168; Ripoll Servent, 2018). Traditionally, the 
Foreign Affairs (AFET) committee appeals to many members and has the 
reputation of holding influential MEPs, yet enjoys relatively few formal 
powers (Neuhold, 2001). The strength of committees is often considered in 
relation to their influence on the budget and on legislative outcomes (e.g. 
Kreppel, 2002; Whitaker, 2011; Yordanova, 2013). Following this line of 
reasoning, committees with the largest amount of legislative reports 
adopted are the most influential (Yordanova, 2013). Consequently, MEPs 
that sit in these committees, or act as (shadow) rapporteur, have the ‘best 
opportunity’ to influence legislation (Whitaker, 2011). Moreover, 
committees with a bigger legislative workload attract more attention from 
national political parties, which allows MEPs to build a profile (Whitaker, 
2011). In the EP, the legislative workload is unevenly distributed across the 
20 standing committees (Neuhold, 2001; Whitaker, 2011).8 Table 1.2.3 
highlights the respective share of committees with the strongest legislative 
activity in the 7th parliamentary term. The top five of committees accounted 
for respectively 40 per cent of all legislative opinions adopted in committee, 
and for 55 per cent of all trilogue meetings held. As the table reflects, these 
proportions have decreased slightly since the start of the 8th term, though 
the same eight committees continue to carry the biggest legislative 
workload.  
 
  
                                   
8 See footnote 7 for an overview of the 20 standing committees of the EP. 
 
 
 
Table 1.2.3 Legislative activity of EP committees9  
 Share of total legislative opinions adopted  
 7th term (2009-2014) 8th term (2014-2017)* 
EMPL 8% 3% 
ENVI 7% 7% 
IMCO 7% 4% 
ITRE 9.5% 5% 
JURI 8.5% 13% 
*In addition, LIBE (22%) and ECON (9%) hold a significant share  
of the legislative opinions adopted thus far. 
            
 Involvement in trilogues  
 7th term (2009-2014) 8th term (2014-2017)* 
AGRI 7% 5% 
ECON 21% 9% 
ENVI 11% 10% 
ITRE 6% 2% 
LIBE 11% 20% 
*EMPL (3%) and IMCO (2%) also belong to the committees 
most involved in trilogues in the 8th term (until April 2018).  
Source: EPRS briefings, November 2014 and April 2018  
 
There are several smaller committees with fewer legislative proposals to 
consider. They either focus on so-called ‘own-initiative reports’, as is the 
case in for example the committee on Women’s Rights (FEMM). Or they 
carry out ‘specialised tasks’ like the committee on Petitions (PETI). In the 
empirical part of this study both the legislative committees and committees 
where the parliament has few or no formal powers are explored. It will be 
interesting to see whether the role of advisors, at least in part, hinges on 
                                   
9 See footnote 7 for an overview of the 20 standing committees of the EP. 
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the type of committee, something that is to be expected because 
committees are likely to require distinctive resources. 
 
Several scholars in their exploration of the role of EP committees have 
pointed to specialisation (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Corbett et al, 2011: 
147; Yordanova, 2013). The trend of further specialisation is reinforced by 
the EP’s expanded legislative responsibilities calling for an efficient division 
of the workload among several key players in the standing committees, 
increasingly controlled by the party groups. These players are central to the 
intra-parliamentary political coordination process (see 1.3). A rapporteur is 
responsible for a certain topic on behalf of the lead committee in the EP and 
sets out to synthesise the present views as much as possible in a draft 
report. Party groups may appoint a shadow rapporteur to negotiate the 
topic with the rapporteur. Their task is to follow the progress of the report 
in question, lead discussions within their group, and attempt to find 
compromises within committee on behalf of their group (Rule 205a, EP 
RoP). In addition, they represent the group in inter-institutional 
negotiations. Needless to say, these actors take a very influential and visible 
role, and therefore, groups dominate the allocation process and strongly 
compete over the appointment of rapporteurs (Whitaker, 2001; Benedetto, 
2005; Yordanova, 2013). For each committee, the groups designate a 
coordinator to manage the work of the group’s members in the respective 
committee (EP RoP, Rule 205). These MEPs take the lead in developing the 
group’s position on issues tabled in the committee and work closely together 
with the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs (Ripoll Servent, 2018). 
Moreover, they act as the group’s leader and spokesperson in committee – 
both internally, with the other groups, and to the outside world. If 
necessary, group coordinators convene to prepare decisions and negotiate 
compromises, notably regarding decisions on procedure and the 
appointment of rapporteurs (Corbett et al, 2011: 151).  
 
 
 
Similar to leadership positions in the EP, rapporteurships are allotted by a 
points system. Each group receives a quota of points and the final allocation 
of subjects is generally a consensual process based on an inter-group share-
out of posts (Corbett et al, 2011: 151). It is common for important reports 
to rotate between the larger groups or for them to be shared through the 
appointment of co-rapporteurs (Benedetto, 2005). Although the allocation 
system leads to a proportional distribution of reports between the party 
groups, dissimilarities within individual groups and between nationalities 
are observed (Benedetto, 2005). By the use of case studies, Benedetto 
(2005) finds that ‘nationalities and parties with a traditionally high 
commitment to the EP’ attach greater value to attaining reports as a way 
to influence legislative outcomes. This discussion of the parliamentary 
structures and actors shows that the party groups play an important role in 
intra-parliamentary decision-making. The various levels of coordination 
within this process are considered below. 
 
1.3  The intra-parliamentary coordination process 
This section demonstrates that the institution’s strengthened position in the 
EU political system and expanded workload increase both the significance 
and amount of political coordination in the EP. In the context of this study 
‘political coordination’ is understood as the process during which decisions 
are prepared and made; and priorities are defined as part of a bargaining 
exercise between different groups of actors. It thus comprises both the 
formal and informal mechanisms that are needed to reach agreement.  
 
The importance of intra-parliamentary coordination increases the role of the 
party groups, as they take centre stage in this process (see 1.1.2). The 
expanded workload means that there simply is more to coordinate within 
and between the groups. The literature and EP practice regarding intra-
group and inter-group coordination are discussed in respectively 1.3.1 and 
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1.3.2. Sub-section 1.3.3 considers inter-institutional coordination. The 
Parliament’s negotiation position vis-à-vis the other institutions hinges on 
the extent to which a unified EP position is reached. Beyond these strategic 
considerations there are concerns regarding the safeguarding of democratic 
and transparent decision-making, which require extensive political 
coordination and negotiation within the Parliament. Rise to such concerns 
is the practice that inter-institutional negotiations take place in camera and 
the fact that the EP negotiation team only involves a small number of actors. 
These developments have generated further politicisation and formalisation 
in the EP’s Rules of Procedure of the intra-parliamentary coordination 
process that is explored in 1.3.4.  
 
1.3.1 Intra-group coordination: theory and practice 
Theory 
Existing research on the groups has exposed two main ‘discoveries’ about 
the functioning of party politics in the institution (Hix, 2009): Party groups 
increasingly vote in a cohesive way and coalitions are mainly formed along 
left-right lines (Hix et al, 2007). The first implies that intensive intra-group 
coordination takes place in the EP, which is discussed below. The second 
relates to inter-group coordination and is considered in the next sub-
section.  
 
Scholars have found voting behaviour to become increasingly structured 
and party group cohesion to strengthen (Hix et al, 2007; Kreppel, 2002; 
McElroy and Benoit, 2012). Research by VoteWatch Europe examining roll 
call votes between 2004 and 2014 shows that EPP, S&D, and the 
Greens/EFA all have over 90 per cent cohesion, with the Greens/EFA 
accounting for the most cohesive group (Corbett et al, 2016:142). For the 
7th parliamentary term, the EFD group has the lowest group cohesion, 
namely 48.6 per cent.  
 
 
 
Hix and colleagues (2007) measure cohesion by use of an ‘Agreement 
Index’ considering ideological closeness in the voting behaviour of the 
members of a given group relative to the cohesion of the EP as a whole. 
They find very high levels of cohesion across the board: The average 
relative cohesion rose from 81.4 to 88.9 per cent between the first and 5th 
Parliament. Problematic for the formulation of a coherent group position is 
the fact that there is no direct electoral mandate and no group discipline 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 141-142). The party groups bring together pre-
existing national political parties that are the direct link to the electorate. 
Therefore, the political authority as well as MEPs’ loyalty remains with the 
national party (Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002). EP groups have no 
carrots or sticks to reward or discipline their members other than the shared 
objective of maximising the group’s influence on the final outcome. Future 
rapporteurships could be denied, but existing rapporteurships cannot be 
withdrawn. Moreover, the decision for re-nomination lies with the national 
party. In practice, therefore, national delegation leaders determine the 
allocation of committee membership and key positions in the Parliament’s 
governing bodies (Ripoll Servent, 2018; see also 1.2.1).  
 
The fact that despite these circumstances group cohesion in the EP remains 
surprisingly strong has led scholars to investigate how cohesive voting 
behaviour can be explained. According to Kreppel (2002), group cohesion 
relies on members sharing similar values and ideals (page 208). Corbett et 
al (2016: 142) claim that most MEPs realise that their main objectives are 
more likely to be achieved through effective structures and coordinated 
action with those politically close to them. In their statistical analysis of the 
determinants for the changing patterns of cohesion in the EP, Hix and 
colleagues (2007) show that policy preferences of MEPs and national 
political parties alone cannot explain variations in party cohesion. They find 
that despite growing internal ideological diversity between the groups’ 
constituting national political parties the EP party groups have become 
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increasingly cohesive. Moreover, their study shows that an increase in 
political group size leads to higher cohesion. Hence, the main motivation 
for cohesive behaviour appears to be tied to the strategic behaviour of 
national political parties to maximise their political influence. Larger groups 
evidently have more impact on parliamentary outcomes, thus providing 
more incentive to act in a cohesive manner.  
 
Group discipline as a strategy for influence may gain importance in light of 
the increase of early agreements between the EP and the Council (see 
Introduction). Bressanelli et al (2016) found the informalisation of EU 
decision-making to increase voting cohesion of the mainstream party 
groups (ALDE, EPP, S&D). The scholars suggest that these groups invest 
more (successfully) in coordination and discipline for votes on legislation 
that is pre-agreed in trilogues. Brack’s elaborate study (2015) of the 
behaviour of Eurosceptic MEPs shows anti-establishment or Eurosceptic 
party groups are characterised by their limited (or lack of) involvement in 
the traditional aspects of parliamentary activities. Their focus is rather on 
denunciating EU integration. Notwithstanding, this could very well be a 
strategy too. The formation of the ENF, following the success of Eurosceptic 
national parties in the 2014 elections, imparted the group with material and 
procedural resources. For example, groups enjoy more speaking time in 
plenary, control the appointment of leadership positions, and the allocation 
of reports (Ripoll Servent, 2018). These benefits are not available to 
individual (non-attached) MEPs. Joining forces thus advances their 
objectives to (collectively) criticize EU policy and decision-making.  
 
A different way of approaching the high level of group cohesion draws from 
the notion that not all members can be knowledgeable on every issue, nor 
have the time to develop an individual position on each amendment. For 
this reason, MEPs who are ‘non-experts’ generally adopt the position of 
trusted ‘expert’ peers with whom they share a common set of preferences 
 
 
 
regarding political outcomes (Ringe, 2010). In the case of the EP, MEPs 
trust the judgement of their fellow group members in the committee 
responsible and therefore follow the party voting line. In sum, existing 
research regarding the intra-group coordination process has revealed high 
levels of group cohesion and provided several explanations as to why 
members follow the group line. Cooperation is ideology or policy-driven, 
however the main impetus appears to be strategic behaviour to either 
maximise the influence on legislative outcomes, or pursue a common 
objective. This study builds on these findings by shedding light on how 
coordinated group positions come about in the day-to-day (informal) 
processes of Parliament. The practice of intra-group coordination is briefly 
introduced below and explored in detail in chapter 7. 
 
Working methods in practice 
Intra-group coordination refers to all activities that take place to formulate 
a group’s position. The following discussion is based on the literature, EP 
and group RoPs, as well as the in-depth interviews held with group advisors 
(see 2.5.3).  
 
The intra-group coordination process is prepared in a collaborative way 
through internal discussions and negotiations involving the leadership, the 
political coordinator of the committee responsible, and usually the leaders 
of the national delegations of the group (Corbett et al, 2016: 141). Ideally, 
this is a consensual process during which the specific interests and 
sensitivities within a group are weighed and aligned, resulting in a group 
position that on the whole is acceptable to most members.  
 
There are several mechanisms in place to establish a group line and 
maintain coherence. First, all groups appoint political coordinators to act as 
their main spokesperson in the parliamentary committees. They are 
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responsible for formulating and safeguarding the group’s position and 
manage the intra-group coordination process (RoP, Rule 205). This process 
starts during the committee phase during which coordinators convene the 
members of their group ahead of committee meetings – in ‘Committee Prep’ 
– to discuss the group line (Busby, 2013: 197 and I.0.1, 0.5, 1-3, 22). The 
preparation of such meetings is found to be the core business of group 
advisors and involves rounding up support within the group, as well as 
negotiating with the other groups (I.0.1, 0.5, 1-3, 22).  
 
Party groups have their own rules and practices and the extent to which 
they coordinate activities and positions varies considerably (see 1.2.2). A 
commonality in the ALDE, ECR, EPP, Greens and S&D groups, however, is 
encountered regarding the coordination through thematic cross-committee 
‘working groups’ (interviews with EPP, S&D, and ALDE advisors). This 
enables broader discussion in the group and allows members to make use 
of each other’s expertise as some files relate to several policy areas, and 
thus committees. Moreover, these structures are set in place to safeguard 
support for the group position in plenary. These meetings are open to all 
the group’s MEPs and decisions reached cannot be revisited in group plenary 
(Busby, 2013: 197-198). The Greens/EFA interviewees stress that the 
functioning of these working groups is relatively informal in comparison to 
the other groups. 
 
With regard to the plenary phase of EP decision-making, one week a month 
is dedicated to group deliberations. These so-called ‘Group Weeks’ take 
place the week before plenary sessions and are used to consider the plenary 
agenda, to discuss group activities such as conferences and publications, or 
to hold political debates on major issues or broader political strategy 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 136). The group leadership and secretariat use these 
weeks as ‘an early warning system’ to work towards a group line that is 
acceptable to the majority of its members (Busby, 2013: 198). In addition, 
 
 
 
groups generally convene during the plenary week in Strasbourg on 
Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and occasionally on Thursdays. Most 
national delegations, especially from the larger groups, meet during the 
Group Week and again during plenaries (Corbett et al, 2016: 136). 
Interviewees underline that advisors’ role is crucial during Group Weeks as 
it is the final chance to get a unified position or change things. In addition, 
plenary votes are pre-eminently considered ‘group business’ for which 
advisors prepare briefings and voting indications. As opposed to the 
committee stage in which personal assistants may take over. These 
activities are addressed in detail in chapters 4-7.  
 
Table 1.3 shows that some groups are more heterogeneous than others. A 
high degree of ideological and national diversity within groups is likely to 
require more coordination efforts. This is one of the issues further explored 
in the empirical analysis (chapters 4-7). For groups to maximise their 
impact on a legislative outcome it is important to synthesise the views of 
the composing national delegations as much as possible. In addition to the 
number of national political parties a group comprises, the power balance 
within the group is an important factor for establishing a group position 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 143-144). In some groups, positions are likely to be 
dominated by several national delegations as they account for a large share 
of the group’s seats in Parliament. This could imply that intra-group 
coordination requires less effort in these groups. For example in the Greens, 
the German and French national delegations each held a quarter of the 
group’s seats in the 7th parliamentary term. However, the French share 
dropped to 12 per cent in the next term. And within the ECR the UK and 
Polish national delegations dominate the group with respectively 46 and 28 
per cent of the seats in the 7th term and 27 and 26 per cent in the 8th term. 
UK and Italian delegations steadily hold the leading position in the EFDD 
group. The UK’s share grew from 41 to 48 per cent between the 7th and 8 
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impact on a legislative outcome it is important to synthesise the views of 
the composing national delegations as much as possible. In addition to the 
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dominated by several national delegations as they account for a large share 
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Polish national delegations dominate the group with respectively 46 and 28 
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terms and the Italian stake from 28 to 37 per cent. In the ENF French Front 
National takes the lead with no less than 51 per cent of the group’s seats.  
 
Table 1.3 Composition of the EP party groups 
 7th term (2009-2014)  8th term (2014-2019) 
 Member 
States 
National 
political parties 
 Member 
States 
National 
political parties 
EPP 26 45  27 47 
S&D 27 31  28 39 
ALDE 19 29  21 34 
GREENS/EFA 14 21  17 26 
GUE/NGL 13 16   14 19 
ECR 8 10  18 24 
EFD(D) 9 9  8 8 
ENF    9 9 
NI 9 14  7 11 
Source: EP website (consulted, January 2014 and November 2016) 
 
1.3.2 Inter-group coordination: theory and practice 
Theory 
In political science there are two central explanations of party competition 
and coalition formation (Hix et al, 2007). The first approach takes the desire 
to maximise the influence of the party or MEP on the legislative outcome as 
the main factor for predicting behaviour. Following this view, coalitions are 
determined by the relative size of the groups. In the second approach policy 
preferences take centre stage and the ideological distance between parties, 
delegations, or MEPs drives coalition formation. It is likely that coalitions in 
the EP are controlled by a combination of relative power and the closeness 
of preferences (Hix et al, 2007).  
 
Studies on inter-group coordination in the EP show that the main dimension 
of competition is the traditional left-right divide and the principal predictor 
for coalition formation is ideological distance. Several analyses of voting 
 
 
 
patterns and the level of cooperation between the EP party groups have 
confirmed this traditional picture of politics (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; 
Hix and Noury, 2009; Hix et al, 2007; Hix, 2009; McElroy and Benoit, 2012). 
A second, though less prominent, dimension is pro-anti EU attitude (Hix and 
Lord, 1997; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Hix et al, 2007, Corbett et al, 
2011). Recent research has suggested that this dimension may have 
strengthened with the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten model, 
predicting a coalition of ‘pro-European groups’ (Brack and Costa, 2018).  
 
Yet, for several reasons it is unlikely that any particular coalition in the EP 
remains stable across all issues. First, as the European Union does not have 
a government-opposition structure, no systematic support or permanent 
coalitions emerge from Parliament. Instead, coalitions are struck on a case-
by-case basis and each vote in Parliament requires a new quest for a 
majority (Corbett et al, 2016: 143). Second, the fragmented nature of the 
EP’s political spectrum with currently eight groups does not allow for right- 
or left-centred majorities to be the standard and a majority is difficult to 
achieve on a narrow left or right basis. More importantly, a narrow majority 
(divided Parliament) weakens the EP’s position in the inter-institutional 
negotiations. Third, a lot of the legislative work is highly technical which 
blurs the line between left- versus right-wing arguments. Finally, owing to 
the EU’s wide range of Member States, regional and sectoral interests, it is 
common to seek widespread agreement. All of these factors command a 
consensual approach. Therefore, the EP’s rapporteur system is designed to 
work towards finding a consensus in parliament (Corbett et al, 2016: 143).  
 
With Parliament gaining power in the EU’s political system, the need for a 
coordinated position has become more critical than ever before. In order to 
make compromise deals acceptable to the other institutions, cooperation in 
pursuit of broad consensus and hence the role of EP party groups have 
strengthened (Corbett et al, 2016: 144). Although intra-parliamentary 
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coordination is a consensual and cooperative process characterised by 
shifting coalitions and the search for compromise, certain patterns can be 
discerned as to what constitute the likely coalitions and who drives the 
coordination process. The Christian Democrats and the Socialists are the 
only two groups that together hold an absolute majority. Together often 
referred to as the ‘grand coalition’, they can generally control the 
coordination process as any deal struck between the EPP and S&D is likely 
to achieve the necessary majority (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Corbett et 
al, 2016). Notwithstanding, the left-right cleavage is apparently strong with 
regard to economic issues, which frequently amounts to the disappearance 
of the grand coalition (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999). The Liberals have a 
high coalition potential being situated in the centre of the political spectrum 
and therefore often hold a strategic position (Corbett et al, 2016: 143). A 
VoteWatch Europe special report (2015) finds that in the first six months of 
the 8th parliamentary term, the coalition EPP-S&D-ALDE is more frequent in 
votes compared to the previous terms. Academic findings are congruent in 
that overall the grand coalition is most successful. Moderate-left or –right 
coalitions are next and extremes are basically unsuccessful (e.g. Kreppel 
and Tsebelis, 1999; VoteWatch Europe, 2015).  
 
A caveat in research regarding voting behaviour, however, is that the votes 
on the final outcomes are taken as a measure when in fact these are votes 
on compromises struck beforehand. This make the final vote a difficult 
yardstick for measuring influence in Parliament. What is more, the informal 
intra-parliamentary process enables all groups, and even individual 
members, to be closely involved in defining Parliament’s position. The 
practice of inter-group coordination is briefly introduced below and explored 
in detail in chapter 7.  
 
  
 
 
 
Working methods in practice 
Inter-group coordination refers to all activities that take place to identify 
and approach potential partners and the ensuing negotiations to reach 
agreement on specific legislative texts. As discussed above, the relationship 
between the EPP and S&D groups is of central importance in the EP’s 
consensual working method. Compromise deals are usually negotiated 
between the two largest groups, either at MEP or staff level, and smaller 
groups are subsequently confronted with the outcomes on a or leave-it 
basis (Corbett et al, 2016: 144). It is also common for several groups to 
agree to support certain of each other’s amendments (I.5, 6, 10). Not 
surprisingly therefore, the practice of ‘compromise negotiations’ is 
organised in detail. EP party groups take six-month rotating turns in 
organising and chairing these negotiations (Corbett et al, 2011: 202). The 
EP RoP do not specify the precise functioning of these meetings, nor is it 
fixed who represents a political group. Usually, at least the political 
coordinators on the issue at hand are involved (Corbett et al, 2011: 202).  
 
EP legislative negotiations are structured by the allocation of committee 
membership, (shadow) rapporteur and coordinator positions (Jensen and 
Winzen, 2012). Generally, these actors take a central role in inter-group 
coordination processes. The rapporteur of a dossier is responsible for 
sounding out what is acceptable across the groups and synthesising the 
present views as much as possible. The appointed shadow rapporteurs of 
the other groups are his or her main interlocutors (Corbett et al, 2016; 
Jensen and Winzen, 2012). They meet during the committee phase in so-
called ‘shadows’ meetings’ to prepare the report and during the plenary 
phase to negotiate final compromise amendments. In addition to these key 
actors, all types of supporting staff can be involved in inter-group 
coordination, i.e. the committee secretariat, group advisors, and MEP 
assistants (see 3.1.2 for an in-depth discussion of MEPs’ sources of political 
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advice). The empirical research corroborates the involvement of group 
advisors in these shadows’ meetings. They participate or even replace the 
designated MEP of their group. The rapporteur is normally there, yet not all 
of the groups provide shadow rapporteurs for each file. This may be dealt 
with at staff level (see 7.1.2). 
 
1.3.3 Inter-institutional coordination: theory and practice 
Theory 
Inter-institutional negotiation through trilogue meetings has become the 
common working method for reaching legislative agreements’ (EP Secretary 
General, 2015). During the 7th parliamentary term 85 per cent of legislative 
files were concluded at first reading (EPRS, 2016). Trilogues typically take 
place behind closed doors, i.e. outside of public and political scrutiny. This 
upward trend of so-called ‘early agreement’ has increased the informal 
dimension of decision-making (Ripoll-Servent, 2018). The move towards a 
secluded form of decision-making in which only a restricted number of 
actors are involved has given rise to an academic debate that does not paint 
a very positive outlook for the EP (see Introduction, and: Farrell and 
Héritier, 2004; Häge and Kæding, 2007; Héritier and Reh, 2012; Jensen 
and Winzen, 2012; Bressanelli et al, 2016). Dealing with its extended 
legislative powers has proved to be a ‘competition’ between efficiency and 
transparency (Huber and Shackleton, 2013). One the one hand, it is 
perceived as a ‘coping strategy’ to deal with an increased, complex 
workload (Reh, 2012). However, the exponential increase of early 
agreements through trilogues is critiqued for a lack of inclusiveness and the 
disproportional control of a small group of actors over the flow of 
information and the negotiation process (e.g. Farrell and Héritier, 2003, 
2004).  
 
 
 
 
Several studies have nonetheless demonstrated that the influence of such 
actors is only limited as the EP developed ‘informal rules and norms’ that 
serve to constrain the behaviour of the lead negotiators (Shackleton and 
Raunio, 2003; Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015). Moreover, their 
chances for success are linked to an accurate representation of the 
(majority) position of the EP (Judge and Earnshaw, 2011; Rasmussen, 
2011; Rasmussen and Reh, 2013).  
 
The debate on early agreements and trilogues has many dimensions, yet 
one thing is uncontested: The informalisation of EU decision-making 
increases both the importance and extent of intra-parliamentary 
coordination. This is reflected in the EP RoP and working practices, as is 
discussed next.  
 
Working methods in practice 
In response to the abovementioned concerns for transparency and 
legitimacy, several changes to the EP RoP were adopted throughout the 7th 
and 8th parliamentary terms.10 In particular, the procedure to establish the 
mandate of the EP negotiating team was formalised in the rules. In addition, 
the room for involvement and intervention by the plenary has increased 
significantly (see 1.3.4).  
 
The EP RoP stipulate that the Code of Conduct as laid down by the 
Conference of Presidents (2008) guides inter-institutional negotiations. The 
                                   
10 Subsequent changes to the rules in 2016 and 2017 further formalised the practice of 
trilogues into the RoP. In 2017, the RoP’s Title II chapters ‘First Reading’, ‘Second Reading’, 
‘Third Reading’, and ‘Conclusion of the Legislative Procedure’ (2016 version RoP) were 
substituted by a new chapter ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’. This chapter now includes a 
separate section on inter-institutional negotiations (RoP 2017, Rules 69b-f).  
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code prescribes that ‘political balance shall be respected and all political 
groups shall be represented at least at staff level in these negotiations.’ 
Whereas the RoP of the 7th parliamentary term did not refer to the specific 
composition of the EP negotiating team, this was included in the rules of 
the 8th term. The rules stipulate that the negotiating team is led by the 
rapporteur, presided over by the committee chair and comprises at least 
the ‘shadow rapporteurs’ from each political group that wishes to participate 
(Rule 69f). The negotiating team thus only roughly accounts for one per 
cent of the members. Considering that the responsible committee - 
reflecting the EP’s political composition – serves as a sounding board, still 
no more than 10 per cent of Parliament is involved in the inter-institutional 
negotiation process.  
 
The Code of Conduct furthermore refers to an ‘administrative support team’ 
that at least includes the committee secretariat, the political advisor of the 
rapporteur, the co-decision secretariat and the legal service (see 3.1.1 for 
an introduction to the EP supporting staff). While previous studies in relation 
to early agreements have concentrated on the democratic consequences 
and power shifts within and between the institutions, we still know little 
about the intra-organisational preparations of the inter-institutional 
negotiations. Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood (2015) made an important 
contribution in this respect. In their article, they disentangled the various 
informal processes that up until then were grouped under the general 
banner of ‘trilogues’. The scholars identify three layers of trilogues, i.e. 
political (MEPs), technical (staff), and bilateral preparations. The collected 
empirical data corroborate the involvement of group advisors in these 
preparations and are further discussed in chapter 7.  
 
 
 
 
1.3.4 Stages of the EP coordination process in legislative 
procedures 
The focus of the study lies on informal coordination and the scope is limited 
to intra-parliamentary decision-making. This process encompasses all 
coordination efforts – intra- and inter-group – that take place throughout 
the legislative decision-making procedure, i.e. from the moment a proposal 
is submitted to the Parliament until a decision is reached. This sub-section 
introduces the four common stages of EP legislative procedures. 
 
The thesis sets out to shed light on intra-parliamentary compromise 
building and the role of advice therein. The focus of the discussion below 
therefore lies on the coordination mechanisms that the EP has in place to 
reach a unified position across the party groups. Four common stages of 
how legislative files progress through Parliament in the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure can be identified: Preparatory stage, committee stage, inter-
institutional negotiations, and the plenary stage. As political advice may be 
provided in each of these stages, they are globally introduced below.11  
 
Although the agenda-setting powers fall outside of the scope of this study, 
it is important to briefly mention the various possibilities in this regard. In 
contrast to many national parliaments, the EP does not enjoy the formal 
right to initiate legislation (Ripoll Servent, 2018).12 The European Council, 
which assembles the leaders of the EU Member States, defines the EU’s 
general political direction and priorities (article 15 TEU). The EC is 
responsible for the translation of these priorities into specific legislative 
proposals (Ripoll Servent, 2018). Nonetheless, this does not give the EC ‘a 
                                   
11 For a more detailed discussion of the legislative procedure, see Corbett et al, 2016 and 
Ripoll Servent, 2018. 
12 Apart from some formal rights under the treaties: for the purposes of adopting a 
uniform electoral procedure for EU elections and the Statutes for its members and for the 
Ombudsman (Corbett et al, 2016: 310). 
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monopoly on ideas’ (Corbett et al, 2016: 311). Both the Council and the 
Parliament may request the submission of any ‘appropriate proposals’ 
(respectively articles 241 and 225 TFEU). Furthermore, the EP has 
developed several instruments to influence the EC’s annual and multi-
annual work programmes (European Parliament, 2015). First, (legislative) 
own-initiative reports are an important political tool to shape the agenda in 
the early phase of the legislative cycle (EP RoP, Rule 52). The EP can 
furthermore draft strategic reports in relation to the EC’s Work Programme, 
monitoring reports, and implementation reports. Yet, the bulk of the EP’s 
output consists of amending and passing EU legislation. Since this is also 
the primary focus of inquiry, the key stages of intra-parliamentary 
coordination are set out below.   
 
Preparatory stage 
Normally the legislative procedure starts with a proposal from the EC to the 
Council and the EP. The EP president then refers it to ‘the committee 
responsible’. Other committees may be asked, or take the initiative to 
deliver an ‘opinion’, consisting of amendments to be voted on in the lead 
committee (EP RoP, Rule 53). If a rapporteur has not previously been 
nominated based on the annual EC work programme, one is appointed at 
this time (EP RoP, Rule 49). The practice of naming rapporteurs at an early 
stage is designed to allow rapporteurs to begin their preparatory work in 
advance of the publication of the legislative proposal, providing for the 
opportunity to liaise with the EC and the Council beforehand. The remaining 
groups appoint shadow rapporteurs to speak and negotiate on behalf of 
their group, a working method that relieves the group coordinators (Corbett 
et al, 2016: 185). In preparation of the drafting phase, rapporteurs seek 
background information from a wide range of sources within and outside 
the EP to obtain a good understanding of the different interests at stake 
 
 
 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 186). Chapter 3 includes a discussion of MEPs’ sources 
of advice (see 3.1.2).  
 
Committee stage  
In its first reading, Parliament examines an issue in detail, obtains expertise 
and advice from stakeholders and discusses various policy options 
internally. Apart from some exceptional cases of urgency – e.g. during the 
busy period towards the end of a parliamentary term – there is a period of 
several months of committee discussion before a draft text is produced 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 189). According to parliamentary practice, rapporteurs 
only present a draft text after a stocktaking exercise and exchange of views 
in committee.  
 
Source: figure created for the purpose of this thesis. Average duration of concluded first-
reading agreements obtained through the EPRS briefing, November 2014. 
 
The first step is a debate in committee where an EC representative is usually 
invited to present the key issues of the text (Ripoll Servent, 2018). During 
the preparation of the report, a series of informal meetings take place 
during which the rapporteur coordinates with the shadow rapporteurs, and 
Figure 1.3a Preparatory stage intra-parliamentary coordination  
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with other EU institutions (Ripoll Servent, 2018). The rapporteur then 
presents and discusses the proposed amendments to the legislative 
proposal in committee. Subsequently, informal inter-group negotiations 
take place and amendments may be submitted (Ripoll Servent, 2018).  
 
After the deadline for tabling amendments has passed, the rapporteur 
either decides to amend his or her text based on the suggested changes, 
negotiate compromise amendments, or to proceed to the committee vote 
on the amendments and the proposal as a whole (Corbett et al, 2016: 190). 
Before the report is tabled in plenary, the rapporteur draws up the final 
report taking into account the adopted amendments. Committees can also 
decide to open inter-institutional negotiations (see below) and thus 
determine the mandate for the EP negotiation team (EP RoP, Rule 69c). 
 
 
 
 
Source: figures created for the purpose of this thesis. Average duration of concluded first-
reading agreements obtained through the EPRS briefing, November 2014. 
 
Figure 1.3b Committee stage intra-parliamentary coordination 
 
 
 
Inter-institutional negotiations  
Once a committee has adopted a legislative report, it may decide by 
majority vote to enter into negotiations (Rule 69c). Up until 2017, a plenary 
debate and vote on the issue could only take place at the request of one of 
the groups (RoP 2016, Rule 74). This has changed and now the decision of 
the lead committee to open trilogues must be announced at the first plenary 
session following that decision. Party groups may call for a vote that would 
then take place the next day of the same session (Rule 69c). If Parliament 
rejects the committee’s decision to enter into negotiations with the Council, 
a deadline for amendments is set and the draft report of the committee 
responsible is put up for a vote during the next plenary session (Rule 69c). 
Thus either the report adopted in the lead committee or in plenary at first 
reading constitutes the mandate of the negotiation team. Before the 2017 
changes of the RoP, the mandate was formed by the report adopted in the 
committee responsible, or failing that, a mere set of amendments, 
objectives, priorities or orientations (RoP 2016, Rule 73). 
Source: figure created for the purpose of this thesis. Average duration of concluded first-
reading agreements obtained through the EPRS briefing, November 2014. 
 
Figure 1.3c Inter-institutional negotiations 
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Because these inter-institutional negotiations start in the committee phase 
extensive intra-parliamentary political coordination is needed before and 
throughout the negotiations in order to formulate and uphold a unified 
Parliament’s position. Generally, a meeting between the rapporteur and 
‘shadows’ takes place prior to a trilogue in order to coordinate the EP’s 
position in the negotiations. The negotiating team is required to report back 
to the committee and immediately notify their colleagues once a 
compromise is reached. When the lead committee receives the Council 
position at first reading, it may provide the EP negotiating team with 
‘guidelines’ or amendments for the elements that are not covered by the 
Parliament's position at first reading (Rule 69e). 
 
Plenary stage 
For the conclusion of a legislative procedure in plenary, inter-group 
negotiations take place to reach compromise amendments. Usually, either 
agreement is reached to replace several amendments by one composite 
text, or a deal is struck to support some of each other’s amendments 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 202-203). The plenary vote is based on the position 
adopted in committee and amendments tabled by the groups or at least 40 
members. However, at this stage, the submission of new amendments is 
rare (Ripoll Servent, 2018). In case of early agreement with the Council 
(see above), the plenary votes to adopt or reject a package of amendments 
resulting from the trilogue negotiations. 
 
A typical plenary process involves a presentation by the rapporteur setting 
out the view of the committee responsible, followed by a response from the 
EC and the Council (RoP, Rule 59). Next, opinions from other committees 
may be heard as well as from spokespersons from each of the other groups 
(shadow rapporteurs or coordinators). Once all the views are presented, the 
 
 
 
EC representative responds to the report and amendments. Finally, the 
rapporteur may take the floor (Corbett et al, 2011: 197).  
 
The empirical analysis in chapters 4-7 comes back to the various stages of 
decision-making as political advice may be provided throughout each of 
them. 
 
1.4  Concluding remarks 
The discussion of the evolution of the legislative powers of the EP showed 
two related characteristics that are key to the study. First, the institution is 
known for its consensual style of decision-making. The need for a unified 
Parliament has become ever more significant now that the institution’s 
legislative powers cover virtually all policy domains and the vast majority 
of EU legislation is agreed in trilogues. Second, the expansion of the EP’s 
legislative powers went hand-in-hand with an increasing importance of the 
EP party groups and increasing informalisation of EU decision-making.  
 
The trilogues only involve a fraction of decision-makers. From a normative 
point of view, the intra-parliamentary coordination practices are therefore 
crucial to safeguard the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making. To 
tackle the concerns for transparency, the EP has taken measures to 
strengthen the mandate of its negotiating team and the room for 
intervention by the plenary. The pursuit for compromise and the 
strengthened position of the EP in the inter-institutional triangle highlight 
the significance of intra-parliamentary coordination. All compromises 
require considerable coordination efforts, within the groups and between 
them. Group advisors are expected to play an important role in the 
(informal) preparation of these compromises, and are involved in the 
preparations of inter-institutional negotiations. The following chapter 
develops a framework to study this role.  
97
1
The Contextual Setting: European Parliament Structures 
 
 
Because these inter-institutional negotiations start in the committee phase 
extensive intra-parliamentary political coordination is needed before and 
throughout the negotiations in order to formulate and uphold a unified 
Parliament’s position. Generally, a meeting between the rapporteur and 
‘shadows’ takes place prior to a trilogue in order to coordinate the EP’s 
position in the negotiations. The negotiating team is required to report back 
to the committee and immediately notify their colleagues once a 
compromise is reached. When the lead committee receives the Council 
position at first reading, it may provide the EP negotiating team with 
‘guidelines’ or amendments for the elements that are not covered by the 
Parliament's position at first reading (Rule 69e). 
 
Plenary stage 
For the conclusion of a legislative procedure in plenary, inter-group 
negotiations take place to reach compromise amendments. Usually, either 
agreement is reached to replace several amendments by one composite 
text, or a deal is struck to support some of each other’s amendments 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 202-203). The plenary vote is based on the position 
adopted in committee and amendments tabled by the groups or at least 40 
members. However, at this stage, the submission of new amendments is 
rare (Ripoll Servent, 2018). In case of early agreement with the Council 
(see above), the plenary votes to adopt or reject a package of amendments 
resulting from the trilogue negotiations. 
 
A typical plenary process involves a presentation by the rapporteur setting 
out the view of the committee responsible, followed by a response from the 
EC and the Council (RoP, Rule 59). Next, opinions from other committees 
may be heard as well as from spokespersons from each of the other groups 
(shadow rapporteurs or coordinators). Once all the views are presented, the 
 
 
 
EC representative responds to the report and amendments. Finally, the 
rapporteur may take the floor (Corbett et al, 2011: 197).  
 
The empirical analysis in chapters 4-7 comes back to the various stages of 
decision-making as political advice may be provided throughout each of 
them. 
 
1.4  Concluding remarks 
The discussion of the evolution of the legislative powers of the EP showed 
two related characteristics that are key to the study. First, the institution is 
known for its consensual style of decision-making. The need for a unified 
Parliament has become ever more significant now that the institution’s 
legislative powers cover virtually all policy domains and the vast majority 
of EU legislation is agreed in trilogues. Second, the expansion of the EP’s 
legislative powers went hand-in-hand with an increasing importance of the 
EP party groups and increasing informalisation of EU decision-making.  
 
The trilogues only involve a fraction of decision-makers. From a normative 
point of view, the intra-parliamentary coordination practices are therefore 
crucial to safeguard the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making. To 
tackle the concerns for transparency, the EP has taken measures to 
strengthen the mandate of its negotiating team and the room for 
intervention by the plenary. The pursuit for compromise and the 
strengthened position of the EP in the inter-institutional triangle highlight 
the significance of intra-parliamentary coordination. All compromises 
require considerable coordination efforts, within the groups and between 
them. Group advisors are expected to play an important role in the 
(informal) preparation of these compromises, and are involved in the 
preparations of inter-institutional negotiations. The following chapter 
develops a framework to study this role.  
  
 
CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:  
THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF POLITICAL 
ADVICE 
Political advice is construed as advice provided to politicians by non-elected 
actors. In general terms, the ‘political advisor’ forms a distinct type of actor 
who can neither be classified as a civil servant nor as a political actor. (S)he 
is hired to serve and contribute to the political priorities and objectives of 
the politician or political party they work for. Further tied to the fact that 
this particular group of actors has remained rather eclipsed in the academic 
debate, no fitting theory to study this type of advice was encountered. 
Therefore, for the study of political advice, this chapter develops an 
analytical framework. It develops the theoretical concepts to address the 
question under which conditions advisors can assume a political role. As 
part of the framework, the concept of political advice is defined (2.1), a 
typology of four analytical categories of advice is conceptualised (2.2), and 
a set of factors deemed to affect the provision of political advice is distilled 
from the literature (2.3). The operationalisation of these general concepts 
to the specifics of the European Parliament (EP) is presented in chapter 3. 
 
Section 2.1 develops a definition for the concept political advice, drawing 
from and building on the literature reviewed in the Introduction (section II). 
The analytical delineation of what is considered overtly ‘technical’ or 
‘political’ is the main challenge in this respect (2.1.1). Political advice is 
conceptualised to entail both and is therefore approached as an alternative 
category (2.1.2). The political scope of advisors’ role is construed in relation 
to their room for manoeuvre. From the literature three incremental modes 
of discretion are inferred (2.1.3).  
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The function and nature of political advice are further conceptualised in 
section 2.2. This chapter shows that political advice manifests itself in 
various ways (2.2.1). Drawing from the body of literature that explores 
legislators’ needs for information and expertise the activities that political 
advice may comprise are categorised into four types of advice (2.2.2). From 
this typology four distinct, yet non-exclusive, ideal-type roles are developed 
that advisors may adopt, each containing technical and political elements.  
 
To explore the circumstances under which advisors may assume these 
roles, section 2.3 identifies seven factors from the literature. The extent to 
which each factor affects delegation by the legislator is assessed per role in 
chapters 4-7. The various concepts that are defined in sections 2.1-2.3 form 
the analytical framework and are summed up in section 2.4. 
 
Finally, the methodological approach to the implementation of the 
framework is discussed in section 2.5. The next chapter operationalises the 
concepts of the framework for the case of the European Parliament (EP) 
and chapters 4-7 then present the empirical analysis. 
 
2.1  The definition of political advice 
Previous studies have shown that officials’ input into the legislative process 
can take various forms and that officials can perform tasks that go beyond 
the technical or administrative sphere of activity (see Introduction, section 
II). Yet, in order to examine how advisors contribute to political processes 
it is necessary to first conceptually disentangle the political and the 
technical dimensions of activity. 13   The first sub-section considers how 
scholars have been dealing with the issue and concludes that the two 
                                   
13 Being aware of the multiple connotations of ‘technical’, and lacking a more appropriate 
word, the concept is used in this study to provide an analytical category to the 
alternative to the political dimension of advice. 
 
 
 
dimensions overlap and ‘meet’ in the informal processes in which political 
positions or decisions are prepared. As no definition is available for what 
exactly characterises ‘political advice’, one is developed in 2.1.2.  
 
Building on the existing literature, it is inferred that within the category of 
political advice the political scope of activities can differ. To assess the 
extent to which the role is political, 2.1.3 develops three incremental modes 
that are tied to the discretion of the advisor: routine, reactive, and pro-
active behaviour. 
 
2.1.1 The technical and political dimensions of advice 
In the discourse of legislative organisation scholars uphold that officials 
make a significant contribution to the coming about of decisions taken by 
the elected representatives (Patterson, 1970; Arnold, 1987). In this 
respect, previous studies have shown that officials can perform tasks that 
go beyond the technical or administrative sphere of activity in the US 
Congress (Hammond, 1984 and 1996), in the Council of Ministers 
(Christiansen, 2002; Fouilleux et al, 2005), in the EP (Winzen, 2011; 
Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014), and in the case 
of national parliaments (Winzen, 2014; and Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). 
Drawing from these contributions it is inferred that officials may perform 
tasks of a political nature: Activities that require political assessments or 
have a potential impact on the political process. Yet, what then is considered 
purely ‘technical’ or ‘political’ proves difficult to disentangle (Fouilleux et al, 
2005; Winzen, 2011). The ambiguity is not related to authority as it is 
clearly demonstrated that the final say in decision-making remains the 
prerogative of the elected representatives. Instead, the overlap is tied to 
the informal process in which political decisions are prepared. To 
demonstrate how this conclusion is reached, below the literature that 
explores how advice may enter the political sphere of activity is reviewed.  
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102
Chapter 2 
 
 
The endeavour to separate the two spheres of activity dates back to the 
Weberian tradition and remains one of the most challenging questions in 
public administration research. Politics-administration dichotomy theory is 
grounded on the proposition of a division of labour and authority between 
the political (elected) and technical (non-elected) spheres of activity. The 
‘technical’ function is linked to expertise and understood as the knowledge 
and skills needed to provide support and advice to legislators. The ‘political’ 
function relates to providing technical experts with political guidance and 
controlling their actions. The political dimension lies in the assessment of 
ideological values and choices, as well as tactics and strategy to pursue a 
certain outcome. Generally this function is considered the turf of elected 
actors or appointed visible representatives who can be held accountable for 
their actions. Administrative staff is supportive and their tasks depend on 
the authority and instructions of the political principal.14 Despite substantial 
critique (see e.g. Demir and Nyhan, 2008), the continued academic interest 
for the position of administrators in relation to politics is explained by the 
legitimising premise of legislative authority and autonomy resting with the 
elected representatives. Although responsibility and authority are clearly 
separated – i.e. the preparations versus the actual decision-making – it is 
with officials’ political assessments and the potential political implications 
thereof that the distinction becomes fuzzy. The need for such judgement 
seems likely in the preparation of political positions, negotiations, and 
decisions. 
 
Radaelli (1999) also approaches the ‘technical’ dimension in connotation to 
expertise. In line with Weber, he defines politics in terms of ‘value choices’ 
and technocracy as ‘behaviour based upon expertise’. According to Radaelli, 
the European policy debate is characterised by a ‘battle of ideas’ through 
                                   
14 For a more in-depth discussion of the dichotomy discussion please refer to: Roth and 
Wittich (1978), Demir and Nyhan (2008), Peters (2009), and Sager and Rosser (2009). 
 
 
 
which knowledge provided by experts enters the sphere of politics. In his 
discussion of the ‘political role of expertise’ he underlines the two sides of 
technical expertise: a concept, on the one hand, associated with virtuous 
problem-solving capacities, and on the other hand a pejorative 
representation of the intransparency of EU decision-making. The solution of 
this ‘paradox’ lies in making expertise more accountable in a politicised 
environment, Radaelli argues.  
 
Romzek and Utter (1977) provide a different approach to expertise with 
their examination of ‘professionalism’ among Congressional legislative staff. 
By applying data gathered through interviews to Brante’s sociological 
typology of professions (1990), they find that Congressional aides fit the 
category of ‘political profession’ comprising government and political elites, 
and higher civil servants. According to Brante’s typology, ‘political 
professionals’ have gone through a process of socialisation and as a result 
these officials can operate with relative autonomy based upon ‘specific 
expertise’ (Brante in: Romzek and Utter, 1997). This expertise is drawn 
from a set of ‘unwritten, tacit knowledge’ that is inaccessible to the general 
public.  
 
Fouilleaux et al (2005) find that actors develop strategies to either politicize 
or depoliticize issues. In their view the  ‘political’ and ‘technical’ spheres 
overlap in practice. They argue that the overlap stems from the institutional 
nature of the EU decision-making system. The ambiguity of the political-
technical distinction allows for a certain amount of flexibility that is 
necessary to reach compromises at EU level, a process in which 
administrators are instrumental. The nature of EU decision-making thus 
leads to a politicisation of the ‘technical sphere’ through increased 
interaction between officials of the different EU institutions.  
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While the activities of officials are labelled as influential and potentially have 
political impact, the common thesis is that they ultimately remain 
subordinate. The distinction between administrative and political activity 
thus primarily is considered as a difference in ‘responsibility’ (Page and 
Jenkins, 2005). Politicians’ prevailing needs for information and expertise 
define the role of officials in political processes and their contribution is 
legitimised by the provision of such expertise. However, expertise is not by 
definition non-political and advisors can build and use political competence 
(Romanyshyn and Neuhold, 2013).  
 
In the analytical model of Romanyshyn and Neuhold (2013) ‘political 
competence’ includes the ‘generation of ideas’, ‘the interpretation of 
interests’, and policy-related advice provided to negotiators on how to 
achieve compromise solutions. They find that the distance between the 
domains of the politician and the official are increasingly shrinking, which 
gives cause for concern of the conceptual boundaries. They therefore raise 
the suggestion that ‘political advisors’ could be the alternative category 
situated between the concepts civil servant and politicians (Carboni, 2010; 
Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010 in: Romanyshyn and Neuhold, 2013). 
 
Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) and Winzen (2011) confirm the notion that the 
final say always remains with the politician who can restrict the role of the 
official. The authors nonetheless pinpoint some political functions of the 
procedural and informational work of EP officials in committee secretariats. 
Political assessments include for example the pre-selection of relevant 
issues for the committee agenda, the assessment of the feasibility of or 
support for given policy options, and the facilitation of an exchange of views 
to work towards compromises (Winzen, 2011). In a series of case studies 
exploring the type of tasks delegated, Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) find that 
EP officials in the committee secretariats draft compromise amendments, 
prepare trilogue meetings (albeit with a clear mandate from the rapporteur) 
 
 
 
and actively take part in the intra-parliamentary negotiations. In a proposal 
to reform legislative assistance in the EP, then EP vice-president James 
Provan describes that there is an ‘amalgam of technical-administrative and 
political functions’ with no clear solution at hand (Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002). In his report, Provan (2001) defines ‘political’ assistance in relation 
to providing policy definitions, political coordination within the political 
group, with other groups, national delegations, party constituencies, and 
suchlike. In his examination of the role of Council Secretariat officials in the 
EU legislative cycle, Christiansen (2002) posits that the support to ministers 
and member state representatives concerns ‘highly political matters’. They 
actively assist the Council presidency in finding a compromise by 
maintaining relationships with officials from the European Commission (EC) 
and the EP throughout the legislative process. 
 
In sum, considering the distinction between the technical and political 
dimensions as a mere difference in responsibility or authority is insufficient 
for the study of political advice. Although correct, more is needed to account 
for the overlapping spheres of activity. The political aspects identified in this 
sub-section occur in the process of preparing political decisions. Advisors’ 
contribution to this process is further conceptualised in the remainder of the 
chapter.  
 
2.1.2 Political advice: a mixed sphere of activity  
The aim of this study is to examine advice provided by non-elected actors 
to elected actors in the preparation of political positions, decisions, and 
negotiations. 2.1.1 determined that in such activities the technical and 
political activity spheres are hard to disentangle. ‘Political’ action is driven 
by value choices and ideology and is the responsibility of the elected actors. 
The ‘technical’ level is determined and often equated with ‘expertise’. 
However, expertise is not by definition non-political and advisors can build 
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The aim of this study is to examine advice provided by non-elected actors 
to elected actors in the preparation of political positions, decisions, and 
negotiations. 2.1.1 determined that in such activities the technical and 
political activity spheres are hard to disentangle. ‘Political’ action is driven 
by value choices and ideology and is the responsibility of the elected actors. 
The ‘technical’ level is determined and often equated with ‘expertise’. 
However, expertise is not by definition non-political and advisors can build 
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and use political competence. This sub-section sets out to define political 
advice beyond a mere difference in responsibility and develops a conceptual 
working definition. 
 
Political delegation theory generally emphasises on outcomes instead of 
exploring the process leading up to a decision. The position of non-elected 
actors is examined questioning accountability, autonomy and what drives 
actors. It is found that officials’ activities enhance efficiency, stability and 
continuity in decision-making and their (political) role is determined by the 
prevailing needs for expertise or information legislators may have (see 
Introduction). Previous studies have also shown that officials anticipate 
priorities and preferences of the politician and base their actions on these 
insights (Patterson, 1970; Page and Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 2006). From the 
discussion it is inferred that the informal contribution of advisors may 
reinforce the position of the politician. The dissertation adds a new 
dimension to the debate on the role of officials by conceptualising what a 
‘political role’ by advisors might entail, and theorising a positive relation 
between the contribution of non-elected actors and the position of the 
elected representatives.  
 
It has been established that in practice the technical and political spheres 
of activity overlap. As part of the framework that is developed in this 
chapter, political advice is construed as an alternative category positioned 
in a mixed activity sphere in which the ‘political’ and ‘technical’ functions 
meet. This mixed sphere is illustrated by figure 2.1.2. For the study of 
political advice an analytical separation based on a difference in 
responsibility (politics-administration dichotomy theory) does not suffice. 
To further and more clearly define the political dimension of advice, the 
following additions are derived from the literature: (1) Anticipation of 
 
 
 
political priorities and desired outcomes 
(Patterson, 1970; Page and Jenkins, 
2005; Olsen, 2006), and (2) the use of 
implicit knowledge and tactics to 
formulate and execute strategies to 
realise the desired outcome (Brante in: 
Romzek and Utter, 1997). 
 
The methodology section of this chapter 
addresses the application of the analytical framework in detail (see 2.5.1). 
For each of the types of political advice – developed below in 2.2 – the 
hypothetical technical and political elements are introduced (chapters 4-7). 
In light of the empirical research, an assessment of these elements is then 
made in order to find whether the mixed sphere of activity indeed holds 
true.  
  
2.1.3 Conceptualising the scope of political advice  
The previous sub-section defined political advice, drawing from political 
delegation theory and the body of research on the role of legislative staff. 
It was established that in addition to a difference in responsibility, the level 
of improvisation manifested by the advisor is key to the demarcation 
between the technical and political spheres. His or her judgement, 
anticipation, and the choice of tactics all relate to forms of improvisation. 
Building on the existing literature, it is inferred that within the category of 
political advice activities can be executed in various manners. To assess the 
extent to which the role is political three incremental modes are proposed 
that are tied to the discretion of the advisor: routine, reactive, and pro-
active behaviour. The role becomes more pro-active as the advisor’s room 
for improvisation increases. These modes are further explained below and 
derived from the logic of appropriateness theory (in particular Page and 
Figure 2.1.2  
Mixed sphere of activity 
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Jenkins, 2005) and organisational behaviour literature (in particular Mayes 
and Allen, 1977).  
 
The institutionalist logic rejects Weber’s approach to bureaucracy 
characterised by a focus on hierarchical authority and formal rules or 
instructions. Instead, it is argued that officials anticipate the preferred 
outcome and improvise the appropriate line of action guided by their 
expertise and experience (Patterson, 1970; Page and Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 
2006). Discretion can be exercised without interfering with authority or 
hierarchy, which ‘are ever present’ (Page and Jenkins, 2005: 128). Rather, 
it is exercised where hierarchical measures or political authority are not 
directly applied. If instructions are lacking, the question arises what ‘cues’ 
advisors use to determine the appropriate course of action (Page and 
Jenkins, 2005: 108).  
 
To further conceptualise the discretion of advisors in political processes, 
inspiration is drawn from the definition of ‘organisational politics’ introduced 
by Mayes and Allen (1977). These scholars put forward that ‘politics’ take 
place in varying degrees in all organisations, yet, not all behaviour can be 
categorised as ‘political’. They argue that outcomes alone are insufficient to 
define political behaviour and that the process whereby the outcomes are 
achieved (or influenced) must be taken into account. In that way, their 
approach allows for the inclusion of behaviour or influence that is not 
typically labelled as political. Mayes and Allen (1977) provide the following 
definition:  
“Organisational politics is the management of influence to obtain ends not 
sanctioned by the organisation, or to obtain sanctioned ends through non-
sanctioned influence means.”  
 
Applying this definition to the context of political advice renders two 
dimensions along which the contribution of advisors may be considered:  
 
 
 
(1) ‘Ends’ versus ‘means’. The ‘ends’, in this regard, are translated into 
objectives or priorities, i.e. the desired political outcome. The ‘means’ relate 
to the process that takes place in order to achieve the desired outcome, i.e. 
the selected tactics and approach of the advisors.  
(2) Explicit instructions versus no instructions (i.e. improvisation). 
Instructions relate to the advisor’s mandate.  In theory, both ‘ends’ and 
‘means’ can be either instructed or improvised. For example, the outcome 
may be derived from the ideology of the party group. In the context of 
legislative decision-making processes and particularly in the case of the EP, 
which is the focus of this study, multiple desirable outcomes are at play. In 
the EP the outcome that a party group pursues is the product of intra-group 
coordination (see 1.3.1). When instructions or clear guidance are lacking, 
advisors have to rely on their interpretation and judgement to conceive an 
outcome that is acceptable to the majority. In such situations, the selection 
of the required ‘means’ is guided by what the advisor deems appropriate or 
necessary. Alternatively, the ‘means’ could be instructed or implied in 
unwritten rules or common working methods within the party group. In that 
case, the discretionary behaviour in attaining the desired outcome is 
delineated by those informal norms. 
 
Building on the logic of anticipation, three modes are conceptualised to 
assess the level of discretion of advisors: 
a) ‘Routine mode’: activities are guided by an explicit mandate. 
b) ‘Reactive mode’: either the ‘means’ or the ‘ends’ require improvisation 
on the part of the advisor. 
c) ‘Pro-active mode’: the advisor has the room to determine both the 
‘means’ and ‘ends’, based on his or her interpretation or judgement. 
 
According to Mayes and Allen (1977), activities that are ‘sanctioned’ by the 
organisation are considered to be non-political. This relates to routine job 
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performance. Behaviour is categorised as political when either the ends or 
the means are not sanctioned. Tying this theory to the definition of political 
advice that was developed in 2.1.2, it can be inferred that the political scope 
of advice hinges on the level of initiative and improvisation by the advisor.  
 
Figure 2.1.3 illustrates the three modes. The political scope of advice thus 
increases as the need to improvise grows. The role is most political (pro-
active mode) in situations in which advisors not only have the discretion to 
construe what a desirable compromise (end) may be, they also determine 
the type of assistance or information required in the process towards 
achieving that goal (means). In the empirical analysis the modes of 
discretion are used to evaluate the political behaviour of advisors. As part 
of the framework, the modes will allow for the examination of the extent to 
which a (reactive or pro-active) role is acceptable, in the eyes of the elected 
representatives as well as from a normative point of view.  
 ENDS 
M
EA
N
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 Explicit instructions No instructions 
(improvisation) 
Explicit 
instructions 
Routine mode Reactive mode 
No instructions 
(improvisation) 
Reactive mode Pro-active mode 
Figure 2.1.3 Conceptualising the political scope of the role of advisors 
 
In sum, the political scope of the role of advisors is assessed across two 
dimensions. To label the role as routine, reactive, or pro-active the following 
is examined:  
(i) The way in which advisors receive instructions or construct their 
mandate. 
(ii) The extent to which advisors have room to improvise in the 
provision of political advice.  
 
 
 
The next section develops four types of political advice. In chapters 4-7, the 
assessment of the political scope is presented per type of advice based on 
the empirical findings.  
 
2.2  Towards a typology: the functions and nature of 
 political advice 
The previous section developed a definition for political advice. To explore 
the provision of such advice, a better understanding is required of the scope 
of activities it entails. To that end, 2.2.1 identifies the general elements of 
the function and nature of advice. Building on existing classifications of the 
role of officials, 2.2.2 maps the types of support required by legislators. 
This typology of political advice translates into four distinct ideal-type roles 
that advisors may adopt, each containing technical and political elements.  
 
2.2.1 The function and nature of advice 
Policy advice is provided in different institutional settings. The introduction 
of this thesis offers an overview of the key studies that set out to 
understand the role of officials at the executive level (Page and Jenkins, 
2005; Peters, 2009), in the US Congress (Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971; Fox 
and Hammond, 1977; Burks and Cole, 1978; Hammond, 1984 and 1996;), 
in EU Member State parliaments (Blischke, 1981; Campbell and Laporte, 
1981; Ryle, 1981; Winzen, 2014; and Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015); in 
the Council of Ministers (Christiansen, 2002; Tallberg, 2004; Fouilleux et al, 
2005), and in the EP (Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels 
and Neuhold, 2013; Busby, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014). These 
scholarly discussions provide the analytical building blocks to develop a 
framework to study political advice. Building on the assumption that the 
activities of officials are determined by politicians’ information needs, a 
clearer understanding and categorisation of these needs is necessary to 
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explore the (multiple) role(s) from which advisors can choose. First, some 
general elements of the function and nature of advice are distilled from the 
literature. The next sub-section maps the types of support required by 
legislators and develops a typology of political advice. 
 
Considering the body of literature on the role of legislative staff, ‘political 
advice’ has hitherto not been studied as a separate category or type of 
expertise (see 2.1). Yet, as stated above, existing studies offer insights as 
to the needs of legislators and the activities of officials to meet these needs. 
From these requirements, the following general elements of political advice 
are inferred: (1) Expertise offered by political advisors is an internal 
resource for the politician to tackle efficiency problems (e.g. Christiansen, 
2002; Tallberg, 2004; Winzen, 2011; Busby, 2013); (2) and to maintain an 
independent position from the executive (Hammond, 1984 and 1996; 
Blischke, 1981; Campbell and Laporte, 1981; and Ryle, 1981; European 
Parliament, 2000); (3) Expertise is not subject-based and rather related to 
a general mastery of the organisational process of law-making and the 
anticipation of needs of legislators (cf. Page and Jenkins’ ‘improvised 
expertise’); (4) Political advisors act on a type of unwritten, tacit knowledge 
acquired through their experience within the institution (cf. Brante’s 
‘specific expertise’ of political professionals in: Romzek and Utter, 1997; 
Page and Jenkins’ ‘improvised expertise, 2005). 
 
Drawing from the anticipation logic theory, advisors are expected to base 
their actions, or construct their role, on what the circumstances demand 
(e.g. Page and Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 2006; Peters, 2009). It is therefore 
expected that there are multiple (political) roles and that adoption of a given 
role may depend on several personal and contextual factors. The latter is 
further addressed in 2.3. The next sub-section develops four ideal-type 
roles for political advice. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 A typology of political advice 
The literature that aims to understand the role of officials in political 
processes shows that advisors’ input into the legislative process can take 
various forms. The literature review showed that previous studies have 
identified important technical and political aspects of this role (see 
Introduction). Yet, existing classifications are either non-exhaustive or they 
appear to unite different activities into one category. For example, Provan’s 
category ‘political assistance’ entails the formulation of policy definitions as 
well as the coordination of political positions. Although these activities both 
entail political elements they are likely to require very different things from 
the advisor. Winzen’s ‘Informant’ comprises the processing of information 
as well as the provision of substance-related expertise. Again, this may call 
for different skills or efforts on the part of the advisor. The assessment of 
political advice, thus, calls for clearly defined analytical categories to 
delineate the various types of input. 
 
Drawing from and building on the reviewed body of literature, four 
categories of legislators’ needs for information and expertise are identified 
and translated into a typology of political advice. They are briefly introduced 
below and the sources for inspiration are summed up in table 2.2.  
 
(1) Process management: organisational support; (tactical) advice on 
the legislative process, parliamentary procedures, and informal practices of 
the institution; agenda management; and actor involvement (Congressional 
‘Office of the Parliamentarian’ in: European Parliament, 2000; Ryle, 1981; 
Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; Tallberg, 2004; Winzen, 2011; Busby, 2013; 
Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015).  
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Table 2.2 Typology of political advice 
Process management 
Advice on parliamentary rules and procedures (‘office of 
the Parliamentarian’) 
European Parliament, 
2000 
Advice on procedures and administrative services Ryle, 1981 
Advice on procedures, legal issues;  
Organisational support for meetings 
Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002 
Staffers’ procedural resources facilitate  
multilateral brokerage 
Tallberg, 2004 
Organising meetings, structuring the agenda, actor 
involvement 
Winzen, 2011 
Agenda management Busby, 2013 
Legal and procedural advice (‘analyst role’) Högenauer and 
Neuhold, 2015 
Information management 
Intelligence Patterson, 1970 
Exchange information with lobbyists, interest groups Fox and Hammond, 
1977 
Research assistance Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002 
Informal exchange of information at staff level Christiansen, 2002 
Informational resource Tallberg, 2004 
In touch with the broader interests at stake (‘democrat 
role’) 
Peters, 2009 
Officials provide the information foundation by pre-
selecting issues  
Winzen, 2011 
Assistants are the information interface Busby, 2013 
Gather and forward summarised information 
(‘administrative assistant role’); and the pre-selection  
of information (‘agenda shaper role’) 
Högenauer and 
Neuhold, 2015 
  
 
 
 
 
Policy expertise 
Innovation (‘shaping policy’) Patterson, 1970 
Policy entrepreneurs Price, 1971 
Provide policy-oriented briefings to the members (‘US 
Congress’ Research Service’) 
European Parliament, 
2000 
Support in the drafting of proposed legislation (‘US 
Congress’ Office of the Legislative Council’) 
European Parliament, 
2000 
Assisting the rapporteur in the examination of  
legislative proposals 
Campbell and Laporte, 
1981 
Substantive advice Blitschke, 1981 
Providing policy definitions; drafting documents Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002 
Policy work (‘production role’) Page and Jenkins, 2005 
Involvement in policy-making by giving advice  
(‘policy maker role’) 
Peters, 2009 
Providing expertise regarding the substantive content  
of policy proposals (‘informants’) 
Winzen, 2011 
Policy-shaping tasks (‘policy-making role’) Dobbels and Neuhold, 
2013 
Content-related advice and interpretation  
(‘advisor role’) 
Högenauer and 
Neuhold, 2015 
Brokering 
Intra-institutional as well as inter-institutional integration Patterson, 1970 
Organising floor support Burks and Cole, 1978 
Facilitating compromises Christiansen, 2002 
Political coordination Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002 
Negotiate compromises that form the basis of a decision Fouilleux et al, 2005 
Mediating function through which officials build and 
maintain relationships with the outside world  
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(2) Information management: gathering and processing information in 
order to create overview, filter or select the most relevant (sources of) 
information, and provide legislators with political intelligence through 
informal information exchange (Patterson, 1970; Fox and Hammond, 1977; 
Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; Christiansen, 2002; Tallberg, 2004; Peters, 
2009; Winzen, 2011; Busby, 2013; Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015).  
 
(3) Policy expertise: substantive, content-related advice that includes 
policy orientations, definitions and interpretations, and the formulation of 
(draft) legislative texts (Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971; Congressional 
‘Research service’ in: European Parliament, 2000; Blitschke, 1981; 
Campbell and Laporte, 1981; Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; Peters, 2009; 
Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Högenauer and Neuhold, 
2015).  
 
(4) Brokering: fulfilling a mediating function and facilitating compromises 
by providing internal and external political coordination, advice on 
negotiation strategy and organising support for political positions 
(Patterson, 1970; Burks and Cole, 1978; Christiansen, 2002; Provan in: 
Neunreither, 2002; Fouilleux et al, 2005; Peters, 2009; Högenauer and 
Neuhold, 2015). 
 
From the typology four distinct, yet non-exclusive, ideal-type roles are 
developed that advisors may adopt, each containing a both technical and 
political elements. Table 2.2 sums up the various elements of political 
advice that are borrowed from the literature including their sources. 
Chapters 4-7 discuss the theoretical elements of each of the categories in 
further detail and apply the empirical data to the roles. 
 
 
 
 
2.3  Factors that affect the discretion of the advisor 
In the previous sections the ‘political dimension’ of advice and the various 
types of advice have been conceptualised. The next step is to identify the 
conditions under which political advice may be provided. Drawing from the 
anticipation logic theory, advisors are expected to base their actions, or 
construct their role, on what the circumstances demand (e.g. Page and 
Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 2006). Hence, the adoption of a given role is expected 
to depend on the context as well as on certain personal competencies or 
attributes.  
 
From the literature seven factors are identified that affect politicians’ 
evaluation to delegate or restrict the activities of their advisors. An overview 
of the factors with the major sources for inspiration is set out below. In the 
analysis, they are used to assess whether the factor facilitates or restricts 
a political role.  
 
2.3.1 Personal factors 
Drawing from the literature regarding the position of officials in public 
administration four personal factors are expected to affect advisors’ 
mandate and room for improvisation: Trust, institutional memory, informal 
network, and political sensitivity. For the selection of the factors, the 
feasibility of assessing the impact of each factor was an important 
consideration. The personality of advisors, their ambition, and their 
sensitivity to social norms are for example individual traits that may account 
for differences in behaviour. Not only would such personal characteristics 
be hard to ‘measure’, the aim of this dissertation is to better understand 
the process of providing advice. Rather than focusing on individual 
differences between advisors, this process-oriented approach sets out to 
identify activity and behaviour patterns in the provision of advice.  
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Trust  
The type of tasks delegated and advisors’ discretion to execute these tasks 
is affected by the relationship between the politician and the advisor. 
Personal relationships and the interplay between officials and the elected 
representatives are characterised by mutual understanding, loyalty, and 
trust (e.g. Patterson, 1970; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013). In the debate on 
delegation, ample attention is devoted to measures to control the behaviour 
or influence of officials. Political oversight measures are generally too formal 
to be applied to legislative staff, which leads to the idea that politicians’ 
main form of control, is trust (Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). However, 
the literature typically ties the concept of trust to neutrality (e.g. 
Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011). Yet, following the anticipation logic that 
has been used to conceptualise the political role of advisors (see 2.1) a 
more substantial role is construed for advisors who the delegating politician 
trusts to have a shared ideology and political affiliation. In a discussion of 
parliamentary party staff in the German Bundestag, Blischke (1981) 
supports this idea. He claims that the position of party officials is one of 
‘special trust’ and that the extent to which Members of the EP (MEPs) accept 
their advice depends on this relationship of trust.  
 
Conceptually, ‘trust’ is hard to grasp. A common theory regarding the 
discretion granted to officials, however, is that politicians are likely to 
empower agents whose ‘ideal outcomes’ lie close to or converge with their 
own, thus keeping administrative actions as close as possible to their own 
values and ideas (e.g. Arnold, 1987; Gailmard and Patty, 2012). Egeberg 
and colleagues (2013) examined levels of loyalty or affiliation driving EP 
staff by way of an online survey and find European allegiance to overall 
outweigh national concerns considerably. Whereas EP secretariat officials 
tend to give priority to sectoral concerns, political group advisors are mostly 
 
 
 
committed to the ideological values of their group. They therefore tend to 
prioritise the arguments of external actors with similar affiliations.  
 
Building on these discussions, trust is likely to depend on the advisor’s 
proven knowledge of and affinity with the ideological orientations and policy 
priorities of the political party. In addition to (past) political experience, 
duration in office (seniority) and track record could lie at the basis of trust.  
 
Informal network  
Politicians rely on supporting staff to contribute to fulfilling their needs for 
information and expertise (Arnold, 1987; Hammond, 1984 and 1996). The 
problem of information asymmetry in public administration upholds that the 
myriad of actors involved in decision-making processes are rarely endowed 
with all the relevant information. The influence of officials arises from the 
‘private information’ they are able to gather (Gailmard and Patty, 2012). In 
this line of thought, analysis of the relationship between elected and non-
elected actors centres on how politicians can overcome this ‘information 
asymmetry’ (Moe, 2005; Gailmard and Patty, 2012). Information is often 
gathered and exchanged through informal channels (Busby, 2013). Officials 
can have a substantial contribution in legislative negotiations through their 
informal connections, thus constituting a valuable resource that allows for 
‘privileged access’ to information (Christiansen, 2002). This privileged 
information results from the cooperation and exchange of information with 
officials from the other EU institutions. Their insight into the different 
interests and sensitivities facilitates compromise building at EU level.  
 
From the theory, the assumption is derived that exchange of information is 
necessary and can take place through informal networks. The exchange 
goes beyond the interplay between elected and non-elected actors and 
reaches further than the scope of the institution. The definition of informal 
network relates to the overall network of the advisor, thus comprising the 
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exchange of information with various internal and external actors. The 
degree to which advisors are allowed or inclined to meet with external 
stakeholders will therefore in part determine the extent of their network.  
 
Institutional memory  
The contribution of officials to political processes is justified through reasons 
of efficiency, stability and continuity (Weber in: Roth and Wittich, 1978; 
Peters, 2009). Politicians delegate tasks motivated through a need for 
information and a lack of resources. Officials can be the constant factors in 
institutions where politicians come and go, and contribute through their 
knowledge of internal rules and procedures. They are a valuable source of 
information for the elected representatives because they embody the 
‘institutional memory’ (Romzek and Utter, 1997; Egeberg et al, 2013) and 
ensure continuity in policy-making (Romzek and Utter, 1997; Peters, 2009).  
 
Along these lines, Christiansen (2002) identifies ‘bureaucratic memory’ of 
the Council Secretariat as an important resource in the legislative 
negotiations between the EU Member States. The idea is that officials have 
knowledge of or easy access to the institutional records and contribute 
through ‘personal insights’ resulting from their involvement over time in the 
policy process or in party politics. The extent to which officials successfully 
employ these assets determines their contribution. In their capacity as a 
source of information regarding past decisions and proposals, they operate 
mostly in the background giving advice to ambassadors and ministers. 
Lacking any kind of formal powers, their role is one of ‘quiet influence’ in 
the words of Christiansen. While they have opportunities to contribute to 
the political process, officials’ actions are limited to reacting to the policy 
proposals or pieces of draft legislation that enter the house.  
 
 
 
 
Drawing from this work, institutional memory is expected to depend on the 
advisor’s knowledge of or access to the institution’s track record 
complemented with personal insights acquired through duration in office 
and (prior) political experience.  
 
Political sensitivity  
In dynamic political coordination processes clear instructions are often 
lacking or tend to be implicit or implied. Under these circumstances advisors 
pro-actively seek political direction, or a ‘steer’ (Page and Jenkins, 2005: 
149). The institutionalist logic presumes officials to use their expertise and 
experience in anticipating the appropriate course of action. They base their 
forecasts on the priorities and orientation of the politician (Patterson, 1970) 
and ‘indicators of what is likely to be acceptable to ministers’ guide their 
actions (Page and Jenkins, 2005: 108). This requires the ability to recognise 
and pursue political and administrative cues (Page and Jenkins, 2005: 165). 
The capability to do so comes with experience in a certain field or institution 
and empathy with the political views and priorities the advisor is serving. It 
involves gaining an understanding of how things work in practice and 
abiding by the prevailing informal code of conduct, as well as exploiting 
these insights to anticipate strategies (Busby, 2013: 136). All things 
considered, it implies that advisors are able to acquire and develop ‘a feel 
for the game’ (Adler-Nissen, 2009). For the analysis this attribute advisors 
may possess or develop is defined as political sensitivity.  
 
Building on the literature discussion, political sensitivity is expected to 
depend on the advisor’s personal insights acquired through duration in 
office and (prior) political experience or involvement.  
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2.3.2 Contextual factors 
Drawing from the literature regarding the position of officials in public 
administration three contextual factors are identified that play a role in 
politicians’ evaluation to delegate (political) activities or restrict the 
advisor’s room for improvisation: Political direction, complexity, and 
politicisation. The major sources for inspiration are set out below.  
 
Complexity  
Officials’ expertise on technical matters is considered as a source of 
influence (Moe, 2005; Gailmard and Patty, 2012). The notion that politicians 
simply do not have the time or the knowledge to master all issues in detail 
and therefore rely on (expert) advice in shaping their views and decisions 
is generally accepted. Delegation in part is explained through the 
complexity of policy issues. In ‘technically complex’ legislative proposals 
staff involvement increases (e.g. DeGregorio, 1994; Wilson in: Kettl, 2000).  
 
In the context of the US Congress, Manley (1968) contends that due to the 
increased scope and complexity of governmental activity, legislators rely on 
staff assistance to be duly informed and remain independent of the 
executive branch: “As the complexity of the decisions facing legislators 
increases so too does the likelihood that the staff will exert influence on the 
outcomes.” In their exploration of the role of EP officials in committee 
secretariats, Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) also find that the opportunity for 
intervention increases in highly technical or complicated policy areas.  
 
Following these interpretations, it is assumed that when ‘complexity’ 
increases legislators are more likely to seek assistance and grant advisors 
a political role. Complexity is defined in relation to the subject matter and 
thus expected to vary across policy domains of parliamentary committees 
or specific policy or legislative proposals.  
 
 
 
Political direction  
This dissertation theorises a positive relation between the contribution of 
non-elected advisors to the legislative process and the position of the 
elected representatives. Advisors provide expertise tailored to the needs of 
the legislator therefore strengthening his or her position. The hypothesis is 
that this reinforcement is mutual, thus positioning the relationship between 
advisors and elected representatives as one of interdependent strength.  
The effectiveness of politicians depends on their position in the field 
(Wodak, 2009: 14-15). By extension, the role of advisors is expected to be 
tied to the position of the politician. If the politician’s position (or reputation) 
is strong the advisor can more easily anticipate the desired process or 
outcome. In the absence of a political steer advisors look for cues to base 
their behaviour on (Page and Jenkins, 2005: 149). It is assumed that 
advisors’ ability to identify such cues depends on the extent to which the 
politician – or political party – they serve is outspoken and reputed.  
 
Political direction is thus defined in relation to the superior of the advisor: 
The reputation and experience of the politician or political party the advisor 
works for affect the degree to which they can assume a political role.  
 
Politicisation  
Politicisation manifests itself in differentiated forms and degrees (De Wilde 
et al, 2016). To facilitate the empirical analysis of the concept, De Wilde 
and colleagues developed a three-dimensional approach. The first 
dimension is ‘salience’ which is tied to the attributed importance and outside 
awareness of the issue. ‘Polarisation’ as a measure of disagreement is the 
second dimension. Finally, ‘actor and audience expansion’ is included in 
their framework as the extent to which external actors are engaged in policy 
making.  
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The role of staff is affected by the scope of the decision that is being 
prepared. “The more salient the issue is to a large number of participants 
the less likely the judgment of the staff will direct the decision” (Manley, 
1968). Salience combines the characteristics ‘importance attributed to the 
issue’ and ‘the degree to which issues are (perceived as) problems’. “It is 
possible for something to be a problem but of little importance. It also is 
possible for something to be important but not a problem. Whether 
something is an ‘important problem’ reflects the combined effect of the two” 
Wlezien, 2005). 
 
In the context of the EP, Neuhold and Dobbels (2014) show that the role of 
officials in committee secretariats is reduced in dossiers that cause division 
within and across the political groups. Clearly, as polarisation grows the 
need for coordination in the House also increases, which allows for a greater 
potential role for the advisor. Staff members keep each other abreast of the 
latest developments and controversial issues (Busby, 2013: 191). Although 
the advisors’ amount of work may increase, their room for manoeuvre is 
predicted to decline as MEPs become less inclined to delegate. Busby 
furthermore reports that MEPs are more likely to follow their own 
interpretation and ‘make an independent decision’ when it concerns a 
‘controversial issue’. Controversy of legislation is related to specific 
implications for the Member State or salience (Busby, 2013: 193).  
 
For the analysis, politicisation is assessed in relation to attributed 
importance (important problems), outside attention and involvement, and 
division in Parliament. It is something that can change over time and vary 
across policy areas.  
 
Table 2.3 sums up the personal and contextual factors that are 
hypothesised to either facilitate or restrict the adoption of a political role. 
The analysis explores whether one or several of these factors are decisive. 
 
 
 
The aim is to explain the circumstances under which legislators delegate 
political tasks to their advisors (chapters 4-7). 
 
Table 2.3 Factors that affect the discretion of the advisor 
Personal factors 
Trust Linked to mutual understanding, loyalty, knowledge of and 
affinity with party ideology and priorities (Arnold, 1987; 
Patterson, 1970; Blischke, 1981; Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 
2011; Gailmard and Patty, 2012; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; 
Egeberg et al, 2013; Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). 
Informal 
network 
Access to and exchange of private information through informal 
connections within and outside the institution (Arnold, 1987; 
Hammond, 1984 and 1996; Christiansen, 2002; Moe, 2005; 
Gailmard and Patty, 2012; Busby, 2013). 
Institutional 
memory 
Insight in and access to the institutional track record (Romzek 
and Utter, 1997; Christiansen, 2002; Peters, 2009; Egeberg et al, 
2013). 
Political 
sensitivity  
Understanding of the institution’s informal code of conduct and 
the ability to recognise political and administrative cues, allowing 
for the anticipation of (negotiation) strategies (Patterson, 1970; 
Page and Jenkins, 2005; Adler-Nissen, 2009; Busby, 2013). 
Contextual factors 
Complexity Defined in relation to the issue under consideration and the 
process of coordination (Manley, 1968; DeGregorio, 1994; Wilson 
in: Kettl, 2000; Moe, 2005; Gailmard and Patty, 2012; Dobbels 
and Neuhold, 2013). 
Political 
Direction 
Tied to the position of the politician based on his/her reputation 
and experience (Page and Jenkins, 2005; Wodak, 2009). 
Politicisation Tied to the importance attributed to an issue, outside attention 
and involvement, and division in Parliament (Manley, 1968; 
Wlezien, 2005; Busby, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014; De 
Wilde et al, 2016). 
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2.4  The analytical framework for political advice 
The previous sections of this chapter have delineated the concepts that 
together constitute the analytical framework for political advice: 
 
Political advice is defined as a mixed sphere of activity where technical 
and political functions meet. The analytical separation of ‘technical’ and 
‘political’ tasks is more than a difference in responsibility alone (politics-
administration dichotomy theory). It comprises the anticipation of political 
priorities or desired outcomes and involves the use of tactics to formulate 
and execute strategies to realise these desired outcomes.  
 
Political advice is theorised to manifest itself in three incremental modes 
of discretion: routine, reactive, and pro-active. The scope of advice is 
assessed according to the degree to which activities are guided by a clear 
mandate (instructed) or by the advisor’s interpretation and judgement 
(improvised).  
 
The examination of the function and nature of advice requires clearly 
defined analytical categories. While building on existing classifications of 
the role of officials, a typology was developed that specifically aims to 
capture political advice. It translates into the following ideal-type roles: 
Process Manager, Information Manager, Policy Expert, and Broker. The 
proposition is that advisors may adopt all four roles depending on what the 
circumstances require. 
 
Finally, seven factors that affect political delegation are distilled from the 
literature. The personal attributes trust, informal network, institutional 
memory, and political sensitivity are expected to have an impact on the 
advisor’s discretion. Three levels of the context are expected to affect 
delegation and trigger potential differences across the groups, committees, 
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policy domains, or specific files: political direction (the advisor’s superior), 
complexity (the substance matter), and politicisation (political landscape). 
The idea is that the factors are instrumental in predicting the (optimal) 
circumstances in which political advice may be provided. 
 
The framework was developed in such a way that it may be applied in 
various institutional settings. In this study it is implemented to explore how 
political advice provided by group advisors contributes to the informal 
process of coordinating political positions and decisions in the EP. The next 
section discusses how the framework will be implemented.  
 
2.5  Methodology  
This chapter has developed an analytical framework to study political 
advice. This section discusses the methodological approach to the 
implementation of the framework to the specific context of group advisors 
in the EP. A mixed methods approach has been selected for the study. 2.5.1 
considers the rationale behind this choice. The following sub-sections 
introduce the qualitative methods (2.5.2) and the quantitative method 
(2.5.3). The first entails document analysis and interviews. The qualitative 
research was complemented with an online survey among political group 
staff in the EP. Finally, 2.5.4 discusses how the framework developed in this 
chapter is implemented by way of combining the qualitative and 
quantitative data in the empirical analysis.  
 
2.5.1 Mixed methods research 
During the last decades, mixed methods research has evolved and can be 
considered the ‘third methodological movement’ in addition to quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003 in: Creswell and 
Plano Clark, 2011). The combination of methods can relate to mixing 
viewpoints, data collection, analysis, and inference techniques for ‘purposes 
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of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration’ (Johnson et al, 
2007). It is based on the assumption that the combined use of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches provides a more complete understanding of 
research problems than either approach alone (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2011). The approach is particularly suited to the inquiry of social processes 
because it allows ‘multiple ways of seeing and hearing, and making sense 
of the social world’ (Greene, 2007: 20). Creswell and Plano Clark therefore 
call mixed methods an ‘intuitive’ approach to research that closely relates 
to what we encounter in everyday life (2011: 1): i.e. the tendency to 
present a convincing quantitative perspective – numbers and trends – 
together with individual stories and examples to provide colour (Creswell 
and Plano Clark, 2011: 1). According to the scholars we find such 
tendencies for example in documentaries, newspaper articles, and also in 
political speeches or debates.  
 
Mixed methods research thus allows for a more comprehensive approach 
and enables the collection of both statistical trends and personal narratives. 
It is fitting to the study of political advisors because it allows for an 
exploratory design. As no existing framework for political advice was 
available, a typology was developed from the theory. The choice for the 
mixed methods approach is further motivated due to the very limited 
existing empirical evidence on political advisors. From a qualitative 
perspective, this study aims to broaden our understanding of what political 
advice entails and how it is provided. From a quantitative perspective, it 
sets out to test the framework and identify some generalisable patterns in 
relation to political advice. 
 
The combined design was intended from the outset. The study is conducted 
according to the convergent parallel design (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2011: 80). Each strand is discussed in further detail below (2.5.2 and 
 
 
 
2.5.3), followed by a sub-section on implementation and how the two 
strands are brought together in the analysis (2.5.4).   
  
2.5.2 Qualitative strands: document analysis and interviews 
Document analysis 
Document analysis entails finding, selecting, appraising, and synthesising 
specific content to disclose insights or contexts relevant to the inquiry 
(Bowen, 2009). The rationale for document analysis lies in data 
triangulation, supplementary data, background and context, or tracking 
change and development (Bowen, 2009).  
 
The process-oriented approach of the study requires an in-depth 
understanding of the evolution of the intra-parliamentary coordination 
process, its internal procedures and informal practices. In part this is based 
on evidence provided by the literature review on group cohesion and 
competition (e.g. Kreppel, 2002; Hix et al, 2007) and literature on the 
internal functioning of the EP (Corbett et al, 2011 and 2016). In addition, a 
range of EP reports, briefings and online sources were studied. A complete 
overview of all analysed documents is included in Appendix I. Here, the 
main data analysed and logic behind it is mentioned.  
 
The EP Rules of Procedure were studied to acquire further insight into the 
EP structures and functioning. A particular important development that was 
tracked between 2009-2017 was the subsequent rounds of change in the 
Rules that led to a formalisation of the EP’s dealings with inter-institutional 
trilogues. The Rules of Procedure of the ALDE, EPP, Greens/EFA and S&D 
groups rendered information about their internal organisation. The specific 
working structures of each of the group secretariats were identified from 
the EP party groups’ websites. 
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The EP establishment plan 2014 was used to obtain figures to establish the 
total number of group staff. Yet, these numbers did not specify the share 
of political or policy advisors. To determine the (approximate) amount of 
political advisors per group the staff sections on the respective group 
websites provided the required data.  
 
EPRS Facts & Figures briefings (2014, 2016, 2017) offered both background 
information as useful statistics regarding for example the legislative activity 
of the EP and the various parliamentary committees in the 7th parliamentary 
term. In addition, several internal briefings were studied to appreciate the 
EP’s strategy to deal with its evolving legislative powers, and most 
significantly its role in the inter-institutional dialogue (see Appendix I). 
 
Finally, an analysis was conducted of vacancy notices published on the EP 
party groups’ websites between 2011 and 2016 (see Appendix I). 
Unfortunately, the amount of published vacancy notices did not yield a 
balanced picture across the groups. Nonetheless, supplementary data 
apropos group advisors’ job profile and an indication of their responsibilities 
could be inferred from the documents. These insights were used for the 
operationalisation of the theoretical framework to the case of the EP, and 
for the survey design (see 2.5.3). The operationalisation is further 
addressed in chapter 3 and in the first sections of the four analytical 
chapters. 
 
Interview design  
The aim of the qualitative interviews was twofold: First, to further explore 
the issues and process central to the research question (Weiss, 1994: 10-
11). In this regard, data collection took place by way of six informal, 
exploratory interviews. In February 2012, interviews were held with a 
former group advisor, two MEP assistants, one former MEP assistant, and 
 
 
 
an EP official. In October 2013, a final exploratory interview was held with 
a national delegation advisor within one of the EP group secretariats. These 
interviews formed part of the preparatory design phase and helped shape 
the interview and survey design.  
 
The second aim was to ‘integrate multiple perspectives’ on the role of 
political advice in the EP (Weiss, 1994: 10). Although case studies are a 
common strategy for ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions that facilitates the analysis 
narrative of social processes (Gerring, 2001), this study takes a different 
approach. The principal motivation is that with a common sample size 
somewhere between one and four, generalisation of a theory is impossible 
(King et al, 1994). A case-study approach would thus not be in keeping with 
the (qualitative and quantitative) aims of the study (see 2.5.1). Instead, 
the interviews explore all conceivable activities political advisors in the EP 
may be involved in. The integrative approach of the study allows for testing 
the framework and assessing the factors in a variety of contexts. An 
advisor’s role may be limited to Process Manager in one dossier while in 
another (s)he acts as Policy Expert, and a combination of roles is also 
conceivable. Alternatively, within one dossier the advisor of group A may 
adopt different roles in comparison to the advisor of group B. In sum, the 
main reason for this approach is to keep all probabilities open and explore 
generalisable patterns in relation to political advice. Moreover, the 
traceability of advisors linked to a specific ‘case’ would likely significantly 
decrease their willingness to cooperate, as it would be problematic to uphold 
the guarantee of anonymity.  
 
The following guidelines were considered in the selection of interviewees: 
(1) Variation in the nature of parliamentary committees, including both 
legislative-intensive committees and committees of a more political 
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nature15; and (2) a distributed participation across the political groups 
active at the time.16 The first and second guidelines combined resulted in 
an initial sample illustrated in table 2.5.2a. Advisors assigned to the 
respective committees from each of the political groups were approached.  
 
Table 2.5.2a Initial sample interviewees  
 Other* AFET INTA ITRE ECON 
Potential 
interviewees 
1 7 7 7 7 
Actual interviewees  1 5 2 3 4 
* A Head of unit (and former group advisor) was approached as ‘key informant’ (Weiss, 
1994: 20). This happened on the introduction by one of the interviewees following the 
exploratory interview. 
 
Table 2.5.2b Final sample interviewees  
 Other AFET INTA ITRE ECON IMCO LIBE FEMM ENVI 
Potential 
interviewees 
1 7 7 7 7     
Actual 
interviewees  
3 5 2 3 4 3 2 1 1
  
 
Interviewees were always asked to recommend colleagues that could be 
approached for an interview. This was very helpful in recruiting interviewees 
because advisors proved overall more willing to cooperate following 
introductions. Yet, this practice to some extent interfered with the purposive 
selection of the sample, as table 2.5.2b illustrates. Nonetheless, the 
guideline with regard to the variation in the nature of committees is 
respected. The legislative activity of the AFET, INTA, and FEMM committees 
                                   
15 See figure 1.2.2 that illustrates the legislative activity of the EP committees. 
16 The ENF group is not represented as the empirical data collection took place before its 
foundation, i.e. between November 2013 and July 2014. 
 
 
 
is low (8 interviews), whereas that of ITRE, ECON, IMCO, and ENVI is high 
(11 interviews). The LIBE committee combines a legislative and political 
nature.17 The two interviews with advisors in this committee thus collect 
examples of procedures of legislative texts and political resolutions. 
 
In total, 22 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 
(former) group advisors between November 2013 and June 2014. In 2018, 
another two interviews were held to triangulate the findings. A full list of 
(anonymised) interviewees is included in Appendix V. In respect to the 
second guideline for selection, the overview of the distribution of 
interviewees shows an overrepresentation of two groups (see table 2.5.3 
below). ALDE and Greens/EFA advisors were particularly willing to 
cooperate and are as such overrepresented in the findings. Given the aim 
of integrating multiple perspectives in a qualitative manner and the absence 
of case studies, this overrepresentation does not significantly affect the 
empirical analysis.  
 
The interviews were structured around a listing of topics with questions and 
possible follow-up questions used as the ‘interview guide’ (Weiss, 1994: 
48). The interview guide is included in Appendix IV. The questions were 
phrased in an open way and special care was taken to not lead the 
interviewee in a particular direction in both the questions and the 
introduction of the study. For example, the four roles of the framework were 
not explicitly introduced, nor were the factors.  
 
The 22 semi-structured interviews (2013-2014) were all conducted in 
Brussels, either in group advisors’ offices or in one of the coffee bars of the 
EP, or outside the Parliament. The interviews lasted somewhere between 
30 minutes and an hour. The choice of location was left up to the preference 
                                   
17 See 1.2.3 for an introduction of the 20 standing committees in the EP.  
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active at the time.16 The first and second guidelines combined resulted in 
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1 7 7 7 7     
Actual 
interviewees  
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respected. The legislative activity of the AFET, INTA, and FEMM committees 
                                   
15 See figure 1.2.2 that illustrates the legislative activity of the EP committees. 
16 The ENF group is not represented as the empirical data collection took place before its 
foundation, i.e. between November 2013 and July 2014. 
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and convenience of the interviewee. One of the triangulation interviews 
(2018) was conducted in The Hague and another via Skype. Eleven of the 
interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee. For the 
remainder, notes were taken either because the interviewee declined to be 
taped or because the interview took place in a noisy setting.  
 
2.5.3 Quantitative strand: survey design 
The qualitative data have been complemented with an online survey among 
political group staff in the EP. The aim is to explore political advisors’ profile 
and main activities, as this group of actors have not previously been 
documented in a structured way. In addition to exploring generalisable 
patterns in relation to political advice, the survey is used to test the 
analytical framework.  
 
The exploratory interviews and document analysis (see above) provided 
inspiration in the development of the questionnaire. In particular, this was 
the case for the questions regarding the advisor’s skills, core activities and 
interlocutors (see Appendix II, questions 5, 7, 8, 12). A ‘pilot test’ is a 
critical component of survey designs and helps identify technical errors or 
problems with wording (Iarossi, 2006: 11). A trial run took place (3 
individuals) and led to a slight revision of the questions for the sake of 
clarity. In addition, a printed version of the questionnaire was discussed 
with three interviewees. The objective was to evaluate the length and 
comprehensibility of the survey and the extent to which answer options 
were considered exhaustive. Another important check was whether advisors 
would feel comfortable answering the questions.  
 
The survey consists of 20 questions: 13 multiple-choice and seven open-
ended questions. As a rule, participation was estimated to take between 10 
and 20 minutes of their time. To that end, the number of questions was 
 
 
 
limited in order to attain the largest possible response rate. For the same 
reason, no ‘required’ questions are included that respondents are obligated 
to answer in order to continue. The survey is divided into three parts and a 
progress indicator was used to stimulate completion (Couper et al, 2001). 
No word limit was set for the answers to open-ended questions providing 
room for personal accounts or examples, which generally led to detailed 
responses. Moreover, six multiple-choice questions include a category 
‘other’ giving respondents the chance to add information or answer in their 
own words. The closed questions that do not include this option for example 
inquire after the group and parliamentary committee the respondent works 
for, his or her professional working experience, and linguistic capabilities. 
The final question is whether advisors have any comments or suggestions 
to add. The complete questionnaire is provided in Appendix II.  
 
The survey was conducted between May and July 2014. To offset the risk 
of a biased estimate and to collect as many responses as possible, the 
complete target population of 308 EP group advisors was invited to 
participate in the survey. They were approached via e-mail introducing the 
research project and leading them to the survey via a link. Participation was 
under the guarantee that all provided information remains strictly 
confidential and is aggregated and analysed in a non-personalised way only. 
99 individual responses were collected, which amounts to an overall 
response rate of 32 per cent. Table 2.5.3 reports the response rate broken 
down per political group.  
 
In terms of gender, the survey response rate shows a fairly balanced 
picture: 56 respondents are male and 43 are female. However, in terms of 
affiliation to the political groups, the data are not representative due to the 
differential response rates of the seven EP party groups (sub-groups of the 
population). Like in the interview sample, a response bias is observed 
among the ALDE and Greens/EFA advisors. In the presentation of the data, 
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the issue of representativity is handled by always considering the overall 
picture as well as potential differences across or within the groups. Any 
significant variations are reported. Where it concerns variation between the 
groups the interviews serve as an additional empirical source.  
 
Table 2.5.3 Overview of survey respondents and interviewees  
Political group 
advisors 
EPP S&D ALDE Greens/
EFA 
ECR GUE/
NGL 
EFD Total 
Target population  
(January 2014) 
55 55 39 53 40 37 29 308 
Interviewees 
(2012-2014) 
6 5 6 6 2 1 1 27 
Survey 
respondents 
(May-July 2014) 
13 
24% 
 
14 
25% 
19 
49% 
22 
42% 
12 
30% 
13 
35% 
6 
21% 
99 
32% 
NB – 12 interviewees also participated in the survey (See Appendices III and V). 
 
Appendix III provides a more elaborate picture of the survey response, 
including figures on the distribution across parliamentary committees and 
the response rate per question. It furthermore provides an overview of the 
main findings. The way in which these findings are analysed in connection 
to the qualitative data is considered below. 
 
2.5.4 Implementation: mixing the data 
The aim is to implement the framework to address the question under which 
conditions political advisors can assume a political role. Although the 
empirical analysis focuses on political advice in the context of the EP party 
group secretariats, the framework may be replicated to explore other 
legislator-advisor relationships. The following set of propositions forms the 
starting point for the analysis: (1) Advisors provide advice through four 
conceptualised ideal-type roles that are non-exclusive; (2) Each of the roles 
 
 
 
can be assumed in a more or less political manner (routine, reactive, or 
pro-active); and (3) The discretion of advisors – and the likelihood that they 
may fulfil the political dimension of the role – depends on a set of personal 
and contextual factors. The three propositions translate into three analytical 
steps. Each is considered below with the way in which the qualitative and 
quantitative data interact. 
 
Level of interaction between the qualitative and quantitative strands 
The interaction of the data at the design level was minimal. As pointed out, 
the document analysis and exploratory interviews contributed to the 
development of the questionnaire. The collection took place separately 
conform the ‘convergent parallel design’ and was administered in two 
‘parallel databases’ (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: 80). 
 
First, the data are applied to the four roles to establish whether each of the 
ideal types is indeed assumed. Each analytical chapter first reflects on the 
theoretical concepts related to the respective category of political advice 
(4.1.1, 5.1.1, 6.1.1, and 7.1.1). The theory is then considered in light of 
the collected qualitative and quantitative data (4.1.2, 5.1.2, 6.1.2, and 
7.1.2). The survey findings are displayed through inferential statistics 
supplemented with graphical statistics to corroborate the specific elements 
of political advice that have been identified as part of the framework. The 
interview findings are connected to these inferences and provide further 
detail, not only as to what advisors do but also as to why they do it. 
 
Second, the political scope of the role is considered by examining advisors’ 
mandate and the extent to which they have room to improvise in the 
provision of political advice. This step is of a predominantly qualitative 
nature. Merging the interview accounts and the responses to the open-
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ended survey questions, an assessment is made as to how pro-active 
advisors are (perceived to be). 
 
Third, the extent to which the seven identified factors affect role 
construction and adoption is assessed. The overall strategy of the study was 
not to explicitly present the roles and factors to the survey respondents and 
interviewees. Rather, the chosen approach was to examine the responses 
and check whether they bring up the theoretical elements on their own 
accord. The objective is to find whether one or a combination of factors can 
be considered indispensable for the provision of political advice and how 
this may differ per role. Based on the collected data a qualification is added 
to each of the factors by probing its (deemed) impact: Indispensable (++), 
positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), or a negative impact (-). 
Finally, the findings are checked for factors that have not been identified 
from the literature review. In the example below, trust is the decisive, or 
indispensable, factor and network, institutional memory, political sensitivity 
and complexity increase the likelihood an advisor will adopt role X. 
Politicisation decreases the likelihood and political direction has no impact 
on the adoption of the political role.  
 
Table 2.5.4 Example of factor assessment table 
 Personal factors Contextual factors 
 Trust Informal 
Network 
Institutional 
Memory 
Political 
sensitivity 
Political 
Direction 
Complexity Politicisation 
Role X ++ + + + 0 + - 
 
  
 
 
 
Coding system survey respondents and interviewees 
Appendices III and V respectively provide an overview of the survey 
response and the interviewees. Throughout the analysis, survey 
respondents (SR) are coded according to the order in which the responses 
were received. Interviewees (I) are numbered in a similar way. In instances 
where the differences between the party groups are discussed, the coding 
is excluded to uphold the guarantee of anonymity. It is important to note 
that a considerable overlap between the survey respondents and 
interviewees exists. 12 interviewees also filled out the survey. This is 
indicated in Appendix V. If such an overlap occurs in the merging of the 
data, it is explicitly mentioned in the presentation of the findings. 
 
2.6  Concluding remarks 
This study advances the sociological institutionalist logic of appropriateness 
and argues that to appropriately advise and support legislators, non-elected 
actors inevitably enter the political sphere of activity. It builds on studies 
that have strived to disentangle the technical from the political dimension. 
These exercises have demonstrated that disentangling overtly ‘technical’ 
and ‘political’ tasks is not straightforward. The thesis adds a new dimension 
to the scholarly debate on the role of officials by conceptualising what a 
‘political role’ by advisors might entail. While building on the literature of 
the role of non-elected actors, it proposes ‘political advice’ as a distinct 
category in which technical and political dimensions ‘meet’. The relationship 
between the political and technical levels is approached as a complementary 
rather than an antagonistic process. The argument is that both dimensions 
are necessary for and feed into political advice.  
 
Since no existing theory was considered suitable for capturing the concept 
of a mixed sphere of activity, an analytical framework for the study of 
political advice has been developed. The framework allows for the 
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consideration of various functions of advice (typology), and the assessment 
of the political scope of advisors’ input (modes of discretion). Chapters 4-7 
apply the collected quantitative and qualitative data to the framework, 
according to the methodology described in 2.5. Three analytical steps are 
carried out for each of the ideal-type roles: First, the collection of data is 
applied to establish whether the technical and political functions of the role 
are indeed assumed. Second, the political scope of the role is considered by 
examining advisors’ mandate and the extent to which they have room to 
improvise in the provision of political advice. Third, the extent to which the 
factors affect role construction and adoption is assessed.  
 
Before the empirical analysis is presented, however, the next chapter 
operationalises the framework for the case of the EP. Given that EP group 
advisors, up until now, have only received marginal scholarly attention, it 
is deemed necessary to provide some background information on this 
particular group of actors. The description of who group advisors are and 
what they do is based on the conducted literature review, document 
analysis and online survey. 
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CHAPTER 3. OPERATIONALISING POLITICAL 
ADVICE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The previous chapter defined the theoretical concepts to address the 
question under which conditions advisors can assume a political role and 
developed a framework to study this phenomenon. The operationalisation 
of the general concepts to the specifics of the European Parliament (EP) 
commands a certain understanding of who group advisors are and what 
they do. Owing to the limited existing empirical evidence, it is deemed 
relevant to describe their profile and activities before discussing the 
analysis. The purpose is to then relate this information as far as possible to 
the concepts of the framework. The material presented in this chapter is 
based on the literature review, conducted document analysis and online 
survey.  
 
In order to operationalise the scope of political advice, section 3.1 discusses 
the major internal sources that are involved in the intra-EP decision-making 
process. 3.1.1 introduces the central actors at staff level that are consulted 
by the Members of the EP (MEPs) in relation to their activities in committee. 
Three groups of staff are considered in this regard: EP officials in the 
committee secretariats, group advisors, and MEP assistants. 3.1.2 reflects 
on existing academic discussions about the function and nature of in-house 
advice to MEPs. The aim is to uncover what we know about the discretion 
of EP staff, their (various) role(s), their cooperation or competition in the 
support of MEPs, the technical or political elements of these roles, and 
possible differences across the findings so far.  
 
The second section of the chapter describes the profile and background of 
group advisors. 3.2.1 considers the contractual status of the group advisor 
and discusses employment criteria, and advisors’ overall experience in their 
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current position. 3.2.2 presents the required education, professional and 
political experience of advisors and the related collected survey data. In a 
similar way, 3.2.3 assesses the desired knowledge and skills as obtained 
through document analysis in light of the gathered perceptions of group 
advisors through the survey. The acquired information is related to the 
definition of political advice, the typology, and factors of the framework. 
The aim is to pinpoint, on the one hand, the general characteristics of group 
advisors. On the other hand, the background information is instrumental in 
exposing potential differentiating features within this specific group of 
actors. In the empirical analysis (chapters 4-7) these features are then 
considered to assess and explain possible variation in the way in which 
group advisors fulfil their roles. 
 
The key activities and responsibilities of group advisors are identified from 
the literature and the analysis of a series of vacancy notices posted on the 
groups’ website. These duties are respectively related to the Process 
Manager (3.3.1), Information Manager (3.3.2), Policy Expert (3.3.3), and 
Broker (3.3.4) roles. The aim is to formulate preliminary expectations 
regarding the adoption of the four ideal-type roles. The following chapters 
(4-7) apply the framework to the collected empirical data and consecutively 
present the analysis for each of the four roles.  
 
3.1  Sources of internal advice in relation to the 
framework 
This study construes political advice as advice offered to politicians by non-
elected actors. In the context of the EP various internal and external sources 
of such advice are conceivable. The focus on internal mechanisms and thus 
on internal political advice is motivated through the expectation that EP 
staff act as gatekeepers for information from the outside world (cf. Busby, 
2013; Corbett et al, 2016). For that reason, the discussion below does not 
 
 
 
include the myriad of external sources of advice available to MEPs 
emanating from for instance interest groups; sectoral, regional or national 
interest representatives.  
 
In the preparation of legislation and policy, Members of European 
Parliament (MEPs) rely on three major internal sources of advice: the EP 
Secretariat, the group secretariats, and their personal assistants 
(Neunreither, 2002; Egeberg et al, 2013; Busby, 2013, Pegan, 2015; 
Corbett et al, 2016). Previous research tends to concentrate on EP officials 
in the committee secretariats and MEP assistants. The chief motivation to 
study group advisors, however, lies in the distinct role they are considered 
to fulfil in the intra-parliamentary coordination process (see 1.3). Their 
unique function follows from the notion that they are employed to represent 
and defend the interests of the party group. 
 
This section first introduces the three principal internal sources of advice 
(3.1.1), followed by a discussion of the academic literature addressing these 
types of support (3.1.2). The aim is to relate the state of play and the 
remaining open questions to the concepts of the analytical framework.  
 
3.1.1 Principal sources of advice at the disposal of MEPs 
Chapter 1 introduced the various stages of intra-parliamentary decision-
making along with the main structures and actors at MEP level. This sub-
section presents the central actors at staff level involved in this process and 
constituting potential sources of political advice.  
 
The expanded workload has increased MEPs’ need for support. Over the last 
three decades there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
Parliament staff, although this has slowed down more recently (Corbett et 
al, 2016: 255-256). The 1979 figure of 1,995 posts rose to 2,966 by 1984 
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and amounted to 6,785 in 2014 (Corbett et al, 2011; EP Establishment Plan, 
2014). Both multilingualism and geographical dispersion of the EP offices 
are cited reasons for this high figure (Corbett et al, 2016: 255),18 brought 
about by the increase of MEPs and working languages following several 
rounds of enlargement, and more recently, the expansion of the EP’s 
legislative activities. The overall amount of EP staff is illustrated by table 
3.1.1. 
 
Table 3.1.1 Distribution of staff during the EP’s 7th legislature (2014)  
Function group AD AST SC Total 
Permanent officials 2,655 2,950 30 5,635 
Political group staff  415 601  1,016 
Other staff 66 68  135 
Total EP staff  6,786 
Accredited parliamentary assistants   1,716 
Sources: EP Establishment Plan 2014, own calculations based on information EP Group 
websites (consulted, January 2014).  
Acronyms refer to the function groups of the EP: Administrators (AD), Assistants (AST), 
and Secretaries and Clerks (SC). The contractual situation of advisors is discussed in 3.2.1. 
 
Considering the internal resources of MEPs in preparing their work in 
committee, a distinction needs to be made between institutional assistance 
and ideological assistance. In line with EP tradition, the EP General 
Secretariat fulfils the function of a central, neutral administration. Direct 
support related to committee business is discussed below. Other, indirect 
types of support offered by the EP secretariat include research, 
communication and legal services, as well as more administrative and 
                                   
18 The European Parliament workplace is spread over Brussels. Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg, with additional offices in the Member States. 
 
 
 
logistical services.19 In addition to this institutional assistance, members 
may seek assistance from advisors of the same ideological orientation. MEPs 
in this case have two options: obtain advice from their political group 
secretariat or from their personal assistants. The three principal sources of 
advice to MEPs are introduced below.20 
 
EP Committee Secretariats 
Direct support to committee business is provided through the Directorates-
General (DGs) of Internal Policies and External policies (Pegan, 2015). The 
latter comprises the secretariats for the foreign affairs committee (AFET), 
international trade (INTA) and the development (DEVE) committees, as well 
as the sub-committees security and defence (SEDE), and human rights 
(DROI). In addition, it assists the work of inter-parliamentary delegations. 
DG Internal Policies provides the secretariats for the remaining 17 standing 
committees and furthermore coordinates all legislative activities, mainly 
through the Conference of Committee Chairs (see 1.2.1).  
 
Staff levels in EP Committee secretariats are small in comparison to the US 
Congress but substantial compared to the general standard in EU Member 
States’ parliaments (Corbett et al, 2016: 175). At the start of 2015, the 
DGs of Internal Policies and External policies comprised around 550 and 
230 EP officials respectively (Corbett et al, 2016: 265). The amount of 
officials staffing a committee secretariat varies somewhere between five in 
smaller to 15 administrators (AD) in larger committees. In addition, one or 
two assistants (AST) take care of the logistics (Corbett et al, 2016: 175).21  
                                   
19 For an overview of the structure of the EP General Secretariat and the main services, 
please see Corbett et al, 2016: 264-270.  
20 For an elaborate discussion and comparison of the legislative assistance provided by 
EP officials, group advisors, and MEP assistants, please see Pegan, 2015. 
21 Section 3.2.1 considers the different types of contract and function groups of EU 
officials.  
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The committee secretariats typically assist the committee chair and the 
rapporteur and provide advice throughout the legislative cycle (Pegan, 
2015). Once a committee is designated responsible for a legislative 
proposal, the administrative head of that committee secretariat assigns the 
file to an EP official who then becomes the ‘principal administrator’ (Pegan, 
2015). The nature of their role varies but the overall aim is to ensure ‘the 
smooth running’ of the respective parliamentary committee’s activities 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 265). Primarily, the committee secretariats are 
responsible for matters of procedure and timing but can be asked by the 
rapporteur to assist in the drafting of the report. Other activities may 
include organising meetings, collecting (background) information for the 
rapporteur, briefing members on past activities and positions adopted, and 
maintaining internal and external contacts (Corbett et al, 2016: 176).  
 
In 2004, in a move to build in-house policy expertise, dedicated policy 
departments were created within the DGs Internal and External policies to 
respond to research requests of the committees (Ripoll Servent, 2018). Yet, 
an internal study in 2013 comparing the EP to the US Congress and the 
parliaments of France, Germany, Italy and the UK concluded that the in-
house parliamentary support structure needed to be strengthened 
(European Parliament, 2013). One of the identified weaknesses was the lack 
of ’independent scientific advice’. The need for such advice was deemed of 
particular importance in light of the expanded legislative powers and the 
ever more complicated and technical nature of MEPs’ legislative work. To 
tackle this issue, the former EP Library service was transformed into a 
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). As part of the EP General 
Secretariat, the EPRS offers a wide range of services aimed at providing 
MEPs with ‘independent, objective and authoritative’ information, analysis, 
and research regarding EU policy issues (EP website, consulted March 
2018). Most relevant to the work in the parliamentary committees is the 
 
 
 
so-called Members’ Research Service. 22  It draws up policy briefings, 
analyses, and statistical overviews upon the request of individual members 
or in support of the parliamentary committees (EP website, consulted March 
2018). It furthermore publishes notes for external purposes and aims at 
providing ‘think tank capacity’ (EPRS, 2017). The EPRS also examines the 
European Commission’s impact assessments and provides the 
parliamentary committees with complementary ex-ante and ex-post impact 
assessments, and impact assessments of ‘substantive EP amendments’ 
(EPRS, 2017). 
 
Group Secretariats  
Group secretariats are financed from the EP’s budget. The 2014 EP 
Establishment plan comprised a total of 1,016 political group staff posts. 
The majority of these posts are distributed among the groups according to 
size although each group receives a basic allocation of posts (Ripoll Servent, 
2018). The rise in the total number of group posts – 1,016 in 2014 versus 
only 285 in 1982 – demonstrates a significant growth rate that is 
considerably higher than for the EP’s permanent staff but has recently 
slowed down (Corbett et al, 2016: 132).  
 
By way of document analysis (see 2.5.2 and Appendix I) the total amount 
of ‘political’ or ‘policy’ advisors as they are called in some groups has been 
estimated at 308 (January 2014). For the remainder of the study they are 
referred to as group advisors, or simply advisors. These advisors are 
responsible for following the activities of one or several parliamentary 
committees. Larger groups can have five advisors following a certain 
                                   
22 See the EPRS website for an overview of all services provided: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20150201PVL00031/European-
Parliamentary-Research-Service  
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committee, whereas an advisor in one of the smaller groups may have to 
follow four committees at once (Ripoll Servent, 2018).  
 
As part of the intra-parliamentary coordination process, group advisors 
contribute to the organisation of the group’s position on a certain file in both 
the committee and plenary stages of decision-making. In this process, 
group advisors have to consider the various national, sectoral and 
constituency considerations that are relevant to the members and the group 
as a whole (Egeberg et al, 2013; Winzen, 2011). Activities may include the 
preparation of background information, discussions within the group, the 
formulation of group positions, or maintaining external contacts (Corbett et 
al, 2016: 132). Advisors ‘sell’ the political positions of their group and advise 
their MEPs how to provide input for reports in a way that is acceptable to 
the majority of the group (Ripoll Servent, 2018). Section 3.3 addresses 
these activities in further detail and relates them to the analytical 
framework. The contractual position and employment criteria of these 
advisors are discussed in 3.2.1. 
 
Group members of the same nationality and national political party are 
organised in national delegations. Occasionally, these delegations can take 
position as a bloc (Corbett et al, 2016: 139). Particularly the larger 
delegations have their own organisational structures and staff members, in 
part financed through group funds (Ripoll Servent, 2018). Their formal and 
informal resources make it easier to operate independently from the party 
group, putting them at a clear advantage over smaller national delegations.  
 
MEP assistants 
In January 2016 MEPs employed a total of 1,774 accredited assistants (EP 
website, consulted August 2016). These personal assistants are based in 
Brussels and are employed directly by Parliament (Corbett et al, 2016: 80). 
 
 
 
Each MEP is granted a budget to employ assistants. In addition to Brussels-
based assistants, ‘local assistants’ are contracted by the MEP directly and 
based in his or her constituency to form the liaison with national or regional 
interests (Pegan, 2015: 94). On average, MEPs’ offices comprise two 
accredited and four local assistants (Pegan, 2015: 94). In this dissertation, 
the focus lies on the intra-parliamentary legislative coordination process. 
Therefore, all further mentioning of MEP assistants refers to accredited 
parliamentary assistants only. 
 
MEPs are free to select their personal assistants. The Staff Regulations 
(2014) determine the conditions for employment. Article 5a states that 
accredited assistants provide ‘direct assistance’ to members ‘in the exercise 
of their functions’ and ‘under their direction and authority and in a 
relationship of mutual trust’. The role of assistants can differ considerably 
(Corbett et al, 2016: 81). They are responsible for all issues directly 
affecting the member, yet, some are closely involved in the legislative work 
while others concentrate on secretarial and organisational tasks (Corbett et 
al, 2016: 81). They usually follow the work in the parliamentary committees 
and advise the MEP on the issue at hand, e.g. the drafting of amendments 
to parliamentary reports, attending meetings when their MEP is engaged 
elsewhere and subsequently report back (Corbett et al, 2016; Busby, 
2013). With MEPs generally having a busy schedule travelling, attending 
meetings that often run in parallel, etc., assistants are their eyes and ears 
(Busby, 2013).  
 
3.1.2 Academic discussion on advice in the EP 
The academic literature on EP supporting staff was briefly mentioned in the 
Introduction and is further considered here in relation to the developed 
framework. This sub-section reflects on the discussions about the function 
and nature of in-house advice to MEPs in order to unveil what we know 
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about the discretion of EP staff, their (various) role(s), the technical or 
political elements of these roles, and possible differences across the findings 
so far.  
 
Function and nature of in-house advice to MEPs 
The EP’s strengthened legislative role heightened academic attention for the 
internal administration and coordination mechanisms of the institution. 
Examinations of the role of officials in the EP tend to concentrate on the 
form of legislative assistance (Neunreither, 2002; Pegan, 2015), the 
activities carried out by EP officials in the committee secretariats (Neuhold, 
2001; Neuhold and Settembri, 2007; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 
2013) or by MEP assistants. Regarding the latter, Neunreither already in 
2002 referred to personal assistants as a ‘largely unused workforce’ that 
should be strengthened. More recently, several studies explored their role 
in detail (Busby, 2013; Michon, 2014). Michon (2014) claims assistants 
perform four types of tasks: secretary, PR, legislative, and political. Busby 
(2013) argues that MEP assistants play an important but under-estimated 
backstage role in the everyday practice of politics inside the EP. 
 
Information takes a central place in the discussions of the contribution of 
EP staff. This is related to various responsibilities. First, staff are said to be 
instrumental in tackling the information overload, by ‘gate-keeping’ the 
MEP’s agenda, pre-selecting issues, and providing tailor-made information. 
Busby (2013) refers to these activities as the responsibility of personal 
assistants who she claims act as the ‘information interface’ for their MEP. 
Winzen (2011) contends that EP officials contribute to the shaping of ‘the 
information foundation’ of positions by pre-selecting issues. These activities 
are covered by the conceptualised Information Manager role (see 2.2.2). 
 
 
 
 
Second, the literature stresses the value of information related to the 
substantive content of policy proposals. Several studies argue that EP staff 
may provide such policy expertise. Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) find that 
EP officials can perform policy-shaping tasks by providing substance-related 
information and advice to MEPs. Former EP vice-president James Provan 
distinguishes ‘political assistance’ as one of the functions of EP staff. This 
category comprises the formulation of policy definitions. Another function 
he identifies is ‘technical-substantive’ assistance, which includes the 
drafting of documents (Neunreither, 2002). Winzen (2011) conceives two 
types of activities related to dealing with the flow of information. His 
category ‘Informants’ relays to the function of offering policy expertise to 
the MEP, something he claims EP officials in the committee secretariats 
provide.  
 
The second category Winzen identifies is ‘Process Manager’, arguing that EP 
officials manage the policy process, structure the agenda, and organise 
meetings. Similarly, Busby (2013) discusses assistants’ involvement in 
‘agenda management’. In line with such activities, Provan defines his 
category ‘technical-administrative’ assistance as the organisational support 
for meetings (Neunreither, 2002). Yet, Provan classifies advice on 
procedures and legal issues in the previously mentioned category of 
‘technical-substantive’ assistance. In the framework, these activities are all 
considered part of process management.  
 
The literature review above shows that there are indications that EP officials 
and MEP assistants adopt the Process Manager, Information Manager, and 
Policy Expert roles. However, hardly any evidence points to these staff 
members adopting the Broker role. For an exception see Romanyshyn and 
Neuhold (2013) who discuss the strategic facilitation of compromises by EP 
Conciliation Committee officials. And they themselves stress that the results 
of their study in the context of the Conciliation Committee – considering its 
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atypical position – cannot unequivocally be projected on the broader 
context of the EP. In addition to the formulation of policy definitions, 
Provan’s category of ‘political’ assistance comprises the political 
coordination within and between the political groups. This activity is 
typically ascribed to group advisors (Neunreither, 2002). 
 
Who does what: competing forces in the assistance of MEPs? 
Up until the 1990s, committee secretariats constituted ‘by and large the 
sole source of support’ (Corbett et al, 2016: 261). The enhanced legislative 
role of the EP, however, went hand-in-hand with an increase in numbers 
and involvement of group advisors and personal assistants (Corbett et al, 
2011: 228). This raises the questions of how these groups of supporting 
staff cooperate or compete in their assistance to MEPs. Reviewing the three 
main sources of legislative assistance, Ripoll Servent (2018) points out that 
there is a considerable overlap in tasks and thus a high potential for 
competition or conflict. The way in which EP officials, group advisors, and 
personal assistants interact is considered in the empirical analysis. Existing 
findings are reviewed here to explore the extent to which a relationship of 
cooperation or competition is to be expected.  
 
Neunreither (2002) postulates that in providing the various functions the 
different groups of EP staff can compete. In his view, group advisors should 
concentrate on political coordination and not ‘interfere directly’ in legislative 
assistance. Pegan (2017) finds that compared to EP officials, group advisors 
and MEP assistants are a more frequent source of advice owing to their 
political and tailored support. Busby (2013) draws a similar conclusion and 
labels the collective of accredited parliamentary assistants and group 
advisors as ‘political sources’ to which MEPs increasingly turn.  
 
 
 
 
There are no official figures available as to how often the principal 
assistance to the rapporteur is provided by the committee secretariat. Yet, 
an internal study in the 1990s showed that the support they provide goes 
beyond technical and procedural questions in over 80 per cent of the cases 
(Neunreither, 2002). According to the same study, group secretariats were 
completely marginalised. Since then, scholars have demonstrated that the 
role of committee secretariat staff is considerable and – although delegation 
of tasks takes place at the discretion of MEPs – officials are said to be 
involved in the political work of the EP with their mandate leaving certain 
room for interpretation (Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and 
Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014).  
 
Several scholars argue that, contrary to EP officials or MEP assistants, group 
advisors do not directly assist the rapporteur (e.g. Neunreither, 2002; 
Pegan, 2015). Simultaneously, it has been argued that ‘insiders’ observe a 
considerable decrease in the direct assistance via the committee 
secretariats (Neunreither, 2002; Corbett et al, 2016: 261). In the 2000s 
the position of both the accredited parliamentary assistants and the political 
group secretariats strengthened, sparked by the increased impact of the EP 
on legislation (Hix et al, 2007; Corbett et al, 2011). In line with this 
observation, Winzen (2011) points to an overlap in the assistance to 
rapporteurs based on a set of interviews with the various types of 
supporting staff in the EP. His findings support the notion that MEP 
assistants and group advisors are explicitly charged with exploring political 
views, possible points of contestation, or compromise. Correspondingly, 
Egeberg and colleagues (2013) conclude from their survey on the behaviour 
of EP staff that group officials – to a greater extent than other EP staff – 
facilitate compromises within the EP. According to the scholars this is to be 
expected as the activity of compromise building requires the involvement 
of both national and EP party groups. Alternatively, EP officials value the 
perception of a neutral role and generally steer clear of political controversy 
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in order to avoid any impression of partisanship (Winzen, 2011; 
Neunreither, 2002). Nonetheless, the line between a ‘neutral’ draft report 
by an EP official and a ‘politicised’ report by a group advisor can be 
ambiguous.  
 
In conclusion, the main divergence in the findings of the discussed research 
relate to the (preferred) principal assistance offered to rapporteurs. 
However, this appears to be rather a matter of a different focus than actual 
conflicting outcomes of the studies. The findings are congruent in that the 
source of assistance varies and that the MEP in charge selects the support 
he or she desires. This dissertation explores the circumstances in which 
MEPs are more or less inclined to delegate activities to group advisors. The 
analytical framework is developed in such a way that it allows for the 
application to other sources of advice in a legislative setting. An interesting 
avenue for future research would be to verify whether the (optimal) 
circumstances for a political role hold true or in fact differ for other types of 
supporting staff.  
 
Political advice in the EP 
In discussions considering the contribution of EP staff, scholars have found 
that the demarcation between ‘political’ and ‘technical’ tasks is blurred. 
Neunreither (2002) for example disclosed some of the political elements 
related to the ‘routine administration’ of committees, notably agenda-
setting activities, determining the order of votes, and maintaining contacts 
with other institutions. The problematic overlap exposes that a conclusive 
definition of what constitutes a political role of advisors currently remains 
lacking (cf. Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011). The ambiguity is 
not related to the final say in decision-making – which is the clear authority 
of the elected representatives – but rather considers the process leading up 
to the decision involving mixed spheres of activity (Winzen, 2011; Dobbels 
 
 
 
and Neuhold, 2013). A development that adds to the ambiguous 
demarcation between technical and political functions of support is the 
increasing politicisation of the EP staff brought about by staff moving from 
the group secretariats into the committee secretariats. No measures have 
been taken to tackle the so-called ‘parachuting’ practice (Pegan, 2015).  
 
Connecting what we know from existing studies to the definition of political 
advice, leads to the inference that the activities of EP officials, group 
advisors, and MEP assistants overlap and are situated in the mixed sphere 
of activity (see 2.1.2). However, the discussions of political advice by mainly 
Busby (2013), Egeberg and colleagues (2013), Neunreither (2002), and 
Winzen (2011) lead us to believe that political advice as defined for the 
purpose of this study is predominantly the domain of MEP assistants and 
group advisors. They are explicitly charged with exploring political views, 
possible points of contestation, or compromise (Winzen, 2011). In addition, 
they often have the same political affiliation as the MEP(s) they work for, 
which enables them to anticipate political priorities and desired outcomes. 
Group advisors have a specific intermediary role to play with the General 
Secretariat on the one hand explicitly designed as an ‘independent non-
partisan service’ (Neunreither, 2002) acting in the general interest of the 
institution, and MEP assistants on the other hand looking out for the specific 
interests of his or her MEP (Busby, 2013; Corbett et al, 2016).  
 
The emphasis of previous studies boils down to establishing the influence 
of officials on outcomes, e.g. if they can shape policy, by exploring their 
activities with the aim of understanding the interplay between officials and 
their elected superiors. These analyses share the conclusion that officials 
make a significant contribution to the legislative process, one that involves 
political assessments or judgements, or potentially has political impact. The 
dissertation builds on these findings and categorisations by defining and 
isolating the ‘political role’ of advisors. The aim is to further unravel the 
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input that group advisors provide into EP positions and explore the 
conditions that either facilitate or restrict their political role. To that end, 
political advice is approached as a separate category, located in a mixed 
sphere of activity, and the political advisor as a distinct type of actor who 
cannot be classified as a civil servant nor as a political actor.  
 
In sum, relating the insights provided by the literature to the framework, it 
is inferred that group advisors are the most likely staff actors to fulfil the 
Broker role. This role is key to the intra-parliamentary coordination process, 
which is the central motivation to focus on group advisors. Moreover, they 
remain a virtually unstudied group of actors, further elevating the relevance 
to understand their contribution to informal political processes.  
 
3.2  Background and profile of the EP group advisor in 
relation to the framework 
The previous section demonstrated that group advisors, up until now, have 
only received marginal scholarly attention. Therefore, before discussing the 
empirical analysis, it is deemed necessary to provide a descriptive overview 
of the acquired background information on this particular group of actors. 
The information presented is tied to the concepts of the analytical 
framework, i.e. the definition of political advice, the typology of advice, and 
the factors that potentially affect delegation to non-elected actors. The aim 
is to pinpoint, on the one hand, the general characteristics of group 
advisors. On the other hand, the background information is instrumental in 
exposing potential differentiating features within this specific group of 
actors. In the empirical analysis (chapters 4-7) these features are then 
considered to assess and explain possible variation in the way in which 
group advisors fulfil their roles.  
 
 
 
 
The data offered in this section are based on the performed document 
analysis and the survey findings (see 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 respectively). The 
profile of the EP group advisors was initially examined through a series of 
vacancy notices published between 2011 and 2016 (see Appendix I). The 
findings of the survey were subsequently used to corroborate the desk 
research.  
 
3.2.1 considers the contractual status of the group advisor, discusses 
employment criteria, and advisors’ overall experience in their current 
position. 3.2.2 presents the required education, professional and political 
experience of advisors, and the related collected survey data. In a similar 
way, 3.2.3 assesses the desired knowledge and skills of advisors – as 
obtained through document analysis – in light of the gathered perceptions 
of group advisors through the survey.  
 
3.2.1 Employment status, criteria and duration 
Employment status 
EP staff members are contracted on a permanent, temporary, or contract 
basis. The latter concerns a fixed maximum period to carry out manual or 
administrative tasks, or to replace permanent or temporary officials (EPSO 
and EP websites, consulted August 2016).23 The great majority of group 
advisors hold a temporary status, yet, their contract is for an indefinite 
period of time (EU Staff Regulations 2014, Title III Temporary Staff: Article 
8). The temporary status is predominantly tied to the uncertainty of (future) 
election results and the continuity of the political group that they work for 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 113). There are some exceptions of permanent 
officials in the group secretariats. They either successfully completed the 
EU open competitions (see below) or already held the permanent status and 
                                   
23 Among the analysed vacancy notices are some examples of contractual agent openings 
for the replacement of temporary agents (e.g. maternity leave). 
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moved to one of the group secretariats from another post within the EU 
institutions (Corbett et al, 2011: 113). Nonetheless, group advisors enjoy 
a sense of job security given that in practice relatively few are made 
redundant due to electoral losses or group reorganisations (Corbett et al, 
2016: 132).  
  
The survey findings corroborate this status: 68 per cent of respondents are 
employed on a temporary contract, 16 per cent on a fixed-term contractual 
basis, and 16 per cent hold the status of permanent official. The results also 
illustrate the practice of mobility within the EP and between the EU 
institutions. Respondents with a permanent contract for example reported 
that they have previous experience in the European Commission (EC) and 
the EP Secretariat.  
 
The EU civil service is divided into three function groups: administrators 
(AD), assistants (AST), and secretaries and clerks (SC). The latter 
corresponds to tasks that are not fulfilled by political advisors and therefore 
falls outside of the scope of this dissertation. Each function group is divided 
into grades. AD grades 1-12 range from scientific, linguistic tasks to 
analytical, conceptual and managerial duties. AST 1-11 grades comprise 
executive and technical duties (EU Staff Regulations 2014: Annex IA). The 
EP Establishment Plan (2014) provides the total AD and AST staff allocations 
per political group (see table 3.1.1). However, the exact number of group 
advisors as well as their distribution over the function groups is not 
specified. The party groups provide an overview of advisors per 
parliamentary committee on their websites (consulted January 2014 and 
April 2017). The ALDE, Greens/EFA, S&D groups refer to them as ‘policy 
advisors’ and the GUE/NGL and EFDD groups designate them ‘political 
advisors’. The ECR and EPP groups list the advisors per committee without 
further classification. Based on the information on these websites, the 
target population of 308 political advisors (2014) was determined for the 
 
 
 
online survey and interviews. Table 3.2.1a illustrates the overall distribution 
across the groups. 
 
Table 3.2.1a Estimation of political group staff distribution (2014)  
Political group AD AST Total  Political advisors 
EPP 142 206 348  62 
S&D 103 149 252  58 
ALDE 47 68 115  41 
ECR 32 47 79  30 
GREENS/EFA 32 47 79  47 
GUE/NGL 23 33 56  37 
EFD 21 30 51  33 
NI 15 21 36   
Total 415 601 1,016 308 
Source: calculations based on EP Establishment Plan (2014 figures) and on the information 
published on the EP party groups’ websites (consulted, January 2014). 
 
The vacancy notice analysis and the survey show that group advisors are 
employed in both AD and AST function groups. 66 per cent of survey 
respondents indicate to belong to the AD-level function group with the 
remainder operating at AST level. While EPP, S&D and ALDE respondents 
generally hold AD-level positions, EFD respondents only included one AD-
level advisor. Illustrative of this finding, one interviewee criticised the EFD 
practice of hiring advisors on AST contracts while having them perform the 
same duties as AD-level advisors. Because AST contracts are cheaper it 
allows a group to hire more advisors with the resources they have (I.16). 
GUE/NGL respondents also show a high proportion of AST-level advisors 
(73%). The level at which advisors are hired may be related to the 
importance of and attention for EU policy-making of the group. For example, 
the Eurosceptic stance of the EFD may decrease the group’s interest in 
contributing to the drafting of legislation. Whether and how this affects the 
role of EFD group advisors is further considered in the empirical analysis.  
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remainder operating at AST level. While EPP, S&D and ALDE respondents 
generally hold AD-level positions, EFD respondents only included one AD-
level advisor. Illustrative of this finding, one interviewee criticised the EFD 
practice of hiring advisors on AST contracts while having them perform the 
same duties as AD-level advisors. Because AST contracts are cheaper it 
allows a group to hire more advisors with the resources they have (I.16). 
GUE/NGL respondents also show a high proportion of AST-level advisors 
(73%). The level at which advisors are hired may be related to the 
importance of and attention for EU policy-making of the group. For example, 
the Eurosceptic stance of the EFD may decrease the group’s interest in 
contributing to the drafting of legislation. Whether and how this affects the 
role of EFD group advisors is further considered in the empirical analysis.  
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Just over half of the Greens’ advisors that participated in the survey are 
employed at AD level and for the ECR the distribution is 50-50. These 
findings show that there are considerable differences between the groups. 
In the following chapters the potential impact of an advisor’s AD or AST 
position on the adoption of the political roles is considered, further drawing 
from the gathered empirical evidence. It will for instance be interesting to 
see whether there is a significant difference between the tasks performed 
by AD and AST advisors. 
 
Employment criteria 
Like permanent officials, group advisors with a temporary contract are 
subject to the EU Staff Regulations (2014) and enjoy similar pay levels and 
social benefits. These regulations comprise a section laying down the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the EU, including those of 
temporary staff (Title II: Articles 8-56). Article 12(2) of this section 
stipulates the general conditions of employment. Temporary officials must 
(i) be a national of one of the EU Member States, (ii) enjoy their full rights 
as citizen, (iii) have fulfilled any military service obligations, (iv) produce 
the appropriate character references for the duties involved, (v) be 
physically fit to perform the duties involved, and (vi) produce evidence of a 
thorough knowledge of one, and a satisfactory knowledge of another 
language of the EU Member States.  
 
The overall selection of group staff is based on written and oral tests 
modelled on the open competitions that take place for the recruitment of 
European civil servants. Whereas the so-called concours is organised by the 
European Personnel Office (EPSO), the groups are in charge of recruiting 
their own staff and practices may vary.24 In this regard, article 12(3) of the 
                                   
24 Observation based on the analysis of political group vacancy notices over the period of 
2010–2013. 
 
 
 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the EU includes the 
provision that EPSO must ‘ensure the transparency of selection procedures 
for temporary staff’. Remarkable, however, is that this provision does not 
apply to group staff. Recruitment policies in the EP have been changing 
gradually. While personal connections, political affinity and experience are 
still factors that should not be underestimated, a tendency toward a more 
objective method based on expertise and skills is observed (Corbett et al, 
2016: 132; Pegan, 2015). 
 
Duration in office 
As part of the analytical framework, four personal factors have been 
identified that are expected to affect advisors’ roles: trust, informal 
network, institutional memory, and political sensitivity. From the literature 
review, it is inferred that duration in office (seniority) is an important 
indicator for the presence or development of these personal attributes. On 
average survey respondents have been in their current position for six 
years, varying between seven months and 23 years. The majority have held 
their position for over four years (see table 3.2.1b). This is not very 
surprising as the investigation took place towards the end of the five-year 
term (2009-2014). Greens/EFA advisors appear to have the longest 
employment record with 36 per cent of respondents filling the post for over 
ten years. There is no significant variation between the time in function of 
AD and AST advisors. Out of the 12 per cent of respondents who have only 
been in function up to a year, the large majority holds the contract agent 
status (64%). These findings depict advisors as loyal servants to their 
group. More importantly, with an average duration in office of six years, 
advisors can be expected to build up trust of both counterpart advisors and 
MEPs; an informal network; institutional memory; and political sensitivity. 
In the empirical analysis, the years of employment and thus the potential 
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differences between newcomers and experienced advisors are taken into 
account. 
 
Table 3.2.1b Years of employment in current position 
Years in current 
position 
<1 1 2-3 4-5 6-7 8-9 >10 
% total respondents 2% 10% 29% 21% 11% 11% 16% 
        
% group respondents        
EPP  8% 23% 31% 15% 15% 8% 
S&D  14% 50%  7% 7% 22% 
ALDE 5% 5% 21% 21% 11% 26% 11% 
Greens/EFA  5% 18% 18% 14% 9% 36% 
ECR  25% 42% 25% 8%   
GUE/NGL 8%  31% 23% 15% 8% 15% 
EFD  33% 17% 50%    
        
Source: responses to survey question 3 (open-ended) 
 
As to their future orientations, 50 per cent of respondents indicated to 
prefer a career within the EU institutions. This supports the idea that group 
advisors have a strong European allegiance (cf. Egeberg et al, 2013). 
However, the differences between the party groups are significant. Whereas 
70 per cent of EPP advisors expressed their wish for a career in the 
institutions only 17 per cent of ECR advisors have a similar ambition. This 
may reflect the ideological orientations of the groups, and by extension their 
advisors. The difference may be the result of a pro-European versus a more 
sceptical stance towards EU integration in general (cf. Hix et al, 2007: 181).  
 
  
 
 
 
3.2.2 Educational, professional, and political background  
Educational background  
The employment criteria for AD and AST positions mainly differ in terms of 
required levels of education and experience (EPSO and EP websites). Article 
5(3) of the EU Staff Regulations (2014) provides the criteria per function 
group. For appointments in the AD function group grades 5-6, a completed 
university programme is required of at least three years attested by a 
diploma. For grades 7-16, completed university studies of four years or 
more is the standard criterion. In case a candidate has only successfully 
completed a university education programme of three years, it should be 
supplemented with ‘appropriate professional experience of at least one 
year’. Vacancy notices for EP group advisors follow these criteria (see 
Appendix I). The required level of education for the appointment of AST 
(assistant) officials differs. Generally, a completed post-secondary 
education attested by a diploma is demanded. Candidates holding a 
secondary-education diploma giving access to post-secondary education 
may apply if they have appropriate professional experience of at least three 
years. 
 
The survey shows that group advisors are generally highly educated: 48 
per cent hold multiple higher-education degrees. Referring to their highest 
degree obtained, 82 per cent of respondents point to a Master’s degree 
(MA) and 11 per cent to having completed their doctoral studies (PhD). Only 
six respondents chose a Bachelor’s degree (BA) as their principal title and 
only one of these Bachelor graduates functions at AST level. The findings 
thus indicate that group advisors’ qualifications go beyond what is required 
in the conditions of employment. In probing the main fields of the 
educational background of political advisors it appears that Law and Political 
Science are the most common programmes – respectively accounting for 
in current 
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23 and 19 per cent – followed by EU studies, Economics, and International 
Relations (see table 3.2.2). 
 
Table 3.2.2 Highest obtained degrees EP group advisors 
Degree level  Field 
PhD 11%  Law 23% 
MA 82%  Political Science 19% 
BA 7%  European Studies 15% 
   Economics 15% 
   International Relations 10% 
   Other 18% 
Source: responses to survey question 17 (open-ended) 
 
In addition to the general employment criteria, EP groups are free to set 
special conditions related to the professional training of the candidate 
‘where justified in the interests of the service’ (EU Staff Regulations, 2014: 
Article 5). The ECR and GUE/NGL vacancy notices do not specify the field 
of study and only one of the EPP job openings puts forth ‘completed 
university studies of at least three years in the field of Economics or Finance’ 
as ‘a major advantage’ (EPP 2012: AD5, Latvian language). In contrast, all 
EFD notices set special conditions with regard to education. A full degree in 
Law is the most frequent, followed by Economics and International 
Relations. European Studies, Political Science, and International Institutions 
are also mentioned (see Appendix I).  
 
These findings are consistent with the conceptual definition that ties 
‘political advice’ to a general mastery of the organisational process of law-
making (see 2.1.2). Whenever a degree in a certain field is specified in the 
vacancy notices, it concerns a relatively broad study (see table 3.2.2). 
Hence, education requirements appear to principally accredit for an 
 
 
 
understanding of the organisational process rather than being related to 
specific policy expertise.  
 
Prior professional working experience 
The analytical framework comprises four personal factors that are expected 
to affect the adoption of a political role: trust, informal network, institutional 
memory, and political sensitivity. In addition to duration in office, the 
literature review identified (prior) experience as an important indicator for 
the presence or development of these personal attributes.  
 
No standard required professional experience applies (EU Staff Regulations, 
2014: article 5). Similar to the educational background, party groups are 
allowed to specify working experience under the special conditions for 
recruitment  ‘where justified in the interests of the service’ (EU Staff 
Regulations, 2014: article 5). The demanded professional background 
varies according to the function group and grade of the group advisor. 
However, the document analysis suggests that AD5, 6, and 7 positions are 
most common (see Appendix I). For AD5 positions ECR and GUE/NGL 
groups require completed university studies of at least three years or 
‘professional training or experience of an equivalent level’. The EPP asks 
that candidates have ‘at least two years’ graduate-level professional 
experience’. GUE/NGL and EFD groups set special conditions tied to the 
policy content the advisor will be working on. For AST-level positions a 
completed post-secondary education combined with a minimum of two 
years of full-time professional working experience is the standard 
requirement. Alternatively, candidates holding a diploma giving access to 
post-secondary education can only apply with additional ‘appropriate 
professional experience of at least three years’ (EU Staff Regulations, 2014: 
article 5). The ECR in this case demands at least six years of experience 
(see Appendix I). 
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From the vacancy notice analysis, it is striking that the EFD group applies 
significantly higher standards for candidates’ experience and explicitly 
stipulates previous professional experience within the EP as a condition for 
all encountered job openings. Whereas the ECR requires AD6 and AD7 
candidates to respectively have two and six years of professional working 
experience, the EFD sets a minimum of respectively five and 15 years of 
experience for posts at the same grade levels.  
 
The survey findings show that group advisors overall are experienced.25 68 
per cent of respondents indicate to have at least ten years of professional 
working experience. Only six per cent have less than four years of 
experience. Respondents were also asked to specify their professional 
background: 42 per cent have prior working experience in the EP, as figure 
3.2.2 illustrates. 
 
The conceptual framework developed in chapter 2 defines a form of tacit 
knowledge through experience within the institution as one of the key 
elements of ‘political advice (see 2.2.2). The findings reveal that 58 per cent 
                                   
25 See Appendix III, SQ2 and 4.  
Figure 3.2.2 Survey response: Prior professional 
experience group advisors 
 
 
 
of respondents were recruited in their current position as group advisor 
lacking such knowledge. Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL groups stand out in 
terms of employing advisors without EP experience. On the contrary, EPP 
appears to prefer employing people with an EP background. From the 
analysed vacancy notice, the EFD appears to be the only group that 
explicitly demands prior professional working experience in the EP. The 
subsequent chapters explore political advisors’ responsibilities in further 
detail, inter alia considering the potential impact of the advisor’s 
professional background. 
 
Political experience and affiliation 
Group recruitment policies have been observed to move toward a more 
objective practice mirroring the EU open competitions (Corbett et al, 2016: 
132; Pegan, 2015). Nevertheless, the literature review exposes that an 
important relation exists between the political affinity of staff and the level 
of trust by the politician (e.g. Arnold, 1987; Blischke, 1981; Gailmard and 
Patty, 2012). The general argument is that politicians are likely to empower 
agents whose ‘ideal outcomes’ lie close to or converge with their own, 
keeping administrative actions as close as possible to their own values and 
ideas. This implies greater potential trust between actors that share political 
views. From this it can be inferred that MEPs are more likely to accept a 
political role of advisors who they trust to support similar ideas. Affinity with 
the group’s ideology is also tied to the concept of political sensitivity. Shared 
political beliefs will help advisors anticipate the desired course of action or 
outcome that the MEP in charge envisions.   
 
In addition to the general employment criteria, groups are free to set 
‘special conditions’ (EU Staff Regulations, 2014: article 5). The vacancy 
notice analysis shows that, at least formally, only the GUE/NGL and EFD 
groups seize this opportunity to require a certain pre-established affinity 
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with the group’s ideology or priorities. EFD describes this as ‘prior 
knowledge of the political activities of the EFD group and its members’. 
GUE/NGL includes a more elaborate description of their expectations from 
applicants as the example below illustrates.  
“The GUE/NGL Group in the European Parliament brings together MEPs from a range of 
European left and progressive parties. In virtually all policy areas, it argues against the 
mainstream neo-liberal prescriptions for the EU and is focussed on presenting 
progressive policy alternatives. All group staff should be comfortable in this environment 
and at ease with, contributing and supporting our MEPs in their policy objectives, inside 
and outside Parliament.” (Source: vacancy notices GUE-NGL 2016 - Temporary Agent 
AD5 Dutch language and Temporary Agent AD5 Spanish language) 
 
Based on the assumption that surveying the advisor’s affinity would not 
yield credible insights due to the risk of politically correct answers, 
membership of a political party was taken as an indicator to assess 
affiliation. The survey shows that the majority of respondents (66%) are 
affiliated to a national party: 52 per cent was affiliated prior to their 
employment and 14 per cent subscribed after they started working for one 
of the groups. ECR and Greens advisors seem to be the least politically 
affiliated, respectively 50 and 55 per cent are affiliated to a national political 
party. In contrast, only one GUE/NGL advisor is not member of a national 
political party, which supports the indication from the desk research that 
this group highly values the political affiliation of their staff members. The 
affiliation with European political parties is much lower. Only 18 per cent of 
all respondents are member of a European political party. 
 
Prior political experience could also be conceived as an indicator of affinity 
with the ideology and priorities of the group. The vacancy analysis did not 
encounter any specific requirements in this regard. As introduced above, 
only the EFD requires prior professional experience in the EP. Nonetheless, 
figure 3.2.2 illustrates that 22 per cent of the respondents already worked 
in the EP as MEP assistant. Another 20 per cent have experience in the EP, 
 
 
 
but did not specify their prior functions. Moreover, four per cent worked in 
national parliaments before joining the group secretariat. In the empirical 
analysis, the level of professional and political experience is assessed in 
relation to the personal factors. Political affiliation and experience are 
expected to indicate (to some extent) the level of affinity with the group’s 
objectives. Such affinity is expected to have a positive impact on gaining 
politicians’ trust, developing an informal network and political sensitivity. In 
the subsequent chapters the extent to which these personal factors 
determine the assumption of a political role is discussed.  
 
Finally, advisors’ sense of loyalty to the group may be a way to assess 
political affinity. The next sub-section addresses the survey findings in 
respect to the qualities that are deemed most important for group advisors. 
‘Loyalty to the group’ was included among the answer options that 
respondents were asked to rank. Only 20 listed it as one of the three most 
important: five ECR advisors, four ALDE, EPP, and S&D advisors, and three 
GUE/NGL advisors. The loyalty of advisors is expected to notably affect the 
extent to which they are trusted by the MEP.  
 
3.2.3 Competencies of the EP group advisor  
As discussed above, the Staff Regulations allow political groups to set 
‘special conditions’ when justified in the interest of the service. This sub-
section considers the desired competencies of EP group advisors, drawing 
from the analysis of vacancy notices for group advisor posts. It 
subsequently addresses linguistic skills, general knowledge and skills, and 
the qualities deemed most important for group advisors. The conditions set 
by the groups are discussed in relation to the survey findings. 
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affiliation with European political parties is much lower. Only 18 per cent of 
all respondents are member of a European political party. 
 
Prior political experience could also be conceived as an indicator of affinity 
with the ideology and priorities of the group. The vacancy analysis did not 
encounter any specific requirements in this regard. As introduced above, 
only the EFD requires prior professional experience in the EP. Nonetheless, 
figure 3.2.2 illustrates that 22 per cent of the respondents already worked 
in the EP as MEP assistant. Another 20 per cent have experience in the EP, 
 
 
 
but did not specify their prior functions. Moreover, four per cent worked in 
national parliaments before joining the group secretariat. In the empirical 
analysis, the level of professional and political experience is assessed in 
relation to the personal factors. Political affiliation and experience are 
expected to indicate (to some extent) the level of affinity with the group’s 
objectives. Such affinity is expected to have a positive impact on gaining 
politicians’ trust, developing an informal network and political sensitivity. In 
the subsequent chapters the extent to which these personal factors 
determine the assumption of a political role is discussed.  
 
Finally, advisors’ sense of loyalty to the group may be a way to assess 
political affinity. The next sub-section addresses the survey findings in 
respect to the qualities that are deemed most important for group advisors. 
‘Loyalty to the group’ was included among the answer options that 
respondents were asked to rank. Only 20 listed it as one of the three most 
important: five ECR advisors, four ALDE, EPP, and S&D advisors, and three 
GUE/NGL advisors. The loyalty of advisors is expected to notably affect the 
extent to which they are trusted by the MEP.  
 
3.2.3 Competencies of the EP group advisor  
As discussed above, the Staff Regulations allow political groups to set 
‘special conditions’ when justified in the interest of the service. This sub-
section considers the desired competencies of EP group advisors, drawing 
from the analysis of vacancy notices for group advisor posts. It 
subsequently addresses linguistic skills, general knowledge and skills, and 
the qualities deemed most important for group advisors. The conditions set 
by the groups are discussed in relation to the survey findings. 
 
  
172
Chapter 3 
 
 
Linguistic skills of group advisors 
Job openings related to the support of parliamentary committees are usually 
connected to a specific language group (see Appendix I). Although 
recruitment officially is not according to nationality, the linguistic 
requirements produce national distributions of staff that are closely related 
to the national distribution of MEPs in the group. For example, Spanish or 
Finnish speaking advisors are recruited to support the work of respectively 
the Spanish and Finnish delegations (GUE/NGL, 2016 and EPP, 2011 
notices). As part of the special conditions, linguistic requirements state that 
candidates are either native speakers or have ‘a thorough knowledge’ of the 
language in question. Additional linguistic skills generally demand 
candidates to be proficient in one or two other languages (‘good’ or 
‘excellent’ knowledge). Sometimes a third language is mentioned as an 
asset and in all analysed vacancy notices candidates’ knowledge of further 
EU languages is said to be taken into account. Most frequently, the 
additional linguistic requirements refer to the common EP working 
languages English, French, and German.  
 
As is to be expected in an international and multicultural environment, 
group advisors are true polyglots according to the data gathered through 
the survey. More than three quarters of respondents indicate to speak at 
least four languages. These numbers include their mother tongue, and the 
languages in which they say to have full or intermediate professional 
proficiency. Moreover, nearly a quarter of respondents claim to be a native 
speaker in multiple languages. It is noteworthy, however, that despite this 
evidence and the linguistic requirements described above, political advisors 
rank ‘language skills’ among the least important skills required to fulfil their 
responsibilities (see figure 3.2.3). The findings therefore lead us to believe 
that because multilingualism is ubiquitous in the EP it is not considered a 
distinctive quality of advisors.   
 
 
 
General knowledge and skills of group advisors 
The vacancy analysis exposes a series of recurring special conditions 
regarding prescribed knowledge or skills (see appendix I). First of all, a 
thorough knowledge of the EU institutional structure and decision-making 
processes is basic to the desired profile of political advisors. Second, the 
job description for political advisors stipulates that a conceptual or 
methodological approach is necessary, and that suitable candidates should 
be able to grasp wide-ranging problems. Accordingly, in the survey both 
the knowledge of EP procedures and analytical skills score high among the 
most important qualities advisors should possess (see figure 3.2.3).26  
 
A third prerequisite encountered in all of the vacancy notices is a certain 
level of flexibility. Job descriptions impose great ‘availability’, ‘flexibility’, 
‘adaptability’ (to varying workloads), and 
the capacity to ‘respond rapidly to changing circumstances’. Other qualities 
frequently listed in the profile are judgement, team player and good 
communication skills. 
 
Drawing from this information gathered through document analysis as well 
as several informal interviews, the questionnaire was designed (see 2.5.3). 
One of the multiple-choice questions asked respondents to rank the top 
three competencies of a group advisor (out of 12 answer options). Figure 
3.2.3 illustrates the response. The qualities overall rated the highest by 
advisors are policy expertise, able negotiator, analytical skills, and 
knowledge of EP procedures. Respectively 45, 42, 38, and 33 per cent of 
respondents mentioned these qualities. No significant variation across the 
groups was encountered. However, a difference is observed between 
advisors with and those without prior professional experience in the EP.  
  
                                   
26 See Appendix III, response to SQ5. 
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Both subsets appraise policy expertise and negotiation skills as the most 
important qualities needed. Yet, EP experienced respondents accredit 
considerable greater value to the knowledge of EP procedures: 40 per cent 
versus 29 per cent of those without EP experience. The opposite applies to 
the appraisal of analytical skills, although the variation is smaller: 33 per 
cent (EP experienced) versus 45 per cent (those without EP experience). 
 
The four qualities identified (perceived) as most important closely relate to 
the developed typology of advice. The link between policy expertise and the 
Policy Expert role is rather clear-cut. The same applies to able negotiator 
and the Broker role. Analytical skills can be construed in relation to the 
analysis and pre-sorting of information (Information Manager role). Finally, 
the knowledge of EP procedures can be connected to advice on formal and 
informal procedures of the institution (Process Manager role). These 
findings are a first indication that group advisors perceive the four types of 
advice to be relevant. The next section addresses each of the roles in 
relation to group advisors’ activities as found from the document analysis. 
The extent to which they in fact fulfil the four roles is then assessed by 
further analysis of the survey and interview data in chapters 4-7. 
 
3.3  Activities of the EP group advisor in relation to the 
framework 
The operationalisation of the general concepts to the practice of the EP 
commands a general understanding of the profile and activities of group 
advisors. In addition to the information presented in the previous section, 
the vacancy notices provide insight into the main activities. The document 
analysis has identified similar tasks and required competencies for group 
advisor posts, regardless of the contractual status, function group, or grade. 
Yet, a difference in the degree of responsibility and discretion granted to 
AST and AD advisors is expected. The tasks listed in the encountered AST 
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job descriptions (grade 1-4) very closely resemble those of AD-level 
notices. However, secretarial assistance is emphasised over involvement in 
policy-making. Yet, the notices include activities that could be classified as 
process management, information management, or brokering too.  
 
This section provides the key activities and responsibilities of advisors and 
relates them to the four roles of the analytical framework. It furthermore 
formulates some preliminary expectations regarding the adoption of the 
four ideal-type roles by EP group advisors. The discussion is limited to what 
can be derived from the literature and the analysis of group advisor vacancy 
notices. A more elaborate discussion of the theoretical technical and political 
dimensions of the roles is included as introductory sections to the chapters 
4-7 that present the empirical findings. 
 
3.3.1 Process management activities 
From the literature, two central elements of process management are 
derived: (1) organisational support, and (2) advice on the legislative 
process, parliamentary procedures, and informal practices of the institution. 
In respect to the first, a standard duty that is encountered in the job 
description of group advisors is the organisation and follow-up of meetings 
(see Appendix I). Considering the literature on intra-group coordination 
practices, such support is likely to first of all relate to the preparation of the 
group meetings (Corbett et al, 2011: 113). In addition, group advisors’ 
involvement is conceivable in the (public) seminars and conferences groups 
organise. These events on specific topical issues take place in cooperation 
with external stakeholders as a way to tap into external sources of expertise 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 119 and EP political groups’ websites, consulted 
August 2016).  
 
 
 
 
With regard to the provision of procedural advice, it is important to note 
that matters of procedure and timing of the legislative process are generally 
considered the domain of the EP committee secretariats (e.g. Neunreither, 
2002). Nevertheless, the vacancy notices provide cause to believe that 
group advisors are (at least) indirectly involved. The main indication for this 
expectation is the reference to drawing up the so-called ‘voting lists’ as part 
of their duties (see Appendix I). This activity is linked to the order of the 
votes and voting instructions that groups generally issue to their members 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 121). Instructions not only indicate how to vote on 
each amendment and text but also stipulate which votes are important 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 121). A second indication for group advisors’ 
involvement in procedural matters is their responsibility for ‘politically and 
technically coherent parliamentary positions’ (see Appendix I). Considering 
this responsibility in relation to the voting lists raises the expectation that 
advisors provide advice regarding technical accuracy and political coherence 
of legislative texts. Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis of the Process 
Manager role, exploring the technical and political dimensions and the 
circumstances that affect the adoption of the role in practice.   
 
3.3.2 Information management 
From the literature, three central elements of information management are 
derived: (1) gathering information, (2) processing information, and (3) 
distributing information. The vacancy notice analysis showed that 
‘information tasks’ are listed as part of the standard duties of EP political 
group administrators (see Appendix I). Such activities can obviously entail 
a variety of things that remain unspecified in the job descriptions. 
Considering ‘information tasks’ in light of the scholarly debate, the 
expectation is that group advisors process information by selecting the 
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sources and content of information in order to present the most relevant 
pieces of information to the MEP.27 
 
Another rather general duty listed in the vacancy notices is ‘communication 
tasks’. Again turning to the literature for inspiration these activities could 
be tied to the internal and external exchange of information. Cooperation 
and interplay at staff level within and between EU institutions facilitates the 
legislative process (Patterson, 1970; Christiansen, 2002). From this the 
possibility is inferred that group advisors gather and distribute information 
through informal interchange at staff level, both within and outside the EP. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical analysis of the Information Manager role, 
exploring the technical and political dimensions and the circumstances that 
affect the adoption of the role in practice.   
 
3.3.3  Policy expertise 
From the literature, two central elements of policy expertise are derived: 
(1) providing policy-related advice and (2) drafting legislative texts or policy 
documents. The provision of ‘policy advice’ is encountered in the job 
description of group advisors. The duties listed in the vacancy notices also 
include the drawing up of ‘parliamentary positions’, drafting amendments, 
and resolutions as part of the political advisor’s duties (see Appendix I).   
 
With the expanded workload of the EP and the growing amount of informal 
trilogues the need for substantive policy-related input increased (see 
1.1.1). Parliament values its independent information position from the 
executive it controls (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2017). For MEPs 
to be able to make an assessment of the policy or legislative proposals on 
                                   
27 This expectation draws on an extensive literature review included in the introduction. 
The main sources for inspiration are: Neunreither, 2002, Winzen, 2011, and Busby, 
2013. 
 
 
 
the table, it can be assumed that they are in need of technical assistance 
to match the expertise present in the Council and the EC. Among the listed 
responsibilities of group advisors we find ‘participating in the legislative 
work of the parliamentary committees’. Usually one or several 
parliamentary committees are specified (see Appendix I). From this we can 
assume that the advice provided by political advisors is tied to a specific 
policy area. Chapter 6 presents the empirical analysis of the Policy Expert 
role, exploring the technical and political dimensions and the circumstances 
that affect the adoption of the role in practice.   
 
3.3.4  Brokering 
From the literature, two central elements of brokering are derived that 
apply both to intra- and inter-group negotiations: (1) facilitating 
compromises by providing advice on negotiation strategies and (2) 
mediating compromises on behalf of the MEP. The studies of Neunreither 
(2002) and Egeberg and colleagues (2013) raise the expectation that group 
advisors – to a greater extent than other EP staff – facilitate and coordinate 
compromises within the EP. The so-called ‘group line’ is defined by a process 
of internal discussion and negotiation between the national delegations of 
the political group (see 1.3.1). From the vacancy notice analysis the 
conclusion can be drawn that in this intra-group coordination process 
advisors are responsible for securing the group’s overall objectives and 
preserving consistency between past and future positions (see Appendix I). 
Considering this responsibility in light of the groups’ working methods (see 
1.3.1 and 1.3.2), it is proposed that advisors mediate between (potentially) 
conflicting issues within the group and possibly propose or negotiate 
alternative or compromise positions. Since the EFD group has the lowest 
cohesion, advisors employed by this group are expected to form an 
exception and not, or to a lesser extent, adopt the intra-group Broker role.  
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In the vacancy notices, GUE/NGL is the only group that explicitly refers to 
an intermediate function the advisor should fulfil by way of liaising with 
other political groups, the EP General Secretariat, and with the national 
press and NGOs (GUE/NGL, 2016). The Code of Conduct (2008) for inter-
institutional negotiations suggests a potential role for advisors in the 
preparation of these negotiations. Representation of all political groups – 
‘at least at staff level’ – is prescribed. The Code of Conduct furthermore 
refers to an ‘administrative support team’ that at least includes the 
committee secretariat, political advisor of the rapporteur, co-decision 
secretariat and the legal service (see 1.3.3). The empirical analysis for the 
Broker role is presented in chapter 7. This examination examines whether 
an inter-group Broker role is assumed, and if so, how this may differ across 
the groups. 
 
3.4  Concluding remarks 
Before discussing the empirical findings, this chapter linked the abstract 
conceptual approaches regarding political advice to the specific context of 
the EP. The discussion concluded that MEPs rely on three internal sources 
of advice in the preparation of legislation and policy: EP officials, group 
advisors, and MEP assistants. The literature is congruent in finding that the 
source of assistance varies at the discretion of the MEP in charge. 
Connecting the insights from the literature to the definition of political 
advice leads to the expectation that the activities of EP staff are situated in 
the mixed sphere of activity. Notwithstanding, political advice as defined for 
the purpose of this study is predominantly the domain of MEP assistants 
and group advisors. This study focuses on the latter as they remain a 
virtually unstudied group of actors and fulfil a primary role in the intra-
parliamentary coordination of political positions.  
 
 
 
 
The second part of the chapter provided a description of group advisors’ 
profile and background stemming from the need to acquire a basic overview 
of who they are and what they do. The presented findings from the survey 
and the document analysis already reveal considerable differences between 
the groups: advisors’ function levels, duration in office, and prior experience 
varies across the groups. The differences are further explored in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
The presented findings are furthermore a first indication that the role of 
group advisors can be associated with the four types of advice. Tasks that 
can be categorised as process management and policy expertise were 
explicitly encountered in the analysed vacancy notices. While information 
tasks are listed as a responsibility of the group advisor, it remains unclear 
from the job description what such tasks entail. Although the vacancy 
notices merely imply brokering activities, group advisors are expected to 
facilitate and coordinate compromises within the EP. With the exception of 
the GUE/NGL group, only the advisor’s contribution to the internal 
coordination process is mentioned in vacancy notices. The adoption of each 
of the roles by EP group advisors is assessed in the following chapters, as 
well as the circumstances determining the provision of advice and advisors’ 
room for improvisation.   
181
3
Operationalising political advice in the European parliament 
 
 
In the vacancy notices, GUE/NGL is the only group that explicitly refers to 
an intermediate function the advisor should fulfil by way of liaising with 
other political groups, the EP General Secretariat, and with the national 
press and NGOs (GUE/NGL, 2016). The Code of Conduct (2008) for inter-
institutional negotiations suggests a potential role for advisors in the 
preparation of these negotiations. Representation of all political groups – 
‘at least at staff level’ – is prescribed. The Code of Conduct furthermore 
refers to an ‘administrative support team’ that at least includes the 
committee secretariat, political advisor of the rapporteur, co-decision 
secretariat and the legal service (see 1.3.3). The empirical analysis for the 
Broker role is presented in chapter 7. This examination examines whether 
an inter-group Broker role is assumed, and if so, how this may differ across 
the groups. 
 
3.4  Concluding remarks 
Before discussing the empirical findings, this chapter linked the abstract 
conceptual approaches regarding political advice to the specific context of 
the EP. The discussion concluded that MEPs rely on three internal sources 
of advice in the preparation of legislation and policy: EP officials, group 
advisors, and MEP assistants. The literature is congruent in finding that the 
source of assistance varies at the discretion of the MEP in charge. 
Connecting the insights from the literature to the definition of political 
advice leads to the expectation that the activities of EP staff are situated in 
the mixed sphere of activity. Notwithstanding, political advice as defined for 
the purpose of this study is predominantly the domain of MEP assistants 
and group advisors. This study focuses on the latter as they remain a 
virtually unstudied group of actors and fulfil a primary role in the intra-
parliamentary coordination of political positions.  
 
 
 
 
The second part of the chapter provided a description of group advisors’ 
profile and background stemming from the need to acquire a basic overview 
of who they are and what they do. The presented findings from the survey 
and the document analysis already reveal considerable differences between 
the groups: advisors’ function levels, duration in office, and prior experience 
varies across the groups. The differences are further explored in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
The presented findings are furthermore a first indication that the role of 
group advisors can be associated with the four types of advice. Tasks that 
can be categorised as process management and policy expertise were 
explicitly encountered in the analysed vacancy notices. While information 
tasks are listed as a responsibility of the group advisor, it remains unclear 
from the job description what such tasks entail. Although the vacancy 
notices merely imply brokering activities, group advisors are expected to 
facilitate and coordinate compromises within the EP. With the exception of 
the GUE/NGL group, only the advisor’s contribution to the internal 
coordination process is mentioned in vacancy notices. The adoption of each 
of the roles by EP group advisors is assessed in the following chapters, as 
well as the circumstances determining the provision of advice and advisors’ 
room for improvisation.   
  
 
CHAPTER 4. PROCESS MANAGER  
The analytical framework comprises four roles that advisors may adopt, 
each potentially containing a political dimension. The previous chapter 
operationalised the general concepts of the framework and applied them to 
the specifics of group advisors in the European Parliament (EP). 28 This 
chapter presents the analysis of the Process Manager role. The ideal-type 
role comprises two central elements: (1) organisational support, and (2) 
procedural advice. To address the research question ‘under which 
conditions can advisors adopt a political role’ three analytical steps are 
carried out.  
 
The first step is to assess whether the ideal-type role is in fact adopted and 
what it entails in practice. 4.1.1 examines the theoretical dimensions of 
process management. Expectations with regard to the adoption of the 
Process Manager role are put forward, drawing from the literature review 
(see introduction) and complemented with the performed document 
analysis. The discussion in 4.1.2 then assesses these projections in light of 
the empirical data. The findings show that group advisors assume the 
Process Manager role and that activities go beyond the conceptualised 
scope.  
 
The second step of the analysis is to assess the political scope of the Process 
Manager role. The extent to which the role is political is assessed with the 
use of the modes of discretion that have been developed as part of the 
analytical framework. In this respect, section 4.2 considers advisors’ room 
for manoeuvre when fulfilling the political dimensions of information 
                                   
28 Advisors employed by one of the EP party groups and assigned to follow the work of 
one or several of the parliamentary committees are the focus of this study. Throughout 
the analysis ‘advisors’ or ‘group advisors’ refers to this type of advisors. 
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management. This is approached by, on the one hand (4.2.1), examining 
the extent to which advisors receive instructions or input from the Members 
of the EP (MEPs), and on the other hand (4.2.2), the degree to which 
advisors can show initiative or improvise. The research shows that in 
addition to practical procedural assistance and information, advisors fulfil a 
guiding and signalling role in which they interpret texts in relation to the 
position of the group and anticipate potential incoherence, conflict, or 
inconsistency. It is concluded that advisors manifest political behaviour for 
the majority of activities. Findings show that in the preparatory process in 
which process management is key advisors are not explicitly told what to 
do. Instead, the advice or support offered is guided by what advisors deem 
to be in line with the priorities or position of the group. 
 
Finally, section 4.3 evaluates the impact of the personal and contextual 
factors on the adoption of the role by group advisors. The analysis concludes 
that trust and political sensitivity are indispensable for pro-active process 
management, whereas complexity and politicisation have a restricting 
impact on some of the process management activities of group advisors. 
 
4.1 The nature of process management in the EP 
This section introduces the theoretical dimensions of the Process Manager 
role (4.1.1). The ideal-type role entails two elements: (1) organisational 
support, and (2) advice on the legislative process, formal procedures and 
informal practices. These elements are explored and related to the 
document analysis on the profile and duties of EP group advisors in order 
to infer expectations regarding the adoption of the role (see 3.3.3). 
 
4.1.2 then presents the empirical findings for the Process Manager role. The 
theoretical expectations are assessed in light of the collected survey and 
interview data. The findings disclose that while group advisors assume the 
 
 
 
role, the encountered organisational support goes beyond the conceptual 
scope of organising and following up on meetings. Instead, it encompasses 
the broader informal intra-group preparation of decision-making. 
 
4.1.1  The theoretical dimensions of process management  
This sub-section draws on the theory and document analysis with the aim 
of identifying the technical and political dimensions of process 
management. The analytical framework defines two central elements of the 
role: (1) organisational support, and (2) procedural advice.29  
 
The first element of process management is operationalised as the 
organisation and follow-up of group meetings, seminars and conferences 
with external stakeholders (see 3.3.1). A standard duty that is encountered 
in the job description of group advisors is the organisation and follow-up of 
meetings (see Appendix I). The literature review on the functioning of the 
intra-group coordination process revealed that groups generally set out to 
coordinate their views internally in order to maximise their impact on a 
legislative outcome (see 1.3.1 for a more elaborate discussion of intra-
group coordination efforts). Organisational support is therefore first of all 
expected to involve the preparation of ‘group meetings’ (Corbett et al, 
2011: 113). In addition, group advisors’ involvement is conceivable in the 
(public) seminars and conferences groups organise. These events on 
specific topical issues take place in cooperation with external stakeholders 
as a way to tap into external sources of expertise (Corbett et al, 2011: 119 
and EP political groups’ websites).  
 
                                   
29 The definition is based on an extensive literature review (see introduction) and draws 
on Congressional ‘Office of the Parliamentarian’ in: European Parliament, 2000; Ryle, 
1981; Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; Tallberg, 2004; Winzen, 2011; Busby, 2013; 
Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015. 
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Procedural advice is conceptualised in relation to the legislative process, 
formal procedures and informal practices (Neunreither, 2002; Högenauer 
and Neuhold, 2015). It is important to note that matters of procedure and 
planning the decision-making process are generally considered the domain 
of the EP committee secretariats (Neunreither, 2002). Nevertheless, the 
analysis of vacancy notices provides cause to believe that group advisors 
are (at least) indirectly involved. Chapter 3 operationalised this element of 
process management as advisors’ involvement in the preparation of voting 
lists. Prior to each vote in Parliament, members are provided with voting 
instructions about how to vote on each amendment and texts, and about 
which votes are considered important from the perspective of the group. 
These ‘voting lists’ are prepared and circulated by the group advisors in 
close cooperation with the group coordinator (Corbett et al, 2011: 121).30 
The extent to which the groups coordinate activities and positions – and 
thus draw up voting instructions for their members - varies considerably 
(see 1.3.2). Previous studies show that the EFD has the lowest group 
cohesion. 31  EFD advisors’ involvement in the voting lists is therefore 
expected to be restricted to advice provided to individual MEPs, or to be 
irrelevant for this subset of advisors. Another activity related to decision-
making procedures is the verification of submitted amendments. From the 
vacancy notices that were examined, it is inferred that advisors may be 
responsible for checking amendments and legislative texts on behalf of the 
group in order to safeguard technical accurateness and political coherence. 
These expectations are further supported by the literature on the working 
methods of the EP party groups discussing group discipline and whipping 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 121).  
 
                                   
30 For each committee, political groups designate a ‘coordinator’ (Rule 205, EP 
procedures) who takes the lead in developing the group’s position (see 1.2.1). 
31 ALDE, ECR, EFD, EPP, GREENS/EFA, GUE/NGL, S&D are the party groups considered in 
the analysis. See 1.3 for the discussion on intra-group coordination.  
 
 
 
In the framework, political advice is defined as a mixed sphere of activity 
that comprises technical and political dimensions (see 2.1.2). Political tasks 
are conceived to contain value or ideological appraisals, the anticipation of 
priorities or objectives, and the use of implicit knowledge or tactics (see 
2.1.2). Technical tasks are void of such judgement by the advisor. 
Organisational support at the outset may appear to be of a purely technical 
nature. For example, it is conceivable that advisors in the organisation of 
meetings or conferences arrange a room or venue, provide for catering 
services, send out invitations, and administer attendance. Yet, activities 
that may require their judgment are not unthinkable in this regard. The 
literature offers some suggestions as to possible political aspects of process 
management. The role of staff is acknowledged in the pre-selection of 
relevant issues and actor involvement (Winzen, 2011). Relating these 
activities to the organisation of group meetings or events with external 
stakeholders, it can be proposed that advisors contribute to the shaping of 
the agenda. They may, for example, advise on topics or priorities for 
discussion, or recommend whom to invite. Similarly, the follow-up of 
meetings by advisors may require them to interpret certain statements or 
decisions, in terms of the desired outcome and strategy to realise that 
outcome.   
 
Procedural advice may be based on formal documents and relate to 
parliamentary procedures. However, this is mostly expected to be the role 
of EP officials in the committee secretariat. Group officials are expected to 
rather advise on voting lists and the accuracy and coherence of 
amendments. Technical aspects of the role are conceivable in situations 
where the advisor merely informs MEPs on procedural matters that are not 
open to interpretation, or simply administers what the MEP in charge 
instructs.  
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Figure 4.1.1 illustrates the theoretical dimensions of process management. 
Relating organisational support to what we know from the literature it is 
inferred that group advisors’ responsibilities for internal and external 
meetings include political tasks, specifically agenda structuring and actor 
involvement. The political dimension of procedural advice is linked to the 
preparation of voting lists that entails indicating the level of importance, 
providing recommendations on how to vote; and to checking amendments 
for technical accurateness and political coherence. Technical aspects of 
process management are the organisation and follow-up of meetings, and 
advice based on formal documents and procedures.  
 
4.1.2  Adoption of the Process Manager Role in practice 
The conducted empirical research demonstrates that EP group advisors 
adopt the Process Manager role and that it entails both technical and 
political tasks. Yet, the findings suggest that advisors mainly fulfil the 
political dimensions of the Process Manager role. Moreover, the data reveal 
that organisational support goes beyond the tasks that were conceptualised 
from the literature and the document analysis. Organisational support is 
most prominently tied to the organisation of the intra-group coordination 
process. Advisors have the opportunity to shape the agenda of group 
meetings and selectively involve MEPs. The discussion below presents the 
survey and interview findings. It first considers the relative importance of 
Figure 4.1.1 Theoretical dimensions of process management 
 
 
 
process management, and then assesses the organisational and advice 
elements of the role.   
 
Advisors’ perception of process management 
In an open-ended question, respondents were asked to name their most 
important responsibility. 23 per cent put forward tasks that may be labelled 
as process management (see figure 4.1.2).  
 
The further analysis of the answers reveals two categories of tasks: 12 per 
cent refer to the preparation of voting lists while 11 per cent point to tasks 
that relate to the organisation of the legislative process. In the latter 
category, ‘process management of parliamentary work’ (SR52) is for 
example said to entail the coordination of amendments, planning of the 
overall coordination process and ensuring that deadlines and procedures 
are respected (SR13, 68, 74, 93).32 Voting lists define the group’s preferred 
voting outcome, i.e. the adoption or rejection of amendments, and can be 
considered as voting advice provided to the members.  
 
                                   
32 Survey respondents (SR) and interviewees (I) are coded according to the order in 
which the responses were received and the interviews conducted. See Appendices III and 
V for an overview. 
Figure 4.1.2 Relative importance attached to process management 
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Compared to the other groups, ECR and EFD appear to attach greater value 
to process management. Four out of 12 ECR and three out of six EFD 
respondents name it as most important. This finding may be interpreted in 
light of the nature of these groups. ECR has a rather pragmatic group 
culture. Internal ideological differences are small and the national 
delegations have a large degree of autonomy (interviews ECR advisors). 
These characteristics likely reduce the need for intra-group coordination 
(see 1.3.1). Like the ECR, the EFD group is dominated by several large 
national delegations. Moreover, the group does not coordinate its positions 
internally and is reputed for being formed for technical reasons (material 
and procedural benefits, see 1.1.2). Finally, the Eurosceptic stance of the 
EFD makes that at least a substantial part of its members are less prone to 
contribute to legislation (I.23). 
 
All but three interviewees discussed the importance of preparing voting lists 
and providing members with advice on how to vote. This activity is 
considered ‘a very political and influential role’ of the advisor (I.3). The EFD 
does not draw up voting lists and advisors are assigned to a national 
delegation. Nonetheless, advisors may give recommendations regarding the 
support of specific (sets of) amendments, for example after consultation 
with the EPP (interview EFD advisor). The reported involvement in the 
organisation of the legislative process is more diffuse and further discussed 
below.  
 
Organisational support 
From the theory and document analysis it is inferred that advisors are 
involved in the organisation and follow-up of group meetings and events 
with external stakeholders (see 4.1.1). Survey findings demonstrate that 
advisors, in addition to their work within the parliamentary committees, 
spend time on group activities. For the majority of respondents, 
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parliamentary committee work takes up 80 per cent of their time.33 Yet, 92 
per cent admits that they are involved in group activities too, on which they 
spend around 20 per cent of their time. Drawing from the qualitative data, 
such tasks are expected to most prominently relate to the preparation of 
group meetings. 15 interviewees mention their role in these preparations,34 
of whom 13 say that they pre-select issues for discussion.35 Most groups 
organise preparatory (‘prep’) meetings to coordinate their position ahead of 
committee meetings (see 1.3). The main task of advisors then is to make 
sure that contentious or sensitive issues are tabled for discussion in a 
subsequent group meeting in order to ensure that they are discussed at 
group level. 
 
In addition to the close cooperation with the group coordinator and 
(shadow) rapporteur, 11 interviewees discuss the (selective) involvement 
of MEPs in both the informal and the formal coordination process. 36  
Advisors ‘decide’ which MEPs to (actively) involve (I.7). In the formal sense 
this may entail organising deputies when a member cannot be present 
(I.0.1-0.4, 6). Several interviewees also described a more informal role in 
relation to informing and involving members (I.5, 7, 22). They see it as 
their responsibility to make sure that the coordination process is 
‘transparent’ (I.22) and that the members of the group ‘do not feel 
excluded’ (I.5). 
 
Contrary to what was hypothesised when conceiving the ideal-type role, the 
empirical data suggest a minor involvement in the organisation of events 
with external stakeholders. Only two interviewees refer to the organisation 
of seminars. Activities are said to include the selection of topics, titles, and 
                                   
33 See Appendix III, response to SQ8. 
34 I.0.2, 0.4, 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12-15, 17, 18, 21, 22. 
35 I.0.2, 0.4, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22. 
36 I.0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 2, 5, 6, 7, 18, 22. 
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to process management. Four out of 12 ECR and three out of six EFD 
respondents name it as most important. This finding may be interpreted in 
light of the nature of these groups. ECR has a rather pragmatic group 
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with external stakeholders (see 4.1.1). Survey findings demonstrate that 
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spend time on group activities. For the majority of respondents, 
 
 
 
parliamentary committee work takes up 80 per cent of their time.33 Yet, 92 
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‘transparent’ (I.22) and that the members of the group ‘do not feel 
excluded’ (I.5). 
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of seminars. Activities are said to include the selection of topics, titles, and 
                                   
33 See Appendix III, response to SQ8. 
34 I.0.2, 0.4, 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12-15, 17, 18, 21, 22. 
35 I.0.2, 0.4, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22. 
36 I.0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 2, 5, 6, 7, 18, 22. 
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speakers (I.0.3, 3). It may be that such activities are simply not deemed 
important or substantial enough to bring up in the interviews or survey 
responses. Alternatively, only a very small proportion of advisors deal with 
these practical matters.  
 
The data instead provide strong evidence of a different type of 
organisational support, relating to the overall coordination of the legislative 
process. Examples of this activity were encountered in both the survey and 
the interviews. Advisors should be able to ‘guide MEPs through the policy 
process’ (SR87) and facilitate ‘the smooth running of the machinery’ 
(SR81). As was discussed above, 11 per cent of survey respondents identify 
this form of support as their core responsibility. Additionally, all but three 
interviewees highlight their role in organising the legislative process. Such 
activities focus on the intra-group coordination process, in particular in the 
committee phase. They range from more administrative tasks to advice 
about the submission of amendments or actor involvement.  
 
The qualitative data disclose that this kind of support relates to more 
practical issues such as planning issues, respecting formal EP procedures 
and deadlines. This responsibility was underlined in the open-ended 
answers of 13 survey respondents and came up in six of the interviews.37 
Broadly speaking advisors take care of the ‘management of reports’ life-
cycle’ (SR49), something that requires ‘good coordination work and 
planning’ (SR50). The survey findings furthermore highlight the importance 
of the knowledge of EP procedures. 33 per cent of respondents rank it 
among the most important competencies of group advisors (see 3.2.3). 
From the qualitative data it is inferred that having an understanding of 
procedures is instrumental in the coordination of the legislative process (I.1, 
                                   
37 I.0.1, 0.5, 1, 15, 17, 21; open-ended responses of SR13, 31, 43, 49-53, 68, 74, 81, 
93, 98. 
 
 
 
7, 21). More specific tasks that were identified are the distribution of 
speaking time that is discussed at staff level (I.17) and ensuring that ‘all 
MEPs turn up to vote at the right time and place’ (I.15).  
 
The interview and survey findings show that for process management tasks 
advisors’ main point of contact at the political level is the group coordinator 
of the respective parliamentary committee (see 1.2.1 for an introduction of 
the key actors at political level). All official communication about the 
legislative work passes through the committee secretariats. EP officials 
submit and distribute all the formal documents, incoming and outgoing 
information from and to the other EU institutions, as well as invitations for 
meetings between the rapporteur and shadows (I. 6, 10). Our job is to get 
‘the best information possible and place it at the right time and using the 
right tools’ (SR51). Advisors state that they act as the link between the EP 
committee secretariat that is in charge of formal process management and 
the MEP.38 This cooperation is further confirmed by the survey data with 
regard to the interaction between EP staff. Most advisors report that they 
have weekly contact with EP officials (see table 5.1a). 
 
In addition to these organisational tasks, advisors may be involved in a 
more strategic type of coordination. Although practices differ per group, 
advisors may attempt to manage the process of amendment submission.39 
After the presentation of the draft report by a rapporteur in committee, a 
deadline for tabling amendments is set. Following the vote in committee the 
rapporteur amends the report to take account of the amendments adopted 
by the committee before it is tabled in plenary (see 1.3.4). The extent to 
which advisors take initiative or are allowed to coordinate amendment 
submission is further discussed in 4.2.2. 
                                   
38 I.0.4, 0.5, 1, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 21; open-ended responses of SR18, 93. 
39 I.2, 3, 5, 10, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22; SR74.  
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Another more strategic activity that can be considered in light of planning 
and actor involvement is advisors’ contribution to the appointment of 
rapporteurs. In the preparatory phase of decision-making, groups 
determine their priorities with regard to the acquisition of rapporteurships. 
As part of this preparation, advisors for example provide background 
information as to which rapporteurships the group can attain in relation to 
the points system of d’Hondt, 40 take stock of which MEPs may have a 
specific interest for certain files, and whether these MEPs can then count on 
the support of the group (I.0.1, 0.4, 0.5). One interviewee who had worked 
for both the IMCO and LIBE committees explained that the dynamic in 
committees with respect to the distribution of reports differs. In IMCO it is 
always the group with the highest points that gets to choose first. In LIBE 
advisors send out e-mails to the members listing the upcoming reports and 
taking stock of who is interested. This finding suggests that the working 
practices and culture in the various parliamentary committees vary, and 
that these practices may affect the role of the advisor.  
 
Procedural advice 
The empirical research confirms that group 
advisors provide procedural advice to MEPs. The 
findings, however, mainly highlight the political 
dimension of this type of advice. Two core 
activities are encountered in this respect: on the 
one hand, advisors advise on the accuracy and 
political coherence of (legislative) draft texts, 
and on the other hand, they issue voting 
recommendations. The responsibility for the so-
                                   
40 Rapporteurships are allotted by a points system based on groups’ share of seats in 
Parliament. Each group receives a quota of points and the groups’ coordinators bargain 
over the final allocation of subjects (Corbett et al, 2011). See 1.2.1 for a more elaborate 
discussion on the allocation of rapporteurships and the d’Hondt system. 
Figure 4.1.2a Preparation 
of voting lists 
 
 
 
called voting lists is a core task of group advisors. Illustrated by figure 
4.1.2a, all survey respondents claim that they prepare voting lists.41 12 per 
cent of respondents designate it their most important responsibility (see 
figure 4.1.2). Only three interviewees do not mention their involvement in 
the preparation of voting lists. 42  The qualitative data reveal that the 
composite nature of this activity. Advisors first verify and comment on the 
voting list drafted by the committee secretariat. Once that list is approved, 
they provide their members with voting indications.  
 
16 advisors expanded on what the preparation of voting lists entails.43  Prior 
to a vote in committee or plenary, the EP committee secretariat drafts a 
voting list that comprises all the amendments submitted. Group advisors 
check and comment on the list (I.18). In addition, they negotiate with the 
committee secretariat and counterparts on the order of the vote (I.2, 3, 10, 
11, 20). Group advisors for example argue what amendment(s) should take 
priority in the voting order and what amendments should fall if another is 
adopted or rejected (I.3, 7, 11, 15, 20). In addition, 20 advisors state that 
they verify texts for political and technical coherence on behalf of the 
group.44 Advisors are responsible for avoiding any conflicting statements in 
amendments submitted by different members of their group, checking the 
‘political logic’, coherence with previous group positions, and possible 
clashes with the overall group position (I.0.4; SR25, SR40, SR62). “We are 
responsible for a coherent end-product that the majority can sign up to. 
The worst thing would be a chaotic report” (I.11).  
 
The second element of the preparation of voting lists relates to the voting 
advice provided to the members. In the run-up to a vote, advisors annotate 
                                   
41 See Appendix III, analysis SQ7. 
42 I.12, 16, 19. 
43 I.0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 2, 3, 5, 7-11, 14, 15, 20; open-ended responses SR67, SR74. 
44 I.0.4, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8-11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21; SR25, 28, 40, 62, 67, 74. 
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41 See Appendix III, analysis SQ7. 
42 I.12, 16, 19. 
43 I.0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 2, 3, 5, 7-11, 14, 15, 20; open-ended responses SR67, SR74. 
44 I.0.4, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8-11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21; SR25, 28, 40, 62, 67, 74. 
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the voting list with recommendations on how to vote. This task was 
highlighted by 17 interviewees. 45  “Preparing voting lists is one of our 
clearest tasks. Sometimes if you have a reliable assistant you can send 
them the list and they fill it in but it is always the advisor’s task to look at 
it and make sure that all the voting recommendations, indications are right” 
(I.18). Voting lists ‘resumes all the work previously done’ (SR48) and 
advisors have to ensure that the group’s position is reflected in the vote 
(SR25, 62, 67). This illustrates that the provided voting advice is actually 
the outcome of the intra-group coordination process, and that the advisor 
bases the recommendations on prior deliberations that have taken place in 
the group.  
 
Several respondents state that for MEPs the voting lists for plenary sessions 
are a particularly important step in the parliamentary process. This is when 
the group’s position ‘is expressed to outside world (SR75) and ‘results of 
the vote can be accessed by journalists or the external public’ (SR8).  
 
To conclude, organisational support goes beyond the conceptual scope of 
organising and following up on meetings. It encompasses the overall 
coordination of the legislative process. The analysis shows that advisors’ 
contribution pre-eminently lies in the informal intra-group preparation of 
decision-making. It is found that advisors shape the agenda of internal 
group meetings and play a role in (selectively) involving MEPs in the 
legislative process. They are furthermore closely involved in the preparation 
of voting lists. In this process they check the work of the EP committee 
secretariat and subsequently provide the group with voting 
recommendations. The political scope of these activities is further 
considered in section 4.2. 
 
                                   
45 I.0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21. 
 
 
 
4.2  Assessment of the political scope of process 
management 
The findings confirm that there are technical and political dimensions to 
process management in the EP context, thus characterising it as a category 
of political advice. The previous section presented the empirical evidence 
for the adoption of the role. The research displays that the role 
predominantly relates to the informal intra-group preparation of decision-
making. In this process advisors inform, advise, involve, and guide MEPs. 
This type of support allows advisors to shape the agenda of internal group 
meetings and to play a role in the submission of amendments. They 
furthermore check and comment on the voting list drafted by the committee 
secretariat, and subsequently provide voting recommendations.  
 
This section evaluates the political scope of the role. The extent to which 
the role is political is assessed with the use of the modes of discretion that 
have been developed as part of the analytical framework (see 2.1.3). The 
aim is to explore advisors’ discretion, room for initiative and improvisation 
when they perform process management activities. To that end, 4.2.1 
addresses the way in which advisors receive instructions from MEPs and 
how this input affects their role. Findings show that in the preparatory 
process in which process management is key advisors are not explicitly told 
what to do. Although several tasks require the explicit approval of the MEP 
in charge, the advice or support offered is guided by what advisors deem 
to be in line with the priorities or position of the group. If instructions are 
lacking the question arises what ‘cues’ advisors use to determine the 
appropriate course of action. 4.2.2 examines the extent to which advisors 
(need to) improvise in their process management efforts. The discussion 
shows that in the absence of instructions advisors are guided by what they 
deem appropriate or necessary. Finally, 4.2.3 considers the three modes of 
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discretion in relation to process management. It is concluded that advisors 
manifest political behaviour for the majority of activities.   
 
4.2.1  Instructions and input from the MEP 
This sub-section sets out to determine the way in which advisors receive 
instructions or input from MEPs and how this affects their ability to act as 
Process Managers. From the quantitative and qualitative data it is found 
that advisors work closely together with (shadow) rapporteurs and the 
group’s coordinator of the parliamentary committee in question. The 
Secretary-Generals constitute the administrative heads of the groups, yet 
in practice, group coordinators function as advisors’ principal (I.10). Thus, 
their explicit or implicit political instructions are most likely to emanate from 
this interaction. The survey explored the interaction of advisors with other 
actors in the EP. Over half of the respondents say to liaise with their group 
coordinator on a daily basis. Another 41 per cent describes the frequency 
as weekly. Comparable figures were collected for the interaction with 
(shadow) rapporteurs within the advisor’s group: 45 per cent of advisors 
estimates the contact as daily and another 45 per cent as weekly. 
Interaction with the political group’s Secretary-General is considerably less 
frequent. The majority of advisors (43%) only interact on a monthly basis 
whereas 37 per cent say to do so weekly (see table 5.1a). In this context, 
it is important to note that advisors’ activities are determined by the 
parliamentary calendar and thus differ one week from another. 46 
Nonetheless, the data clearly point to coordinators and (shadow) 
rapporteurs as advisors’ main principals.  
 
                                   
46 In general, one week a month is dedicated to the plenary session, preceded by a week 
of group meetings. Furthermore, there are assigned weeks for committee meetings and 
for external parliamentary activities. 
 
 
 
Both the survey and interviews demonstrate that a large majority of 
advisors acknowledge their autonomy. In carrying out their daily tasks they 
are not explicitly told what to do. In respect to process management, one 
third of the survey respondents specifically underline the need for pro-active 
behaviour. Notwithstanding, advisors tend to represent their role in 
supportive and advisory terms, emphasising that the final responsibility and 
decision lie with the MEP. Only three survey respondents and five 
interviewees portray their role as truly ‘routine’, void of initiative on their 
part and clearly bound by the supervision or demands of the MEP. “In an 
ideal world, MEPs and their assistants steer parliamentary work” (SR52). 
Several advisors recognise that their discretion creates a certain tension.47 
Lacking a political mandate, advisors must balance ‘modesty and 
assertiveness at the same time’ (I.2).  
 
A first example of an activity that advisors fulfil without an explicit mandate 
is the preparation of group meetings. They are found to select issues for 
group debates (see 4.1.2). The interviews show that such potentially 
divisive issues are then picked up with the group coordinator or (shadow) 
rapporteur who then can decide to table and defend the issue in group 
discussions (I.0.1, 0.2, 2, 10, 12, 13, 16, 22). “The MEP in charge has to 
convince the others of his or her position. It is not common for advisors to 
speak during group meetings so we have to prep the MEP” (I.12). The 
Greens/EFA have a coordination meeting at staff level in which advisors and 
the Secretary-General discuss the preparation of group meetings. “We have 
the freedom to determine the relevance of a dossier: (A) point of 
information, (B) point of discussion, (C) only a briefing. MEPs can then 
always call for a discussion and this happens. Contentious issues are always 
                                   
47 I.2, 12, 17, 22. SR43, 46, 52, 61, 77, 78. 
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Secretary-Generals constitute the administrative heads of the groups, yet 
in practice, group coordinators function as advisors’ principal (I.10). Thus, 
their explicit or implicit political instructions are most likely to emanate from 
this interaction. The survey explored the interaction of advisors with other 
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coordinator on a daily basis. Another 41 per cent describes the frequency 
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frequent. The majority of advisors (43%) only interact on a monthly basis 
whereas 37 per cent say to do so weekly (see table 5.1a). In this context, 
it is important to note that advisors’ activities are determined by the 
parliamentary calendar and thus differ one week from another. 46 
Nonetheless, the data clearly point to coordinators and (shadow) 
rapporteurs as advisors’ main principals.  
 
                                   
46 In general, one week a month is dedicated to the plenary session, preceded by a week 
of group meetings. Furthermore, there are assigned weeks for committee meetings and 
for external parliamentary activities. 
 
 
 
Both the survey and interviews demonstrate that a large majority of 
advisors acknowledge their autonomy. In carrying out their daily tasks they 
are not explicitly told what to do. In respect to process management, one 
third of the survey respondents specifically underline the need for pro-active 
behaviour. Notwithstanding, advisors tend to represent their role in 
supportive and advisory terms, emphasising that the final responsibility and 
decision lie with the MEP. Only three survey respondents and five 
interviewees portray their role as truly ‘routine’, void of initiative on their 
part and clearly bound by the supervision or demands of the MEP. “In an 
ideal world, MEPs and their assistants steer parliamentary work” (SR52). 
Several advisors recognise that their discretion creates a certain tension.47 
Lacking a political mandate, advisors must balance ‘modesty and 
assertiveness at the same time’ (I.2).  
 
A first example of an activity that advisors fulfil without an explicit mandate 
is the preparation of group meetings. They are found to select issues for 
group debates (see 4.1.2). The interviews show that such potentially 
divisive issues are then picked up with the group coordinator or (shadow) 
rapporteur who then can decide to table and defend the issue in group 
discussions (I.0.1, 0.2, 2, 10, 12, 13, 16, 22). “The MEP in charge has to 
convince the others of his or her position. It is not common for advisors to 
speak during group meetings so we have to prep the MEP” (I.12). The 
Greens/EFA have a coordination meeting at staff level in which advisors and 
the Secretary-General discuss the preparation of group meetings. “We have 
the freedom to determine the relevance of a dossier: (A) point of 
information, (B) point of discussion, (C) only a briefing. MEPs can then 
always call for a discussion and this happens. Contentious issues are always 
                                   
47 I.2, 12, 17, 22. SR43, 46, 52, 61, 77, 78. 
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discussed. And if we are voting against the compromise agreement a 
discussion always takes place” (interview Greens/EFA advisor). 
 
The survey data presented in chapter 3 demonstrate that advisors attach 
great importance to the knowledge of EP procedures (see 3.2.3). Knowledge 
of the EP Rules of Procedure as well as the legislative procedures is 
instrumental for the Process Manager role (SR46). It helps in carrying out 
the practical organisational matters that, although not discussed at great 
length in the interviews, appear to be part of advisors’ duties. Advisors 
manage deadlines, organise deputies, or distribute speaking time (see 
4.1.2). These activities are guided by the EP RoP and the working practices 
of the group. Consequently, neither the ends nor the means appear to be 
open to interpretation. 
 
From the qualitative data it is inferred that advisors’ can show initiative in 
the overall organisation of the legislative process. Advisors use their 
procedural knowledge to guide MEPs through the intra-parliamentary 
process (I.0.5, 1, 15, 21). The discussion of the empirical research revealed 
that advisors’ guidance entails various activities in the margins of political 
meetings where they act as the liaison between the group and the 
committee secretariat (see 4.1.2). From a more practical point of view, it 
relates to issues of planning and managing deadlines. More substantially, 
advisors can have a role in the submission of amendments. Finally and most 
prominently, all of the advisors in the study indicate their involvement in 
checking the voting list drawn up by the committee secretariat. It is unlikely 
that for such activities they receive instructions or input, and rather it is 
through their familiarity with EP rules and procedures that they provide 
added value to the MEP or the group as a whole. Five advisors explicitly 
point out that advisors are influential through procedural support (I.1, 4, 7; 
SR8, 47). “It helps immensely if you know the rules of the House in order 
to influence decision-making” (SR47). An ‘in-depth knowledge’ of the 
 
 
 
procedures enables the advisor ‘to achieve more results’ for the group 
(SR8). Advisors thus use their knowledge of procedures to advance the 
position of the group. How they go about this is further considered in 4.2.2. 
 
The qualitative data show that advisors generally discuss voting indications 
with the (shadow) rapporteur (I.0.3, 0.4, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18). 
The advisor makes a ‘proposal’ (I.7) and the MEP then ‘says yes or no’ (I.9). 
Although the voting indications are discussed with – and checked by – the 
MEP in charge, the advisor ‘pre-filters’ (I.0.4, 9). Only one interviewee 
stresses that the preparation of voting recommendations is purely based on 
‘what the coordinator wants’. Overall, the research shows that in this 
activity advisors are granted a great deal of discretion. They apply 
judgement and interpretation in order to assess what amendments should 
be adopted or rejected. Their assessment of the ideal outcome for the group 
is based on what they believe in in line with the position of the group, and 
thus acceptable to the majority of its members. For the voting advice 
provided ahead of plenary, advisors may be (indirectly) guided by group 
discussions that have taken place on the issue.  
 
The analysis concludes that for most activities no explicit instructions are 
provided to advisors. Instead, they are guided by their understanding of the 
group position and priorities, as well as those of the national delegations. 
This is something that requires anticipation and judgement and is further 
discussed in 4.2.2. 
 
4.2.2  Improvisation by the advisor 
It is found that group advisors fulfil the political dimensions of the role (see 
4.1.2). The previous sub-section concluded that, for these activities, 
advisors’ mandate is implicit and that there is considerable room for 
initiative despite the finding that several process management tasks require 
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explicit approval of the MEP in charge. In this sub-section group advisors’ 
manifested level of improvisation is assessed for the process management 
activities that occur before the approval of the MEP or in the absence of 
clear input. Improvisation is construed as value or ideological appraisals by 
the advisor, the anticipation of priorities or objectives, or the use of implicit 
knowledge or tactics (see the definition of political advice in 2.1.2).  
 
Survey and interview findings suggest that in some cases advisors attempt 
to manage the process of amendment submission. Group working practices 
differ in this regard. Advisors may use their judgement to coordinate 
different (sets of) amendments to ensure a coherent outcome for the group. 
Nonetheless, their contribution is of a reactive nature as tabling 
amendments is the prerogative of MEPs’ offices (interviews ALDE and ECR 
advisors). From the data it is inferred that the Greens/EFA are the most 
active in this regard and the ECR the least. It is ‘unusual’ for the Greens/EFA 
to have ‘a competing set of amendments’ and advisors set out to 
‘streamline’ the production of amendments (interviews Greens/EFA 
advisors). They have a monthly meeting with their Secretary-General in 
order to avoid this. An ECR advisor, on the other hand, emphasised that the 
group does not coordinate this process: advisors just go through all 
proposed amendments ‘to see what everyone is saying’. “Although not 
always possible, we aim to coordinate the amendments submitted by MEPs 
of the group,” an EPP advisor stated. The same interviewee admits that at 
times MEPs submit amendments without consulting, or even informing the 
group secretariat and attributes this to the fact that amendments are 
usually submitted very close to the deadline. It is presumed that the EFD, 
lacking a group discipline, does not coordinate the process of amendment 
submission. The GUE/NGL interviewee said that there is room for 
‘alternative voting’ in the group and that in principle any amendment can 
be submitted provided that there are no inconsistencies within one 
 
 
 
paragraph. Any potentially problematic issues are then discussed in the 
group secretariat meetings.  
 
Although the MEP in the end always decides, advisors’ contribution lies in 
the chosen approach leading up to the decision (I.7). The overall picture is 
that advisors pro-actively involve MEPs in the intra-parliamentary 
coordination process: “We act as a coach for the members in close 
cooperation with the coordinator” (SR31). Concretely, several advisors 
state that they select ‘a few competent MEPs’ to involve in their work 
(SR92). And by doing so, advisors can (sometimes) decide who gets to 
decide (I.2, 6, 7, 12). Others approach the same activity as ‘including the 
members’ in order to safeguard support for the position of the (shadow) 
rapporteur (I.5, 9, 13, 18). “I try to get feedback from the members 
regarding the priorities and most important issues for the negotiations with 
the other groups. I do this to make them feel important and not feel 
excluded. If you don’t do that, and carry on working only with the shadow 
rapporteur, the risk that the group will be split during the vote is higher. 
We therefore circulate the compromise amendments and ask whether they 
have any comments or want to add something. My aim is to make sure that 
the majority of my members are going to follow the rapporteur and find out 
if I can propose some suggestions to make them happy. For example, if 
there is a word or phrase that they don’t like maybe we can ask for a split 
vote” (I.5).  
 
As was concluded in 4.2.1, advisors enjoy room for manoeuvre in the 
organisation of the legislative process. “Our role is to make sure that no 
important steps are missed in the legislative or political process” (SR53). 
This shows that several elements of process management are by definition 
pro-active. The means and the ends are left up to the advisor’s judgement 
or anticipation of what is necessary. A first example is found in advisors’ 
contribution to defining the group’s strategy on what reports to attain. This 
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entails anticipation of what other groups want and an assessment of 
possible suitable candidates that are likely to gain support. In this sense it 
is important to establish the reputation and network of the MEP within and 
beyond the committee, his or her previous activities, expertise and that of 
the personal assistant beforehand (I.0.4). Advisors play a coordinating role 
and advise the group coordinator (I.0.1, 0.5, 18). They provide information 
as to what other reports or opinions will come up in order to plan ahead and 
determine what rapporteurships the group wants to acquire and where 
room for bargaining exists (I.0.1). “Sometimes you are approached by 
members who are interested in a certain file. Then it is up to us to discuss 
it with the coordinator whether it is in fact a priority of the political group 
or just a personal interest of an individual member” (I.18). Yet, the 
distribution of reports differs per committee and per group. An EPP 
interviewee said that the distribution is not discussed at group level as it 
would ‘completely overburden the group’. The same advisor added that 
‘very often you already know what the priorities of your group are’, 
confirming that advice is often based on what advisors deem appropriate. 
 
A second activity through which advisors coordinate the legislative process 
is their responsibility to comment on the voting list drawn up by the 
committee secretariat (see 4.1.2). In this process they speak on behalf of 
the group and exert influence on the legislative decision-making process 
with only an indirect and implicit mandate (see 4.2.1). Several interviewees 
stress that they check the (compromise) texts to make sure that no 
(unapproved) ‘politics’ get into the amendments (I.3, 10, 17). Greater room 
for improvisation, however, is encountered in the process of determining 
the voting list that reflects the final (compromise) amendments and the 
voting in committee or plenary. Advisors claim to negotiate over the order 
of the vote with the committee secretariat (I.3, 7, 10, 11, 15, 20), which is 
considered ‘a very political and influential role’ of the group advisor (I.3). 
These negotiations relate to what amendments are most important, and 
 
 
 
should thus take priority in the voting order (I.3, 7, 11, 15, 20). “We discuss 
what is most important, or changes the most. This is rather subjective and 
a political thing. It means a lot of power for the advisor who double-checks 
the list” (I.20). Subsequently, the voting list is approved by the committee 
chair (I.10).  
 
As part of the intra-group coordination process, advisors set out to identify 
sensitive or potentially dividing issues, in fact fulfilling a signalling role. In 
this role, advisors shape the agenda of group debates by pre-selecting 
issues that require deliberation at MEP level. Concrete instructions in this 
regard are hard to conceive as the sensitivities remain to be discovered. 
Whether the issue is actually put on the agenda, however, depends on the 
MEP in charge. Another signalling function is encountered in relation to the 
group voting lists. It is found that advisors, before sending their voting 
advice to all the members of the group, discuss a draft with the (shadow) 
rapporteur (see 4.2.1). Nonetheless, should the advisor disagree with the 
voting indications as decided by the (shadow) rapporteur, he or she can 
intervene. “If I think the group has a completely different line, the shadow 
rapporteur would still put his or her voting indications in there, but I would 
always inform the coordinator and perhaps even other members, saying 
(s)he has put a plus there, but I don’t think it’s right because our group has 
decided differently in the past. You need to raise that issue. If the group 
then decides differently that’s fine, but it’s our role to point it out and alert 
everyone. The same goes for the plenary voting list” (I.18). 
 
Advisors provide voting indications to the group. They are responsible for 
ensuring that the recommendations reflect the group’s position. Based on 
the information they acquired through the Information Manager role (see 
chapter 5), advisors assess the various views, stakes, and sensitivities 
present in the group in order to ‘sense’ what is acceptable to the majority 
of the group (I.2). Voting advice thus not only requires that the advisor 
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interprets the legislative texts in relation to the group’s position, it also 
involves their evaluation as to what is acceptable to the members of the 
group.  
 
To conclude, the analysis shows that in addition to practical procedural 
assistance and information advisors assume a guiding and signalling 
function in their Process Manager role. For these functions the desired 
outcome is unknown or uncertain. Advisors’ improvisation is a strategy to 
deal with situations in which they are not explicitly told what to do and have 
to rely on what they feel is necessary or appropriate in light of the group’s 
ideological views. The next sub-section concludes what this means for the 
political scope of the various activities that were discussed in 4.1.1 and 
4.1.2.  
 
4.2.3  Process Management as a category of political advice 
The empirical analysis disclosed that process management entails technical 
and political tasks. The framework defines political advice as a mixed sphere 
where technical and political activities meet. The findings presented in this 
chapter corroborate process management as a category of political advice. 
Although advisors are found to provide a form of organisational support and 
procedural advice, the data expose that the conceptualised technical and 
political dimensions do not fully capture what empirically appear to be the 
core activities. Figure 4.2.3 illustrates the dimensions as revealed from the 
collected data.  
 
To assess the political scope of the role, the framework conceptualised three 
incremental modes of political advice tied to the discretion of the advisor: 
routine, reactive, and pro-active behaviour (see 2.1.3). Discretion is 
exercised where hierarchical measures or political authority are not directly 
applied. The role thus becomes more pro-active as the advisor’s room for 
 
 
 
improvisation increases. Figure 4.2.3 sums up the key features of the 
Process Manager role as found from the empirical research:  
 
 In the context of process management, routine job performance is 
encountered in the practical procedural assistance and 
information that advisors provide. Organisational support is for 
instance provided through arranging deputies in the absence of 
members, forwarding information received from the committee 
secretariat, or distributing speaking time. In addition, information 
regarding procedures and deadlines is provided. These activities are 
either based on the EP Rules of Procedures, working practices of the 
group, or on the explicit instructions of the MEP in charge. Consequently, 
neither the ends nor the means appear to be open to interpretation and 
the room for improvisation is marginal to non-existent.  
 
 Reactive process management was observed in relation to 
activities where the outcome is implied through or derived from 
group debates. Advisors rely on the various views expressed in the 
group in their attempts to coordinate amendments. They furthermore 
use this indirect input to propose voting indications that are likely to 
count on the support of the majority of the group. Both activities require 
considerable interpretation by the advisor. Nonetheless, the MEPs or 
national delegations submit amendments and the (shadow) rapporteur 
decides on the final voting indications. Advice will thus only be accepted 
when it reflects a position that is supported by the majority of the group. 
 
 Pro-active process management was encountered in the guiding 
function advisors fulfil. Advisors manage the intra-group preparations 
for the legislative process. At this stage of the deliberations no explicit 
instructions from the MEP in charge have been provided, nor can input 
be derived from political debates. Rather, the advisor bases the support 
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improvisation increases. Figure 4.2.3 sums up the key features of the 
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 Reactive process management was observed in relation to 
activities where the outcome is implied through or derived from 
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group in their attempts to coordinate amendments. They furthermore 
use this indirect input to propose voting indications that are likely to 
count on the support of the majority of the group. Both activities require 
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national delegations submit amendments and the (shadow) rapporteur 
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when it reflects a position that is supported by the majority of the group. 
 
 Pro-active process management was encountered in the guiding 
function advisors fulfil. Advisors manage the intra-group preparations 
for the legislative process. At this stage of the deliberations no explicit 
instructions from the MEP in charge have been provided, nor can input 
be derived from political debates. Rather, the advisor bases the support 
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offered on his or her understanding of the priorities or position of the 
group. As this group position is composed of various, potentially 
conflicting, elements advisors rely on their judgement and experience to 
determine what is acceptable to the (majority of) members of the group. 
Examples of the pro-active guiding function were encountered in 
advisors’ input for the acquisition strategy for rapporteurships, the 
(selective) involvement of MEPs, and in checking the voting list drawn 
up by the committee secretariat.  
 
 The signalling function of group advisors by definition is pro-
active. A first signalling function is found in the preparation of group 
meetings. Advisors signal (potentially divisive) issues to be tabled for 
discussion at MEP level. A second function is related to the voting list. 
Advisors identify potential incoherence or conflicts in the position of the 
group, and inconsistency with previously adopted positions. A third 
activity in this regard is the advisor’s role to ensure that the voting 
indications as approved by the (shadow) rapporteur are in line with the 
overall group position and priorities.  
  
 
 
 
 
4.3  Impact of the factors on process management 
The objective of the thesis is to explore and explain the circumstances that 
stimulate or restrict advisors assuming a political role. From the literature 
a set of factors has been identified that are expected to affect the adoption 
of the Process Manager role (see 2.3). As a third and final step of the 
analysis, this section consecutively evaluates each of the personal (4.3.1) 
and contextual factors (4.3.2) by presenting evidence from the survey and 
interviews. It is found that trust and political sensitivity are indispensable 
for a pro-active Process Manager role, whereas complexity and politicisation 
may have a restricting impact.  
 
Figure 4.2.3 Empirical findings: process management as a category of 
political advice 
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4.3.1  Personal factors 
The analytical framework conceptualises four personal attributes of advisors 
that are theorised to facilitate political behaviour. Each is considered below 
in relation to process management, concluding that trust and political 
sensitivity are indispensable for a pro-active Process Management role. The 
findings are illustrated in figure 4.3.1. 
 
Trust  
In the analytical framework trust is linked to knowledge of and affinity with 
party ideology and priorities (see 2.3.1). A more substantial role is 
construed for advisors who the delegating politician trusts to have a shared 
ideology. It can be inferred from the survey and the interviews that trust 
between the advisor and the MEP is key in determining the working 
relationship. 25 advisors stress that their discretion depends on trust 
granted by the group coordinator or (shadow) rapporteur.48 In case of a 
high-trust relationship advisors will have ‘a lot of room for manoeuvre’ 
(I.22). These statements lead us to believe that the contrary holds true as 
well. Should trust be betrayed, the working relationship is disturbed.  
 
The qualitative data highlight that collaboration at staff level also depends 
on trust.49 Group advisors have an interest in maintaining a good working 
relationship with EP officials in order to acquire procedural information at 
an early stage.50 Trust thus facilitates the ‘liaison function’ that advisors 
fulfil between the group and the committee secretariat. 
 
                                   
48 I.0.2, 0.4, 4, 7-9, 11, 13, 15-18, 22; SR6, 17, 25, 31, 38-40, 52, 60, 61, 84, 99. 
49 I.0.1-0.5, 1-5, 9-11, 15-19, 21; SR17, 25, 31, 38, 39, 54, 59.  
50 I.3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 19. 
 
 
 
In addition, advisors rely on the trust of MEP Assistants to share their 
insights of the MEP’s views or priorities with regard to certain files.51 The 
informal interviews put forward that some group advisors are reputed to 
provide ‘biased advice’ or ‘try to get certain points in’ that were not 
discussed with the MEP. MEPs and their assistants would subsequently avoid 
working with them. In their guiding and signalling role, advisors determine 
what is acceptable to the (majority of) members of the group based on their 
judgement and experience. Trusted advisors are more likely to fulfil these 
functions of the Process Manager role as they will have the ear of the MEP 
in charge and his or her personal assistant. More importantly, the reliability 
of the advisor is crucial for the input or provided voting recommendations 
to be followed or ‘accepted’. In the end, the MEP decides who provides his 
or her assistance. If the trustworthiness of an advisor is questioned, the 
MEP will look to the committee secretariat officials for procedural guidance 
and to his or her personal assistant for checking the voting lists and texts 
as well as for advice on how to vote. 
 
Informal network 
An informal network is conceptualised as access to and exchange of private 
information through informal connections within and outside the institution 
(see 2.3.1). For process management activities, the intra-parliamentary 
network of the advisor is most important. Findings show that advisors’ most 
frequent contact is with MEP assistants, generally estimated as daily (see 
table 5.1a). The qualitative data reveal that informal contact and personal 
relationships affect the collaboration and exchange at staff level.52 Contact 
with MEP assistants allows the advisor to assess what is acceptable to the 
(majority of) members of the group, which is instrumental for their guiding 
                                   
51 I.2, 3, 9-11, 13, 15-17, 22. 
52 See analysis SQ5, Appendix III. Responses SQ6: SR3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 27, 37, 42, 
43, 47, 51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 74, 79, 84, 88, 89, 92, 97, 98. I.0.4, 2-4, 6-10, 13, 15-17, 
19, 22.  
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and signalling functions. In addition, advisors’ relationship with EP 
committee officials (generally estimated as weekly) determines whether 
they are able to gather the relevant procedural information in an informal 
and timely manner. In order to guide members through the EP coordination 
process, advisors are the liaison between the EP administration and the 
MEP. They keep MEPs informed prior to the official lines of communication 
that run through the EP secretariat. 
 
Advisors also work closely with their counterparts from the other party 
groups. In terms of process management this will allow them insight into 
other groups’ wishes and priorities with regard to rapporteurships and their 
opinions on amendments. “Sometimes I call colleagues to check what they 
are advising their MEPs on certain amendments. When I worked for the 
EMPL committee I even exchanged voting lists with counterparts. For IMCO 
I never do that,” one interviewee commented. 
 
In sum, the informal network of advisors facilitates their various process 
management activities. In particular, their intra-EP network allows them to 
gather information that they use to organise the legislative process and 
appreciate the various interests at stake, both within their group and within 
the other groups.  
 
Institutional memory 
Institutional memory is conceptualised as the insight into – and access to – 
the institutional track record (see 2.3.1). In the EP context the factor is 
interpreted as knowledge of the functioning of the institution (formal and 
informal rules) and an appreciation of the political group’s (previous) 
positions. For process management institutional memory facilitates both 
organisational support and procedural advice.  
 
 
 
 
Overall, advisors seem to be experienced allowing them to develop a level 
of institutional memory, conceptualised as insight in and access to the 
institutional track record. Survey findings show that advisors on average 
have held their position for 6 years, varying between seven months and 23 
years (see 3.2.1). Moreover, the survey accounts show that a background 
of working in the EP is common: 42 per cent of advisors have prior 
experience in the EP. The qualitative data support that ‘knowing your way 
around’ is an asset (I.3). Advisors recognise the significance of 
understanding EP procedures (see 4.2.1). In order to guide the MEP in 
charge through the formal coordination process, advisors should naturally 
possess a sound knowledge of the functioning of the EU institutions and its 
policies. The document analysis showed that this is one of the requirements 
stipulated in the vacancy notices (see Appendix I). For these reasons it is 
concluded that institutional memory is considered more or less a given, and 
not as a decisive factor in the provision of political advice. 
 
The contribution of advisors in the informal, preparatory coordination 
process is found to be most significant (see 4.1.2). As part of their guiding 
and signalling role, advisors must understand and be able to forecast the 
group’s objectives and priorities. This appreciation of the group line is 
highlighted in the quantitative and qualitative data.53 In the recruitment of 
advisors, familiarity with the activities and the operation of political groups 
are sometimes explicit requirements, notably for the GUE-NGL and EFD 
groups (see 3.1.5). Interviewees’ accounts show that in practice political 
affinity and political experience are taken into account in the selection of 
group advisors. Advisors will benefit from a thorough understanding of the 
group’s position when they check amendments and other parliamentary 
texts for ‘political logic’ and coherence with previous group positions. 
Moreover, in issuing voting recommendations their advice is most likely to 
                                   
53 See Appendix III, responses to SQ5 and 6. I.0.2, 1-3, 7-9, 13, 15-17, 22.  
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53 See Appendix III, responses to SQ5 and 6. I.0.2, 1-3, 7-9, 13, 15-17, 22.  
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be followed when they remain close to the group’s ideology. In the EP this 
only applies to the more homogeneous groups like the Greens/EFA or 
GUE/NGL. For the other groups – either large or heterogeneous – advisors 
should appreciate the different views of the national delegations within the 
group and take these into account when drawing up the group’s voting list.  
 
It is important to note that the previously defined factors trust and informal 
network may produce a similar appreciation and anticipation of the group’s 
position. In sum, there appears to be a positive relation between advisors’ 
institutional memory and the execution of the political process management 
functions but the factor is not indispensable for the adoption of the role. 
 
Political sensitivity 
The analytical framework conceptualises political sensitivity as the 
understanding of the institution’s informal code of conduct and the ability 
to recognise political and administrative cues, allowing for the anticipation 
of (negotiation) strategies (see 2.3.1). Inquiring after the qualities advisors 
should possess to effectively fulfil their responsibilities, advisors 
conclusively cite political sensitivity as the most decisive.54 
 
As part of their responsibility to organise the coordination process advisors 
identify and propose issues that require discussion at MEP level (see 4.1.2). 
The interviews and survey findings show that this task requires advisors to 
understand and predict the sensitivities within the group.55 “One needs to 
be sensitive to differences existing within a political group, i.e. what divides 
national delegations.” (SR95). Advisors should have the ‘ability to provide 
                                   
54 See Appendix III, responses to SQ6, 9 and 11. Out of the 28 interviews, only 5 
interviewees did not flag up political sensitivity as crucial to their role. 
55 I.1, 2, 8, 9, 13, 22. SR9, 15, 22, 27, 29, 43, 51, 72, 77, 89, 95. 
 
 
 
unbiased political judgement’ (SR34). If advisors successfully recognise and 
pursue such cues, problems will be addressed informally before they arise.  
 
In order to effectively fulfil the task of checking amendments for accuracy 
and political coherence advisors should recognise and appreciate the 
internal politics. This requires them, first of all, to understand the various 
stakes present within the group and within the broader EP, and 
subsequently anticipate the negotiation strategies of the groups. In this 
regard, the data show that advisors are expected to ‘know’ several things. 
They should be able to distinguish what is strategically important for the 
group, what points can count on a majority in the group and in plenary, and 
be able to hierarchise political priorities.56  
 
Political sensitivity helps advisors in producing voting recommendations. As 
a successful advisor ‘you share the political views of the Group you work 
for, so that you can intuitively feel what the group line on a certain matter 
would be’ (SR29). Advisors must be able to ‘anticipate and translate what 
members want’ (I.1), ‘have a good understanding of what is acceptable’ 
(I.2), and ‘where the red lines are’ (SR41).57  
 
In sum, political sensitivity is actually a general prerequisite for the 
provision of acceptable advice. This conclusion closely relates to the finding 
that pro-active behaviour is only acceptable when the advice reflects a 
position that is supported by the majority of the group. 
 
Assessment of the personal factors 
In the analytical framework it was proposed that the personal factors affect 
the advisor’s discretion and their ability to adopt a political role. The factors 
                                   
56 I.1, 4, 9, 15, 17, 19. SR9, 15, 22, 24, 29, 36, 39, 41, 48, 97. 
57 Similar examples were provided by SR9, 13, 15, 22, 27, 39, 41, 97. 
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are used to assess the (optimal) circumstances in which political advice may 
be provided. The following values are used to qualitatively evaluate the 
impact of the factors on the adoption of the Process Manager role: 
indispensable (++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), or a 
negative impact (-). From the empirical research it is concluded that trust 
and political sensitivity are indispensable for political process management. 
The findings are illustrated in figure 4.3.1. 
 
Table 4.3.1 Personal factor assessment for the Process Manager role 
 
 
Trust Informal 
network 
Institutional 
memory 
Political 
sensitivity 
ROUTINE PROCESS MANAGER 
Practical procedural 
assistance 
+ + + 0 
Procedural information + + + 0 
REACTIVE PROCESS MANAGER 
Coordination of 
amendments 
++ + + ++ 
Proposal for voting 
indications 
++ + + ++ 
PRO-ACTIVE PROCESS MANAGER 
Guiding function ++ + + ++ 
Signalling function ++ + + ++ 
 
4.3.2  Contextual factors 
Three contextual factors are expected to affect delegation and trigger 
potential differences across the groups, committees, policy domains, or 
specific files: political direction, complexity, and politicisation. This sub-
section presents the assessment of these factors. The findings are 
 
 
 
illustrated in table 4.3.2, concluding that political direction facilitates the 
Process Manager role whereas complexity and politicisation may restrict 
pro-active process management. 
 
Political direction 
The analytical framework defines political direction in relation to the position 
of the MEP or group: advisors’ ability to identify political cues to guide their 
behaviour depends on the extent to which the MEP in charge or the group 
they represent is outspoken and reputed (see 2.3.2). The idea is that the 
clearer advisors’ political direction is, the more likely they are to assume a 
political role.  
 
No evidence was found that political direction affects routine job 
performance. In their guiding and signalling functions, however, advisors 
rely on their understanding of the political priorities and positions (see 4.2). 
Political direction facilitates the pro-active behaviour of advisors. The 
interviewees underline that implicit political direction is derived from the 
ideological principles of the group (I.11, 13, 19, 20). GUE/NGL and EFD 
advisors derive this mandate from their contact with the MEP in charge as 
no formal group discipline applies. Several interviewees claim that advisors 
working for a more homogeneous group, or for one MEP, enjoy more room 
for manoeuvre (I.12, 14). The idea is that for example Greens/EFA advisors 
can more easily assess the desired outcome for the group, which allows 
them to improvise in order to realise outcomes that are accepted by the 
(majority of the) group.  
The data furthermore suggest that when the MEP in charge is actively 
involved on a given file advisors are more likely to manifest pro-active 
behaviour (I.12, 17, 22). Furthermore, five interviewees discuss that as the 
experience of the MEP increases, the support they need changes (I.3, 4, 5, 
13, 15). Newcomers tend to require more guidance and information than 
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clearer advisors’ political direction is, the more likely they are to assume a 
political role.  
 
No evidence was found that political direction affects routine job 
performance. In their guiding and signalling functions, however, advisors 
rely on their understanding of the political priorities and positions (see 4.2). 
Political direction facilitates the pro-active behaviour of advisors. The 
interviewees underline that implicit political direction is derived from the 
ideological principles of the group (I.11, 13, 19, 20). GUE/NGL and EFD 
advisors derive this mandate from their contact with the MEP in charge as 
no formal group discipline applies. Several interviewees claim that advisors 
working for a more homogeneous group, or for one MEP, enjoy more room 
for manoeuvre (I.12, 14). The idea is that for example Greens/EFA advisors 
can more easily assess the desired outcome for the group, which allows 
them to improvise in order to realise outcomes that are accepted by the 
(majority of the) group.  
The data furthermore suggest that when the MEP in charge is actively 
involved on a given file advisors are more likely to manifest pro-active 
behaviour (I.12, 17, 22). Furthermore, five interviewees discuss that as the 
experience of the MEP increases, the support they need changes (I.3, 4, 5, 
13, 15). Newcomers tend to require more guidance and information than 
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experienced MEPs (I.5). In sum, a clear group line (group cohesion) appears 
to facilitate the guiding and signalling functions of the Process Manager role. 
The findings in relation to political direction derived from the position of the 
MEP are less clear-cut. The level of involvement of MEPs aids the advisor in 
process management activities. For example, for issues to be tabled (and 
defended) during group meetings the advisor normally relies on the MEP in 
charge. The level of experience of the MEP, on the other hand, may restrict 
the contribution of the advisor as the need for guidance and advice 
decreases.  
 
Complexity 
In the framework complexity is defined in relation to the subject matter and 
thus expected to vary across parliamentary committees or specific policy or 
legislative proposals (see 2.3.2). From the literature the assumption is 
drawn that as ‘complexity’ increases MEPs are more likely to seek assistance 
and grant advisors a political role.  
 
The document analysis and the qualitative data reveal that advisors should 
have the capacity to analyse technical and complicated files. Advisors 
contend to have more discretion as the issue under consideration becomes 
more complex. Several advisors explained how the discretion of group 
advisors increases in ‘highly technical dossiers’: the more technical a file, 
the more room for ‘influence’ advisors have (I.4); or the less attention is 
paid by MEPs (I.15). Although those surveyed and interviewed do not 
discuss the matter extensively, the data suggest that complexity facilitates 
the role. Nonetheless, the level of complexity may negatively affect MEPs’ 
(active) involvement (I.15, 16, 17). This would imply that actor involvement 
becomes more difficult and MEPs are less inclined to bring issues up for 
discussion in group meetings. Thus, although the overall need for guidance 
throughout the intra-parliamentary process increases in complex files, 
 
 
 
MEPs’ involvement is likely to decrease. In that case, the pro-active Process 
Manager role is restricted.  
 
Politicisation 
The framework conceptualises politicisation in relation to division in the EP, 
in general or with regard to a specific dossier (see 2.3.2). It is therefore 
defined as something that may change over time and vary across policy 
areas. Based on the theory, politicisation is expected to restrict the advisor’s 
role.  
 
The qualitative data show that MEPs are less likely to delegate tasks related 
to controversial or salient files, thus restricting the role of the group advisor. 
From the interviews it is found that in the preparations of amendments and 
voting indications, the controversial issues are dealt with at MEP level (I.11, 
18). It is the advisor’s responsibility to signal these controversies and make 
sure that a group debate takes place (see 4.1.2). Whereas politicisation 
thus facilitates advisors’ signalling function, their ability to organise the 
legislative process is deemed to be restricted. Issues that divide the House 
are likely to be controversial in the group as well, particularly in the larger 
political families such as ALDE, EPP, and S&D (I.18). Checking the voting 
list and providing voting recommendations will be more cumbersome and 
sensitive in such politicised files. In sum, politicisation facilitates advisors’ 
signalling function but restricts the advisor’s discretion to organise the 
legislative process.  
 
Assessment of the contextual factors 
As proposed in the framework, the context affects delegation. The factors 
are used to assess the (optimal) circumstances in which political advice may 
be acceptable to MEPs. The following values are used to qualitatively 
evaluate the impact of the factors on the adoption of the Process Manager 
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role: indispensable (++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), 
or a negative impact (-).  
 
The empirical research concludes that a clear group line (group cohesion) 
appears to facilitate the guiding and signalling functions of the Process 
Manager role. Although the overall need for guidance throughout the intra-
parliamentary process increases in complex files, MEPs’ involvement is 
likely to decrease. This hampers political direction and therefore restricts 
pro-active process management. Politicisation facilitates advisors’ signalling 
function, yet decreases the likelihood that MEPs delegate other process 
management tasks. The findings are illustrated in table 4.3.2. 
 
Table 4.3.2 Contextual factor assessment for the Process Manager role 
 
 
Political 
direction 
Complexity Politicisation 
ROUTINE PROCESS MANAGER 
Practical procedural 
assistance 
0 + 0 
Procedural information 0 + 0 
REACTIVE PROCESS MANAGER 
Coordination of 
amendments 
+ + - 
Proposal for voting 
indications 
+ + - 
PRO-ACTIVE PROCESS MANAGER 
Guiding function + - - 
Signalling function + - + 
 
  
 
 
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
The findings presented in this chapter corroborate process management as 
a category of political advice that combines technical and political tasks. 
Although advisors are found to provide a form of organisational support and 
procedural advice, the data expose that the former goes beyond the 
conceptualised scope of organising and following up on meetings. Process 
management is most prominently tied to the overall coordination of the 
intra-parliamentary legislative process: advisors fulfil a guiding function 
(organisational tasks) and signal issues that may cause incoherence, 
conflict or inconsistency in the group position (advisory tasks). 
 
Compared to the other groups, ECR and EFD appear to attach greater value 
to process management. This procedure-oriented approach is interpreted 
in light of the nature of these groups. Internal ideological differences are 
small in the ECR and national delegations have a large degree of autonomy. 
This reduces the need for intra-group coordination. The EFD group does not 
formally coordinate its positions and its Eurosceptic stance generally makes 
it less inclined to contribute to legislation. The Greens/EFA group fulfils a 
relatively stronger (more pro-active) guiding role, as the indicated 
coordination of amendment submission reveals.  
 
Findings have revealed that advisors perform several practical activities 
such as managing deadlines, organising deputies and taking care of the 
distribution of speaking time. These tasks are guided by – and bound to – 
the EP RoP and working practices of the group and are therefore categorised 
as the routine job performance of advisors. In contrast, all other process 
management activities require some form of improvisation by the advisor 
because they are not guided by rules or instructions. It is therefore 
concluded that advisors manifest political behaviour for the majority of 
activities. Although several tasks require the explicit approval of the MEP in 
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charge, the advice or support offered is generally guided by what advisors 
deem to be in line with the priorities or position of the group. The data 
suggest that advisors’ improvisation is closely related to the informal nature 
of the intra-parliamentary decision-making process. Pro-active behaviour 
seems unavoidable in situations in which they are not explicitly told what 
to do. Advisors manage the intra-group preparations for the legislative 
process. At this stage of the deliberations no explicit instructions from the 
MEP in charge have been provided, nor can input be derived from political 
debates. Throughout the decision-making process advisors are furthermore 
expected to identify issues that potentially divide the group and are 
unknown to the MEP in charge. Both the guiding and signalling functions of 
process management thus require the advisor to operate without an explicit 
mandate. Advisors carry out these activities by relying on what they feel is 
necessary or appropriate in light of the group’s ideological views. The 
qualitative data underline that it is only due to the derivative nature of their 
mandate that pro-active behaviour is accepted. Reactive behaviour is 
encountered in the activities of advisors that take place after group or 
committee deliberations, from which they can derive their mandate. For 
example in their efforts to coordinate amendments or propose voting 
indications advisors are found to enjoy considerable discretion, yet their 
input is based on the political views expressed. 
 
As mentioned at the outset, the objective of the thesis is to explore and 
explain the circumstances that stimulate or restrict a political role by group 
advisors. The analysis reveals that political sensitivity is a general 
prerequisite for effective process management. This conclusion closely 
relates to the finding that pro-active behaviour is only acceptable to MEPs 
when the advice reflects a position that is supported by the majority of the 
group. A trusted working relationship with the MEP and his or her staff 
further adds to this by allowing the advisor to understand the MEP’s views 
and priorities. Both personal factors are found to have a decisive impact on 
 
 
 
the discretion of the advisor. Politicisation facilitates advisors’ signalling 
function because the ideological lines are then highlighted. However, MEPs 
tend to take care of any sensitive issues themselves, which decreases the 
likelihood that they delegate other process management tasks to group 
advisors. Although the overall need for guidance throughout the intra-
parliamentary process increases in complex files, MEPs’ involvement is 
likely to decrease, which restricts pro-active process management. Finally, 
the guiding and signalling functions of the role are reinforced by group 
cohesion, as a clear group line allows the advisor to construct a clear 
mandate (political direction).  
  
223
4
Process Manager 
 
 
charge, the advice or support offered is generally guided by what advisors 
deem to be in line with the priorities or position of the group. The data 
suggest that advisors’ improvisation is closely related to the informal nature 
of the intra-parliamentary decision-making process. Pro-active behaviour 
seems unavoidable in situations in which they are not explicitly told what 
to do. Advisors manage the intra-group preparations for the legislative 
process. At this stage of the deliberations no explicit instructions from the 
MEP in charge have been provided, nor can input be derived from political 
debates. Throughout the decision-making process advisors are furthermore 
expected to identify issues that potentially divide the group and are 
unknown to the MEP in charge. Both the guiding and signalling functions of 
process management thus require the advisor to operate without an explicit 
mandate. Advisors carry out these activities by relying on what they feel is 
necessary or appropriate in light of the group’s ideological views. The 
qualitative data underline that it is only due to the derivative nature of their 
mandate that pro-active behaviour is accepted. Reactive behaviour is 
encountered in the activities of advisors that take place after group or 
committee deliberations, from which they can derive their mandate. For 
example in their efforts to coordinate amendments or propose voting 
indications advisors are found to enjoy considerable discretion, yet their 
input is based on the political views expressed. 
 
As mentioned at the outset, the objective of the thesis is to explore and 
explain the circumstances that stimulate or restrict a political role by group 
advisors. The analysis reveals that political sensitivity is a general 
prerequisite for effective process management. This conclusion closely 
relates to the finding that pro-active behaviour is only acceptable to MEPs 
when the advice reflects a position that is supported by the majority of the 
group. A trusted working relationship with the MEP and his or her staff 
further adds to this by allowing the advisor to understand the MEP’s views 
and priorities. Both personal factors are found to have a decisive impact on 
 
 
 
the discretion of the advisor. Politicisation facilitates advisors’ signalling 
function because the ideological lines are then highlighted. However, MEPs 
tend to take care of any sensitive issues themselves, which decreases the 
likelihood that they delegate other process management tasks to group 
advisors. Although the overall need for guidance throughout the intra-
parliamentary process increases in complex files, MEPs’ involvement is 
likely to decrease, which restricts pro-active process management. Finally, 
the guiding and signalling functions of the role are reinforced by group 
cohesion, as a clear group line allows the advisor to construct a clear 
mandate (political direction).  
  
  
 
CHAPTER 5. INFORMATION MANAGER 
The analytical framework comprises four roles that advisors may adopt, 
each potentially containing a political dimension. The dissertation applies 
the theoretical concepts to the specific case of European Parliament (EP) 
group advisors58 and this chapter presents the analysis of the Information 
Manager role. The ideal-type role comprises three central elements: (1) 
gathering information, (2) processing information, and (3) distributing 
information. To address the research question ‘under which conditions can 
advisors adopt a political role’ three analytical steps are carried out.  
 
The first step is to assess whether the role is adopted and what it entails in 
practice. To that end, 5.1.1 examines the theoretical dimensions of 
information management. Expectations regarding the technical and political 
dimensions of information management are inferred from the literature 
review (see introduction) and the conducted document analysis (see 
Appendix I). Subsequently, these expectations are considered in light of the 
empirical research. The discussion in 5.1.2 shows that EP group advisors 
assume the Information Manager role, and that their activities contain 
technical and political elements. In this respect, they pre-select, interpret, 
and present information. It is furthermore found that information serves an 
auxiliary function and forms the basis for the adoption of the Policy Expert 
and Broker roles.  
 
The second step is to assess the extent to which the role is political, based 
on the three modes of discretion that have been developed as part of the 
analytical framework. Section 5.2 considers advisors’ room for manoeuvre 
                                   
58 Advisors employed by one of the EP party groups and assigned to follow the work of 
one or several of the parliamentary committees are the focus of this study. Throughout 
the analysis ‘advisors’ or ‘group advisors’ refers to this type of advisor. 
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when fulfilling the political dimensions of information management. This is 
approached by, on the one hand (5.2.1), examining the extent to which 
advisors receive instructions or input from the Members of the EP (MEPs), 
and on the other hand (5.2.2), the need and their capacity to improvise. 
The empirical research shows that in all three aspects of information 
management advisors enjoy considerable leeway with very little direction 
from their superiors. It is therefore concluded that information management 
is predominantly pro-active (5.2.3).    
 
Thirdly, the impact of the personal and contextual factors on the adoption 
of the role is evaluated (5.3). The analysis concludes that political sensitivity 
combined with a context where advisors work on a policy issue or specific 
file that is not highly politicised in the EP are the optimal conditions for 
advisors to pro-actively adopt the Information Manager role.  
 
5.1 The nature of information management in the EP 
This section builds on a discussion of the relevant literature on information 
management (5.1.1). Drawing from the theory, the technical and political 
dimensions of the role are explored. The three central elements of the ideal-
type role are considered: (1) gathering, (2) processing, and (3) distributing 
information. These activities are discussed and related to the document 
analysis on the profile and duties of EP group advisors in order to infer 
expectations about the adoption of the role (see 3.3.3).  
 
Subsequently, 5.1.2 presents the empirical findings for the Information 
Manager role. The theoretical expectations regarding the role are examined 
in relation to the collected survey and interview data. The empirical analysis 
finds that group advisors adopt the role. Furthermore, it exposes two key 
functions of information in the EP: policy and political intelligence.  
 
 
 
5.1.1 The theoretical dimensions of information management 
The analytical framework proposes that information management entails 
the gathering and processing of information in order to create overview, 
filter or select the most relevant (sources of) information, and to provide 
legislators with political intelligence through informal information 
exchange. 59 The analysis of vacancy notices identified ‘information and 
communication tasks’ as one of the standard duties of EP political group 
advisors (see Appendix I). Such tasks can obviously entail a variety of 
things that remain unspecified in the job descriptions. Drawing on the 
literature that explores advisors as a source of information, these activities 
could be tied to the Information Manager role. Advisors can for example 
provide MEPs with background information on files under discussion and lay 
out the various interests and actors involved (cf. Neunreither, 2002; Peters, 
2009). Advisors furthermore act as a gatekeeper through the pre-selection 
of relevant information and sources, which is vital for politicians to deal with 
the information overload (cf. Winzen, 2011; Busby, 2013). Information 
management also includes the informal exchange of information by liaising 
with other staff members or external stakeholders (cf. Fox and Hammond, 
1977; Christiansen, 2002; Busby, 2013; Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). 
The role is thus expected to involve the collection and distribution of 
information from various sources as well as the transformation into 
functional information or intelligence for the MEP. 
 
The literature has dealt extensively with the topic of information as a 
resource for the politician, underlining that gathering, processing, and 
distributing information are the central elements of the role of officials (e.g. 
Patterson, 1970; Tallberg, 2004). MEPs have various sources of information 
                                   
59 The definition is based on an extensive literature review (see introduction) and draws 
on Patterson, 1970; Fox and Hammond, 1977; Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; 
Christiansen, 2002; Tallberg, 2004; Peters, 2009; Winzen, 2011; Busby, 2013; 
Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015.  
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resource for the politician, underlining that gathering, processing, and 
distributing information are the central elements of the role of officials (e.g. 
Patterson, 1970; Tallberg, 2004). MEPs have various sources of information 
                                   
59 The definition is based on an extensive literature review (see introduction) and draws 
on Patterson, 1970; Fox and Hammond, 1977; Provan in: Neunreither, 2002; 
Christiansen, 2002; Tallberg, 2004; Peters, 2009; Winzen, 2011; Busby, 2013; 
Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015.  
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at their disposal that can broadly be distinguished as in-house sources, 
information from other institutions, and information from third parties 
(Dobbels and Neuhold, 2014). The latter category usually takes centre 
stage in academic discussions on information channels in the EP. Yet, in 
their discussion of how the Parliament obtains and processes information 
for policy-making, Dobbels and Neuhold (2014) find that in-house sources 
of information are crucial for the EP to fulfil its function as co-legislator. An 
important explanation as to why MEPs heavily rely on internal resources lies 
in safeguarding independence. Information from the other institutions is 
‘treated with caution’ because both the European Commission (EC) and the 
Council have a stake in the outcome of the EP decision-making process 
(Dobbels and Neuhold, 2014). MEPs are confronted with an ‘information 
deficit’ and therefore depend on staff resources and on their colleagues for 
information (Ringe, 2010). 
 
For this reason, information management is deemed to play a particularly 
important role in the EP. To tackle its information needs the institution 
continuously attempts to improve the available resources. In 1987 the EP 
launched the Science and Technology Options Assessment Unit (STOA) 
following from the need for independent, impartial information about the 
opportunities and risks related to scientific and technological developments 
(EP website, consulted March 2018). STOA carries out projects, usually with 
the assistance of external contractors selected on the basis of the expertise 
required through public tenders. In recent years, the EP has developed 
several new (online) information sources to facilitate MEPs in dealing with 
their increased workload and to increase the overall transparency of EP 
decision-making (EPRS, 2017). In particular, the transformation of the 
former EP Library service into the European Parliamentary Research Service 
(EPRS) has strengthened the in-house parliamentary support (European 
Parliament, 2013). The service draws up policy briefings, analyses, and 
statistical overviews upon the request of individual members or in support 
 
 
 
of the parliamentary committees (EP website, consulted March 2018). It 
furthermore publishes notes for external purposes and aims to provide 
‘think tank capacity’ (EPRS, 2017). Publications comprise briefings, in-depth 
analyses, studies, and EU Fact Sheets (EP website, consulted March 2018). 
The EPRS also examines the EC’s impact assessments and provides the 
parliamentary committees with complementary ex-ante and ex-post impact 
assessments, and impact assessments of ‘substantive EP amendments’ 
(EPRS, 2017).60 
 
The framework’s mixed sphere of activity postulates that information 
management comprises both a technical and a political dimension. 
Following from the theory, political tasks are conceived to contain value or 
ideological appraisals, the anticipation of priorities or objectives, and the 
use of implicit knowledge or tactics (see 2.1.2). Technical tasks are void of 
such judgement by the advisor. The gathering of information via in-house 
and third-party sources for example involves political choices about which 
sources are consulted or are asked to provide input. The same applies to 
the subsequent use of the information. The Information Manager role is 
thus expected to comprise a technical, inventory aspect as well as a political 
dimension that entails the selection of the (most relevant) sources or 
specific elements of information.  
 
The task of processing information is delegated to EP staff (Brandsma, 
2012; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2014). Yet, only little is known about this 
process. Brandsma (2012) discusses information processing in the context 
of the EP’s role to control the EC. He finds that the need to organise 
information only arises when there is a functional link to political action 
related to specific parliamentary powers. Building on these findings, it is 
inferred that the transformation of information by advisors into specific and 
                                   
60 See 3.1.1 for a more elaborate discussion of the EPRS. 
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60 See 3.1.1 for a more elaborate discussion of the EPRS. 
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action-oriented intelligence is a crucial determinant for the uptake of that 
information by MEPs. The political dimension of information processing lies 
in the ‘selective bias’ requiring political choices (Blom and Vanhoonacker, 
2014). In their Information Manager role advisors are expected to either 
anticipate or interpret the desired political choices.  
 
Advisors informally exchange information with actors inside and outside the 
EP (Patterson, 1970; Christiansen, 2002). This activity facilitates both the 
collection and the distribution of information. Internally, it involves the 
‘free-floating information’ within the Parliament mostly passed on in social 
encounters (cf. Kingdon in: Blom and Vanhoonacker, 2014). Externally, 
industry, trade associations, trade unions, employer federations, chambers 
of commerce, interest groups, NGOs, think tanks, consultancies, regional 
authorities, and third countries are the main third parties that get in touch 
with EP actors (cf. Greenwood, 2011). Finally, the distribution of 
information naturally also involves the way in which it is presented or 
‘framed’ to MEPs. The concept of framing suggests ‘purposive manipulation’ 
and strategic attempts to influence (decision) behaviour (Blom, 2014). 
Figure 5.1.1 illustrates the anticipated dimensions of information 
management based on the theory. Technical aspects of information 
management are the (i) inventory, (ii) summary, and (iii) distribution of 
information to MEPs. The political functions of information management in 
the context of the EP are expected to lie in (i) the pre-selection of issues 
and internal and external sources of information, (ii) the transformation of 
this selected information by the interpretation of political choices or 
preferences, and (iii) the way in which the information is finally presented 
to the MEP.  
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.2 The adoption of the Information Manager role in practice  
The conducted empirical research demonstrates that EP group advisors 
adopt the Information Manager role, and that the role indeed involves both 
technical and political tasks. 70 per cent of survey respondents agreed that 
they manage the flow of information. The qualitative data reveal that this 
involves gathering, processing, and distributing information: effective 
advisors should have the ‘ability to collect a lot of information from different 
sources, to process it in a short period of time, and to issue 
recommendations in a clear and precise language’ (SR44).61  
 
This sub-section first discusses that information serves an auxiliary function 
in the EP and forms the basis for the adoption of the Policy Expert and 
Broker roles. Subsequently, the findings related to the gathering, 
processing, and distribution of information are presented.  
 
  
                                   
61 Survey respondents (SR) and interviewees (I) are coded according to the order in 
which the responses were received and the interviews conducted. See Appendices III and 
V for an overview. 
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Advisors’ perception of information management  
The survey and interview findings reveal two key functions of information 
provided by group advisors. First, advisors set out to obtain knowledge 
about the content or implications of a given file, which can be used to 
provide policy-related advice or define a (group’s) position (i.e. required to 
fulfil the Policy Expert role). A second purpose is to acquire intelligence 
about the overall political landscape on a given file aimed at facilitating the 
coordination process (i.e. required to fulfil the Broker role). In addition, 
advisors gather information from EP officials in the committee secretariats 
related to procedures (i.e. required to fulfil the Process Manager role). 
Accordingly, information management is found to serve an auxiliary 
function. This finding is further supported through the data presented below 
regarding the gathering, processing, and distribution of information by 
advisors in the EP. 
 
Figure 5.1.2 illustrates the survey findings with respect to the relative 
importance attached to the four roles.62 Only 13 respondents identified 
information management as their core responsibility. Nonetheless, the 
qualitative data show that they use and rely on information for most of their 
tasks. Findings show that notably Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL advisors attach 
value to information for the purpose of providing MEPs with policy and 
political intelligence.63 Of those who label information as the most important 
task of group advisors, seven relate this task to fulfilling MEPs’ needs for 
substance-related information and political intelligence. For example, 
respondents say that it is their role to ‘ensure a well-informed group 
position’ that can count on the support of the ‘EP as a whole’ (SR60); and 
to provide the group with ‘accurate’ and ‘politically relevant’ information on 
                                   
62 Analysis open-ended SQ9: What is the most important task of a group advisor? See 
Appendix III. 
63 Five Greens/EFA, three GUE/NGL, two S&D, and one ALDE, ECR, and EFD advisor 
labelled information management activities as their most important tasks.  
 
 
 
a dossier (SR22, 95), while anticipating ‘possible political problems’ (SR95). 
The data thus reflect that information is deemed instrumental in the 
provision of policy expertise and brokering. These activities are further 
addressed in chapters 6 and 7 respectively.  
 
Gathering information  
20 interviewees and 31 survey respondents stated that they collect 
information regarding the policy content and background of a file. 64 
Effective advisors have a ‘thorough knowledge of the topic’ (SR30) by 
monitoring policy developments (I.7, 8, 9; SR55, 90), ‘reading up on the 
topic’ (I.0.4; SR43), and staying ‘up to date’ (SR8, 10, 36, 43, 50, 55, 58, 
60, 97). Several interviewees and survey respondents explain how they 
actively go in search of information via various internal and external 
sources.65 To this end, they may attend events inside and outside the 
Parliament (I.0.4, 3, 7, 15). In order to acquire specialist or expert 
information advisors can also organise events themselves (I.7, 15). In 
addition to substance-related information, advisors set out to gain insight 
into the various perspectives and stakes that are in play. This activity is 
                                   
64 I.0.4, 3, 4, 6-22; Open-ended responses of SR7, 8, 15, 18, 27, 30, 32, 34, 36, 39, 40, 
42, 43, 48, 51, 52, 55, 59, 60, 66, 67, 74, 77, 79, 86, 90, 91, 92, 95, 97, 99.  
65 I.3, 4, 6, 7, 13-15, 17; SR8, 10, 36, 59, 60, 74. 
Figure 5.1.2 Relative importance attached to information management 
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Greens/EFA (38%) and EPP (33%) appear to be ambivalent but significantly 
less so than their counterparts in the groups on the left of the political 
spectrum. Differences between the groups are less striking for the 
frequency of contact with other types of external stakeholders.  
 
Table 5.1 Contact frequency external stakeholders 
 Daily Weekly Monthly Never 
Interest groups or NGOs 12% 34% 48% 6% 
EC staff 8% 35% 46% 11% 
Industry representatives 4% 22% 46% 28% 
Council staff  15% 56% 29% 
 
Contact with staff from the other EU institutions appears to be tied to the 
Broker role rather than serving as a resource for the accumulation or 
distribution of information. 69  Moreover, the findings suggest that the 
interaction with EC and Council officials is predominantly the domain of the 
committee secretariats. Only four interviewees state that they liaise with 
EC and Council officials to provide MEPs with information. 70  The EFD 
advisors interact the least with Council officials. This may be interpreted in 
light of the group’s relatively lower involvement in the construction of 
compromises, and in policy-making in general. The EFD do not formulate 
joint group positions, which combined with their overall EU-sceptical stance 
does not make them likely allies. Consequently MEPs, and thus their 
advisors, appear to be more interested in political profiling than in 
contributing to legislation (I.23).  
 
                                   
69 92 per cent of survey respondents say to be involved in the technical trilogues where 
officials of the European Commission, Council, and European Parliament meet. Only 
seven respondents say that they are never involved. 
70 I.7, 9, 10, 22.  
 
 
 
interpreted as the political intelligence function of information and was put 
forward by 20 interviewees and 32 survey respondents.66 Some report use 
of collected arguments as input for the formulation of (legislative) texts, or 
to advise MEPs on the acceptability of certain positions or amendments (see 
6.1.2 and 7.1.2 respectively).  
 
To appreciate the various views and interests of 
the field, advisors liaise with external 
stakeholders (see figure 5.1.2a).67 The majority 
of respondents (46%) say they interact on a 
weekly basis. Only four per cent of respondents 
stated that they never gather information in this 
way. These advisors work for different groups:  
EPP, S&D, and EFD. Table 5.1 provides a 
specification of advisors’ external contacts and 
the indicated frequency of their interaction. From 
the aggregated survey data it is deducted that 
advisors are in touch with external stakeholders on a regular basis and that 
the scope of their external networks varies, most likely according to the 
policy area they work on. Yet, different group cultures may also affect this 
type of interaction with the outside world. The findings show that S&D 
advisors are the least inclined to meet with industry representatives: 58 per 
cent report that they never interact with such stakeholders.68 Similarly, 
GUE/NGL advisors (50%) also appear hesitant to take the input from 
industry into account. In comparison, the non-interaction of advisors of the 
ALDE (6%), ECR (18%), and EFD (17%) groups is much smaller. 
                                   
66 I.0.1, 0.4, 1-4, 6-8, 10-14, 16-21; Open-ended responses of SR8, 9, 15, 22, 27, 29, 
34, 36, 39, 41-43, 47, 48, 51, 55, 57, 59, 60, 64-67, 72, 77, 82, 90-92, 95-97, 99. 
67 Analysis SQ7: Can you please estimate how much time you devote to gathering 
information from external stakeholders? See Appendix III Survey Response. 
68 Analysis of multiple-choice SQ12 regarding the frequency of contact with various 
actors. See Appendix III Survey Response. 
Figure 5.1.2a Gathering 
information from 
external stakeholders 
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69 92 per cent of survey respondents say to be involved in the technical trilogues where 
officials of the European Commission, Council, and European Parliament meet. Only 
seven respondents say that they are never involved. 
70 I.7, 9, 10, 22.  
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interpreted as the political intelligence function of information and was put 
forward by 20 interviewees and 32 survey respondents.66 Some report use 
of collected arguments as input for the formulation of (legislative) texts, or 
to advise MEPs on the acceptability of certain positions or amendments (see 
6.1.2 and 7.1.2 respectively).  
 
To appreciate the various views and interests of 
the field, advisors liaise with external 
stakeholders (see figure 5.1.2a).67 The majority 
of respondents (46%) say they interact on a 
weekly basis. Only four per cent of respondents 
stated that they never gather information in this 
way. These advisors work for different groups:  
EPP, S&D, and EFD. Table 5.1 provides a 
specification of advisors’ external contacts and 
the indicated frequency of their interaction. From 
the aggregated survey data it is deducted that 
advisors are in touch with external stakeholders on a regular basis and that 
the scope of their external networks varies, most likely according to the 
policy area they work on. Yet, different group cultures may also affect this 
type of interaction with the outside world. The findings show that S&D 
advisors are the least inclined to meet with industry representatives: 58 per 
cent report that they never interact with such stakeholders.68 Similarly, 
GUE/NGL advisors (50%) also appear hesitant to take the input from 
industry into account. In comparison, the non-interaction of advisors of the 
ALDE (6%), ECR (18%), and EFD (17%) groups is much smaller. 
                                   
66 I.0.1, 0.4, 1-4, 6-8, 10-14, 16-21; Open-ended responses of SR8, 9, 15, 22, 27, 29, 
34, 36, 39, 41-43, 47, 48, 51, 55, 57, 59, 60, 64-67, 72, 77, 82, 90-92, 95-97, 99. 
67 Analysis SQ7: Can you please estimate how much time you devote to gathering 
information from external stakeholders? See Appendix III Survey Response. 
68 Analysis of multiple-choice SQ12 regarding the frequency of contact with various 
actors. See Appendix III Survey Response. 
Figure 5.1.2a Gathering 
information from 
external stakeholders 
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show that this interchange between group advisors occurs across the board 
(see table 5.1a): 49 per cent of respondents say that they exchange 
information on a daily basis and another 44 per cent report the frequency 
as weekly.  
 
Table 5.1a Contact frequency internal actors 
 Daily Weekly Monthly Never 
Assistants (within the 
group) 
83% 16% 1%  
Colleague advisors  80% 13% 6% 1% 
Counterpart advisors 49% 44% 6% 1% 
(Shadow) rapporteurs of the 
group 
45% 44% 9% 2% 
Political coordinator of the 
group 
51% 40% 4% 5% 
Committee secretariat staff 26% 43% 24% 7% 
 
The qualitative data reveal that, although formal meetings take place, the 
contact between advisors for the larger part is of an informal nature. 
Advisors liaise via e-mail, by phone, or in the Parliament’s corridors. “We 
communicate face-to-face or by phone. In that case nothing is recorded on 
paper” (I.2). In their open-ended answers, several survey respondents also 
raise the importance of social or interpersonal skills in the cooperation with 
their counterparts.74 To be effective it is important to stay ‘on friendly terms 
even with political opponents’ and ‘have lunch with the political advisors 
from the other groups once a month to talk business and to gossip about 
the MEPs’ (SR92).  
 
                                   
74 SR19, 51, 54, 74, 77, 92, 94, 96, 97. 
 
 
 
Important internal sources of information are MEPs and their offices. Eight 
interviewees underline that they turn to them for information regarding the 
content of a file and the prevailing perspectives thereof.71 “You should feed 
yourself with information from the members” (I.2). A large majority (83%) 
of survey respondents report interacting with MEP assistants on a daily basis 
(see table 5.1a). They form the link to lobbyists and other external 
stakeholders (I.10, 11) and forward the information received from these 
actors (I.0.4). “We work closely with the assistants because they are 
contacted by lobbyists. They can work on everything and are thoroughly 
aware of the MEP’s agenda” (I.10). Moreover, assistants form an important 
resource of information for the advisor as they have (more) time to spend 
on research, thus having the capacity to examine and grasp the important 
details of a file (I. 0.4, 6, 17, 20, 21). These findings are in line with the 
observation drawn from the literature that EP staff act as gatekeepers for 
information from the outside world (cf. Busby, 2013; Corbett et al, 2016). 
The interview accounts lead us to believe that the personal assistants of 
MEPs mainly fulfil this function. Notwithstanding, the survey findings show 
that only a minority of group advisors never interacts with external 
stakeholders (see table 5.1). 
 
With the underlying objective of providing negotiation advice and 
coordinating positions (see chapter 7), 44 advisors indicate that they gather 
information to obtain the overview of the positions and priorities of the 
groups regarding a given file. 72  Such ‘political intelligence’ is usually 
acquired through day-to-day informal interchange with counterparts, 22 
advisors explained.73 The quantitative data gathered through the survey 
                                   
71 I.0.4, 2, 6, 10, 11, 17, 20, 21. 
72 I.0.1, 0.4, 1-4, 8, 11, 13, 16-21; open-ended responses of SR9, 15, 22, 27, 29, 34, 
36, 39, 41, 43, 47, 51, 57, 59, 60, 64-67, 72, 75, 77, 82, 90-92, 95-97, 99. 
73 I.2-4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 17-22; open-ended responses of SR10, 19, 20, 51, 55, 74, 92, 96, 
97. 
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71 I.0.4, 2, 6, 10, 11, 17, 20, 21. 
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97. 
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Another significant internal source of information are the committee 
secretariats. The survey shows that over two thirds of advisors are in 
regular contact with EP officials (see table 5.1a). The qualitative data offer 
further insight into the cooperation between advisors and committee 
secretariat officials. Most significantly, it appears to concern an informal 
exchange about procedures, planning, the content of the file and the various 
positions, stakes, or potentially sensitive issues. “The EP Secretariat is in 
charge of managing the legislative decision-making process. They organise 
meetings, but also map out the different views and interests in play in for 
example the other groups, the Council, and the European Commission” 
(I.6). “We contact the Secretariat to get to know more about the 
Commission’s position, because they meet them much more frequently. 
And their role is to report back to Parliament on the intentions of the 
European Commission, the timing of the proposal, etc. If an assistant asks 
me about this then I will ask the Secretariat” (I.5). In addition to this 
informal contact, advisors rely on the committee secretariat for the 
distribution of all formal communication and documents. “All official 
communication regarding the legislative work passes through the EP 
Secretariat. They submit all the formal documents, information from and to 
the other institutions, and invitations for meetings” (I.10). 
 
Finally, advisors can keep track of MEPs’ views and core activities by 
monitoring online (social) media. “Nowadays, information and 
communication is digital. Social media are a convenient tool for gathering 
information, providing easier, quicker and continuous access to information. 
You get a good view of what is driving the members. These tools speed up 
the exchange of information in general, both internally and externally, and 
the flow of information never stops” (I.2). 
In sum, the findings show that the gathering of information most 
prominently takes place through the informal interaction with external 
stakeholders and internal actors. These activities appear to comprise both 
 
 
 
an inventory element and a selective approach. The extent to which 
advisors are instructed or have room to improvise in their information 
management tasks is considered in section 5.2.    
 
Processing information 
All respondents acknowledge that they process 
information. To attend to MEPs’ needs for 
information in their parliamentary activities, 
advisors filter and analyse information. “The 
selection and analysis of information is one of 
our daily activities” (I.3). The quantitative data, 
as illustrated by figure 5.1.2b75, show that the 
large majority (79%) of survey respondents 
agree with this statement. No significant 
variation across groups or committees is 
encountered in respect of the indicated 
frequency.  
 
The qualitative data gathered through the interviews and the answers to 
the open-ended survey questions offer further details of what is understood 
by filtering information. 14 advisors point out that this relates to the level 
of relevance or importance.76 In order to be effective, advisors should have 
‘the capacity’ to distinguish ‘what is essential, important and less important 
or superfluous’ (SR39). Advisors have to shed light on the different 
perspectives by ‘pre-sorting content, filtering, and giving MEPs only the 
most essential bits of information’ (I.9). Findings show that processing 
information applies to information about the content of a file and its 
                                   
75 Analysis of multiple-choice SQ 7: Can you please estimate how much time you devote 
to filtering and analysing information? See Appendix III Survey Response. 
76 I.0.3, 0.4, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16; open-ended responses of SR13, 22, 39, 44, 49, 55, 
75, 99. 
Figure 5.1.2b Filtering 
and analysing 
information 
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implications, and the political viewpoints or priorities that are likely to affect 
the decision-making process. “You have to know how to filter, determine 
what ideas or input are important and what to leave aside” (I.0.4). It is the 
advisor’s responsibility to ‘point out the most political aspects of proposals’ 
(SR99). “You need to be able to analyse, summarise, understand quickly 
and get across the key points to get the job done (I.11). 
 
The empirical analysis discloses that advisors’ tasks include but go beyond 
the technical sphere. They pre-select information through the choice of 
internal and external sources, and by determining what is (most) relevant 
for MEPs. “It is essential to understand all the political aspects of an issue, 
collect information, analyse it in an in-depth manner and transform it into 
political advice, for the MEPs following it as well as in a readable manner to 
the whole political group” (SR22). As discussed above, the analysis of 
information is generally policy-related or aimed at providing political 
intelligence. The aggregated survey data support this finding by showing 
that advisors perceive ‘analytical skills’ and ‘policy expertise’ among the 
most important qualities to possess in order to effectively carry out their 
role (see figure 3.2.3).  
 
Policy analysis entails compounding information about the content of a file 
and its possible implications that allows the advisor to fulfil the Policy Expert 
role (see chapter 6). This starts with thoroughly studying the dossier’s topic, 
understanding its content and implications, and advising the group 
accordingly, several advisors explained.77 Subsequently, the responsibility 
of the advisor is to provide MEPs with an in-depth analysis, cast light on the 
various aspects of a file and to put them into political context, as 16 others 
stated.78  
                                   
77 I.0.4; open-ended responses of SR7, 32, 36, 49, 90. 
78 I.7, 11, 14, 17, 21; open-ended responses of SR7, 22, 34, 36, 42, 45, 60, 69, 79, 90, 
95. 
 
 
 
Producing political intelligence consists of combining pieces of information, 
an activity that allows the advisor to provide the MEP with negotiation 
advice (see chapter 7). It entails the strategic analysis of the political 
landscape – i.e. the positions of internal and external stakeholders – as well 
as their various interests and possible compromises. This kind of 
information processing was mentioned by 49 of the advisors questioned.79 
“A political advisor needs to know and understand the different political 
forces and interests, analyse these and map them in order to advise the 
members” (I.1). 
 
From the findings it is concluded that processing includes but goes beyond 
the mere summary of information. The political dimension of these activities 
is further addressed in section 5.2.  
 
Distributing information  
From the empirical research it is found that the analysed information forms 
the basis for the Policy Expert and Broker roles, and to a lesser extent for 
the Process Manager role. Regarding the latter, advisors provide procedural 
assistance and advice based on the information they gather, and their sense 
of the broader picture. They will use their analysis and insight to, for 
example, comment on the voting list drafted by the committee secretariat, 
issue voting recommendations, or argue for a split vote (see 4.1.2). 
 
Policy and political intelligence are distributed in briefings or exchanged 
face-to-face (see 6.1.2 and 7.1.2).  Advisors distribute information ‘to 
advise MEPs what is happening’ (I.9). “In policy notes the state of play is 
evaluated: what is at stake, what are the differences, etc.” (I.0.4). Face-
                                   
79 I.0.1, 0.4, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16-21; open-ended responses of SR9, 15, 22, 27, 
29, 30, 34, 36, 39, 41, 43, 47, 51, 52, 57, 59, 60, 64-67, 69, 72, 75, 77, 82, 90-92, 95-
97, 99. 
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79 I.0.1, 0.4, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16-21; open-ended responses of SR9, 15, 22, 27, 
29, 30, 34, 36, 39, 41, 43, 47, 51, 52, 57, 59, 60, 64-67, 69, 72, 75, 77, 82, 90-92, 95-
97, 99. 
242
Chapter 5 
 
 
to-face exchange of information is both an important source of information 
for the advisor as it is a way to communicate (group) priorities. In this 
respect, nine advisors underline the importance of having good 
communication skills in the open-ended responses of the survey.80 The 
informal exchange occurs internally with counterpart advisors and 
externally with various stakeholders (see tables 5.1 and 5.1a). In the 
interviews and the survey, advisors stress the importance of maintaining a 
good working relationship with their counterparts in the other groups. “It is 
important to be friends with everyone, to get information and to sell your 
information” (I.20). The interaction with external stakeholders can be a 
tactic that allows the advisor ‘to test’ certain ideas prevalent within the 
group in order to ‘see how for example industry would respond to them’ 
(I.14). Finally, as part of this distribution function some advisors report 
being involved in media and press activities.81 
 
Besides merely distributing information, findings expose that the way 
advisors present information requires interpretation and judgement. The 
political scope of these activities is further discussed in the next section of 
this chapter.  
 
5.2 Assessment of the political scope of information 
management  
The findings confirm that there are technical and political dimensions to 
information management in the EP context, thus characterising it as a 
category of political advice. The previous section presented the empirical 
evidence for the adoption of the role and revealed that the Information 
Manager role may involve the selection of sources, the pre-sorting of 
                                   
80 Open-ended responses of SR25, 27, 53, 64, 74, 75, 77, 91, 98. 
81 SR13, 22, 25, 55, 59, 75. 
 
 
 
content, and the framing or selling of political messages. The data show 
that these activities are common to group advisors. This section evaluates 
the political scope of information management. The extent to which the role 
is political is assessed with the use of the modes of discretion that have 
been developed as part of the analytical framework (see 2.1.3). The aim is 
to explore what guides the selection and interpretation by the advisor, and 
how they determine the appropriate way to present information. The 
analysis below approaches this issue by looking at advisors’ discretion, 
room for initiative and improvisation when they adopt the role.  
 
5.2.1 considers the way in which advisors receive instructions from MEPs 
and how this input affects their role. The analysis shows that advisors do 
not receive explicit direction or guidance in carrying out information 
management tasks. In order to determine the type of information required 
and the appropriate sources, they are guided by their understanding of the 
ideological priorities of the group. 5.2.2 further discusses this improvisation, 
which is a strategy to deal with situations in which explicit instructions are 
wanting. Findings show that advisors anticipate the information that is 
desired (ends) and use their judgement to compile and use it (means). It 
is therefore concluded in 5.2.3 that advisors manifest pro-active behaviour 
in all three information management functions. They thus have considerable 
room for manoeuvre with very little direction from their superiors.  
 
5.2.1 Instructions and input from the MEP 
This sub-section sets out to determine the way in which advisors receive 
instructions or input from the elected representatives and how this affects 
their room for initiative in the gathering, processing, and distribution of 
information. From the quantitative and qualitative data it is concluded that 
EP group advisors work closely together with (shadow) rapporteurs and the 
group’s coordinator of the parliamentary committee in question (see 4.2.1). 
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80 Open-ended responses of SR25, 27, 53, 64, 74, 75, 77, 91, 98. 
81 SR13, 22, 25, 55, 59, 75. 
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Their explicit or implicit political instructions are most likely to emanate 
from this interaction.  
 
As concluded in chapter 4, the large majority of survey respondents and 
interviewees acknowledge their autonomy. In carrying out their daily 
activities they are not explicitly told what to do but expected to take 
initiative. Instead, advisors construct their mandate based on a certain 
grasp of the ideology and priorities of the group. This understanding serves 
as a guideline for the advisor’s activities. The research shows that this in 
particular applies to information management because information needs 
generally remain implicit. 5.2.2 further addresses improvisation by 
advisors, which is in fact a strategy to deal with a lack of instructions or 
direction. Beyond the advisor’s appreciation of what the position and 
information needs of the group or the member in charge are, no examples 
were encountered of explicit instructions regarding information 
management tasks. Ten interviewees state that MEPs’ offices are an 
important source of information, which implies some indirect guidance as 
to what information is deemed relevant for the MEP.82 Overall, however, 
advisors report that they gather and process information at their own 
discretion.  
 
For the collection of information advisors depend heavily on the exchange 
with internal and external actors (see 5.1). Several interviewees stated that 
whom they turn to for specialist or expert knowledge depends on the file.83 
It was found that it is largely up to the advisor to decide who they contact 
or talk to. The survey analysis shows that internally MEP assistants are the 
group contacted most frequently (see table 5.1a), further supporting the 
notion that group advisors indirectly get direction with regard to the desired 
                                   
82 I.0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 2, 6, 10, 11, 17, 20, 21. 
83 I.4, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19. 
 
 
 
outcome and strategy. Externally, interest groups and NGOs are the most 
prominent groups with which advisors exchange information (see table 
5.1). External stakeholders as well as the advisor can take the initiative for 
this exchange. The extent to which advisors interact with third parties 
differs per group. The culture within the group and its ideology also affect 
the type of actors that are consulted. The interview findings bring some 
interesting observations to light. For the administration of meetings with 
external actors, the S&D group has formulated guidelines and the ECR 
group has a lobby register in place. According to two S&D advisors, 
stakeholders who are aligned with the group’s ideology are actively 
approached for their opinion or input on certain files. Another stressed that 
the general S&D rule is to not meet with stakeholders individually and to 
only gather their input through organised hearings or workshops. The 
survey findings show that S&D respondents are the least likely to meet with 
industry representatives (see 5.1.2).  
 
The ECR’s lobbyist register is based on the Anglo-Saxon model and ‘is an 
incentive to inform each other as extensively as possible’, one interviewee 
explained. Advisors have to fill in the date, related file and the name of the 
person they are meeting. MEPs then have to approve. ECR and EPP 
interviewees agree that meeting with external stakeholders happens a lot 
and is based on their knowledge and expertise. The Greens advisors 
underline that they are able to take a pro-active approach in deciding who 
to contact and by selecting the most relevant external stakeholders. In this 
regard, the advisor ‘screens’ external contacts for the MEP, one Greens/EFA 
advisor claims. An ALDE interviewee similarly describes the advisor as the 
‘interface’ between lobbyists and the MEP. A GUE-NGL interviewee explains 
that contact with third parties generally runs through the MEP’s office and 
that the selection is based on whether you need the stakeholder for your 
argument. All interviewees acknowledge the necessity of consulting 
external stakeholders for information and their room for manoeuvre in this 
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regard. Only the EFD interviewee suggests that this happens significantly 
more when working on legislative files.  
 
Discussing the interaction with officials of the other EU institutions, one 
interviewee suggested that advisors are perceived as ‘pushy’ because they 
are ‘explicitly politically driven’ (I.7). As discussed in 5.1.1, the EP highly 
values its independent (information) position within the institutional 
triangle, which explains the apparent inclination towards preferring 
knowledge or expertise provided by third parties over acquiring information 
from the other EU institutions.  
 
In sum, the discussion shows that group advisors enjoy considerable 
discretion in their Information Manager role. No examples are encountered 
of explicit instructions in relation to information management tasks. 
Instead, advisors use their judgement and appreciation of the MEP’s or 
group’s priorities to determine the appropriate course of action. 
Alternatively, they seek indirect guidance from the personal assistants. Both 
the policy area and the group culture appear to affect the selection of 
preferred (sources of) information.  
 
5.2.2 Improvisation by the advisor 
It is found that group advisors fulfil the political dimensions of the role (see 
5.1.2). The previous sub-section concluded that, for these activities, the 
mandate of advisors is implicit and that there is considerable room for 
initiative. This sub-section addresses group advisors’ manifested level of 
improvisation in the Information Manager role. Improvisation is construed 
as value or ideological appraisals by the advisor, the anticipation of priorities 
or objectives, or the use of implicit knowledge or tactics (see the definition 
of political advice in 2.1.2).  
 
 
 
 
The literature has dealt extensively with information as a resource for 
legislators (e.g. Patterson, 1970; Tallberg, 2004) and previous studies show 
that MEPs rely heavily on internal sources (Dobbels and Neuhold, 2014). 
Information needs, however, are generally implicit and not very specific. 
Information management therefore by definition requires some form of 
anticipation and judgement by advisors. In this regard, they are found to 
determine what type of information is required and what the appropriate 
way to compile and present it entails. Advisors provide the necessary 
elements to help MEPs form an opinion and come to a decision (I.16). 
Findings reveal that, in addition to the technical inventory, summary, and 
distribution dimensions, information management by group advisors entails 
selection, interpretation, and presentation. The way in which advisors have 
to improvise for each activity is further discussed below. 
 
The qualitative and quantitative data presented in 5.1.2 provided evidence 
that advisors actively search for information and input. 84  Information 
management appears to be a day-to-day activity for group advisors. 
Activities consist of studying the file, monitoring related developments 
inside and outside the EP, compiling information from multiple sources, 
organising and attending events, exchange information with internal and 
external actors. However, advisors do not receive explicit direction or 
guidance in carrying out these tasks (see 5.2.1). The selection of 
information sources, for example, requires the advisor to anticipate both 
the desired input and the preferred provenance of the input. At their 
discretion, they select the sources that they deem most relevant or 
‘tactically’ useful for MEPs (I.14). Moreover, the timeliness of information is 
important to appropriately support MEPs, as several survey respondents 
emphasise.85 Not only is it the responsibility of the advisor to keep abreast 
                                   
84 I.0.4, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17; open-ended response of SR8, 10, 30, 32, 36, 43, 
55, 59, 60, 74, 90. 
85 SR8, 10, 36, 43, 50, 55, 58-60, 97. 
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of any new developments and ensure up-to-date information, they also 
need to inform themselves and get involved at an early stage, i.e. ‘prior to 
the publication of the EC proposal’ (SR59). “You have to be informed first, 
before you can appropriately advise your politician” (I.7). At this stage, no 
formal discussions or exchange will have taken place in Parliament and 
advisors must therefore anticipate both the interests, potential position of 
their group as well as the stakes of the other groups and the other 
institutions.  
 
In response to the open-ended question as to what characterises an 
‘excellent advisor’, 48 respondents refer to political intelligence and 28 bring 
up policy-related information. Advisors can thus stand out by having or by 
showing the initiative to acquire expertise in a specific field.86 The advisor 
should be able ‘to understand all the political dimensions of an issue and 
the positions of the various stakeholders’ (SR22). Advisors bring added 
value to the group through their understanding of the topic (SR43).  
 
The findings furthermore demonstrate that all group advisors filter 
information. They do so in order to provide MEPs with an overview of the 
broader picture. The qualitative data provided by interviewees and survey 
respondents illustrate that this type of information processing relates to 
analysing policy content, interpreting or ‘translating’ information (SR22), as 
well as to offering insight into the political landscape. In this role, advisors 
interpret the relevance and urgency of the policy and the political contexts. 
They make a selection based on their evaluation of what MEPs need to know 
(I.0.4, 9; SR39) and what are the ‘most political’ issues (SR99). Advisors 
can have considerable influence by distilling the relevant, or most important 
ideas or input and proposing these to be supported by the group (I.0.3).  
 
                                   
86 See Appendix III, responses to SQ5 and 6.  
 
 
 
The findings confirm that advisors structure and bundle information to make 
it controllable for the MEP. They use their judgement to combine policy and 
political intelligence, which allows advisors to grasp the broader picture. 
Effective advisors are able to provide MEPs with such a strategic overview, 
12 of those probed say.87 It is the task of the advisor to monitor internal 
and external developments. “Advisors should be aware of the different 
stakes, views or sensitivities in the group, in the EP, and in the outside 
world” (I.2). It is found that advisors anticipate the strategies of internal 
and external stakeholders either by interpreting the information they 
gather, or by drawing from their experience. Advisors should furthermore 
have the ability to connect policy information and practical implications to 
the political objectives of the group, several survey respondents underline.88 
These activities illustrate that advisors have considerable room for 
improvisation in their Information Manager role. 
 
Advisors also apply judgement with respect to (possible) future 
developments that may require a response from the group. “Our most 
important responsibility is to keep a complete overview of all activities in a 
committee, understand how files intertwine, and anticipate how they may 
develop over time” (SR92). In addition to their interaction with external 
stakeholders, advisors liaise with their colleagues to be aware of relevant 
related issues and files in the other parliamentary committees (I.19, 22). 
 
The data presented in 5.1.2 demonstrate that advisors’ activities include 
but go beyond the mere distribution of information. Internally, advisors 
present information regarding the policy content and political stakes 
through briefings and in face-to-face encounters.89 26 advisors highlight 
                                   
87 I.1, 2, 3, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21; open-ended responses of SR52, 75, 90, 92. 
88 Open-ended responses of SR55, 75, 77, 82, 84, 90, 91, 97. 
89 The ways in which advisors use information to provide policy-related advice and 
recommend negotiation strategies are addressed in respectively chapters 6 and 7. 
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that these activities include political analysis, interpretation, judgement, 
and the use of tactics on their part.90 This may relate to the timing of (not) 
sharing information or to the way in which the information is shared. 
Information exchange is a ‘game of give and take’: when you ask for 
information, you have to be willing to provide information in return. “And 
you don't always want to do this” (I.2). In both their internal and external 
communication efforts, advisors make use of framing as a tactic to test the 
ideas of their group and gather support. In such attempts to ‘sell’ 
information advisors ‘express political ideas and messages’ (I.20). By 
sharing information with others, advisors act as the MEP’s proxy, giving 
visibility to his or her decisions and initiatives (SR25).  
 
In conclusion, advisors improvise in order to deal with situations in which 
they are not explicitly told what to do. The adoption of the role requires 
improvisation because information needs remain implicit. Advisors 
anticipate the information that is desired and use their judgement to 
compile and use it. The analysis thus shows that the desired outcome, as 
well as the means to achieve it, are guided by the advisor’s understanding 
of the ideological priorities of the group. The next sub-section discusses 
what this means for the political scope of the various information 
management tasks. 
 
5.2.3 Information management as a category of political advice 
The empirical research revealed that the core information management 
tasks combine technical and political elements. No evidence has been 
encountered of purely technical tasks. Yet, the technical inventory, 
summary, and distribution functions of information are part of and feed into 
the role. The framework conceptualises political advice as a mixed sphere 
                                   
90 I.1-3, 8, 9, 17, 20, 22; open-ended responses of SR9, 13, 22, 24, 30, 34, 39, 40, 41, 
44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 69, 89, 91, 99. 
 
 
 
where technical and political activities meet. The findings presented in this 
chapter thus corroborate information management as a category of political 
advice. 
 
To assess the political scope of the role, the framework conceptualised three 
incremental modes of political advice tied to the discretion of the advisor: 
routine, reactive, and pro-active behaviour. Discretion is exercised where 
hierarchical measures or political authority are not directly applied. The role 
thus becomes more pro-active as the advisor’s room for improvisation 
increases. In the context of information management the routine mode is 
interpreted as follows: a situation in which the information needs (desired 
outcome) and the way in which to fulfil these needs (means) are explicated. 
No indications were encountered of either predefined information needs, or 
instructions about how advisors should gather, process, and distribute it. 
Instead, it is found that both the ends and the means in relation to 
information management remain implicit, which requires the advisor to 
improvise. The Information Manager role is thus labelled as pro-active and 
advisors are found to enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre with very 
little direction from their superiors. 
 
Figure 5.2.3 illustrates the key features of the Information Manager role as 
found from the empirical research:  
 Advisors actively search and exchange information, for which they 
select the most relevant sources and content from their inventory. In the 
collection of information advisors are guided by their judgement and rely 
on their understanding of the priorities of the group.  
 
 Advisors transform information into useable intelligence. To this 
end, they filter information according to relevance and urgency, by 
interpreting substance-related content and political stakes.  
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summary, and distribution functions of information are part of and feed into 
the role. The framework conceptualises political advice as a mixed sphere 
                                   
90 I.1-3, 8, 9, 17, 20, 22; open-ended responses of SR9, 13, 22, 24, 30, 34, 39, 40, 41, 
44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 69, 89, 91, 99. 
 
 
 
where technical and political activities meet. The findings presented in this 
chapter thus corroborate information management as a category of political 
advice. 
 
To assess the political scope of the role, the framework conceptualised three 
incremental modes of political advice tied to the discretion of the advisor: 
routine, reactive, and pro-active behaviour. Discretion is exercised where 
hierarchical measures or political authority are not directly applied. The role 
thus becomes more pro-active as the advisor’s room for improvisation 
increases. In the context of information management the routine mode is 
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outcome) and the way in which to fulfil these needs (means) are explicated. 
No indications were encountered of either predefined information needs, or 
instructions about how advisors should gather, process, and distribute it. 
Instead, it is found that both the ends and the means in relation to 
information management remain implicit, which requires the advisor to 
improvise. The Information Manager role is thus labelled as pro-active and 
advisors are found to enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre with very 
little direction from their superiors. 
 
Figure 5.2.3 illustrates the key features of the Information Manager role as 
found from the empirical research:  
 Advisors actively search and exchange information, for which they 
select the most relevant sources and content from their inventory. In the 
collection of information advisors are guided by their judgement and rely 
on their understanding of the priorities of the group.  
 
 Advisors transform information into useable intelligence. To this 
end, they filter information according to relevance and urgency, by 
interpreting substance-related content and political stakes.  
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 Advisors test or sell information to relay political ideas or 
messages. This activity involves the distribution of information to 
internal and external actors.   
 
 
5.3 Impact of the factors on information management 
The objective of the thesis is to explore and explain the circumstances that 
stimulate or restrict a political role by group advisors. The literature review 
identified a set of factors expected to affect the adoption of the Information 
Manager role (see 2.3). By presenting evidence from the survey and 
interviews this section consecutively evaluates the personal factors (5.3.1) 
and the contextual factors (5.3.2). The analysis concludes that political 
sensitivity combined with a context where advisors work on a policy issue 
Figure 5.2.3 Empirical findings: information management as a 
category of political advice 
 
 
 
or specific file that is not highly politicised in the EP are the optimal 
conditions for advisors to pro-actively adopt the Information Manager role. 
 
5.3.1 Personal factors 
The analytical framework conceptualises four personal attributes of advisors 
that are theorised to facilitate political behaviour. Each is assessed below in 
relation to information management, finding that the factor political 
sensitivity is indispensable for the political dimensions of the Information 
Manager role. Trust, informal network, and institutional memory facilitate 
information management activities.  
 
Trust  
The analytical framework links trust to knowledge of and affinity with party 
ideology and priorities (see 2.3.1). The empirical research shows that for 
information management trust relates to the quality and scope of 
information (in accumulation), the relevance and usability (processing), and 
reliability and acceptance of information (distribution). 
 
17 advisors stress that trust, reliability and reputation are important for the 
accumulation of information.91 A trusted relationship with colleagues and 
counterparts in the other groups, as well as MEP Assistants facilitates the 
gathering and exchange of information internally. The interview and survey 
accounts show that the contrary holds true as well. Should trust be 
betrayed, the working relationship is disturbed.  
 
25 advisors underline that trust between the advisor and the MEP is key in 
determining the working relationship, i.e. how much discretion the advisor 
                                   
91 I.0.1-0.4, 3, 10, 15, 17, 19, 21; open-ended responses of SR17, 25, 39, 40, 52, 60, 
92. 
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91 I.0.1-0.4, 3, 10, 15, 17, 19, 21; open-ended responses of SR17, 25, 39, 40, 52, 60, 
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is granted by the coordinator or (shadow) rapporteur (s)he works with.92 
Trust of the MEP increases the advisor’s discretion to pro-actively select the 
sources of external information. Moreover, it is instrumental for the 
anticipation of the relevance and usability of information. MEPs will be more 
open to trusted advisors, relaying what they need to form an opinion, and 
more likely to give the advisor feedback on the information provided. The 
same reasoning applies to trust of MEP Assistants as they generally act as 
the interface to the MEP and screen the information provided by group 
advisors.  
 
Findings illustrate that trust facilitates each of the three elements of 
information management. For the effective distribution of information it is 
even found to be indispensable. The collected data show that analysed 
information forms the basis for the Policy Expert and Broker roles. Policy 
and political intelligence are distributed in briefings or exchanged face-to-
face. The reliability of the advisor is crucial to ensure internal and external 
actors accept the advice that is provided. The factor trust is therefore found 
to be indispensable for the adoption of the Policy Expert and Broker roles 
(see 6.3.1 and 7.3.1 respectively).  
 
Informal network  
The framework conceptualises an informal network as the access to and 
exchange of private information through informal interactions with actors 
in and outside the institution (see 2.3.1). For information management the 
scope of the information accumulated and distributed depends on the extent 
of an advisor’s informal network.  
 
                                   
92 I.0.2, 0.4, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15-18, 22; open-ended responses of SR6, 17, 25, 31, 38-
40, 52, 60, 61, 84, 99. 
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From the literature it was derived that in-house sources of information are 
crucial for safeguarding the Parliament’s independence. The survey analysis 
demonstrates that advisors’ networks centre on contacts within the 
institution. 39 advisors underline that informal contacts and personal 
relationships with actors inside the EP are crucial to information 
management.93 Internally, their most valued contacts are MEP assistants 
(see table 5.1a). The informal exchange with assistants facilitates the 
advisor to acquire insight into MEPs’ views, information needs, and 
preferences regarding the sources or stakeholders to consult for 
information. The collaboration of advisors facilitates their ability to 
synthesise information and provide the group with a strategic overview of 
the policy and political context of a file. Within the group, colleagues 
exchange information about the key issues in the respective parliamentary 
committees in order to map out interconnections or possible conflicts (I.19, 
22; SR92). Information exchange with counterparts in other groups allows 
the advisor to map out the various stakes, to test or sell information, or to 
give visibility to group initiatives or priorities. Finally, officials working within 
the EP committee secretariats are important for the pro-active search for 
information (I.16).  
 
The degree to which advisors are allowed or inclined to meet with external 
stakeholders determines the effectiveness of their networks. The 
aggregated survey data reveal that advisors are in touch with external 
stakeholders on a regular basis (see table 5.1). Although differences exist 
between group cultures regarding the selection of and tendency to meet 
external stakeholders, the scope of advisors’ external networks is most 
strikingly dependent on the policy area they work on, i.e. the parliamentary 
committee they support.  
                                   
93 O  pen-ended responses of SR3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 27, 37, 42, 43, 47, 51, 53, 55, 59, 
60, 74, 79, 84, 88, 89, 92, 97, 98. I. 0.4, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22. 
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to recognise political and administrative cues (see 2.3.1). In the context of 
information management in the EP, the factor allows the advisor to 
anticipate information needs, judge the relevance and urgency of 
information sources and content, and employ tactics for distribution.  
 
Political sensitivity first of all relates to understanding the information 
needs, which advisors deduct from the views of the MEP in charge and the 
ideological position of the group (see 5.2.1). 37 advisors discuss the need 
to know what is strategically important for MEPs and the group as a whole.95 
“Advisors should be able to assess, appreciate, and predict political 
interests” (I.1). Political sensitivity in these terms entails the anticipation of 
‘what is likely to be acceptable’ to the members of the group (cf. Page and 
Jenkins, 2005). The empirical research reveals that this is indispensable for 
the anticipation of information needs as well as judging the political and 
strategic relevance of information. Advisors must have the ability to predict 
and empathise with the various – possibly conflicting – views within the 
group. Subsequently, they tailor the information to accommodate the 
respective needs (SR56).  
 
By interpreting collected information advisors provide the group with a 
strategic overview of the broader picture. This requires a certain insight into 
the priorities and strategies of the various internal and external actors and 
the ability to anticipate changes (I.1, 2, 15, 21). Group advisors are able to 
do so by drawing on their ‘awareness’ of what is going on inside and outside 
Parliament (I.3, 14, 19, 20). This can be associated with having ‘a feel for 
the game’ (Adler-Nissen, 2009), allowing advisors to understand and 
forecast the process of political coordination. 
 
                                   
95 I.0.1-0.4, 1-4, 9, 13-15, 17, 18, 19, 22; SR9, 10, 13, 15, 22, 24, 29, 36, 39, 41, 48, 
60, 64, 72, 74, 75, 77, 87, 95, 96, 97. 
 
 
 
The findings presented in the chapter, and summed up in the discussion 
above, show that advisors’ intra- and extra-parliamentary networks 
facilitate pro-active information management. “The amount of input and 
arguments obtained determines if you can have more or less influence as 
an advisor” (I.3). 
 
Institutional memory  
Institutional memory is conceptualised as the insight into – and access to – 
the institutional track record (see 2.3.1). In the EP context the factor is 
interpreted as knowledge of the functioning of the institution (formal and 
informal rules) and an appreciation of the political group’s (previous) 
positions. For information management institutional memory facilitates the 
advisor to anticipate information needs, judge information sources, as well 
as the relevance and usability of information.  
 
The advisors in the study do not elaborately present institutional memory 
as a specific asset. ‘Knowing your way around’ rather seems a given for 
those inside (I.3). The survey finds advisors to be generally experienced.94 
Moreover, nearly half of the respondents have a background of working in 
the EP. These figures lead to the conclusion that advisors are in a position 
to develop a level of ‘institutional memory’. Successfully employing this 
knowledge and insight is instrumental for pro-active information 
management. Nonetheless, no evidence was found that information 
management is dependent on the institutional memory of the advisor.  
 
Political sensitivity  
The analytical framework conceptualises political sensitivity as the 
understanding of the institution’s informal code of conduct and the ability 
                                   
94 On average advisors are in their current position for six years, varying between seven 
months and 23 years. 
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94 On average advisors are in their current position for six years, varying between seven 
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In the presentation of information advisors enjoy considerable room for 
manoeuvre (see 5.2.2). Findings show that political sensitivity is in fact 
indispensable for these activities. In relaying political messages advisors 
‘need to distinguish between their personal opinion and the line of the 
group’ (I.8) and know how to ‘be diplomatic’ (I.5). Advisors should have 
the ‘ability to frame’ their information in a way likely to be ‘accepted’ by 
others (I.11). Other interviewees also discuss the presentation of 
information in relation to political sensitivity: advisors should ‘understand 
the skill of political presentation’ (I.12) and ‘the language and tone in 
conveying advice is an intangible skill’ advisors should master (I.2). Finally, 
a ‘feeling for the right timing’ is needed (I.21).  
 
Inquiring after the qualities advisors should possess to effectively fulfil their 
responsibilities, political sensitivity is cited most prominently by survey 
respondents.96 Interviewees are even more united in stressing the crucial 
importance of political sensitivity for their role. Out of 28 interviewees, only 
five did not discuss the concept. From the quantitative as well as the 
qualitative data the conclusion is drawn that the factor political sensitivity 
is indispensable for the adoption of the Information Manager role. 
 
Assessment of the personal factors 
In the analytical framework it was hypothesised that the personal factors 
affect the advisor’s discretion and their ability to adopt a political role. The 
factors are used to assess the (optimal) circumstances in which political 
advice may be provided. The following values are used to qualitatively 
evaluate the impact of the factors on the adoption of the Information 
Manager role: indispensable (++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not 
relevant (0), or a negative impact (-).  
                                   
96 See Appendix III, responses to SQ6 and 11. Respectively 41 per cent and 52 per cent 
of respondents cite political sensitivity. 
 
 
 
From the empirical findings as discussed above it is concluded that political 
sensitivity is indispensable for the political dimensions of the Information 
Manager role. Trust, informal network, and institutional memory also 
facilitate information management activities. Table 5.3.1 illustrates the 
outcomes of the analysis. 
 
Table 5.3.1 Personal factor assessment for the Information Manager role 
PRO-ACTIVE INFORMATION MANAGER 
 
 
Trust Informal 
network 
Institutional 
memory 
Political 
sensitivity 
Actively search and 
exchange information 
+ + 0 ++ 
Filter according to 
relevance and urgency 
+ + + ++ 
Test or sell information + + 0 ++ 
 
5.3.2 Contextual factors 
Three contextual factors are expected to affect delegation and trigger 
potential differences across the groups, committees, policy domains, or 
specific files: political direction, complexity, and politicisation. The 
assessment in this sub-section concludes that the political functions of 
information management are restricted in politicised cases and enabled in 
highly complex cases. The Information Manager role is further stimulated if 
the group attaches particular importance to the policy area or file under 
discussion.   
 
Political direction  
The analytical framework defines political direction in relation to the position 
of the MEP or group: advisors’ ability to identify political cues to guide their 
behaviour depends on the extent to which the MEP in charge or the group 
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they represent is outspoken and reputed (see 2.3.2). The idea is that the 
clearer advisors’ political direction is, the more likely they are to assume a 
political role.  
 
Advisors construct political direction from their appreciation of the 
position(s) and ideological principles of the political group (I.13, 19, 20). 
The prediction of information needs is thus based on their ability to do so. 
Several interviewees explain that these needs are more straightforward and 
aligned within the smaller or more homogeneous groups than for the ALDE, 
EPP, or S&D groups.97 For specific information needs, advisors look to the 
MEP in charge and the political coordinator of the group. The experience of 
MEPs affects the role of the advisor and can have both a facilitating and 
restricting impact. Six interviewees explain that newcomers tend to have 
different needs for assistance compared to ‘experienced’ MEPs.98 As the 
experience of the MEP increases, less research is necessary by the advisor 
(I.5). This implies that information management becomes less significant 
as MEPs get settled into their function. At the same time, it is harder for 
advisor to anticipate the information needs of newcomers and tailor their 
analysis of information to these needs. 
 
The role of the advisor is furthermore affected by the extent of involvement 
of the MEP and his/her office. The scope of the Information Manager role 
decreases if the MEP Assistant is experienced, pro-active, or knowledgeable 
about the file under discussion (I.18, 22). Nevertheless, advisors’ 
responsibility for informing the group (distribution function) remains 
unaffected by the activity of Assistants.  
 
                                   
97  I.3, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 21. 
98 I.0.3, 3, 4, 5, 13, 15. 
 
 
 
Using the factor political direction to assess the adoption of the Information 
Manager role proves difficult. No examples are encountered in the data in 
support of an unambiguous relation (positive or negative) between political 
direction and the Information Manager role. Instead, findings show a mixed 
picture in terms of the experience of MEPs, which can have both a 
facilitating and restricting impact, as can their active involvement.   
 
Complexity  
In the framework complexity is defined in relation to the subject matter and 
thus expected to vary across parliamentary committees or specific policy or 
legislative proposals (see 2.3.2). From the literature the assumption is 
drawn that as ‘complexity’ increases MEPs are more likely to seek assistance 
and grant advisors a political role.  
 
Both survey respondents and interviewees stress that advisors should be 
able to analyse technical and complicated files. Several advisors underline 
that political advisors have more room for manoeuvre and ‘influence’ as the 
issue under consideration becomes more complex.99 They claim that in files 
with a lot of technical details the ‘value’ of assistance and information 
increases considerably in such cases (I.1). In addition, it is ‘more likely that 
MEPs follow the advisor’s advice’ (I.13), or are ‘less controlling’ (I.15). 
Moreover, certain files require ‘specialist expertise’ which MEPs do not 
possess and the advisor can provide (I.4). Findings presented in 5.1 and 
5.2 show that advisors indeed fulfil such information or expertise 
requirements. These examples confirm the relevance of the policy context 
for the role of advisors. Four interviewees described the role of the advisor 
as being more significant for policy issues that are a priority of the group.100 
The importance attached to files is generally bigger for legislative files, nine 
                                   
99 I.1, 4, 13, 15, 18. 
100 I.5, 7, 8, 21. 
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97  I.3, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 21. 
98 I.0.3, 3, 4, 5, 13, 15. 
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Manager role proves difficult. No examples are encountered in the data in 
support of an unambiguous relation (positive or negative) between political 
direction and the Information Manager role. Instead, findings show a mixed 
picture in terms of the experience of MEPs, which can have both a 
facilitating and restricting impact, as can their active involvement.   
 
Complexity  
In the framework complexity is defined in relation to the subject matter and 
thus expected to vary across parliamentary committees or specific policy or 
legislative proposals (see 2.3.2). From the literature the assumption is 
drawn that as ‘complexity’ increases MEPs are more likely to seek assistance 
and grant advisors a political role.  
 
Both survey respondents and interviewees stress that advisors should be 
able to analyse technical and complicated files. Several advisors underline 
that political advisors have more room for manoeuvre and ‘influence’ as the 
issue under consideration becomes more complex.99 They claim that in files 
with a lot of technical details the ‘value’ of assistance and information 
increases considerably in such cases (I.1). In addition, it is ‘more likely that 
MEPs follow the advisor’s advice’ (I.13), or are ‘less controlling’ (I.15). 
Moreover, certain files require ‘specialist expertise’ which MEPs do not 
possess and the advisor can provide (I.4). Findings presented in 5.1 and 
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as being more significant for policy issues that are a priority of the group.100 
The importance attached to files is generally bigger for legislative files, nine 
                                   
99 I.1, 4, 13, 15, 18. 
100 I.5, 7, 8, 21. 
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interviewees claim. 101  For example, the exchange of information with 
internal and external actors increases considerably on legislative files (I.6, 
9).  
 
The empirical research confirms that complexity facilitates the Information 
Manager role. More specifically, it is found that the policy context (file or 
parliamentary committee) has a significant impact on the role: the need for 
specialist expertise (i.e. technical files) and the attached importance (i.e. 
group priorities and legislative files) facilitate information management.   
 
Politicisation  
The framework conceptualises politicisation in relation to division in the EP, 
both in general and with regard to a specific dossier (see 2.3.2). It is 
therefore defined as something that may change over time and vary across 
policy areas. Politicisation is expected to restrict the advisor’s role.  
 
The type of parliamentary committee or file affects the type of information 
required. A committee or certain policy area can be technical, mostly 
dealing with legislative files in a compromise-oriented way. Other 
committees are more political, focussing on political resolutions (I.15, 20). 
In technical committees the ideological lines are less prominent and the 
work is less visible, as it receives little attention from the media. Such a 
situation requires increased information management from the advisor – 
regarding the content as well as the stakes of other internal and external 
actors. For political resolutions, the positions are generally clearly 
delineated and highly visible. Thus, in these cases, policy or political 
intelligence offer little added value. Moreover, the interview and survey 
findings show that MEPs tend to be more controlling when it concerns highly 
                                   
101 I.0.5, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 21.  
 
 
 
visible or divisive issues. The empirical research thus confirms the 
expectation that politicisation restricts information management.  
 
Assessment of the contextual factors 
As hypothesised, the context affects delegation. The factors are used to 
assess the (optimal) circumstances in which political advice may be 
acceptable to MEPs. The following values are used to qualitatively evaluate 
the impact of the factors on the adoption of the Information Manager role: 
indispensable (++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), or a 
negative impact (-).  
 
The empirical research concludes that pro-active information management 
is restricted in politicised cases because the added value of policy and 
political intelligence reduces in such cases and MEPs tend to be more 
controlling. On the other hand, pro-active behaviour is easier for advisors 
in highly complex cases where they generally have more room to improvise. 
More specifically, the policy context (file or parliamentary committee) is 
found to significantly affect the advisor’s role. The role becomes more 
prominent when the group attaches particular importance to a given policy 
area or file under discussion. No examples are encountered in the data in 
support of an unambiguous relation (positive or negative) between political 
direction and the Information Manager role. Nonetheless, the level of 
involvement and the experience of MEPs and their offices do affect 
information management. 
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Table 5.3.2 Contextual factor assessment for the Information Manager 
role 
PRO-ACTIVE INFORMATION MANAGER 
 Political 
direction 
Complexity Politicisation 
Actively search and exchange 
information 
0 + - 
Filter according to relevance 
and urgency 
0 + - 
Test or sell information 0 + - 
 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
The findings expose two underlying motives for gathering information: the 
provision of policy expertise and political intelligence. Information serves as 
preparation for the formulation of policy positions and political 
deliberations. These activities are further addressed in the next two 
chapters, respectively presenting the analysis of the Policy Expert (chapter 
6) and Broker (chapter 7) roles. Notably the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL 
advisors attach value to information management for the purpose of policy 
and political intelligence. However, the overall picture – encountered across 
the groups – supports the idea that information is instrumental to the role 
of advisors, yet not the key purpose as such.  
 
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter corroborates the 
proposition that information management by EP group advisors can be 
characterised as a category of political advice. Activities comprise but go 
beyond the technical dimensions. Group advisors gather and summarise 
information, yet this technical dimension in practice cannot be separated 
from the political dimension of information management. For the 
information to be distributed to and used by MEPs, advisors transform it 
 
 
 
into specific and action-oriented intelligence. This requires the advisor to 
select the relevant and appropriate sources and to interpret the content and 
related political stakes. For example, the selection of (preferred) sources of 
information may vary across policy areas and across the groups. 
 
No indications were encountered of either predefined information needs, or 
instructions about how advisors should gather, process, and distribute it. 
Instead, both information needs (the desired outcome) and the activities to 
fulfil these needs (means) remain implicit. To deal with this lack of direction, 
advisors improvise. The preparatory function of information – ahead of the 
formulation of policy positions and political deliberations – means that 
advisors cannot derive their mandate from political debates. The 
Information Manager role is thus labelled as pro-active and advisors adopt 
the role with very little direction from their superiors. In all three aspects 
of information management, they are guided by their judgement and rely 
on their appreciation of the priorities of the group. The findings therefore 
support the conclusion that the preparations made by advisors can shape 
the direction of policy positions, and the form of compromises forged across 
the groups.   
 
The objective of the thesis is to explore and explain the circumstances that 
stimulate or restrict a political role by group advisors. The assessment of 
the factors revealed political sensitivity as an indispensable asset for 
effective information management. The added value of this factor lies in the 
advisor’s ‘awareness’ or ‘feel for the game’, which allows for forecasting of 
and empathising with various positions and information needs. It 
furthermore enables the advisor to judge the political and strategic 
relevance of information. In light of the distributive purpose of information 
management, political sensitivity is indispensable for the framing of 
information, the assessment of the appropriate timing and tone so as to 
ensure that the information becomes acceptable to those targeted. This 
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asset combined with a context where advisors work on a policy issue or file 
that is not highly politicised in the EP, are the optimal conditions for the 
adoption of the Information Manager role. In politicised cases, the added 
value of policy or political intelligence decreases because positions are 
generally clearly delineated and highly visible. Moreover, MEPs appear to 
be more controlling with regard to divisive and visible issues. On the other 
hand, pro-active behaviour is easier in highly complex cases where advisors 
generally have more room to improvise. More specifically, the policy context 
(file or parliamentary committee) is found to significantly affect the 
advisor’s role. The role becomes more prominent when the group attaches 
particular importance to a given policy area or file under discussion. 
Generally, more importance is attached to legislative files over non-
legislative files, resulting in increased opportunities for advisors to pro-
actively accumulate, process, and distribute information. No examples are 
encountered in the data in support of an unambiguous relation (positive or 
negative) between political direction and adoption of the Information 
Manager role. Nonetheless, the level of involvement and the experience of 
MEPs and their offices do affect information management.   
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CHAPTER 6. POLICY EXPERT 
The analytical framework conceptualised four roles that advisors may 
adopt, each potentially containing a political dimension. The dissertation 
applies the theoretical concepts to the specific case of group advisors in the 
European Parliament (EP)102 and this chapter presents the analysis of the 
Policy Expert role. The ideal-type role comprises two central functions: (1) 
the provision of policy-related advice and (2) the formulation of policy 
positions and legislative texts. To address the research question ‘under 
which conditions can advisors adopt a political role’ three analytical steps 
are carried out.  
 
The first step is to assess whether the ideal-type role is in fact adopted and 
what it entails. To that end, 6.1.1 examines the hypothetical dimensions 
related to policy expertise. The theoretical expectations regarding the 
adoption of the Policy Expert role are put forward, drawing from the 
literature review (see introduction) and complemented with the performed 
document analysis. The discussion in 6.1.2 then assesses these theoretical 
expectations in light of the empirical findings. The analysis shows that EP 
group advisors assume the Policy Expert role, and that their activities 
contain technical and political elements. In this respect, they select, 
interpret, and articulate policy and decision options. Although advisors from 
across the groups claim that they provide policy-related advice and 
acknowledge a potential drafting role, Greens/EFA advisors most 
prominently consider these activities as part of their responsibility. 
 
                                   
102 Advisors employed by one of the EP party groups and assigned to follow the work of 
one or several of the parliamentary committees are the focus of this study. Throughout 
the analysis ‘advisors’ or ‘group advisors’ refers to this type of advisors. 
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The second step is to assess the extent to which the role is political, based 
on the three modes of discretion that have been developed as part of the 
analytical framework. Section 6.2 discusses advisors’ room for manoeuvre 
to fulfil the political dimensions of policy expertise. This is approached by 
on the one hand examining the extent to which advisors receive instructions 
or input from the elected delegates (6.2.1), and on the other hand, the 
need and their capacity to improvise (6.2.2). The empirical findings show 
that advisors have more leeway as the group’s interests are more aligned. 
In groups with multiple and possibly conflicting policy interests, advisors’ 
mandate is less clear and their room for improvisation declines. 
Consequently, ALDE, EPP, and S&D advisors are less likely to adopt a pro-
active Policy Expert role (6.2.3). Conversely, Greens/EFA advisors enjoy the 
largest degree of autonomy to contribute to or develop policy lines.  
 
As a third and final step, the impact of the personal and contextual factors 
on the adoption of the role is evaluated (6.3). From the empirical research 
it is found that in particular trust and political sensitivity are necessary to 
pro-actively provide the Members of the EP (MEPs) with policy expertise. 
The homogeneity or heterogeneity of the group has an important impact on 
the Policy Expert role. Political division within the group negatively affects 
the extent to which advisors are able to derive political guidance for their 
activities. The findings furthermore show that advisors’ pro-active 
behaviour is stimulated by the complexity of files.  However, such behaviour 
is restricted in politicised legislative files. 
 
6.1 The nature of policy expertise in the EP  
This section first introduces the various theoretical dimensions of policy 
expertise. Drawing from the literature, the technical and political tasks 
pertaining to the Policy Expert role are discussed (6.1.1). The ideal-type 
role comprises two central functions: (1) the provision of policy-related 
 
 
 
advice and (2) the formulation of policy positions and legislative texts. The 
theory is complemented with the document analysis on the profile and 
duties of EP group advisors in order to infer expectations about the adoption 
of the role (see 3.3.3).  
 
Subsequently, 6.1.2 presents the empirical findings for the Policy Expert 
role. The theoretical expectations regarding the role are evaluated in light 
of the collected survey and interview data. The empirical research finds that 
EP group advisors adopt the Policy Expert role. They provide policy advice 
and are involved in formulating positions. Findings reveal that although 
policy expertise is considered a prerequisite for effective advisors, it is not 
perceived as their most important task. Greens/EFA advisors form the 
exception in the EP case: they are considered ‘experts’ and deem it their 
core responsibility to develop and shape policy outcomes. 
 
6.1.1 The theoretical dimensions of policy expertise  
MEPs require input throughout the process of examining policy and 
legislative proposals (Campbell and Laporte, 1981; European Parliament, 
2000). With the expanded workload of the EP and the growing amount of 
informal trilogues the need for policy-related input increased.103 Evidently, 
the EP values its independent position from the executive it controls 
(Corbett et al, 2011: 319). For MEPs to be able to assess the proposals on 
the table, it can therefore be assumed that they are in need of technical 
assistance to match the expertise present in the Council and the European 
Commission (EC). Notwithstanding the creation of the European Parliament 
                                   
103 See 1.1.1 for a discussion of the EP’s evolving legislative powers and a brief 
introduction of the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ in which the Council and the EP work 
in parallel as co-legislators. In the so-called trilogue negotiations EC representatives also 
take part. 
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Research Service (EPRS) that in part meets this need, the expectation is 
that group advisors also provide MEPs with policy expertise (see 3.3.3).104  
 
In the analytical framework policy expertise is conceptualised as 
substantive, content-related input that includes policy orientations, 
definitions and interpretations, and the formulation of (draft) legislative 
texts (see 2.2.2).105 The Policy Expert role is thus expected to comprise two 
central functions: (1) the provision of policy-related advice and (2) the 
formulation of policy positions and legislative texts. From the theory and 
document analysis it is inferred that group advisors assume the two 
functions. The expectations as to what such activities entail are discussed 
below.  
 
The academic discussion on the role of officials in the policy process 
supports the distinction between the advisory and drafting functions of 
policy expertise. Page and Jenkins’ (2005) categorisation of ‘policy work’ 
into a production (drafting documents) and a service (advice) role for 
example fittingly reflects this. 106  Most of the vacancy notices for the 
recruitment of EP group advisors specify one or several parliamentary 
committees. We can therefore assume that the provided advice is tied to a 
specific policy area (see Appendix I). Policy advice relates to the substantive 
content of proposals or initiatives and supports the process of forming an 
opinion on these proposals (cf. Blischke, 1981; Peters, 2009; Winzen, 2011; 
Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). Generally, it is provided to the members 
                                   
104 See 5.1.1 for a more elaborate discussion of the role of the EPRS. 
105 The definition is based on an extensive literature review (see introduction) and draws 
on Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971; Congressional ‘Research service’ in: European 
Parliament, 2000; Blitschke, 1981; Campbell and Laporte, 1981; Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002; Peters, 2009; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Högenauer and 
Neuhold, 2015.  
106 The scholars include the management of policy implementation processes as a third 
element because their study focuses on civil servants’ role at the executive level. This 
activity falls outside the scope of parliamentary responsibility. 
 
 
 
through policy-oriented briefings (European Parliament, 2000). This type of 
advice can entail a variety of things. For example, advisors may analyse the 
policy option(s) upon which the House has to form its opinion, set out the 
prevailing or alternative policy options (cf. Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971). 
As part of their advice, they may also offer policy definitions (Provan in: 
Neunreither, 2002).  
 
The second function of the Policy Expert role is the formulation of policy 
positions or legislative texts (cf. Patterson, 1970; European Parliament, 
2000; Page and Jenkins, 2005). In the context of the EP, Egeberg et al 
(2013) and Neunreither (2002) identify the drafting of ‘documents’ as one 
of the key supporting activities of officials. Among the listed responsibilities 
of EP group advisors in the vacancy notices we find ‘participating in the 
legislative work of the parliamentary committees’. Furthermore, the 
drawing up of ‘parliamentary positions’, amendments, and resolutions is 
listed as one of their common duties (see Appendix I).  
 
Drawing from the literature, EP group advisors are expected to contribute 
to shaping the policy outcome (cf. Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971; Dobbels 
and Neuhold, 2013; Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). They may do so by 
showing initiative (Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971) or by ‘steering’ the political 
discussion (Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013). Information or knowledge that 
non-elected actors feed into the policy-making process can be of a political 
nature (cf. Radaelli, 1999). Radaelli ties the political role of expertise to the 
lack of scrutiny and political oversight of those providing the expertise. The 
sources on which policy-related advice or the formulation of texts is based 
also matter. The opportunity to shape policy increases when officials have 
the discretion to draw from their own ideas or research as opposed to 
merely registering the input expressed by MEPs (cf. Högenauer and 
Neuhold, 2015). 
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104 See 5.1.1 for a more elaborate discussion of the role of the EPRS. 
105 The definition is based on an extensive literature review (see introduction) and draws 
on Patterson, 1970; Price, 1971; Congressional ‘Research service’ in: European 
Parliament, 2000; Blitschke, 1981; Campbell and Laporte, 1981; Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002; Peters, 2009; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Högenauer and 
Neuhold, 2015.  
106 The scholars include the management of policy implementation processes as a third 
element because their study focuses on civil servants’ role at the executive level. This 
activity falls outside the scope of parliamentary responsibility. 
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Summing up the scholarly discussion, advisors are expected to provide 
policy-related advice and draft (legislative) texts within the scope of one or 
several parliamentary committees. The framework’s mixed sphere of 
activity presumes that there is both a technical and a political dimension to 
this role. Tasks pertaining to the latter comprise value or ideological 
appraisals, the anticipation of priorities or objectives, and the use of implicit 
knowledge or tactics (see 2.1.2). Technical tasks are void of such 
judgement by the advisor and could for example entail the inventory of 
policy options that are supported by the various groups or institutions. A 
technical approach to drafting documents could be construed as the mere 
registration of input expressed by certain MEPs. The political dimension of 
the Policy Expert role in the context of the EP is hypothesised to involve the 
following: (i) the pre-selection of (the sources of) policy or decision options; 
(ii) the interpretation of policy or decision options and their (political) 
implications, and (iii) the articulation of alternative policy or decision 
options. Figure 6.1.1 illustrates the anticipated dimensions of policy 
expertise based on the theory. 
 
6.1.2 The adoption of the Policy Expert role in practice 
The conducted empirical research demonstrates that EP group advisors 
adopt the Policy Expert role and that the role indeed involves both technical 
and political tasks. Within the scope of one or several parliamentary 
Figure 6.1.1 Theoretical dimensions of policy expertise 
 
 
 
committees, they provide policy advice and are involved in formulating 
positions. First, the recruitment of advisors is discussed, assessing to what 
extent they are hired or perceived as policy experts. Next, the activities 
related to policy-specific advice and the formulation of positions and texts 
are presented. 
 
Advisors’ perception of policy expertise  
The survey findings corroborate the assumption from the document analysis 
that EP group advisors are assigned to one or several parliamentary 
committees.107 The job profile of advisors, however, only puts forward a 
minimum level of education. In the exceptional cases where vacancy notices 
specify the required educational background, the studies most frequently 
listed are Law, Economics, and International Relations (see 3.2.2). The 
quantitative data furthermore expose that EP group advisors are highly 
educated, with 48 per cent of respondents holding multiple academic 
degrees. The most common programmes are Law (23%) and Political 
Science (19%), followed by EU studies, Economics, and International 
Relations (see table 3.2.2). These results are consistent with the theory 
that ties ‘political advice’ to a general mastery of the legislative 
organisational process (see 2.2.2). EP advisors’ educational background 
thus principally provides for an understanding of the organisational process 
rather than specific policy content.  
 
Survey findings demonstrate that group advisors are generally experienced 
professionals. Only six per cent of respondents have less than four years of 
working experience, whereas 68 per cent have at least ten years. Moreover, 
42 per cent worked in the EP prior to taking up their current position (see 
3.2.2). The vacancy analysis found that GUE/NGL and EFD groups are most 
                                   
107 See Appendices III and IV for an overview of the distribution across committees of 
respectively the survey respondents and interviewees. 
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107 See Appendices III and IV for an overview of the distribution across committees of 
respectively the survey respondents and interviewees. 
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prone to stipulate special conditions in relation to the policy content of the 
committee for which the advisor is recruited (see Appendix I). The interview 
accounts furthermore reveal that the Greens/EFA group is known for 
recruitment based on policy-related expertise. All six interviewed advisors 
from the group referred to this practice and three EPP advisors stated that 
the Greens employ ‘experts’ as advisors. Their ‘specialist expertise’ means 
that they are ‘really engaged’ in their role to push the Green agenda, three 
of them explained. Two others furthermore claim that the focus of the group 
lies on the substance of the file and that advisors are ‘free to develop policy 
lines’ by providing input to MEPs. They typify their counterpart advisors as 
‘political operatives’. An ECR interviewee said that, similar to the 
Greens/EFA, his group values expert knowledge and is ‘led by the technical 
content of a file’.  
 
The survey suggests an overall presence 
of policy expertise, at least according to 
the perception of the respondents. 
Among the most important qualities 
advisors should possess ‘expertise in a 
specific policy area’ ranks highest: 22 
per cent list it as most important, 11 and 
12 per cent respectively list it second 
and third (see Appendix III). 
Furthermore, a large majority of the respondents (79%) claim that they are 
‘an expert in a specific policy area’ (see figure 6.1.2a 108). Those who 
disagree, state that they are generalists instead. Nonetheless, out of those 
who agree 28 per cent simultaneously describe themselves as generalists. 
On the one hand, we should bear in mind the possibility of socially desirable 
                                   
108 Analysis multiple-choice SQ10: To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? See Appendix III. 
Figure 6.1.2a Policy 
expertise in a specific area 
 
 
 
answers. It seems unlikely that advisors would label policy expertise as 
irrelevant. On the other hand, however, it may provide further evidence for 
the need to master the overall organisational process (see 3.2.2). Finally, 
one does not necessarily exclude the other: advisors’ specific policy 
expertise could also go hand-in-hand with having more general process 
expertise. 
 
Considering the (perceived) importance of policy expertise in relation to the 
other types of advice leads us to believe that – similar to information 
management – it serves a secondary function. Although a majority ranks 
policy expertise as advisors’ most important attribute, only 14 per cent 
identify the Policy Expert role as their overall most important task (see 
figure 6.1.2b 109 ). The qualitative evidence gathered through in-depth 
interviews supports this conclusion. Although only three interviewees do not 
acknowledge the role, policy expertise as such is generally not depicted as 
the central element of their role.  The Greens/EFA advisors form the 
exception and the Policy Expert role appears to be the most important or 
most frequent for this group. 
                                   
109 Analysis open-ended SQ9: What is the most important task of a group advisor? See 
Appendix III. 
Figure 6.1.2b Relative importance attached to policy expertise 
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In conclusion, the empirical research finds that EP group advisors adopt the 
political Policy Expert role. They provide policy advice within the scope of 
one or several parliamentary committees and are involved in formulating 
positions. Both activities are further discussed below.  
 
The provision of policy-related advice  
Findings show that the provision of policy-specific advice is a common task 
for EP group advisors. Only one survey respondent and six interviewees did 
not bring up this type of advice as part of their role.  
 
99 per cent of survey respondents claim that they 
provide ‘specialist policy advice’. 47 per cent say 
to provide such advice on a daily basis, 42 per 
cent on a weekly basis, and 10 per cent on a 
monthly basis (see figure 6.1.2c). 110  Survey 
respondents mostly relate policy expertise to 
knowledge of the respective topic or policy area. 
In response to the open-ended questions, 34 
respondents identify substantive, content-
related advice as part of their responsibility.111  
Most prominently, these are Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL advisors. In 
comparison, S&D advisors hardly mention this type of advice.  
 
The majority of interviewees also acknowledge the advisory element of their 
role. One ALDE and two EPP advisors stated that policy-related advice is 
mainly, but not exclusively, the domain of the MEP assistants. Six 
interviewees did not mention the provision of this type of advice at all. In 
                                   
110 Analysis multiple-choice SQ7: Please estimate how much time you devote to the 
following activities. See Appendix III. 
111 SR7, 9, 16, 18, 22, 24, 30, 40, 42-44, 46, 50, 51, 55, 57-61, 69, 70, 74, 79, 80, 82, 
84, 86, 88, 90, 91, 95, 97, 98. 
Figure 6.1.2c Providing 
specialist policy advice 
 
 
 
this context it is important to note that particular attention was paid to not 
‘steering’ advisors during the interviews. Open questions were asked 
without providing pre-fixed categories of activities. For this reason, it cannot 
be concluded that policy-related advice is not part of these advisors’ 
activities simply based on the fact that they did not raise the activity.  
     
14 interviewees indicate that they provide MEPs with briefings in which they 
evaluate policy options and their implications. Moreover, advisors make 
suggestions for alternatives that could be raised by the MEP.112 “Advisors 
have to have knowledge of the subject matter at hand. For legislative files 
we propose different alternatives to MEPs. The advisors prepare the political 
decisions. For consent on trade agreements we provide the MEP with 
arguments why the agreement is good or necessary and what the problems 
are” (I.9). Several interviewees break down their policy-advice role as 
pointing out to the MEP what is ‘essential’. 113 Others explain that they 
engage with external stakeholders to provide MEPs with pro and contra 
arguments for given policy options or alternatives.114 
 
As was concluded above, the Greens/EFA advisors relatively ascribe most 
weight to policy-related advice. Those that were interviewed describe this 
advisory function at great length. Compared to their counterparts they are 
‘more free to develop policy’ and ‘have influence based on substance’. They 
for example prepare policy papers for internal purposes. One even claims 
that ‘staff can be more knowledgeable than MEPs on specific issues as they 
have the time and role to specialise.’ Interviewees from the other groups 
support this picture. An ALDE advisor claims that Greens advisors 
concentrate on policy rather than ideology ’by knowing all the details’. ‘They 
leave the politics to the politicians’, the advisor added. In line with these 
                                   
112 I.0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 3, 5-9, 11, 14, 15, 19, 21. 
113 I.3, 8, 20. 
114 I.9, 10, 14, 19, 21. 
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112 I.0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 3, 5-9, 11, 14, 15, 19, 21. 
113 I.3, 8, 20. 
114 I.9, 10, 14, 19, 21. 
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remarks, an EPP interviewee noted that Greens/EFA advisors are more 
closely involved in the substance of files compared to their counterparts in 
the other groups.   
 
The formulation of policy positions and legislative texts 
The quantitative and qualitative data 
reveal that advisors contribute to the 
formulation of policy positions and 
legislative texts. 98 per cent of survey 
respondents claim that they are involved 
in the formulation of policy positions and 
legislative texts. 50 per cent say to 
engage in this activity weekly, 37 per cent 
monthly, and 11 per cent on a daily basis 
(see figure 6.1.2d).115 In response to the 
open-ended questions, five respondents mentioned the importance of 
drafting documents. Three even identify it as their most significant task. 
Drafting is related to formulating amendments (SR40, 91), group positions 
(SR80), or generally ‘holding the pen for reports, resolutions, and speeches’ 
(SR88). Another respondent claims that ‘experience in drafting policy’ is 
required to be an effective advisor (SR74).  
 
The interview data convincingly illustrate advisors’ involvement in the 
formulation of policy positions and legislative texts. 23 interviewees 
acknowledge a potential drafting role for EP group advisors. Ten of whom 
say they are (on occasion) responsible for drafting and finalising texts. All 
interviewed Greens/EFA advisors claim to engage in such activities, as well 
as two S&D advisors, one ECR, and one GUE/NGL advisor. Two others state 
                                   
115 Analysis multiple-choice SQ7 regarding the estimation of time spent on a series of 
activities. See Appendix III. 
Figure 6.1.2d Drafting reports, 
opinions, resolutions, and 
amendments 
 
 
 
they are closely involved in the process (ALDE and EFD). Six advisors affirm 
that they provide political input for texts (three EPP, two ALDE, and one 
S&D advisor). The role of the advisor is to propose changes to include the 
‘political accents’ of the group, an EPP advisor states. Several interviewees 
underline that the MEP in charge decides who holds the pen.116 Depending 
on the MEP this may be the committee secretariat official, the group 
advisor, or the MEP assistant. An ALDE advisor explains that the rapporteur 
may ask the committee secretariat to prepare draft compromise 
amendments. This is ‘a neutral draft’, taking into account all the 
amendments and accommodating the different groups. Advisors and MEP 
assistants then take this draft as a starting point for adding ‘the political 
message’. Finally, five interviewees claim that the committee secretariat 
officials write most of the texts (three EPP and two ALDE advisors). 
 
In conclusion, the empirical research demonstrates that group advisors 
provide policy-specific advice and are involved in the formulation of 
positions and legislative texts. Findings reveal that the selection and 
interpretation of policy or decision options – e.g. in policy briefings – as well 
as the articulation of (political input for) policy options are common 
activities for EP group advisors. The political scope of these activities is 
discussed next.  
 
6.2 Assessment of the political scope of policy 
expertise  
The findings confirm that there are technical and political dimensions to 
policy expertise in the EP context, thus characterising it is a category of 
political advice. The previous section presented the empirical evidence for 
the adoption of the role and revealed that the Policy Expert role may involve 
                                   
116 I. 0.3, 0.4, 2, 7, 22. 
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the selection, interpretation, and articulation of policy or decision. This 
section evaluates the political scope of these activities. The extent to which 
the role is political is assessed with the use of the modes of discretion that 
have been developed as part of the analytical framework (see 2.1.3). The 
aim is to determine what guides the provision of policy expertise and 
explore advisors’ discretion.  
 
6.2.1 addresses the way in which advisors receive instructions from MEPs 
and how this input affects their role. Findings show that for policy-specific 
tasks they derive their mandate from the (assistants of the) elected 
representatives. If advisors primarily deal with the wishes of one MEP (EFD 
and GUE/NGL groups), the (implied) mandate is rather straightforward. The 
same applies to groups that have relatively aligned policy interests (ECR 
and Greens/EFA). In groups with multiple, possibly competing, policy views, 
however, the advisor’s mandate is more elusive. 6.2.2 examines how 
advisors provide policy expertise in the absence of clear instructions. The 
findings show that in their efforts to achieve the desired outcome advisors 
are guided by their understanding of the priorities and interests at stake in 
the group. Nonetheless, advisors also perform policy tasks during the early 
stages of the decision-making process, i.e. ahead of group discussions or 
specific input from the MEP. It is therefore concluded in 6.2.3 that the Policy 
Expert role can be of a reactive or pro-active nature.  
 
6.2.1 Instructions and input from the MEP  
This sub-section sets out to determine the way in which advisors obtain 
instructions or input from the elected representatives for policy-related 
activities. The aim is to establish what essentially guides their advisory and 
drafting functions. From the quantitative and qualitative data it is concluded 
that group advisors work closely together with (shadow) rapporteurs and 
the group’s coordinator of the parliamentary committee they are assigned 
 
 
 
to (see 4.2.1). Their explicit or implicit political instructions are therefore 
most likely to emanate from this interaction. 
 
In discussing their discretion and the scope of their activities, interviewees 
overall subscribe to the fact that the MEP decides who provides support. 
The MEP decides ‘how to organise the work’. The division is done ad hoc 
and the advisor’s role further depends on the priorities set by the MEP.117 
Drafting positions and legislative texts takes place in close coordination with 
the (shadow) rapporteur. Yet, the staff member who drafts the text is the 
most influential (I.7). A GUE/NGL interviewee explained that the mandate 
of advisors differs across the groups: “In the bigger groups there is a 
stronger collective interest. In GUE/NGL we deal with individuals”. As is 
further discussed in chapter 7, advisors in the larger, or more 
heterogeneous groups, spend a lot of effort trying to internally coordinate 
the various views and develop a group line. In groups where advisors 
primarily deal with the wishes of one MEP, which is usually the case in the 
EFD and GUE/NGL groups, the (implied) mandate will thus be clearer. The 
same applies to the ECR and Greens/EFA since the policy interests in these 
groups are generally more aligned. ALDE, EPP and S&D advisors have to 
take into account multiple, possibly competing, policy views. As a result, 
their mandate or instructions are more elusive.  
 
Interviewees discuss the interplay between MEP assistants and group 
advisors. Mainly the ALDE and EPP advisors stress the importance of this 
cooperation. Assistants convey the views of their MEP and help the advisor 
understand how the MEP thinks. More broadly across the groups, 
interviewees agree that assistants promote the agenda of their MEP and 
safeguard that his or her wishes are followed. While advisors ensure that 
the formulated policy position can count on the support of the group. The 
                                   
117 I.0.3, 0.4, 2, 7, 11, 15, 19, 22. 
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findings show that assistants can represent the MEP. The way in which MEP 
offices operate obviously varies but it is common for advisors – either in 
addition to or instead of conferring with the member – to directly liaise with 
assistants and acquire their mandate in this way.  
 
From the interviews and remarks made by the survey respondents, it 
appears that advisors consider substantive advice – related to details of 
policy issues and their implications – as a technical task. “Substantive 
advice is a more academic, technical role of the advisor” (I.3). This type of 
activity requires some form of specialisation. “It is essential to be or become 
an expert on the policy area that you are working on” (SR7). Nonetheless, 
they recognise the significance of having room for manoeuvre when it 
concerns dossiers of a highly ‘technical nature’ as they cannot be instructed 
by an MEP who knows less or as little as they do on the issue (I.4, 13). This 
autonomy for the advisor is not exclusively the case for the Policy Expert 
role. 
 
An ECR interviewee put forward that in the Greens/EFA and ECR groups, 
advisors are led by the technical content of the file. “It is always quite clear 
in our politics where we would like things to go.” The advisor adds that 
‘expertise’ is sometimes lacking in the larger groups. EPP or S&D advisors 
have less freedom to develop a policy line and are ‘more directed by what 
is decided in the Working Group structure’. Greens/EFA interviewees accede 
to being granted a large degree of autonomy in their Policy Expert role. 
They are or become experts on the policy areas in which they advise MEPs. 
We can provide ‘instant input’, one interviewee explains, tying this to the 
lack of internal division that allows the advisor ‘a certain leverage’ toward 
other actors in the EP. Another Greens/EFA advisor adds that they can 
‘easily guarantee the support of the group’ and that advisors from the 
bigger groups ‘have to be cautious’.  
 
 
 
These accounts provide further evidence that the mandate of ALDE, EPP 
and S&D advisors is less straightforward, restricting their autonomy to 
substantively shape policy. Conversely, Greens/EFA advisors are able to 
pro-actively contribute to or develop policy lines, as the desired policy 
outcome of the group is more coherent. One Greens/EFA interviewee 
laments this independence and considers the ‘inadequate knowledge and 
involvement of MEPs’ a problem for democracy: “If you ask me whether I 
like the autonomy in my role, I would tell you no. I would prefer my deputy 
to be active and discuss with me rather than do it myself. We need input 
from those elected. Other advisors might be jealous, but I feel it is not the 
way it should be.” 
 
6.2.2 Improvisation by the advisor 
The discussion above concluded that the mandate differs between groups. 
Advisors have more room for manoeuvre as the group’s policy positions are 
more aligned. This sub-section addresses group advisors’ level of 
improvisation in the Policy Expert role. Improvisation is construed as value 
or ideological appraisals by the advisor, the anticipation of priorities or 
objectives, or the use of implicit knowledge or tactics (see the definition of 
political advice in 2.1.2). The empirical research revealed that group 
advisors fulfil the political dimensions of the Expert role (see 6.1). The 
selection and interpretation of policy or decision options – e.g. in policy 
briefings – as well as the articulation of (political input for) policy options 
are further addressed below.  
 
The research reveals that advisors weigh and present policy options. These 
activities by definition require the advisor’s judgement with regard to the 
desired outcome or the (importance of) implications of certain policy 
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options. 92 per cent of survey respondents admit that they weigh and 
present policy options (see figure 6.2.2).118  
 
As was presented in 6.1.2, the large 
majority of interviewees say they 
prepare briefings in which they evaluate 
the policy options and possible 
implications. This then raises the 
question what such judgement is based 
on. In the previous sub-section it was 
found that, generally speaking, either 
the agenda of the MEP in charge or that of the group guides advisors’ policy 
advice and formulation. Advisors provide policy-specific advice and 
formulate positions or texts linked to the values of the political group. 
Throughout these activities not only the mandate but also the level of 
improvisation varies. In a more reactive role, the advisor bases the 
formulation of (legislative) texts on group debates or decisions and ensures 
that the group’s positions are represented in the parliamentary text (SR25). 
Alternatively, the advisor’s input may be based on a discussion within the 
parliamentary committee, shadows’ meeting, or on the specific input from 
the MEP in charge. In these cases the advisor ‘listens’ carefully to the 
members and ‘summarises’ (SR43, 46, 92) or ‘synthesises’ (SR49, 73) the 
different views.  
 
More examples, however, were encountered of a pro-active way of weighing 
and presenting policy options. This for example entails pointing out the 
most ‘important elements’ of the proposal to MEPs (SR39, 99). Displaying 
even more initiative, eight survey respondents claim that explaining and 
                                   
118 See Appendix III, analysis multiple-choice SQ10: To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements?  
Figure 6.2.2 Weighing and 
presenting policy options 
 
 
 
arguing for a specific policy choice or decision is part of their role. Four of 
these advisors are employed by the Greens/EFA, three by the ALDE, and 
one by the ECR. The interview findings confirm that most notably 
Greens/EFA advisors have the room to show a high degree of initiative in 
shaping policy choices and decisions of the group. In this regard, 6.2.1 
concluded that advisors have more room for improvisation as the group’s 
interests are more aligned. This appears to be tied to their ability to identify 
and thus represent the collective interests of the group. 
 
For the formulation of policy positions or legislative texts advisors may 
derive their mandate from group debates, input provided by the MEPs, or 
from the personal assistants. Alternatively, advisors base their input on the 
(expert) knowledge they possess or acquire through a third (expert) source. 
The latter demands a selective approach with regard to the sources of 
expertise and the advisor’s interpretation of the provided expertise. These 
information management activities are presented in chapter 5. The way in 
which the acquired input is subsequently transformed into policy advice or 
texts involves improvisation by the advisor. Such improvisation requires the 
ability of relating the (acquired) expertise to the group’s political priorities 
(SR7, 55). In this respect, it is crucial that the advisor is able to anticipate 
what is (and is not) acceptable to the members of the Group (I.2).  
 
In addition to applying judgement, evidence was encountered that advisors 
pro-actively offer input that has the potential to shape the policy or 
legislative outcome. In both the survey remarks and interviews, advisors 
indicate that they add the political message to (legislative) texts.119 They 
may do so by ‘translating technical information into a clear political 
                                   
119 In response to open-ended questions about their key responsibilities, eight survey 
respondents refer to being responsible for adding the political message to (legislative) 
texts: SR7, 9, 15, 22, 34, 61, 97, 98. Out of the 23 interviewees that see a potential 
drafting role for the advisor, six refer to providing this type of political input. 
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message’ (I.14), dotting the ‘political i’s’ (I.1), or by proposing changes to 
include the ‘political accents’ of the group (I.2). Another way in which 
advisors contribute to EP decisions is by promoting new ideas and proposing 
policy alternatives (SR25, 54, 69, 85). The majority of interviewees say 
they provide such input through policy briefings (see 6.1.2). Two of them 
(ALDE and S&D advisors) stressed that advisors can be very influential in 
such contributions.  
 
Advisors can also be ‘influential through drafting amendments’. 
Negotiations on legislative files are compromise-oriented and ‘each 
amendment is considered’ (I.13). Several survey respondents included 
remarks about their ability to articulate policy options on behalf of the 
group.120 Two claim to ‘shape’ policy outcomes in this manner: “Often, there 
are no group policies yet but you are shaping new policies by building up 
your own mind, and convincing your MEPs” (SR47). Another commented 
that the most important responsibility of the advisor is to ‘shape the group’s 
profile in the policy field’ (SR98). Examples illustrating a more cautious 
approach are encountered too. One respondent, for example, underlined 
that advisors should ‘have the support of the hierarchy and members to 
form a policy’ (SR31).  
 
Finally, advisors employ tactics in the Policy Expert role to secure the best 
possible outcome for their group. Working towards a compromise policy 
outcome, advisors may be involved in the tabling of various amendments 
for different MEPs within the group: ”If you table both amendments you can 
do it in such a way that you make sure that you can work on a compromise 
amendment later” (I.22). As part of the Broker role, advisors then anticipate 
the likelihood that amendments may carry a majority (see chapter 7). Such 
political analysis facilitates the Policy Expert role in that it allows them to 
                                   
120 In particular SR20, 23, 47, 88, and 98. 
 
 
 
assess what is necessary for the adoption of the proposed texts. “We help 
the adoption in committee or plenary by making the text more consensual” 
(I.22). 
 
The analysis shows that the desired outcome can be derived from views 
expressed by the elected actors. However, advisors also perform policy 
tasks during the early stages of the decision-making process, i.e. ahead of 
group discussions or specific input from the MEPs. The findings show that 
in their efforts to achieve the desired outcome advisors are guided by their 
understanding of the priorities and interests at stake in the group. The next 
sub-section discusses what this means for the political scope of the various 
information management tasks. 
 
6.2.3 Policy expertise as a category of political advice 
The empirical research revealed that EP group advisors fulfil the political 
dimensions of the role. No evidence has been encountered of purely 
technical tasks, as the Policy Expert’s activities require at least some level 
of improvisation. Yet, the technical dimensions – inventory and summary 
of policy options – do form part of the activities and feed into the political 
advice category. The framework conceptualises political advice as a mixed 
sphere where technical and political activities meet. The findings presented 
in this chapter thus corroborate policy expertise as a category of political 
advice composed of both technical and political elements. The combination 
of tasks is also acknowledged among those advisors included in the survey 
and interviews. Referring to policy advice, one interviewee for example 
stated that advisors should have a ‘deep knowledge of the politics and 
technicalities of each dossier’ (SR92). 
 
To assess the political scope of the role, the framework conceptualised three 
incremental modes of political advice tied to the discretion of the advisor: 
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routine, reactive, and pro-active behaviour. The role becomes more pro-
active as the advisor’s room for improvisation increases. In the context of 
policy expertise the routine mode is interpreted as follows: a situation in 
which the policy outcome and the means to achieve this outcome are 
instructed or clearly implied. Whereas the analysis shows that the advisor 
may receive input from MEPs or derive input from political debates, the 
realisation of the desired outcome is generally open to interpretation and 
thus requires at least a certain level of improvisation. It is therefore 
concluded that the Policy Expert role can be of a reactive or pro-active 
nature. 
 
Figure 6.2.3 illustrates the key features of the Policy Expert role as found 
from the empirical research:  
 
 Advisors present MEPs with policy advice. They take stock and 
summarise the various policy options in briefings, for which they select 
the most important issues and interpret the respective 
implications. The input is of a reactive nature when advisors are guided 
by their understanding of the priorities and interests at stake in the 
group. In addition, advisors pro-actively argue for specific policy choices.  
 
 Advisors have the ability to provide input for the formulation of 
policy options. Their contribution can be reactive when based on the 
direct or indirect input from MEPs. It becomes of a pro-active nature 
when the advisor constructs policy options from personal or third-party 
expert knowledge.  
 
 Related but going even further, advisors may have the autonomy to 
develop policy positions. This activity would take place very early in 
the decision-making process, prior to any political discussions on the 
policy issue in question. Such a role is most likely to be adopted by 
 
 
 
Greens/EFA advisors, and least likely to be adopted by ALDE, EPP, and 
S&D advisors.  
 
6.3 Impact of the factors on policy expertise 
The aim of the thesis is to explore and explain the circumstances that 
stimulate or restrict a political role by group advisors. Drawing on the 
literature, a set of factors is expected to affect the adoption of the Policy 
Expert role (see 2.3). As a third and final step of the analysis, this section 
consecutively evaluates each of the personal (6.3.1) and contextual factors 
(6.3.2) by presenting evidence from the survey and interviews. It is found 
that in particular trust and political sensitivity are necessary for the 
fulfilment of the political dimensions of the role. The findings furthermore 
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show that advisors’ pro-active behaviour is stimulated by the complexity of 
files.  However, such behaviour is restricted in politicised legislative files.  
 
6.3.1 Personal factors 
The analytical framework proposes four personal factors that facilitate pro-
active behaviour. This sub-section presents the assessment of these factors 
in relation to policy expertise and in light of the empirical data. The findings 
reveal that trust and political sensitivity are necessary for the adoption of a 
pro-active Policy Expert role. The advisor’s internal network facilitates the 
construction of their mandate whereas external networks allow for the 
acquirement of outside expert knowledge. Institutional memory may 
facilitate the role and appears to be an indispensable attribute for the 
shaping of policy positions.  
 
Trust 
In the analytical framework trust is linked to knowledge of and affinity with 
party ideology and priorities (see 2.3.1). A trusted working relationship with 
the MEP in charge and his/her office enables advisors to obtain their 
mandate for the reactive Policy Expert role. Trust is indispensable for an 
effective pro-active role as it forms the basis for the advice to be followed 
or the input to be ‘accepted’.  
 
23 advisors underline that the trust of the MEP – the political coordinator or 
(shadow) rapporteur – has a positive effect on the Policy Expert role.121 To 
develop or contribute to the articulation of policy positions, trust is a 
prerequisite. Trust increases when the advisor and MEP have shared (policy) 
affinities (I.22). And if you do not agree with the views of the MEP it is 
difficult to put forward your ideas (I.4, 17). The MEP in charge decides who 
                                   
121 I. 0.4, 3-5, 7-10, 13, 15-18, 22; SR25, 38, 39, 40, 46, 52, 60, 61, 83. 
 
 
 
drafts: “This is a matter of trust, confidence, expertise, and experience” 
(I.0.4). The interview data show that a high level of trust can result in the 
advisor drafting amendments on behalf of the MEP without having to consult 
with them first (I.7, 16, 22). 
 
The extent to which the advice or input is ‘accepted’ depends on trust. Trust 
results from the previous contributions by the advisor and the demonstrated 
level of expertise. 12 advisors stress the importance of their reliability and 
reputation in this sense. 122  However, views vary about what exactly 
amounts to trust. Two S&D interviewees explain that it is critical to take an 
objective approach and not favour, or ‘push for’, specific positions or 
delegations as this will ‘harm the credibility of the advisor’. Alternatively, 
several advisors put forward that it is essential that MEPs have ‘confidence’ 
in their work and their expertise, which can also be considered a form of 
trust. Finally, having the ‘appropriate’ political background also invokes 
trust (I.13, 17). 
 
One interviewee sums up the overall importance of trust as follows: “You 
will be appreciated and can do your job if the MEPs and assistants feel that 
they can trust you” (I.5). In both the accounts of survey respondents and 
interviewees, cooperation with MEP assistants is tied to trust. The analysis 
of advisors’ instructions showed that their mandate can indirectly follow 
from this interaction (see 6.2.1). 19 interviewees claim that a trusted 
working relationship with assistants affects their role. 123 Trust does not 
necessarily imply a personal relationship between the group advisor and the 
member. “Sometimes you hardly have any contact but the MEP hears from 
the assistant how you are working. Simply letting you do your work is also 
a sign of trust” (I.18). 
                                   
122 I.0.3, 0.4, 5, 10, 13, 15, 17; SR39, 40, 57, 58, 74. 
123 I.0.1-0.5, 1-5, 9-11, 15-19, 21 
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Informal network 
The framework conceptualises an informal network as the access to and 
exchange of private information through informal interactions with actors 
in and outside the institution (see 2.3.1). For policy expertise the relevance 
of the internal network of advisors is tied to their ability to acquire input. 
As discussed above, their relationship with MEP assistants is crucial to gain 
insight into the views and priorities of the MEPs. Advisors’ external networks 
are important for acquiring expert or specialist knowledge from third 
parties. It is found that the factor may facilitate the advisory and drafting 
functions of the Policy Expert role. However, no evidence was encountered 
that informal networks are a pre-condition for the adoption of a political 
role. 
 
The way in which advisors gather and process information from external 
stakeholders is discussed in chapter 5. It was found that information serves 
an auxiliary function and forms the basis for the adoption of the Policy 
Expert. Advisors set out to obtain knowledge about the content or 
implications of a given file, which can be used to provide policy-specific 
advice or for the formulation of positions or legislative texts. Interviewees 
acknowledge that they approach external specialists to ‘find expertise’ that 
the MEP (or advisor) does not possess (I.4). Several survey respondents 
underline the value of acquiring ‘expert knowledge’ from external 
stakeholders to analyse the ‘in-depth substance’ of policy proposals (SR60, 
79). Finally, the importance of keeping close ties ‘in the field’ (SR51) is 
related to staying ‘up-to-date’ on the relevant policy developments (SR97). 
This is achieved through the interaction with external academia and NGO 
actors ‘who hold specialist knowledge’ (SR55). 
 
The degree to which advisors are allowed or inclined to meet with external 
stakeholders determines the effectiveness of their networks. The 
 
 
 
aggregated survey data reveal that advisors are in touch with external 
stakeholders on a regular basis (see chapter 5, table 5.1). The policy area 
in question most prominently determines the external networks of advisors, 
i.e. the parliamentary committee they support (I.10, 16, 21).  
 
Institutional memory 
Institutional memory is conceptualised as the insight into – and access to – 
the institutional track record (see 2.3.1). In the EP context, this factor is 
interpreted as knowledge of the functioning of the institution (formal and 
informal rules) and an appreciation of the political group’s (previous) 
positions. Mainly the latter is significant in terms of policy expertise. One 
interviewee explains the importance in connection with the mobility of 
advisors: when advisors leave or change parliamentary committee the 
existing knowledge and expertise deteriorates and ‘the collective memory 
disappears, which is problematic’ (I.1). 
 
Across the EP party groups, survey respondents acknowledged the 
importance of appreciating the group’s (previous) positions. Awareness and 
understanding of the group position can form the foundation of the advisor’s 
mandate, thus facilitating the reactive Policy Expert role. In response to the 
open-ended survey question what characterises an excellent advisor, 28 
respondents put forward that this is related to understanding the group’s 
position. 124  To effectively fulfil the responsibilities of an advisor, it is 
necessary ‘to relate expertise or specialist knowledge of the policy area’ to 
the general group line (SR75). Such an understanding may furthermore 
improve the consistency of policy-making (SR3).  
 
                                   
124 SR: 7 ALDE, 7 Greens/EFA, 4 ECR, 3 GUE/NGL, 3 EPP, 3 S&D, 1 EFD. 
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The empirical research demonstrated that the uniformity of the advisor’s 
(implied) mandate affects the political scope (see 6.2.1). ALDE, EPP, and 
S&D advisors are less likely to adopt a pro-active Policy Expert role due to 
the multitude and possibly conflicting policy interests lying at the basis of 
their mandate. Conversely, Greens/EFA advisors enjoy the largest degree 
of autonomy to contribute to or develop policy options. From these findings 
the conclusion is drawn that the appreciation of the group’s position is 
indispensable for shaping policy outcomes. 
 
Political sensitivity 
The analytical framework conceptualises political sensitivity as the 
understanding of the institution’s informal code of conduct and the ability 
to recognise political and administrative cues (see 2.3.1). In relation to 
policy expertise, the factor allows advisors to anticipate what policy options 
are acceptable or have priority, and how to accordingly formulate positions 
or legislative texts.  
Advisors’ remarks in the survey and during the interviews show that they 
consider it their role to judge what is in the best interest of the group.125 14 
advisors explicitly point to the need for sensitivity in relation to what is 
‘acceptable’ to the members or national delegations.126 Effective advisors 
‘intuitively feel’ what the group position should be (SR29). Such ‘political 
competence’ (SR15) facilitates both the reactive and pro-active Policy 
Expert role in that it enables advisors to construct their mandate and 
empowers them to improvise.  
 
For the articulation of policy options the ‘skill of political presentation’ 
matters. As one interviewee put it: “It is important that the advisor chooses 
the right language and tone” (I.2). This activity forms part of the 
                                   
125 Notably I.0.1-04, 1, 4 and SR9. 
126 I.2, 3, 8, 11, 13, 17, 19, 22; SR9, 10, 15, 17, 24, 29. 
 
 
 
presentation function of the Information Manager role and is further 
addressed in chapter 5. Political sensitivity in this regard is pertinent for the 
advisor’s autonomy to improvise and will determine whether or not the 
proposed policy options are in fact embraced by the group.   
 
Assessment of the personal factors 
The analytical framework proposes that the personal factors affect the 
advisor’s discretion and their ability to adopt a political role. They are used 
to assess the (optimal) circumstances in which political advice may be 
provided. The impact of the factors on the adoption of the Policy Expert role 
is qualitatively evaluated by attributing the following values: indispensable 
(++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), or a negative impact 
(-).  
 
It is found that trust and political sensitivity are necessary for the pro-active 
provision of policy expertise. The advisor’s internal network facilitates the 
construction of their mandate whereas external networks allow for the 
acquirement of outside expert knowledge. Institutional memory may 
facilitate the role and appears to be an indispensable attribute for the 
shaping of policy positions. Table 6.3.1 illustrates the outcomes of the 
analysis. 
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Table 6.3.1 Personal factor assessment for the adoption of the Policy 
Expert role 
 
 
Trust Informal 
network 
Institutional 
memory 
Political 
sensitivity 
REACTIVE POLICY EXPERT 
Weigh and present 
policy options 
+ + + + 
Formulation based on 
(indirect) input from the 
MEP 
+ + + + 
PRO-ACTIVE POLICY EXPERT 
Argue for specific policy 
choices or decisions 
++ 0 + ++ 
Formulation based on 
(third-party) expert 
knowledge 
++ + + ++ 
Shape policy positions ++ 0 ++ ++ 
 
6.3.2 Contextual factors 
Three contextual factors are expected to affect delegation and trigger 
potential differences across the groups, committees, policy domains, or 
specific files: political direction, complexity, and politicisation. Below these 
factors are assessed based on the empirical research. It is found that the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the group has an important impact on the 
advisor’s role. Political division in the group, for example, negatively affects 
the extent to which advisors are able to derive political guidance for their 
activities. For complex, substance-related details of policy issues and their 
potential implications, advisors are more likely to adopt a pro-active role. 
 
 
 
Advisors enjoy considerable discretion to contribute to or develop non-
legislative policy options or political resolutions. Yet, their advisory and 
drafting functions are restricted in legislative files. Finally, advisors’ leeway 
in fulfilling the drafting function increases in (controversial) dossiers that 
generate a high number of amendments. 
 
Political direction 
The analytical framework defines political direction in relation to the position 
of the MEP or group: advisors’ ability to identify political cues to guide their 
behaviour depends on the extent to which the MEP in charge or the group 
they represent is outspoken and reputed (see 2.3.2). The idea is that the 
clearer advisors’ political direction is, the more likely they are to assume a 
political role.  
 
Advisors construct political direction from their appreciation of the 
position(s) and ideological principles of the political group. The homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of the group has an impact on the advisor’s role. Yet, for 
a specific policy direction group advisors turn to the MEP in charge. The 
findings show that the reputation or position of the MEP may reflect on the 
advisor.127 More importantly, the involvement of the MEP in charge affects 
the advisor’s mandate and room for improvisation. First of all, a clear group 
line depends on the MEP who should internally defend the position and 
stimulate discussion in the group (I.12). “There has to be a participatory 
process of building up a position and this can only be effective if the deputies 
are active in committee and in the group” (I.12). From the qualitative data, 
it is inferred that political direction related to the active involvement of MEPs 
facilitates the mandate of the group advisor. Conversely, such active 
involvement will restrict the advisor’s autonomy (I.22). It is found that the 
                                   
127 I.3, 12, 17; SR23, 53. 
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127 I.3, 12, 17; SR23, 53. 
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attention and involvement of MEPs is greater in legislative files (see 5.3.2). 
Consequently, advisors will have more room to contribute to or develop 
policy options that are of a non-legislative nature.   
 
Complexity  
In the framework complexity is defined in relation to the subject matter and 
thus expected to vary across parliamentary committees or specific policy or 
legislative proposals (see 2.3.2). From the literature the assumption is 
drawn that as ‘complexity’ increases MEPs are more likely to seek assistance 
and grant advisors a political role.  
 
The survey and interview data suggest that activities concerning the details 
of policy issues and their implications are considered technical or complex 
tasks. In discussing their policy-related activities, respondents and 
interviewees do not point out that the level of complexity may be higher is 
certain policy areas. Moreover, ‘policy expertise’ is perceived as a form of 
(existing or acquired) ‘specialisation’ by the advisor for which MEPs may not 
have the time. This is for example illustrated by the value advisors attach 
to having expertise in a specific policy area (see 6.1.2). 
 
Advisors have significant autonomy when it concerns dossiers of a highly 
‘technical nature’ as they cannot be instructed by an MEP who knows less 
or as little as they do on the issue (I.4, 12, 13). The factor thus stimulates 
the reactive and pro-active Policy Expert role. 
 
Politicisation 
The framework conceptualises politicisation in relation to division in the EP, 
in general or with regard to a specific dossier (see 2.3.2). It is therefore 
defined as something that may change over time and vary across policy 
 
 
 
areas. Based on the theory, politicisation is expected to restrict the advisor’s 
role.  
 
On issues that are non-controversial, for example receiving little or no 
media attention, MEPs may be less interested (I.4, 7, 11, 12, 18). This gives 
advisors more ‘leeway to dive into the details’ of the file (I.7). These 
accounts suggest that advisors’ contribution decreases in controversial, 
salient files due to a stronger intervention by the MEPs. It is therefore 
concluded that in politicised files advisors are less likely to provide policy 
advice.  
 
In respect of advisors’ drafting role, other circumstances have to be 
factored in to conclusively determine the impact of politicisation on policy 
expertise. It is found that advisors are allowed considerable discretion in 
drafting political resolutions (I.11, 15, 20, 21). In general, these texts 
reflect ideological messages that are accompanied by clear polarisation in 
the EP. The (potential) involvement of the advisor in drafting such political 
messages is higher than in legislative texts because MEPs are less inclined 
to delegate ‘political work’ to officials in the committee secretariats (I.20, 
21). Advisors’ role also increases on files for which many amendments are 
submitted (I.1). In such cases there is a need for redrafting of 
(compromise) amendments and for ensuring coherence among the 
amendments submitted or supported by the group. In summary, the 
advisor’s ability to formulate policy options is most notably found in political 
resolutions and in dossiers that generate a high number of amendments. 
Conversely, this contribution of advisors is restricted in legislative files. 
 
Assessment of the contextual factors 
As derived from the literature, the context affects delegation. To assess the 
(optimal) circumstances in which political advice may be acceptable to MEPs 
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the impact of the factors is evaluated by attributing the following values: 
indispensable (++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), or a 
negative impact (-). From the empirical research it is found that advisors’ 
pro-active behaviour is stimulated by the complexity of files. Political 
direction may provide advisors’ mandate and reactive role. Yet, their 
autonomy is restricted by the active involvement of MEPs. In politicised 
legislative files the acceptance of policy advice as well as advisors’ ability to 
contribute to the formulation of policy positions is restricted. Yet, their 
drafting function is more prominent in political resolutions and in 
(controversial) dossiers that generate a high number of amendments. 
 
Table 6.3.2 Contextual factor assessment for the adoption of the Policy 
Expert role 
 Political 
direction 
Complexity Politicisation 
REACTIVE POLICY EXPERT 
Weigh and present policy 
options 
+ + - 
Formulation based on 
(indirect) input from the MEP  
+ + +/- 
PRO-ACTIVE POLICY EXPERT 
Argue for specific policy 
choices or decisions 
- + - 
Formulation based on (third-
party) expert knowledge 
- + +/- 
Shape policy positions - + +/- 
 
  
 
 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
The findings demonstrate that policy expertise is generally perceived as an 
important asset, instrumental to the role of the advisor. Nonetheless, the 
provision of expertise does not constitute advisors’ most important task. 
Although the Greens/EFA advisors form the exception in this regard, it can 
be concluded that for the other advisors policy expertise – like information 
– serves a secondary function. The empirical analysis presented in this 
chapter confirms that policy expertise can be characterised as a category 
of political advice. The findings demonstrate that EP group advisors adopt 
the Policy Expert role and that the role indeed involves both technical and 
political tasks. Within the scope of one or several parliamentary 
committees, they provide policy-specific advice and are involved in the 
formulation of positions and legislative texts. Advisors for example take 
stock and summarise the various policy options in briefings, for which they 
select the most important issues and interpret the respective implications. 
The technical and political aspects of their role thus take place in tandem. 
 
Findings show that when adopting the Policy Expert role, advisors are 
guided by their understanding of the priorities and interests at stake in the 
group, or by the direct or indirect input from MEPs. The mandate of advisors 
and their capacity to improvise differs across the groups. It is relatively 
easy to construct a mandate for advisors who primarily deal with the wishes 
of one MEP (EFD and GUE/NGL groups), or who are employed by groups 
with (fairly) aligned policy interests (ECR and Greens/EFA). Conversely, in 
groups that have to take into account multiple, possibly competing, policy 
views the advisor’s mandate is more elusive (ALDE, EPP, and S&D). This 
heterogeneity negatively affects the extent to which advisors are able to 
derive political guidance for their activities.  
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Whereas the analysis shows that advisors may receive input from MEPs, 
derive input from political debates or via MEP assistants, the realisation of 
the desired outcome is generally open to interpretation. It is therefore 
concluded that the Policy Expert role requires at least a certain level of 
improvisation and can therefore be of a reactive or pro-active nature. In 
addition, the data reveals that advisors provide input during the early 
stages of the decision-making process, i.e. ahead of group discussions or 
specific input from the elected representatives. Such a pro-active role is 
most likely to be adopted by Greens/EFA advisors, and least likely to be 
adopted by ALDE, EPP, and S&D advisors. Nonetheless, other forms of pro-
active behaviour are encountered across the groups.  Advisors may for 
example argue for specific policy choices, trying to convince MEPs (pro-
active advice). Or they may construct policy options from their personal or 
from acquired expert knowledge (pro-active formulation). 
 
Finally, the assessment of the factors concludes that trust and political 
sensitivity are necessary for the fulfilment of the political dimensions of the 
role. Political sensitivity allows advisors to anticipate what policy options are 
acceptable or have priority and only the input from ‘trusted advisors’ is 
accepted by MEPs. It is furthermore found that advisors’ pro-active 
behaviour is stimulated by the complexity of files. However, their autonomy 
reduces in politicised legislative files. Policy advice is then less likely to be 
accepted by MEPs and advisors’ ability to contribute to the formulation of 
policy positions is restricted. Yet, their drafting function is found to notably 
increase in political resolutions and in (controversial) dossiers that generate 
a high number of amendments. MEPs are more inclined to delegate such 
political work to group advisors over, for example, committee secretariat 
officials. On the contrary, files of a legislative nature are often perceived as 
more technical due to the compromise-oriented style of decision-making in 
the EP. In these types of files EP officials may fulfil the drafting function. 
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CHAPTER 7. BROKER  
The analytical framework conceptualised four roles that advisors may 
adopt, each potentially containing a political dimension. The dissertation 
applies the theoretical concepts to the specific case of group advisors in the 
European Parliament (EP) and this chapter presents the analysis of the 
Broker role. The ideal-type role comprises two central functions: (1) 
facilitation of compromises and (2) coordination of political positions within 
and between the groups. To address the research question ‘under which 
conditions can advisors adopt a political role’ three analytical steps are 
carried out.  
 
The first step is to assess whether the functions of the ideal-type role are 
fulfilled by group advisors and what they entail in practice.128 7.1.1 lays 
down the theoretical technical and political dimensions of brokering. It 
furthermore infers expectations with regard to the adoption of the role from 
the literature review (see introduction) and the performed document 
analysis. Subsequently, the empirical research is presented in 7.1.2. The 
findings show that group advisors assume the facilitation and coordination 
functions of the Broker role and that their activities contain technical and 
political elements. The role is found to go beyond the conceptualised scope 
in that advisors may actually replace the MEP in charge in intra- and inter-
group coordination. Compared to the other groups, intra-group brokering is 
considered to be more important to ALDE, EPP, and S&D advisors. 
 
The second step of the analysis is to examine the political scope of the 
Broker role, based on the three modes of discretion that have been 
                                   
128 The political group advisors assigned to follow the work of one or several of the 
parliamentary committees are the focus of this study. Throughout the analysis ‘advisors’ 
or ‘political advisors’ refers to this type of advisors in the context of the European 
Parliament.  
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developed as part of the analytical framework. Section 7.2 assesses the 
discretion granted to the advisor in brokering activities. This is approached 
by on the one hand examining the extent to which advisors receive 
instructions or input from the elected representatives (7.2.1), and on the 
other hand, the need and their capacity to improvise (7.2.2). The empirical 
research shows that improvisation is a coping strategy and requires 
advisors to assess the necessary or appropriate course of action in light of 
the group’s ideological views. It is therefore concluded that the Broker role 
is predominantly pro-active, with the exception of advisors’ participation in 
the inter-institutional negotiations, which is bound by the strict and fragile 
mandate of the EP negotiating team and thus of a routine nature. 
 
Thirdly and finally, the impact of the personal and contextual factors on the 
adoption of the role is evaluated (7.3). The analysis concludes that trust 
and political sensitivity are indispensable for the adoption of a pro-active 
Broker role. These attributes, combined with a context where advisors work 
on a file or a specific text that is not highly politicised in the EP, prove to be 
the optimal conditions for advisors to pro-actively engage in brokering.  
 
7.1 The nature of brokering in the EP 
This section analyses the brokering activities of EP political groups’ advisors. 
First, the theoretical dimensions are explored (6.1.1). Drawing on the 
literature, the technical and political tasks of brokering are extrapolated. 
The ideal-type role comprises two central functions: (1) facilitation of 
compromises and (2) coordination of political positions within and between 
the groups. The latter entails intra- and inter-group coordination efforts. 
These elements are explored and related to the document analysis on the 
profile and duties of EP group advisors in order to infer expectations 
regarding the adoption of the role (see 3.3.3). 
 
 
 
 
Subsequently, 7.1.2 presents the empirical findings for the Broker role. The 
theoretical expectations regarding the role are assessed in light of the 
collected survey and interview data. The analysis concludes that group 
advisors fulfil both functions of the Broker role, yet the coordination function 
is considered key.  
 
7.1.1 Theoretical dimensions of brokering 
From the scholarly debate on the role of non-elected actors, a series of 
expectations about the brokering activities of advisors can be inferred (see 
3.2.2). Brokering has been conceptualised in relation to legislators’ need for 
a mediating function on their behalf. In different contexts the literature has 
supported the notion of such a role for officials. Advisors can provide 
internal and external political coordination by organising support for political 
positions (Burks and Cole, 1978). They serve as a strategic channel of 
communication through which preparatory negotiations can take place that 
form the basis of a compromise later reached at political level (cf. Fouilleux 
et al, 2005; Peters, 2009; Romanyshyn and Neuhold, 2013). Moreover, 
staff can facilitate compromises by providing advice on negotiation 
strategies (cf. Patterson, 1970; Christiansen, 2002; Provan in: Neunreither, 
2002; Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). The brokering concept thus contains 
a coordinating and a facilitating aspect that both can apply to intra-group 
and inter-group negotiations in the EP.  
 
In the EP, the common working method to define a group’s position involves 
a process of internal deliberations between the group’s leadership, political 
coordinator of the committee responsible, and usually the leaders of the 
national delegations (Corbett et al, 2011: 121).  Previous studies have 
shown voting behaviour to become increasingly structured and party group 
cohesion to strengthen (Hix et al, 2007; Kreppel, 2002; McElroy and Benoit, 
2012). Research by VoteWatch Europe – examining roll call votes between 
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2004 and 2014 – shows that EPP, S&D, ALDE and the Greens/EFA all have 
over 90 per cent cohesion (Corbett et al, 2011). Ideally, intra-group 
coordination is a consensual process during which the specific interests and 
sensitivities within a group are weighed and aligned, resulting in a ‘group 
line’ that on the whole is acceptable to most members (Corbett et al, 2011). 
The desk research regarding advisors’ required profile and job description 
revealed that they are expected to safeguard the group’s overall objectives 
and to preserve consistency between past and future positions (see 3.3.4). 
Relating this responsibility to both the practice of consensual coordination 
and the conceptualisation of brokering raises the expectation that group 
advisors coordinate and facilitate positions within the political group. EFD 
has the lowest group cohesion, namely 47 per cent (Corbett et al, 2011). 
For that reason, EFD advisors are expected to form an exception and not, 
or to a significantly lesser extent, engage in intra-group brokering activities. 
 
EP legislative negotiations are structured by the allocation of committee 
membership, (shadow) rapporteurs and group coordinator positions 
(Jensen and Winzen, 2012). Generally, these actors take a central role in 
inter-group coordination processes (see 1.2). The rapporteur of a dossier is 
responsible for sounding out what is acceptable across the groups and for 
synthesising the present views as much as possible. The appointed shadow 
rapporteurs of the other groups are his or her main interlocutors (Corbett 
et al, 2011; Jensen and Winzen, 2012). They meet during the committee 
phase in so-called ‘shadows’ meetings’ to prepare the report and during the 
plenary phase to negotiate final compromise amendments. The EP is known 
for its consensual decision-making style. With the expansion of the 
institution’s legislative powers the need for a coordinated position has 
become more critical than ever before. In order to make compromise deals 
acceptable to the other institutions, EP decision-making is characterised by 
cooperation in pursuit of broad consensus. This compromise-oriented 
approach implies a pivotal role for EP party groups. Considering the concept 
 
 
 
of external brokering in the setting of the EP, group advisors are first and 
foremost expected to coordinate or facilitate possible coalitions or 
compromises with the other groups. In addition, the Code of Conduct 
(2008) regarding inter-institutional negotiations suggests a potential inter-
institutional coordination role for advisors. This code prescribes that 
‘political balance shall be respected and all political groups shall be 
represented at least at staff level in these negotiations’. Moreover, it refers 
to an ‘administrative support team’ that at least includes the committee 
secretariat, political advisor of the rapporteur, co-decision secretariat and 
the legal service (see 1.3).  
 
Summing up the theoretical discussion, advisors are expected to facilitate 
and coordinate intra-group and inter-group positions, and represent the 
group in inter-institutional negotiations. The conceptualised mixed sphere 
of activity of the framework suggests that there is both a technical and a 
political side to the Broker role. Brokering activities can be classified as 
‘political’ if they involve value or ideological appraisals, the anticipation of 
priorities or objectives, and the use of implicit knowledge or tactics (see 
2.1.2). Technical tasks are void of such anticipation or interpretation. Intra- 
and inter-group facilitation can be conceived as technical activities when 
advisors provide information that does not involve interpretation or political 
judgement. For example through the mere inventory of the various views 
or interests – either within the group or in other groups – which the advisor 
then feeds back to his or her superior. Conceivably, advisors may also 
provide strategic advice with regard to internal and external negotiations 
for which they interpret various possible scenarios. The coordination 
function relates to the interplay between advisors and the Members of the 
EP (MEPs) or other staff members. In the hypothetical technical dimension, 
advisors just serve as an intermediary passing on information or delineated 
positions formulated by their superior. The political dimension of 
coordination is hypothesised to entail the organisation of support and the 
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pre-negotiation of compromises. The theoretical dimensions of brokering 
are illustrated in figure 7.1.1.  
 
7.1.2 Adoption of the Broker role in practice 
The conducted empirical research demonstrates that EP group advisors 
adopt the Broker role and that the role indeed involves both technical and 
political tasks. The survey and interview findings provide evidence that 
group advisors assume the facilitation and coordination functions of the 
role. Moreover, their role is found to go beyond the conceptualised scope in 
that advisors may replace the MEP in charge in intra- and inter-group 
coordination.  
 
First, this sub-section discusses the relative importance of the role, finding 
that ALDE, EPP, and S&D advisors consider brokering to be their most 
important responsibility. Next, the evidence is presented for advisors’ 
facilitation of compromises and their respective involvement in intra-group, 
inter-group, and inter-institutional negotiations. 
 
  
Figure 7.1.1 Theoretical dimensions of brokering  
 
 
 
 
Advisors’ perception of brokering 
As figure 7.1.2 illustrates, advisors perceive the Broker role as their most 
important responsibility. In response to an open-ended question, 43 per 
cent of respondents point to brokering activities. The categorisation of 
answers shows that the vast majority of these respondents (40%) consider 
the coordination function to be their core task.  
 
The findings show that advisors from the ALDE, EPP, and S&D groups attach 
relatively more weight to brokering than their counterparts in the other 
groups. The qualitative data confirm that in the larger groups internal 
coordination efforts take centre stage. Overall, advisors in these groups 
consider it their core responsibility to find consensus between the different 
(geographical) interests. Conversely, none of the EFD respondents mention 
it as their most important task. The qualitative data show that the EFD does 
not apply group discipline and thus no formal coordination takes place 
within the group. Similarly, the GUE/NGL group has no formal group 
discipline. Nonetheless, four of the 14 respondents pinpoint coordination as 
their most important task. This may relate to inter-group coordination. Yet, 
the GUE/NGL interviewee pointed out that there are significant differences 
between the GUE and the NGL and that potential clashes or inconsistencies 
are discussed. The ECR formulates a group line but national delegations 
Figure 7.1.2 Relative importance attached to brokering1 
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have considerable room for autonomy (interviews ECR advisors). Four out 
of 12 survey respondents point to brokering as their most important task. 
The Greens interviewees claim that intra-group coordination is more 
informal than within the other groups. They say it is easier to have 
coherence and consistency in positions as interests are generally more 
aligned. EFA members, however, may have specific and diverging interests, 
for example the Scottish members with regard to Fisheries. In such cases 
each sub-group has their own voting list (interview EFA advisor).  
 
Facilitation of compromises  
The empirical research shows that advisors facilitate compromises both 
within and between the EP party groups. The facilitation element of 
brokering involves the inventory of positions and priorities as well as 
political analysis and advice on negotiation strategies. Each may be 
provided during the intra- and the inter-group coordination process.  
 
To facilitate intra-group coordination, advisors undertake several activities. 
First of all, they write briefing notes aimed at establishing a position that is 
supported by the (majority of the) group – the so-called ‘group line’. In 
these briefings advisors map out the prevailing positions within and outside 
the political group, identifying (potential) internal and external 
controversies. This facilitating function was pointed out in the interviews as 
well as in the answers to open-ended survey questions: ten interviewees, 
mostly EPP and S&D advisors, and 14 survey respondents, mostly ALDE and 
Greens/EFA advisors said they provided such assistance to MEPs. 
 
Beyond the mere inventory of positions, advisors underline that they 
provide advice on how to tackle potentially divisive issues. For example, 
they put forward (compromise) solutions that are likely to be acceptable to 
the national delegations of the group, or that are in line with the overall 
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ideology of the group. 129  This activity closely relates to the signalling 
function advisors have in the preparation of group meetings that was 
discussed as part of the Process Manager role (see 4.1.2).  
 
As part of the inter-group coordination process, the vast majority of 
interviewees130 and 21 survey respondents131 describe their contribution to 
defining negotiation strategies. In this respect, they identify possible 
compromises that are acceptable to the group and assess the likelihood that 
these compromise positions will carry a majority in the House. “An advisor 
assesses and appreciates political interests, should be able to predict what 
the sensitive issues are, and assess the coalitions that are possible” (I.1). 
Accordingly, the qualitative data reveal that negotiation advice also entails 
an evaluation of prospective coalitions.132 In doing so, the advisor weighs 
the chances, laying out what the group can achieve and what battles to 
fight, several advisors explained.133 Advisors from all seven EP party groups 
forming part of the analysis say they carry out such inter-group 
facilitation.134 
 
Intra-group coordination  
The survey shows that advisors are in agreement regarding their 
involvement in intra-group coordination. With the exception of one EFD 
advisor, all respondents claim to coordinate interests and positions within 
                                   
129 Only two EPP, two ALDE, and two Greens/EFA interviewees do not discuss this 
activity. In addition, 12 survey respondents mention it in their open-ended answers: 
SR25, 27, 48, 56, 60, 61, 73, 75, 85, 87, 91, 95. 
130 The same advisors as mentioned in footnote 133 do not discuss this activity. 
131 Open-ended responses of SR9, 38, 41, 43, 53, 64, 66, 69, 71-73, 75, 77, 85, 87, 89, 
91-93, 98, 99. 
132 I.1, 15, 18, 19, 22; open-ended responses of SR9, 29, 34, 36, 42, 53, 72, 73, 77, 91, 
99. 
133 I.19, 22; open-ended responses of SR4, 9, 32, 36, 39, 40, 41, 52, 53, 55, 59, 66, 
88, 89, 90, 99. 
134 ALDE, ECR, EFD, EPP, GREENS/EFA, GUE/NGL, S&D are the seven party groups 
considered in the analysis. 
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their group. The majority (40%) indicate to do so on a weekly basis, 30 per 
cent on a monthly basis, and another 29 per cent see it as their every-day 
activity (see figure 7.1.2a).135  
 
The interviews support this picture. Advisors 
acknowledge the importance of coordination 
with the aim of establishing a position that is 
supported by the majority of the group.136 “The 
added value of the advisor lies in finding and 
stimulating a majority position within the 
group” (I.4). “The advisor supports the MEP in 
his or her committee work by coordinating 
different ideas within the group. There are 
members from different Member States, with 
different approaches and cultures. You have to merge these ideas into one 
coherent position” (I.15). In their quest for a common group position, the 
advisors’ role is to find a compromise between the various views of national 
delegations or – in the case of substantially diverging opinions – to ensure 
that the issue is discussed in a group meeting, ALDE, EPP, S&D, and ECR 
advisors say. “We try to avoid divisions and find a common position. In case 
of internal division you try to reconcile between the delegations ensuring 
that the main points end up in the final text. If you don’t succeed the other 
groups can take advantage of that. At all cost we have to avoid the 
impression that the group is split” (interview EPP advisor). In this capacity 
advisors negotiate on behalf of the members and set out to represent and 
organise support for the ideas of the MEP in charge (interviews ALDE, EPP, 
and S&D advisors).  
 
                                   
135 Analysis SQ7: Can you please estimate how much time you devote to the following 
activities? See Appendix III Survey Response. 
136 The EFD interviewee and two Greens/EFA interviewees form the exception. 
Figure 7.1.2a Intra-group 
coordination 
 
 
 
The EFD group is formed for ‘procedural reasons’ and does not coordinate 
policy positions: a common group line is therefore not the objective 
(interview EFD advisor, see also 1.1.2). Notwithstanding, coordination at 
staff level occurs in relation to matters of MEPs attendance, substitution, 
and speaking time. These activities form part of process management (see 
4.1.2). In such cases ‘I do speak and operate on behalf of the group, the 
EFD interviewee explained, ‘but this is by no means self-evident’. Findings 
reveal that in particular the advisors of the larger groups adopt an active 
internal mediating function. The coordination of positions within the group 
is put forward as a key activity by ALDE, EPP, and S&D interviewees. 
“Advisors are trained to work towards compromises,” an EPP advisor stated. 
The larger groups are expected to take position first. “We always have a 
position on a file. There is no other way,” another EPP advisor explained. 
“You are expected to speak first, other groups wait for you.” Intra-group 
coordination is a careful balancing act for the larger groups since there are 
many (potentially) diverging opinions to consider. “Sometimes the advisor 
needs to represent the group line internally, to convey to the members or 
delegations what the position of the group is” (interview S&D advisor). It 
requires more effort compared to the other groups as is confirmed by their 
counterparts. “We negotiate within the group as to what is acceptable and 
what is the red line” (interview EPP advisor).  
 
Conversely, the Greens/EFA is a more homogeneous group and advisors 
say that they spend relatively little time on intra-group coordination, as 
there is ‘a greater meeting of the minds’ within the group (interview Greens 
advisor). Yet, ‘different cultures need to be balanced’ within the group, 
another Greens advisor stated. The interviews with ECR advisors show that 
there commonly is a group line but national delegations have room for 
autonomy. “You have to mediate and reconcile different views where 
necessary”, an ECR advisor said. Another ECR interviewee stressed that this 
is relatively easy as the group’s position is formulated along the lines of the 
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‘Prague Declaration’, which ‘more or less is considered as our ten 
commandments’. 137  As a con-federal group, GUE/NGL values the 
preservation of its members’ diversity of identities and opinions. Although 
the group does not have a formally coordinated position, there clearly is a 
group culture that advisors are expected to follow: “The GUE/NGL Group 
[…] argues against the mainstream neo-liberal prescriptions for the EU and 
is focussed on presenting progressive policy alternatives. All group staff 
should be comfortable in this environment and at ease with, contributing 
and supporting our MEPs in their policy objectives, inside and outside 
Parliament” (GUE-NGL vacancy notices, 2016). 
 
Inter-group coordination 
Survey findings confirm the overall involvement 
of advisors in inter-group coordination (see figure 
7.1.2b). Only a small minority (3%) denies their 
involvement in the coordination of interests and 
positions between the groups.138 Most advisors 
(49%) do this every week while others report 
that they are involved on a daily (30%) or 
monthly (18%) basis. 
 
As part of their inter-group coordination activities advisors defend and 
promote the group position and negotiate compromises with the other 
                                   
137 In 2009, the ECR adopted this declaration containing the ten principles that the group 
share.  
138 The three per cent that denies involvement in inter-group coordination represent two 
EFD respondents and one GREENS-EFA respondent. 
Figure 7.1.2b Inter-
group coordinating 
 
 
 
 
groups. 90 per cent of survey 
respondents agree with the 
statement that they negotiate 
compromises on behalf of the 
group (see figure 7.1.2c). 139 
ALDE, EPP, and S&D interviewees 
describe themselves as 
‘compromise makers’ and 
‘mediators’. The qualitative data 
furthermore disclose that advisors aim for the group position to be 
represented properly in parliamentary activities, and that it is reflected as 
much as possible in the legislative outcome.140  
 
Inter-group negotiations are very informal and deliberation takes place 
simultaneously at political and staff level. Nearly all interviewees stressed 
that compromises between the groups are pre-negotiated among 
advisors.141 Advisors for example represent the group line in negotiations 
on compromise amendments with their counterparts (I.2, 11, 15, 18, 19, 
22). "In order to relieve time-constraint MEPs, group advisors try to get the 
bulk of the issues out of the way. They negotiate with other group advisors 
and then report back to us, the MEPs or their assistants. Obviously, contact 
between natural coalition partners is easier, for example S&D and 
Greens/EFA or GUE/NGL advisors. Whereas in the coordination between EPP 
and S&D competition is fierce." (I.0.4). As part of the pre-negotiations at 
staff level it is common for advisors to check with their counterparts for 
potential support for an amendment, even before submitting or proposing 
it to the MEP (I.15, 18, 19). 
                                   
139 Analysis SQ10: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? See 
Appendix III Survey Response. 
140 I.9; open-ended survey responses of SR3, 9, 18, 25, 29, 39, 40, 53, 60, 83, 87. 
141 Exceptions are one ALDE and one S&D interviewee.  
Figure 7.1.2c Negotiating 
compromises on behalf of the group 
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advisors.141 Advisors for example represent the group line in negotiations 
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22). "In order to relieve time-constraint MEPs, group advisors try to get the 
bulk of the issues out of the way. They negotiate with other group advisors 
and then report back to us, the MEPs or their assistants. Obviously, contact 
between natural coalition partners is easier, for example S&D and 
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139 Analysis SQ10: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? See 
Appendix III Survey Response. 
140 I.9; open-ended survey responses of SR3, 9, 18, 25, 29, 39, 40, 53, 60, 83, 87. 
141 Exceptions are one ALDE and one S&D interviewee.  
Figure 7.1.2c Negotiating 
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The accounts of advisors show that throughout the informal preparations 
they fulfil an intermediary role, acting and speaking on behalf of the MEP in 
charge.142 “A very good adviser is finally the person who can or even must 
replace the respective member if necessary, not only in the technical 
meetings where the negotiations are being often already prepared at staff 
level but also in the official meetings with the other political groups and 
institutions” (SR61). 97 per cent of respondents attend shadows’ meetings 
on behalf of the MEP (see figure 7.1.2d). Parliamentary assistants and 
group advisors usually prepare these meetings, in which an exchange of 
views between (advisors of) the rapporteur and the shadows takes place. 
“Before reports are drawn up there usually 
are one or two meetings with the rapporteur 
and shadows. Once the report is drawn up 
and amendments are submitted the real 
work starts, that is negotiation on a 
compromise. Staff then takes care of the 
bulk of the work. We have meetings at staff 
level to go through the text. This is where 
the bargaining starts. We talk to our 
counterparts in other groups to find a 
majority” (I.11).  
 
Inter-institutional coordination 
Interview and survey findings report that advisors also contribute to the 
inter-institutional coordination process (see 1.3). An EPP interviewee stated 
that group advisors are always present in the trilogue negotiations. “They 
have to be in order to report back to the group.” The mandate for the EP 
negotiating team is determined beforehand and ‘group advisors create the 
                                   
142 I.0.1, 2, 3, 8-19, 22; SR13, 25, 56, 61. 
Figure 7.1.2d Attending 
shadows’ meetings  
 
 
 
 
support within the group and ensure it throughout the process.’ Another 
EPP advisor stated that ‘it is nice to take the lead’ in the technical trilogues 
when you are representing the rapporteur.  
 
Overall, the findings demonstrate advisors’ involvement in the trilogue 
preparations across the groups and across parliamentary committees. Close 
to the politics-administration dichotomy theory, EP practitioners use the 
distinction to illustrate the division of labour and authority by referring to 
‘technical’ or ‘political’ meetings. Generally, a ‘political’ meeting between 
the rapporteur and the ‘shadows’ takes place prior to a trilogue negotiation 
in order to coordinate the EP’s position (Corbett et al, 2011). During these 
shadows’ meetings the decisions are taken and issues are subdivided into 
political topics, which are resolved in the trilogues, and into technical points 
that are worked out at staff level (I.4, 10, 11, 15, 17).  
 
92 per cent of survey respondents state that 
they are involved in technical trilogues (see 
figure 7.1.2e). Only 7 respondents report 
never being involved and they work for 
different groups and committees. These 
meetings assemble MEP assistants, EP 
officials from the committee secretariats, 
group advisors, and representatives from the 
European Commission (EC) and the Council 
(I.4, 11). “For example, when we find and 
agree on the exact wording. Politicians aren’t 
interested and don’t want to spend their time on this” (I.11).  
 
Figure 7.1.2e Participating 
in technical trilogues 
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7.2 Assessment of the political scope of brokering  
The previous section presented the empirical evidence for the adoption of 
the role. The research demonstrates that advisors facilitate compromises, 
an activity that encompasses the inventory of positions and advice on 
negotiation strategy. They furthermore coordinate positions within the 
group, pre-negotiate compromises with their counterparts in the other 
groups, and participate in the technical trilogues. This section evaluates the 
degree to which brokering is political. The extent to which the role is political 
is assessed with the use of the modes of discretion that have been 
developed as part of the analytical framework (see 2.1.3). The aim is to 
explore advisors’ discretion, room for initiative, and improvisation in 
brokering activities.  
 
7.2.1 addresses the way in which advisors receive their instructions from 
the MEPs and how this input affects their role. The analysis concludes that 
the advisors’ mandate is implicit and derived from the group’s or the MEP’s 
priorities. 7.2.2 examines the extent to which advisors (need to) anticipate 
or improvise in their brokering activities. The collected data suggest that – 
ahead of explicit political input – advisors devise and propose acceptable 
compromises and coalitions. Throughout the informal preparations advisors 
have to consider multiple outcome scenarios. Their improvisation is a coping 
strategy and requires them to determine the necessary or appropriate 
course of action in light of the group’s ideological views. It is therefore 
concluded in 7.2.3 that the role is mostly pro-active, with the exception of 
advisors’ participation in the inter-institutional negotiations, which is tied to 
the strict and fragile mandate of the EP negotiating team. 
 
7.2.1 Instructions and input from the MEP 
This sub-section sets out to determine the way in which advisors receive 
instructions or input from the elected representatives and how this affects 
 
 
 
their ability to act as Brokers. Advisors are assigned to follow the work of 
one or several parliamentary committees. In the administrative hierarchy 
the group’s Secretary General is the advisor’s superior (see 1.2.2). From 
the quantitative and qualitative data it is found that group advisors work 
closely together with (shadow) rapporteurs and the group’s coordinator for 
the parliamentary committee they are assigned to (see 4.2.1). Their explicit 
or implicit political instructions are most likely to emanate from this 
interaction. The vacancy notice analysis deduced that throughout the 
process of defining a political group’s position advisors are responsible for 
safeguarding the group’s overall objectives and preserving consistency 
between past and future positions (see Appendix I). Advisors base their 
actions and recommendations on the ideology and priorities of the group. 
They ensure that ‘the group position respects the fundamental values of the 
group’ (SR25) and they advise MEPs according to those values (SR27). 
These values could thus also be perceived as advisors’ implicit instructions. 
However, and in particular for the larger and more heterogeneous ALDE, 
EPP, and S&D groups, such political values are usually not clear-cut as there 
are great differences between their national delegations (see 1.3.1 and 
7.1.2 on intra-group coordination). 
 
Advisors consider it one of their main responsibilities to secure a common 
group line, in which the different ideas that exist within the group are 
balanced or merged into one coherent position. Advisors in the more 
homogeneous groups feel that they have greater discretion in formulating 
the group’s position (i.e. Greens, ECR, GUE). As the internal divisions are 
smaller, they have more room to show initiative in coming up with 
(compromise) solutions. Notwithstanding, intra-group coordination for the 
larger, heterogeneous groups is more substantial. A great deal of ALDE, 
EPP, and S&D advisors’ time is spent on what they refer to as a careful 
balancing act.  
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In their intra-group mediation function advisors base their actions on what 
(they think) the MEP in charge wants and assay these wishes to the political 
values and priorities of the group. Their (implicit) mandate is thus twofold. 
On the one hand, they consider themselves to be the MEP’s proxy, and on 
the other, they safeguard the group’s fundamental values. “The 
engagement of coordinators differs a lot. You have to do either whatever 
complements their work or invisibly replace them” (SR56). Particularly in 
the context of intra-group coordination, respondents alluded to ‘convincing’ 
or ‘persuading’ MEPs with the aim of rounding up support for the group 
line. 143   One even claimed that an advisor should have the ‘ability to 
convince an MEP to do what you want without him or her realising it’ (SR58). 
The more general representation by advisors, however, is that they should 
be able to ‘explain and argue for specific policy choices’ (SR77), and 
‘promote new ideas and propositions’ (SR55). Yet, if such ideas deviate 
from the convictions of the MEP in charge there is no real chance for 
success. “If you are not on the same page as your MEP you have less 
opportunities to bring your ideas forward” (I.4). “Advisors first and foremost 
have to support the (shadow) rapporteur, and help explain their political 
position to the group and other colleagues, whether this carries a majority 
view or not” (SR77). “In the case of a minority position we try to explain to 
the member or national delegation why the majority position is necessary, 
and why for example the MEP should withdraw a certain amendment” 
(I.15). These examples illustrate that the advisor acts and speaks on behalf 
of the MEP in charge, representing his or her views. Discretion and room 
for initiative of advisors decreases when their coordination activities diverge 
from the wishes of the MEP in charge. Exceptions to this, however, are 
encountered in situations where the (shadow) rapporteur does not follow 
the group line. As part of their Process Manager role (see 4.2.3), advisors 
                                   
143 Open-ended responses of SR26, 30, 32, 33, 40, 47, 53, 55, 58, 69, 72, 74, 77. 
 
 
 
then pro-actively report to their political and administrative hierarchies 
(signalling function). 
The same holds true for inter-group mediation. 90 per cent of the 
respondents agree with the statement that they negotiate compromises on 
behalf of the group. The data presented in 7.1.2 demonstrate that these 
compromises are (pre-)negotiated at staff level. The advisor represents the 
MEP and the group in meetings. The EP Rules of Procedure do not specify 
the precise functioning of ‘shadows’ meetings’. It is not stipulated who can 
represent the group in these meetings and the empirical data suggest that 
advisors may do so. “Normally the rapporteur is there, but over half of the 
time the group advisors are there alone” (I.22). Another interviewee cites 
an example of a meeting to prepare a resolution. All advisors and one 
member came in and somebody asked ‘is this meeting open to members 
too?’ (I.16). These examples predicate high discretion and room for 
initiative by the advisor. Nevertheless, advisors underline that they base 
such coordination activities on the (expected) group position, bearing in 
mind the group’s priorities (SR48, 52, 53, 86). “On the basis of group 
decisions, advisors have to make sure these are represented in 
parliamentary texts and voting lines” (SR25). Although negotiations are 
prepared at staff level, this work needs to be confirmed at MEP level in 
shadows’ meetings and later at the level of the group, which can be 
‘challenging’ (I.18). “In negotiations you or your (shadow) rapporteur may 
agree to certain things because you understand the dynamics of the 
negotiation process and see that everyone is compromising. This is not 
necessarily obvious to the group so you then need to make this understood 
and defend a compromise result that maybe nobody really likes” (I.18). 
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Advisors’ room for manoeuvre in intra- and inter-group negotiations is 
higher in the committee phase.144 At this stage advisors’ mandate for inter-
group coordination is comparable to that for the intra-group coordination 
process and more flexible than during the negotiations leading up to the 
plenary vote. Once the group line and preferred amendments to the 
proposed text are discussed in the group this input forms the advisor’s 
mandate in the plenary phase. “For the plenary, if everything runs 
smoothly, all we have to do is draft a voting list” (I.15). “Advisors' role is 
most important in committee phase. Before the plenary vote not a lot can 
be done” (I.2). 
 
For inter-institutional negotiations with the Council and the EC the role of 
advisors is bound by a carefully defined mandate established through a 
decision in the parliamentary committee responsible or plenary (see 1.3). 
This is done to secure wider support in the EP as in the actual negotiations 
only a fraction of MEPs is involved, a practice that is frowned upon both 
within and outside the European Parliament (I.11, 19). The task of group 
advisors is to ensure that the established mandate is respected in order to 
keep the House united. “Our job is to defend the position whether you like 
it or not” (I.15). All in all, this leads us to believe that the role of advisors 
is more restricted compared to intra-parliamentary mediation. Yet, some 
room for initiative remains as the advisor may be charged with working out 
specific details or the exact wording of texts. These inter-institutional 
activities at staff level, however, are preceded and delineated by a decision 
of the rapporteur and the shadows. Inter-institutional mediation is thus of 
either a routine or reactive nature.  
 
                                   
144 See 1.3.1 for an introduction to the respective stages of intra-parliamentary 
coordination: Preparatory, committee, plenary, and inter-institutional negotiations.  
 
 
 
While several advisors point out the potentially “undemocratic” nature of 
the informal coordination process in the EP (I.11, 19), the majority depicts 
their role as benign. Advisors are in close contact with the (shadow) 
rapporteur and coordinator, and the final say always remains with the MEPs 
(I.7, 17, 18; SR25, 61, 82). However, this does not mean that in the 
informal process leading up to a decision by the MEP advisors follow explicit 
instructions. In their brokering activities advisors rather depend on their 
capacity to anticipate both the desired outcome for the MEP or group as 
well as the strategy to achieve this outcome, as the discussion below will 
further demonstrate. 
 
7.2.2 Improvisation by the advisor 
It is found that group advisors fulfil the political dimensions of the role (see 
7.1.2). The previous sub-section concluded that, with the exception of their 
role in technical trilogues, advisors’ mandate is implicit and derived from 
the group’s or MEP’s priorities. This sub-section addresses group advisors’ 
manifested level of improvisation in the Broker role, before or in the 
absence of clear input from the elected actors. Improvisation is construed 
as value or ideological assessments by the advisor, the anticipation of 
priorities or objectives, and the use of implicit knowledge or tactics (see 
2.1.2). 
 
In the survey, all respondents classify their activities as ‘political advice’. 
Interviewees and survey respondents claim that they are aware of the 
political implications of their role and a majority of all advisors in the study 
acknowledge that they can have a pro-active role. They underline the 
importance of anticipating the positions within the groups and showing 
initiative in their support provided to MEPs. Out of the advisors that describe 
a form of pro-active behaviour, the vast majority refer to brokering 
activities.  
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144 See 1.3.1 for an introduction to the respective stages of intra-parliamentary 
coordination: Preparatory, committee, plenary, and inter-institutional negotiations.  
 
 
 
While several advisors point out the potentially “undemocratic” nature of 
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The data corroborate that advisors facilitate compromises and that these 
activities can entail tactical and strategic advice (see 7.1.2). No examples 
were encountered of advisors facilitating compromises in a situation where 
both the desired outcome and the means to achieve that outcome are 
instructed or implied (routine mode). Instead, the empirical data highlight 
political analysis and judgement on the part of the advisor.145  
 
The qualitative data show that to provide strategic negotiation advice, 
advisors must be able to anticipate and interpret the group’s objectives as 
well as acquire insight into the other groups’ positions and priorities.146 In 
briefing notes advisors ‘carve out the position of the group, anticipate the 
positions of the other groups, and put files into a political context’ (SR36). 
Although these activities include an inventory element the advice described 
by respondents and interviewees shows a high degree of improvisation. 
Advisors acquire this political intelligence through their Information 
Manager role, drawing from their experience and by liaising with their 
counterparts in the other groups (see chapter 5). “You get to know the 
strategies of the other groups. For example the Greens will push and push, 
negotiate and negotiate to get their points in. But in the end they will vote 
against the formal compromise anyway. Our role is to advise the MEPs on 
such strategies, anticipating what the others will do” (I.19).  
 
Advisors furthermore assess the likelihood that a position or compromise is 
acceptable to the national delegations of the group or prospective allies. 
Advisors should have the capacity to identify ‘allies and compromises with 
necessary majority as close as possible to the aims of his group’ (SR 53). 
                                   
145 I.1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 17, 22; open-ended responses of SR9, 13, 24, 30, 34, 39, 40, 41, 45, 
49, 50, 89, 91, 99. 
146 I.1, 8, 13, 18, 22; open-ended responses of SR9, 13, 15, 22, 24, 29, 30, 34, 36, 39, 
45, 50, 52, 53, 56, 60, 64, 65, 72, 77, 92, 96, 97, 99. 
 
 
 
“When working on a particular issue for a particular MEP, advisors should 
be able to identify like-minded in other groups who are able to give support 
to a particular opinion” (SR72).  
 
Advisors can fulfil a pro-active role in intra- and inter-group coordination 
although their discretion and room for manoeuvre hinges on the accurate 
representation of the MEP’s or group’s position. The findings also show, 
however, that usually there is not just one desired outcome or one 
appropriate course of action. The role of the advisor then is to secure the 
best possible outcome for the group. Inevitably, this requires improvisation. 
Advisors for example weigh different interests and assess the likelihood of 
success. “Advisors can simultaneously propose different things because 
different MEPs ask you different things” (I.22). The interviewee described a 
case of a report for which his group delivered the rapporteur. He knew the 
rapporteur wanted a certain issue to be amended but several MEPs within 
the group wanted to keep it unchanged. Others wanted to go much further 
than the rapporteur. In the end it worked out that the compromise position 
was that of the rapporteur. “As an advisor you can go out and actively look 
for these extremes on either end, preparing the way toward a compromise.” 
 
The empirical research reveals that advisors act and speak on behalf of 
MEPs, both in intra- and inter-group coordination efforts. Advisors’ accounts 
demonstrate that such ‘shadowing’ of MEPs, by some referred to as ‘acting 
as MEP’ (I.5, 10, 12, SR99), implies anticipation and crawling into the skin 
of the politician. For example, not all of the groups provide a shadow 
rapporteur for each file. In that case, the political advisor deals with the file 
on behalf of the group. To prepare the shadows’ meetings, meetings are 
convened at staff level. Moreover, advisors contact each other informally to 
probe the acceptability or level of support for certain amendments, and 
form alliances on certain issues. They then brief their members based on 
this information prior to the actual negotiations. Apart from a few 
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exceptions, advisors stand together in their claim that in these negotiations 
they do not voice their own opinions. Instead, they represent the ideas and 
interests of the group or the individual MEP who is in charge of the file.147 
The qualitative data show that in this respect the advisor needs to predict 
and understand what the MEP wants and be able to think as the MEP 
would. 148 This requires them to anticipate the politician’s priorities and 
based on that determine the appropriate strategy to realise the desired 
outcome.  
 
As concluded in 7.2.1, inter-institutional mediation is bound by a carefully 
constructed mandate. Nevertheless, some room for improvisation remains 
as several examples provided by interviewees support. One advisor referred 
to ‘tough negotiations’ within the Parliament during which he was able to 
leverage his contacts at the Permanent Representation to change the 
outcome of the technical trilogue meeting (I.4). During the intra-
parliamentary deliberations the groups had agreed on a compromise. 
Nonetheless, the advisor had simultaneously coordinated with ‘his’ national 
attachés that the Council would overturn certain points that were 
unacceptable to his group. An ECR advisor stated that once you know a file 
is going into informal trilogues it becomes easier to compromise on certain 
issues with the other groups. “The Council’s position is usually stronger in 
line with the ECR position and we would expect them eventually to go our 
way.”  
 
To conclude, the analysis shows that ahead of explicit political input 
advisors devise and propose acceptable compromises or coalitions. 
Moreover, they fulfil a backstage coordination function in relation to the 
intra-parliamentary negotiations. For these functions the desired outcome 
                                   
147 I.0.2, 1, 2, 3, 17, 18; open-ended responses of SR9, 13, 24, 43, 48, 50, 52, 53, 77, 
79, 86. 
148 I.0.1; 0.2, 0.3, 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 17; open-ended responses of SR9, 13, 24, 50, 64. 
 
 
 
is multifaceted or uncertain. Advisors’ improvisation is a strategy to deal 
with situations in which there are multiple scenarios to consider. In such 
cases they have to rely on what they feel is necessary or appropriate in light 
of the group’s ideological views. The next sub-section concludes what this 
implies for the political scope of the various brokering activities.  
   
7.2.3 Brokering as a category of political advice 
The empirical research revealed that EP group advisors combine technical 
and political tasks in their Broker role. No evidence has been encountered 
of purely technical tasks. Rather, advisors to a large degree depend on their 
capacity to anticipate both the desired outcome for the MEP or group as 
well as the means to achieve this outcome. The technical dimensions 
(inventory and intermediary) do form part of the activities and feed into the 
political advice category. The framework conceptualises political advice as 
a mixed sphere where technical and political activities meet. The findings 
presented in this chapter thus corroborate brokering as a category of 
political advice composed of technical and political elements. The 
combination of tasks is also acknowledged among the advisors in the survey 
and interviews. One interviewee summarised the role as follows: “A group 
advisor is a political figure and a technical figure at the same time” (I.17). 
 
To assess the political scope of the role, the framework conceptualised three 
incremental modes of political advice tied to the discretion of the advisor: 
routine, reactive, and pro-active behaviour. Discretion is exercised where 
hierarchical measures or political authority are not directly applied. The role 
thus becomes more pro-active as the advisor’s room for improvisation 
increases. While advisors broadly claim to act in the interest of the MEP or 
group, it has become apparent that these interests (the desired outcome) 
are not straightforward or predefined. For that reason the role is 
predominantly labelled as pro-active.  
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The process during which compromises come about in the EP appears to be 
highly informal. Particularly during the early stages of this process, advisors 
have no explicit political instructions or debates to use as guidance for their 
actions. It is found that the facilitation of compromises is aimed at advising 
MEPs on the best conceivable strategy (means) while anticipating what is 
acceptable to the members of the group (desired outcome). Advisors assay 
what is at stake, what is acceptable, as well as the respective chances for 
success. These activities are thus labelled as pro-active. Ahead of meetings 
at MEP level, advisors devise acceptable compromises or coalitions. They 
advise how to tackle (potential) internal and external controversies and 
predict possible coalitions. In the margins of these meetings, group advisors 
pre-negotiate compromises with their counterparts. In this way, they 
represent as well as shape the position of the group. These pro-active 
functions of the Broker role clearly set group advisors apart from other 
supporting actors in the EP.  
 
Figure 7.2.3 illustrates the key brokering activities that are found based on 
the empirical research:  
 
 Political analysis: advisors evaluate the different internal and external 
positions and provide the group with advice on negotiation strategy. 
These tasks require the advisor to have a feeling for what is (likely to 
be) acceptable to the members of the group (desired outcome) and 
determine the best conceivable strategy (means). The facilitation of 
compromises therefore requires pro-active behaviour by the advisor.  
  
 
 
 
 Group advisors reconcile views internally. In their intra-group 
coordination function advisors pro-actively coordinate the different ideas 
within the group, and stimulate the support of the majority position. The 
desired outcome is multifaceted and advisors are guided by what they 
deem necessary or appropriate in light of the group’s ideological views. 
 
 Group advisors negotiate compromises at staff level. In their inter-
group coordination function they pro-actively defend and promote the 
group position ahead of the meetings that take place at MEP level.  
 
 As part of their coordination function, advisors replace their MEP. 
Throughout the informal preparations they fulfil an intermediary role, 
acting and speaking on behalf of the MEP in charge. This requires 
improvisation although the acceptance of their pro-active behaviour 
hinges on the accurate representation of the MEP’s or group’s position. 
 
 Although some examples were encountered of advisors executing 
discretion in the preparation of inter-institutional negotiations, their 
participation in the technical trilogues is generally deemed to be of 
a routine nature, given the strict and fragile mandate of the EP 
negotiating team.  
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7.3 Impact of the factors on brokering 
The objective of the thesis is to explore and explain the circumstances that 
stimulate or restrict a political role by group advisors. The literature review 
identified a set of factors that are expected to affect the adoption of the 
Broker role (see chapter 2.3). This section consecutively assesses each of 
the personal (7.3.1) and contextual factors (7.3.2) by presenting evidence 
from the survey and interviews. It is found that trust and political sensitivity 
are indispensable for the effective fulfilment of the Broker role. 
Figure 7.2.3 Empirical findings: brokering as a category of political 
advice 
 
 
 
Furthermore, it is concluded that pro-active behaviour is restricted in cases 
that are politicised.  
 
7.3.1 Personal factors 
The analytical framework proposes four personal factors that facilitate pro-
active behaviour. This sub-section analyses the impact of these factors on 
the adoption of the Broker role. Findings show that trust of the MEP and of 
other staff members defines the advisor’s room for manoeuvre. Political 
sensitivity enables the advisor to think as the MEP and provide tactical 
advice with regard to compromise-building and negotiation strategies. 
Intra-EP informal connections are instrumental for both the mediating and 
the facilitating functions of brokering as it provides the advisor with 
intelligence.  
 
Trust 
The analytical framework links trust to knowledge of and affinity with party 
ideology and priorities (see 2.3.1). It can be inferred from the survey and 
the interviews that trust between the advisor and the MEP is key in 
determining the working relationship. 25 advisors say that the discretion 
they are granted depends on the trust of the coordinator or (shadow) 
rapporteur (s)he works with.149 For MEPs to listen to the provided advice, 
advisors need trust and acknowledgement of their role from the members 
(I.18). Trust is thus indispensable for an effective pro-active role as it forms 
the basis for the advice to be followed or the input to be ‘accepted’.  
 
In the case of a high-trust relationship advisors will have ‘a lot of room for 
manoeuvre’ (I.22). “Definitively once you start speaking on behalf of the 
member when you’re replacing them it is very important that you know 
                                   
149 I.0.2, 0.4, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22; open-ended responses of SR6, 17, 
25, 31, 38, 39, 40, 52, 60, 61, 84, 99. 
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where they are standing and also get the trust from them. So you can speak 
on behalf of them” (I.18). The interview and survey accounts show that the 
contrary holds true as well. Should trust be betrayed, the working 
relationship is disturbed. In cases where the MEP in charge and the advisor 
disagree or do not ‘share the same affinity’ (I.22), discretion ‘to put forward 
your ideas’ decreases (I.4), thus obstructing the provision of political 
advice. In sum, a lack or decreased sense of trust has a critical impact on 
the role of the advisor. In the end, the MEP decides who provides his or her 
assistance. If the trustworthiness of advisors is questioned, MEPs will look 
to their personal assistants to fulfil the brokering activities.  
 
The empirical research shows that compromises are pre-negotiated at staff 
level. 19 advisors say this collaboration depends on trust.150 Reliability and 
the reputation of the advisor is important, i.e. ‘not winning through tricks’ 
(I.10). Trust of advisors’ counterparts in the other groups is essential to 
effectively engage in intra-parliamentary and inter-institutional 
coordination. It is important ‘to stay on friendly terms, even with your 
political opponents’ (SR92).  
 
The research shows that advisors may replace their MEP, which implies that 
they understand the way of thinking of the MEP and represent his or her 
ideas. 11 advisors state that to acquire a good sense of the MEP’s priorities 
and understand how (s)he thinks, they rely on their relationship with both 
the MEP in charge and their assistants who share insights as to the MEP’s 
views, priorities, and behaviour.151 The informal interviews put forward that 
some group advisors are reputed to ‘try to get certain points in’ that were 
not discussed with the MEP. MEPs and their assistants would subsequently 
avoid working with them. 
                                   
150 I.0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19; open-ended responses of SR 17, 25, 
31, 38, 39, 54, 59. 
151 I.2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22. 
 
 
 
Informal network 
The framework conceptualises an informal network as the access to and 
exchange of private information through informal interactions with actors 
in and outside the institution (see 2.3.1). In respect to brokering, informal 
contacts are instrumental for political analysis of the various stakes, 
positions, and (possible) coalitions. They gather this information through 
the Information Manager role (see chapter 5) and use it in their facilitation 
and coordination efforts. The analysis demonstrates that for brokering 
activities the networks of advisors centre on contacts within the institution. 
 
The findings show that informal contacts and personal relationships are 
crucial to collaboration and exchange at staff level: 39 advisors underline 
the importance.152 Chapter 5 considered the networks of group advisors. 
MEP assistants are found to be their main points of contact (see table 5.1a). 
Having close ties with assistants will allow advisors to assess or forecast 
what is at stake and what is acceptable to the members. This enables them 
to devise the appropriate negotiation strategy and accurately represent the 
interests of the group. Advisors also work closely, and meet socially, with 
their counterparts from the other groups and keep each other informed. 
These contacts allow them to gain insight into other groups’ positions, a 
necessity for inter-group coordination and advice on negotiation strategy. 
Several advisors stress the level of informality – talking and meeting off the 
record – as pertinent in this regard (notably I.2, 3, 15). “We have an added 
value by acquiring ‘new’ information through informal channels” (I.2). And 
“if you know the people and they know you, this helps” (I.3). In sum, 
advisors’ informal intra-parliamentary networks are instrumental to the 
facilitation of compromises, and even indispensable for the effective 
negotiation at staff level.  
                                   
152 I. 0.4, 2-4, 6-10, 13, 15-17, 19, 22; open ended responses of SR3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 
27, 37, 42, 43, 47, 51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 74, 79, 84, 88, 89, 92, 97, 98. 
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where they are standing and also get the trust from them. So you can speak 
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150 I.0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19; open-ended responses of SR 17, 25, 
31, 38, 39, 54, 59. 
151 I.2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22. 
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Institutional memory 
Institutional memory is conceptualised as the insight into – and access to – 
the institutional track record (see 2.3.1). In the EP context this factor is 
interpreted as knowledge of the functioning of the institution (formal and 
informal rules) and an appreciation of the political group’s (previous) 
positions. Though not a prerequisite, 42 per cent of advisors have a 
background of working in the EP and interviewees’ accounts support the 
advantages of ‘knowing your way around’ (I.3). Moreover, the survey finds 
advisors to be experienced, on average holding their position for six years, 
varying between seven months and 23 years. This would allow them to 
develop a level of ‘institutional memory’. 
Survey respondents and interviewees stand together in their claim that 
advisors must understand and be able to forecast the group’s objectives 
and priorities. In the recruitment of advisors, familiarity with the activities 
and the operation of political groups are sometimes explicit requirements, 
notably for the GUE-NGL and EFD groups. Interviewees’ accounts show that 
in practice political affinity and political experience are taken into account 
in the selection of group advisors. An understanding of the group’s position 
helps the advisor to fulfil the inter-group Broker role and to propose 
acceptable solutions or compromises (facilitation). Moreover, in the larger 
or more heterogeneous groups it will allow advisors to appreciate the 
different views of the national delegations within the group, which is 
important for intra-group brokering, particularly relevant for the ALDE, EPP, 
and S&D advisors.  
 
From the research it is found that institutional memory facilitates the Broker 
role. However, the other personal factors may produce a similar 
appreciation of the institution’s formal and informal rules, as well as 
allowing for the understanding and anticipation of the group’s position. In 
sum, there appears to be a positive relation between advisors’ institutional 
 
 
 
memory and their brokering activities but the factor is not indispensable for 
the adoption of the role. 
 
Political sensitivity 
The analytical framework conceptualises political sensitivity as the 
understanding of the institution’s informal code of conduct and the ability 
to recognise political and administrative cues, allowing for the anticipation 
of (negotiation) strategies (see 2.3.1). Inquiring after the qualities advisors 
should possess to effectively fulfil their responsibilities, political sensitivity 
is cited most prominently.153  
 
From the interviews and survey it appears that advisors are expected to 
know what is strategically important for the group, what points can count 
on a majority in the group and in Parliament, and be able to rank political 
priorities (see 7.1.2 and 7.2.2). In negotiations, advisors must ‘have a good 
understanding of what is acceptable’ (I.2) and ‘have a good sense as to how 
far they can go, making sure to not overstep their mandate’ (I.8).154 For 
internal briefing purposes, advisors should be able to infer whether a 
position can count on the support of the national delegations within the 
group. And for negotiation advice, whether a parliamentary majority can be 
found for such a position. “Negotiations are usually a question of what 
others can live with or what will be hard for them to refuse. We have to 
keep the feasibility of an amendment in mind. You know this from 
experience, a gut feeling” (I.13). To effectively brief MEPs, advisors should 
have ‘a feeling for possible compromise lines’ which they develop through 
‘knowing where the red lines’ on either side lie (SR41).  
 
                                   
153 See Appendix III, responses to SQ6, 9 and 11. Out of the 28 interviews, only five 
interviewees did not flag up political sensitivity as crucial to their role. 
154 Similar examples were provided in the open-ended responses of SR9, 13, 15, 22, 27, 
39, 41, 97. 
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In their intra- and inter-group coordination activities, advisors represent the 
views of the group and the MEP in charge. To this end, they must be able 
to ‘anticipate and translate what members want’ (I.1). This requires 
advisors to crawl into the skin of the MEP, basing their actions on what is 
likely to be acceptable to MEPs. Rather than following a set of clearly defined 
instructions, Group Advisors have to trust their ‘political instincts’ and be 
able to think and act as the MEP would (I.3, 4, 17, 18). ‘Good’ advisors 
know how to make the distinction between their ‘personal opinions’ and the 
‘group line’ (I.16) and can forecast the ‘ideal outcome’ for the MEP (I.16, 
18).  
 
As these examples illustrate, political sensitivity is a prerequisite for the 
adoption of the Broker role; this factor allows advisors to pro-actively 
prepare the intra-parliamentary negotiations. It enables them to assess 
acceptable compromises and the likelihood that these amendments will 
carry a majority in the House, which are prerequisites for devising the 
group’s negotiation strategy. Finally, only politically sensitive advisors will 
be able to accurately represent the group in negotiations at staff level.   
 
Assessment of the personal factors 
The analytical framework postulates that the personal factors affect the 
advisor’s discretion and their ability to adopt a political role. They are used 
to assess the (optimal) circumstances in which political advice may be 
provided. The impact of the factors on the adoption of the Broker role is 
qualitatively evaluated by attributing the following values: indispensable 
(++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), or a negative impact 
(-).  
 
It is found that trust and political sensitivity are indispensable for pro-active 
brokering (see table 7.3.1). Political sensitivity enables advisors to assess 
 
 
 
acceptable compromises and the likelihood that these amendments will 
carry a majority in the House, which are prerequisites for devising the 
group’s negotiation strategy. Trust forms the basis on which advice is 
followed or the input is ‘accepted’. The advisor’s informal intra-
parliamentary network is indispensable for the effective negotiation at staff 
level. And only advisors who demonstrate political sensitivity will be able to 
accurately represent the group in such negotiations. Although institutional 
memory facilitates the role, similar effects may be produced by the other 
factors.  
 
Table 7.3.1 Personal factor assessment for the adoption of the Broker role 
 
 
Trust Informal 
network 
Institutional 
memory 
Political 
sensitivity 
ROUTINE BROKER  
Participation in technical 
trilogues 
+ 0 + + 
PRO-ACTIVE BROKER 
Political analysis + + + ++ 
Reconciling views 
internally 
++ ++ + ++ 
Negotiating compromises 
at staff level 
++ ++ + ++ 
Replacing MEPs ++ 0 + ++ 
 
7.3.2 Contextual factors 
Three contextual factors are expected to affect delegation and trigger 
potential differences across the groups, committees, policy domains, or 
specific files: political direction, complexity, and politicisation. Below the 
contextual factors are assessed based on the empirical research. It is found 
that the role is enabled by political direction and complexity, although the 
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latter may hamper advisors’ contribution to inter-group negotiations. 
Politicisation increases the need for facilitation while advisors’ internal and 
external coordination function is restricted. 
 
Political direction 
Political direction is defined in relation to the superior of the advisor: the 
position of the politician, or of the group the advisor works for, is expected 
to affect the degree to which they may assume a political role (see 2.3.2). 
Evidence gathered through the interviews confirms that MEPs’ position and 
experience affect brokering activities (I.3-5, 13, 15). Four interviewees 
explained that the working relationship between MEPs and advisors changes 
over the course of a term. Advisors feel that MEPs may take a ‘careful’ 
approach, either as newcomers at the start of their term or with elections 
approaching (I.3, 4, 13, 15). Activities are then put under a ‘magnifying 
glass’ by the national parties. As a result, MEPs want to be as visible as 
possible and are less prone to delegate. This would imply that at the start 
and end of parliamentary terms the (scope of) brokering activities could 
change. What is more, newcomers to the House are unknown to advisors. 
They may not yet know (or be able to anticipate) the MEP’s objectives and 
priorities, which they for example need to represent in the negotiations.  
 
It is found that advisors derive or ‘construct’ political direction from their 
appreciation of the position(s) and values of the political group. The 
prediction of the group line and subsequently the appropriate course of 
action appears easier for advisors working for the smaller or more 
homogeneous groups than for ALDE, EPP, or S&D advisors. Moreover, a 
coherent group line strengthens the advisor’s position in the external 
negotiations as (s)he can more easily guarantee the support of the group 
(I.0.2, 8, 12, 13, 19; SR73). In the internal coordination of positions and in 
the external negotiation of compromises, advisors first and foremost 
 
 
 
represent the MEP in charge. Advisors’ political role is enhanced by a strong, 
established position of the MEP in charge of the file. “An excellent advisor 
is able to add and increase the persuasiveness of his shadow MEP /group” 
(SR53). Not only does the reputation of the MEP reflect on the advisor as 
(s)he acts as the MEP’s proxy, the objectives and priorities of an 
experienced and reputed MEP are easier to anticipate based on his or her 
track record (I.3, 11, 15, 22; SR23, 53). In cases where the MEP in charge 
voices ideas that substantially deviate from the common group line the 
advisor’s role is to mediate, either by finding a compromise between the 
different ideas represented in the group or by convincing the MEP to 
withdraw the dissenting amendment (I.1, 15). In sum, political direction 
facilitates the pro-active behaviour of advisors, hence having a positive 
impact on their coordination activities and ability to provide compromise-
building and negotiation strategy advice.   
 
Complexity 
The analytical framework of the thesis defines complexity in relation to the 
subject matter and is expected to vary across parliamentary committees or 
specific policy or legislative proposals (see 2.3.2). From the literature the 
assumption is drawn that as ‘complexity’ increases MEPs are more likely to 
seek assistance and grant advisors a political role.  
 
Both survey respondents and interviewees stress that advisors should be 
able to analyse technical and complicated files. They contend that political 
advisors have more discretion as the issue under consideration becomes 
more complex (I.1, 4, 13, 15). Several advisors explained how the 
discretion of group advisors increases in ‘highly technical dossiers’. In files 
with a lot of technical details, the ‘value’ of assistance increases (I.1), 
advisors have more room for ‘influence’ (I.4, 13), it becomes ‘more likely 
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that MEPs follow the advisor’s advice’ (I.13), or MEPs pay less attention 
(I.15).  
 
An interviewee compared the Internal Market committee (IMCO) to the 
Employment committee (EMPL), illustrating that the level of complexity 
affects the degree of visibility – hence importance – MEPs ascribe to a file 
(I.16). Two other interviewees stressed that technical files get less 
attention, in terms of group debates (I.15, 17). This means that advisors 
cannot derive their mandate from the discussed group position. In such files 
‘it becomes more difficult to work with the other groups’ (I.15). The 
complexity of files may thus have a restricting effect on group advisors’ 
inter-group coordination function. Nevertheless, in highly complex files it is 
more likely that MEPs follow the suggested (compromise) positions or 
advice on negotiation strategy. 
 
Politicisation 
Politicisation is defined in relation to division in the EP, in general or with 
regard to a specific dossier (see 2.3.2). It is therefore something that can 
change over time and varies across policy areas. Issues that divide the EP 
are likely to cause division within the larger and more heterogeneous groups 
(I.15). A coherent group line forms the advisor’s political mandate in 
external coordination. Thus, politicisation increases the need for intra-group 
coordination and for facilitating internal and external compromises.  
 
Nonetheless, politicised issues or policy domains are likely to attract more 
attention from the outside world. Interviewees reported that increased 
attention from national political parties or the media makes MEPs less prone 
to delegate and results in tougher negotiations across the groups (I.1, 4, 7, 
11). In salient and divisive issues, MEPs take a more active role, thus 
potentially restricting the coordination function of the advisor. In sum, 
 
 
 
politicisation increases the need for political analysis of the various stakes, 
while advisors’ internal and external coordination functions are restricted 
because MEPs tend to be more controlling on salient, divisive issues.   
 
Assessment of the contextual factors 
As proposed in the framework, the context affects delegation. To assess the 
(optimal) circumstances in which brokering may be acceptable to MEPs the 
impact of the factors is evaluated by attributing the following values: 
indispensable (++), positive impact (+), no impact/ not relevant (0), or a 
negative impact (-). The findings are illustrated in table 7.3.2.  
 
The analysis concludes that as a group is more cohesive it becomes easier 
for advisors to construct political direction, or guidance for their actions. 
The same applies to advisors that represent experienced and reputed MEPs. 
Moreover, the track record of an MEP reflects on advisors in negotiations. 
Depending on the MEP this may facilitate or restrict their role. Complexity 
increases the overall need for support and thus the discretion of the advisor. 
However, the decreased involvement of MEPs in complex files also means 
that advisors cannot derive guidance for their actions from political debates 
held on the issue. Finally, politicisation increases the need for political 
analysis of the various stakes, while advisors’ internal and external 
coordination functions are restricted because MEPs tend to be more 
controlling on salient, divisive issues.   
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Table 7.3.2 Contextual factor assessment for the adoption of the Broker 
role 
 
 
Political 
direction 
Complexity Politicisation 
ROUTINE BROKER  
Participation in technical 
trilogues 
+ + - 
PRO-ACTIVE BROKER 
Political analysis + + + 
Reconciling views internally + + - 
Negotiating compromises at 
staff level 
+ - - 
Replacing MEPs + + - 
 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter analysed the Broker role by applying the framework to the 
empirical data. The ideal-type Broker role entails both a facilitating and a 
coordination function. The former relates to advice on negotiation strategies 
and the latter to organising support for positions and pre-negotiating 
compromises. The empirical research shows that advisors from across the 
different groups and various parliamentary committees are responsible for 
both brokering functions, yet the vast majority of questioned advisors 
consider the coordination of positions within and between the groups to be 
their core task. Moreover, the findings expose that advisors from the ALDE, 
EPP, and S&D groups attach relatively more weight to brokering than their 
counterparts in the other groups. The findings reflect that they fulfil a 
stronger intra-group coordination function because they have to find 
agreement between the multiple interests and sensitivities of the national 
delegations. The cohesion and priorities of a group appear to affect the 
 
 
 
focus of advice. It is found that coordination activities take centre stage in 
the larger groups and that their overall orientation is aimed at reaching 
agreement.  
 
Brokering entails technical as well as political elements. Advisors’ day-to-
day activities include the inventory of positions. Yet, they facilitate 
compromises by advising MEPs how to overcome controversies, assessing 
what is acceptable to the group, and what can carry a majority in 
Parliament. In their coordination function advisors work towards a group 
line by synthesising and reconciling the different views within the group, 
then representing this position in external negotiations that often take place 
at staff level. They thus perform an intermediary function but not only by 
transmitting clearly delineated positions. Beyond the conceptual scope, 
advisors fulfil a backstage coordination function in relation to the intra-
parliamentary negotiations. They can shape the position of the group 
through their advice on how to solve internal differences and by actually 
setting out to resolve these divergences themselves. It is furthermore found 
that the advisor’s role in intra-parliamentary negotiations transcends the 
ideal-type role in that they replace the MEP in charge, acting and speaking 
on his or her behalf.  
 
The empirical evidence presented in this and the preceding chapters 
demonstrates that the intra-parliamentary coordination is an informal 
process. For the larger part it takes place outside of the formal 
parliamentary structures. Advisors operate ahead of political discussions 
and in the margins of meetings at MEP level. Interviewees and survey 
respondents acknowledge that their activities are of a political nature but 
the majority of advisors depict their role as benign, stressing that the final 
say always remains with the MEP. However, this does not mean that 
advisors follow explicit instructions in the informal process leading up to a 
decision by the MEP. While advisors broadly claim to act in the interest of 
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the MEP or group, it has become apparent that these interests (the desired 
outcome) are not straightforward or predefined. For that reason the role is 
predominantly labelled as pro-active. The analysis concludes that the 
advisors’ mandate is implicit and derived from the group’s or the MEP’s 
priorities. Advisors’ participation in the inter-institutional negotiations forms 
the exception, given the strict and fragile mandate of the EP negotiating 
team. 
 
Throughout the informal preparations advisors have to consider multiple 
outcome scenarios. Improvisation is a strategy to deal with such situations 
in which the desired outcome is multifaceted or uncertain. This requires the 
advisor to determine the necessary or appropriate course of action in light 
of the group’s ideological views. Nonetheless, advisors’ pro-active 
behaviour hinges on the accurate representation of the MEP’s or group’s 
position. The empirical research reveals that advisors, when replacing MEPs 
in negotiations, do not voice their own opinions. They rather predict and 
interpret what the MEP in charge wants to achieve, and what is in the 
general interest of the group. Although advisors enjoy significant discretion 
when acting as Brokers their activities are thus delineated by the ideological 
values of the group they work for. The role of the advisor is to secure the 
best possible outcome for the group. Moreover, they take action when 
members of the group take positions that oppose or clearly deviate from 
the ideology of the group. This type of intervention by the advisor shows 
that their discretion in intra- and inter-group coordination is high. These 
pro-active functions of the Broker role clearly set group advisors apart from 
other supporting actors in the EP. 
 
The assessment of the seven factors of the framework concludes that trust 
and political sensitivity are prerequisites for pro-active brokering. These 
attributes, combined with a context where advisors work on a file or a 
specific text that is not highly politicised in the EP, prove to be the optimal 
 
 
 
conditions for the adoption of the role. Political sensitivity enables the 
advisor to assess acceptable compromises and the likelihood that these 
amendments will carry a majority in the House, which are prerequisites for 
devising the group’s negotiation strategy. Trusted advisors will have the ear 
of the MEP in charge and his or her personal assistant, which increases the 
likelihood that advice is followed or the input is ‘accepted’. The advisor’s 
informal intra-parliamentary network is indispensable for the effective 
negotiation at staff level. And only advisors who demonstrate political 
sensitivity will be able to accurately represent the group in such 
negotiations. Although institutional memory facilitates the role, similar 
effects may be produced by the other factors. The context affects the 
discretion of advisors. First of all, advisors have greater room for 
manoeuvre in the committee phase because their mandate is more flexible 
than during the negotiations leading up to the plenary vote. The analysis 
furthermore concludes that when a group is more cohesive it becomes 
easier for advisors to construct political direction, or guidance for their 
actions. The same applies to advisors that represent experienced and 
reputed MEPs. Moreover, the track record of an MEP reflects on advisors in 
negotiations. Depending on the MEP this may facilitate or restrict their role. 
Complexity increases the overall need for support and thus the discretion 
of the advisor. However, the decreased involvement of MEPs in complex 
files also means that advisors cannot derive guidance for their actions from 
political debates held on the issue. Finally, politicisation increases the need 
for political analysis of the various stakes, while advisors’ contribution to 
internal and external coordination is restricted because MEPs are more 
reluctant to delegate when it concerns salient and divisive issues.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS: ‘UNPACKING’ THE 
POLITICS OF ADVICE 
The role of political advice in decision-making was the overarching topic of 
this thesis. Specifically, the thesis examined in-house political advice in the 
European Parliament (EP). In this respect, it has explored the question 
whether and under which conditions group advisors in the EP assume a 
political role. In addressing the research question, the thesis contributes to 
conceptual, empirical, and normative scholarly discussions. The key 
contributions are listed below. Sections 8.1-8.5 then further synthesise and 
reflect on these findings and their implications.    
 
First, the developed analytical framework contributes to conceptual debates 
and theory building within the scope of legislative organisation and informal 
governance. The concept of ‘political advice’ has remained relatively 
unchartered territory thus far. The dissertation addresses this gap and 
contributes to the academic debate by conceptualising what a political role 
by advisors might entail. It proposes ‘political advice’ as a distinct category 
in which technical and political dimensions ‘meet’, thereby offering a novel 
approach to study the relationship between the two dimensions and assess 
the political aspects of advice (8.1).  
 
In terms of empirical evidence, the thesis responds to a wider lack of 
knowledge about the preparations that precede actual decision-making 
within the wider EU arena. The findings increase our understanding of intra-
parliamentary practices and the backstage arena in which the groundwork 
for compromises is laid down. It has contributed to the uncovering of intra-
parliamentary preparations of EU trilogue negotiations that remain out of 
the public eye. The research has demonstrated that advice may shape 
group positions and inter-group compromises. Section 8.2 presents the key 
351
8
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS: ‘UNPACKING’ THE 
POLITICS OF ADVICE 
The role of political advice in decision-making was the overarching topic of 
this thesis. Specifically, the thesis examined in-house political advice in the 
European Parliament (EP). In this respect, it has explored the question 
whether and under which conditions group advisors in the EP assume a 
political role. In addressing the research question, the thesis contributes to 
conceptual, empirical, and normative scholarly discussions. The key 
contributions are listed below. Sections 8.1-8.5 then further synthesise and 
reflect on these findings and their implications.    
 
First, the developed analytical framework contributes to conceptual debates 
and theory building within the scope of legislative organisation and informal 
governance. The concept of ‘political advice’ has remained relatively 
unchartered territory thus far. The dissertation addresses this gap and 
contributes to the academic debate by conceptualising what a political role 
by advisors might entail. It proposes ‘political advice’ as a distinct category 
in which technical and political dimensions ‘meet’, thereby offering a novel 
approach to study the relationship between the two dimensions and assess 
the political aspects of advice (8.1).  
 
In terms of empirical evidence, the thesis responds to a wider lack of 
knowledge about the preparations that precede actual decision-making 
within the wider EU arena. The findings increase our understanding of intra-
parliamentary practices and the backstage arena in which the groundwork 
for compromises is laid down. It has contributed to the uncovering of intra-
parliamentary preparations of EU trilogue negotiations that remain out of 
the public eye. The research has demonstrated that advice may shape 
group positions and inter-group compromises. Section 8.2 presents the key 
352
Chapter 8 
 
 
findings on which this conclusion is based. The involvement of group 
advisors in intra- and inter-group coordination sets them apart from other 
internal advisors. This distinct role of political group advisors is further 
discussed in section 8.3.  
 
The empirical research has furthermore shown that advisors enjoy a great 
deal of autonomy and have room to improvise (adopt a pro-active role), 
most notably during the early stages of decision-making. It was revealed 
that advisors manifest pro-active behaviour in each of the four roles of the 
framework. The pro-active mode is, in fact, found to be common for the 
large majority of activities carried out by group advisors in the EP. Section 
8.4 presents the circumstances that were found to affect the likelihood that 
advisors’ pro-active behaviour is acceptable to MEPs. The analysis revealed 
that advisors can only manifest pro-active behaviour when they act in 
pursuit of the interests of their group. The assessment of the personal 
factors concluded that the general prerequisites for the provision of political 
advice are that the advisor demonstrates political sensitivity and is trusted. 
In respect to the contextual factors, it was found that the type of 
parliamentary procedure, the stage of decision-making, and the experience 
of MEPs and their personal assistants matter considerably. This, however, 
requires further investigation. Moreover, the study exposed that the 
importance attached to a role, as well as the likelihood that advisors take 
up a certain role is strongly linked to the group they represent. In this 
regard, section 8.5 concludes that there are three different orientations of 
advice. 
 
Finally, in respect to the normative debate on EU governance, the thesis 
allows for a more nuanced assessment of the legitimacy of (informal) EU 
decision-making than is generally assumed in the rationalist politics-
administration dichotomy (see Hague and Harrop, 2010). Contributing to 
theory building, the framework defines the relationship between the political 
 
 
 
and technical spheres of activity as a complementary rather than an 
antagonistic process. The conceptualisation of a ‘mixed sphere of activity’ 
helps to explain how political coordination takes place at the everyday level. 
In terms of empirical evidence, the large-scale research that was conducted 
did not conclusively determine that political advice poses a threat to 
democratic decision-making per se. While in rational-choice and principal-
agent theory the dichotomy is premised on the notion that the behaviour of 
non-elected advisors is strictly monitored or controlled by elected 
representatives, no evidence for such a restriction of the advisor’s room for 
manoeuvre was encountered. Rather, the findings support the logic of 
appropriateness argument, showing that advisors determine the required 
activities based on what they deem to be line with the political aims of their 
superiors. The in-depth examination of the implications of the role of 
political advice for legitimacy is one of the subjects proposed for a future 
research agenda (8.6). 
  
8.1 Contribution to theoretical debates: capturing the 
technical and political elements of advice 
The concept of ‘political advice’ has hitherto remained relatively 
unchartered territory. The dissertation addresses this gap and contributes 
to the academic debate by conceptualising what the political aspects of 
advice might entail. This section reiterates the added value of the developed 
analytical framework and sums up its three key contributions: (i) the 
framework allows for a process-oriented approach, (ii) the framework is 
instrumental for the analysis of the practical functions and nature of advice, 
and (iii) the framework offers a nuanced approach to the normative debate 
on the role of non-elected actors. Each of these contributions is further 
discussed below.  
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The literature has demonstrated that advice to elected representatives may 
involve political aspects (Fouilleux et al, 2005; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and 
Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014; and Högenauer and Neuhold, 
2015). Yet, studies that attempted to disentangle what are overtly 
‘technical’ or ‘political’ categories have shown that the two spheres are 
difficult to disentangle (Fouilleux et al, 2005; Winzen, 2011). The literature 
review conducted in this thesis concludes that the ambiguity is not related 
to authority as it is generally found that the final say in decision-making 
remains the prerogative of the elected representatives. Instead, the overlap 
is tied to the informal process in which political decisions are prepared. The 
thesis adds a new dimension to this scholarly debate by conceptualising 
what a ‘political role’ by advisors might entail (see 2.1.2).  
 
Traditionally, public administration scholars approach the relationship 
between elected and non-elected actors in terms of a division of labour and 
authority between the political and technical spheres of activity (e.g. Moe, 
2005). The developed framework proposes an alternative approach by 
conceptualising ‘political advice’ as a distinct category in which the two 
spheres ‘meet’, thereby offering a novel approach to study the relationship 
between the two dimensions and assess the political aspects of advice. The 
relationship between the political and technical categories is defined as a 
complementary rather than an antagonistic process. The argument is that 
both categories are necessary for and feed into political advice. In this way, 
the thesis advances the sociological institutionalist logic of appropriateness 
and argues that to appropriately advise and support legislators, non-elected 
actors inevitably enter the political sphere of activity. During the early 
stages of informal decision-making, advisors act without explicit 
instructions from the political level. They anticipate what the legislator 
needs or wants to achieve and apply judgement in their activities to achieve 
the desired outcome. It is found that this improvisation is a strategy to deal 
with unknown or uncertain outcomes (see 8.4).  
 
 
 
The significance of this novel approach is threefold. First of all, it allows for 
a process-oriented approach, which offers a new way of explaining how 
political coordination takes place at the everyday level. The aim of this 
dissertation was to better understand the process of providing advice. 
Rather than focusing on individual differences between advisors, the 
framework that has been developed enables the identification of general 
activity and behaviour patterns in the provision of advice. While the 
traditional politics-administration dichotomy is actor-focused (see Hague 
and Harrop, 2010), the developed framework thus concentrates on activity. 
The former considers the demarcation between the technical and political 
categories predominantly as a difference in responsibility or authority. The 
thesis postulates that this does not fully capture the overlapping spheres of 
activity. Building on the anticipation logic theory, advisors are expected to 
base their actions, or construct their role, on what the circumstances 
demand (see e.g. Page and Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 2006; Peters, 2009).  
 
As part of the framework, the following key elements have been identified 
that define whether an activity is labelled as political: (1) anticipation of 
political priorities and desired outcomes, (2) ideological assessment, and 
(3) the use of implicit knowledge and tactics. The first two elements are for 
example markedly manifested through the briefings that advisors draw up 
for their MEPs. They anticipate the elements MEPs need to form an opinion 
or take a decision. Based on their judgment as to what is acceptable to the 
majority of the group, they include policy options, arguments, or 
implications in such briefings (see 6.2.2). Advisors use implicit knowledge 
and tactics to formulate and execute strategies to realise the desired 
outcome. An example of such a political activity that was encountered 
across the groups is the gathering of intelligence about the various positions 
present in the EP, or those of external stakeholders, so as to predict 
acceptable compromises or coalitions. Nonetheless, advisors can only 
perform those political tasks based on the preparatory or practical activities 
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they also execute. Therefore, each of the four roles that are constructed 
combines technical and political tasks. For example when drawing up a 
briefing note, advisors’ technical tasks entail the compilation and 
organisation of information about procedures and content (see 6.1.2).  
 
The second contribution lies in the framework’s operational value for the 
analysis of the function and nature of advice. The application of the 
framework (chapters 4-7) has demonstrated how it is instrumental for the 
unpacking of political advice. Previous studies have found that advisors’ 
input in legislative decision-making takes various forms (see e.g. 
Hammond, 1984, 1996). The typology that has been developed as part of 
the framework defines clear analytical categories that allow for the 
consideration of the various functions of advice (see 2.2.2). The three 
modes of discretion that have been construed facilitate the evaluation of 
the political scope of advisors’ input (see 2.1.3). Finally, the factors are 
instrumental in predicting the optimal circumstances in which political 
advice may be provided (see 2.3). It is demonstrated in the thesis that the 
combination of these analytical tools provides for capturing and 
understanding the ‘mixed sphere of activity’ in which advisors operate. 
According to what the circumstances require, advisors fulfil the different 
types of advice (roles). The framework helps to identify activity patterns in 
the provision of advice, to assess the extent to which these activities can 
be labelled as ‘political’, and to evaluate the circumstances in which a 
‘political role’ is acceptable to elected representatives. 
 
The third contribution is related to the normative debate on informal EU 
governance. Academic studies on the relationship between elected and non-
elected actors generally discern questions or concerns around 
accountability, preferences, and control (see e.g. Arnold, 1987; Moe, 2005; 
Peters, 2009; Gailmard and Patty, 2012). The developed concepts provide 
an alternative to the prevailing notion that influence of non-elected actors 
 
 
 
pre-supposes a threat to legitimacy. The framework offers a more nuanced 
perspective on this issue, demonstrating that the impact of advice on 
decision-making is not necessarily normatively questionable. By advancing 
the anticipation logic it proposes that the input by advisors in the political 
sphere of activity is derived from the political aims of their superiors. In 
other words, advisors have to anticipate what the MEP needs, or wants to 
achieve in order to be successful (see 8.4).  
 
These theoretical contributions suggest the value of applying the framework 
to other institutional settings, or using it to compare the roles of various 
types of advisors within one institution. These future research avenues are 
further discussed in 8.6. The next section presents the central empirical 
findings in relation to the political scope of the role of advisors.  
 
8.2 The political scope of the role of advisors 
The thesis responds to a wider lack of knowledge about the preparations 
that precede actual decision-making within the wider EU arena. The 
empirical findings presented in this section increase our understanding of 
intra-parliamentary practices and the backstage arena in which the 
groundwork for compromises is laid down. The encountered evidence 
suggests that ‘political advice’ may shape group positions and inter-group 
compromises in the early stages of EP decision-making. However, as a 
legislative file progresses through Parliament, the role of advisors becomes 
increasingly bound by the input from MEPs, and thus less political.  
 
The thesis has argued that non-elected actors anticipate the preferred 
outcome of elected actor(s) and improvise the appropriate line of action 
guided by their expertise and experience (cf. Patterson, 1970; Page and 
Jenkins, 2005; Olsen, 2006). To assess the extent to which advice is 
political, varying degrees of political behaviour were developed. Drawing 
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inspiration from Mayes and Allen (1977), the framework proposed three 
incremental modes that are tied to the discretion of the advisor: routine 
(activities are guided by an explicit mandate), reactive (either the ‘means’ 
or the ‘ends’ require improvisation on the part of the advisor), and pro-
active behaviour (the advisor has the room to determine both the ‘means’ 
and ‘ends’). In this approach, the focus lies on the process whereby the 
(desired) outcomes are achieved (or influenced). Activities become more 
pro-active as the advisor’s room for improvisation in the intra-parliamentary 
coordination process increases (see 2.1.3). 
 
Although the initial proposition of the study was that MEPs have the final 
say on the outcome, the findings have shown that the preparations by 
advisors can influence the direction of group positions, and of the 
compromises forged between the groups. The empirical research has shown 
that advisors enjoy a great deal of autonomy and have room to improvise 
(pro-active role). Such pro-active behaviour, however, appears to 
predominantly occur during the deliberative process through which EP party 
groups develop their positions on specific legislative proposals. Accordingly, 
the potential of advisors to shape political decisions is found to be highest 
during the early stages of decision-making. At that time, advisors act 
without explicit instructions or input from the elected representatives. 
 
It was revealed that advisors manifest pro-active behaviour in each of the 
four roles of the framework. The pro-active mode is, in fact, found to be 
common for the large majority of activities carried out by group advisors in 
the EP, as figure 8.2 below illustrates. The main findings are summed up 
below, assorted according to the potential of advisors’ activities to shape 
political decisions. First, advisors’ key activities prior to political debates are 
presented. Next, their role in the margins of EP meetings is considered. 
Finally, the activities that are performed after political debates are 
discussed.   
 
 
 
 
 
Advisors’ activities prior to political debates 
The empirical research has revealed that the activities of advisors notably 
enter the political sphere during the early stages of intra-parliamentary 
coordination, i.e. prior to the formulation of positions. At this point in the 
coordination process, advisors provide input in the absence of clearly 
delineated political positions. In this respect, the research identified the 
following activities as common to group advisors: 
 
 Pro-active guidance (Process Manager role): advisors can shape 
the group’s priorities by advising on which rapporteurships to attain. The 
acquisition of rapporteurships depends on a point system and is usually 
a bargaining exercise between the groups (see 1.2). Advisors contribute 
to formulating a strategy as to the key goals and margins for negotiation. 
They can furthermore influence the direction of the group line by 
approaching and involving specific MEPs in the development of a group 
Figure 8.2 Advisors’ potential to shape political decisions 
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position. These preparations occur informally ahead of the group 
meetings (see 4.2). 
 
 Pro-active information management: advisors select and interpret 
(sources of) information that they then use for pro-active policy 
expertise and brokering. The empirical findings revealed that the 
information needs of MEPs are generally implicit or at least open to the 
interpretation (see 5.2). Advisors thus have to rely on their judgement 
to provide MEPs with the appropriate information.  
 
 Pro-active policy expertise: advisors argue for (or against) specific 
policy choices and develop policy positions based on (third-party) expert 
knowledge (see 5.2). With regard to the provision of policy expertise, 
the involvement of advisors differs significantly across the groups, which 
is further discussed in section 8.5.  
 
 Pro-active facilitation of compromises (Broker role): advisors 
devise acceptable compromises or coalitions. They advise how to tackle 
(potential) internal and external controversies and predict possible 
coalitions (see 6.2).  
 
Negotiations by advisors in the margins of EP meetings 
Since the EU does not have a government-opposition structure, the EP does 
not function through stable coalitions. Instead, deals are struck on a case-
by-case basis (see 1.3.3). The thesis adds to the literature on coalition 
formation by unravelling the informal coordination process through which 
compromises come about. The research has shown that multiple coalitions 
can play a role within a certain file. In fact, the findings suggest that details 
of a legislative proposal are negotiated ‘line by line’ and that these 
negotiations largely take place at staff level (see 7.1.2).  
 
 
 
In the committee and plenary stages of EP decision-making, the role of 
advisors is structured around the intra- and inter-group coordination 
mechanisms that are in place (see 1.3). There are three EP mechanisms 
that are found to be central to the role of the advisor: (1) ‘prep meetings’ 
in which group coordinators convene the respective members, deputies, 
personal assistants, and group advisor(s) ahead of committee meetings; 
(2) group meetings ahead of EP plenary sessions to deliberate and work 
towards a final group line that is acceptable to (the majority of) the 
members; and (3) ‘shadows’ meetings’ in which the appointed rapporteur 
and shadow rapporteurs prepare the report and negotiate compromise 
amendments.  
 
The empirical research has demonstrated that advisors prepare each of 
these meetings. In the run-up to the meetings they engage in the four types 
of pro-active behaviour mentioned above. They also participate in these 
mechanisms, can even replace MEPs, but mostly operate in the margins. As 
to the latter, advisors are found to coordinate the process of intra-
parliamentary negotiation through their Process Manager and Broker roles. 
These two activities set group advisors apart from the other types of 
supporting staff (see 8.3): 
 
 Pro-active signalling (Process Manager role): advisors signal 
potential incoherence, conflict, or inconsistency between the various 
(national delegation) interests within the group. They then report such 
issues to the group coordinator in order for them to be addressed during 
group meetings. As part of their pro-active Process Manager role, 
advisors provide MEPs with voting indications ahead of a vote (see 4.2).  
 
 Pro-active coordination (Broker role): advisors set out to reconcile 
diverging views within the group, and (pre-)negotiate compromises at 
staff level. In these informal negotiations they speak on behalf of the 
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MEP in charge, and in shadows’ meeting they can even replace MEPs 
(see 7.2). 
 
Advisors’ activities after political debates  
One of the key findings of the study is that advisors manifest pro-active 
behaviour in the preparation of political decisions. These activities occur 
ahead, or in the margins, of meetings convened at MEP level. However, 
advisors’ capacity to influence the direction of positions decreases once 
political debates, either at group or committee level, have taken place. As 
a legislative file progresses through Parliament, the role of advisors thus 
becomes increasingly bound by the input from MEPs as expressed during 
these debates. At this point in the intra-parliamentary coordination process, 
advisors contribute through the reactive Process Manager and Policy Expert 
roles:  
 
 Reactive process management: advisors coordinate the amendments 
submitted by the members or national delegations of their groups. It is 
their responsibility to avoid conflicting amendments. Moreover, advisors 
propose voting indications to the MEP in charge based on the views that 
are present in the group (see 7.2).  
 
 Reactive policy expertise: advisors provide policy advice by weighing 
and presenting policy options based on the views that are present in the 
group. In addition, they can draft legislative or policy texts (reports, 
political resolutions, amendments) based on the views expressed during 
group debates, or specific input received from the MEPs. Exceptionally, 
advisors have the autonomy to develop policy positions without such 
input (pro-active Policy Expert role). However, findings show that such 
a role is most likely to be adopted by Greens/EFA advisors. ALDE, EPP, 
 
 
 
and S&D advisors are least likely to assume a pro-active Policy Expert 
role (see 6.2).  
 
Finally, as part of the Process Manager and Broker roles, advisors perform 
tasks that have no – or a very low – impact on the formation of political 
positions. In the routine mode activities are bound by a clear and/or strict 
mandate: 
 
 Routine process management: advisors provide practical 
organisational assistance by arranging deputies when MEPs cannot 
attend a committee meeting, and by distributing speaking time for the 
plenary sessions. They make sure that MEPs are aware of the relevant 
procedural information, so that EP procedures and deadlines are 
respected (see 4.2). In such activities advisors are led by the EP and 
group RoP. 
 
 Routine brokering: advisors participate in technical trilogues based on 
the mandate that is formulated for the EP negotiating team (see 1.3). 
These meetings convene the staff of the EP, Council, and EC who prepare 
the political trilogues and work out the details of political decisions taken 
in those trilogues (see 7.2).  
 
To conclude, advisors’ potential to shape political decisions is the highest 
during the early stages of EP decision-making. Prior to, and in the margins 
of, political debates advisors can influence the direction of group positions, 
and of compromises forged between the groups. This potential decreases 
as a file progresses through Parliament and the role of advisors becomes 
increasingly bound by the input from MEPs. The empirical research 
furthermore revealed that the involvement of group advisors in intra- and 
inter-group coordination sets them apart from other internal advisors. This 
distinct role of political group advisors is further discussed in section 8.3.  
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of, political debates advisors can influence the direction of group positions, 
and of compromises forged between the groups. This potential decreases 
as a file progresses through Parliament and the role of advisors becomes 
increasingly bound by the input from MEPs. The empirical research 
furthermore revealed that the involvement of group advisors in intra- and 
inter-group coordination sets them apart from other internal advisors. This 
distinct role of political group advisors is further discussed in section 8.3.  
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8.3 The distinct role of political advisors 
The previous section presented the key activities of EP group advisors, as 
have been identified from the empirical research. The analysis revealed that 
the involvement of group advisors in intra- and inter-group coordination 
sets them apart from other internal advisors. The distinct role of group 
advisors and the division of labour between them and other in-house 
sources of advice are considered in this section.  
 
In the EP, party groups are at the heart of majority-building processes as 
the internal organisation and division of labour is structured around them. 
This thesis postulated that – by extension – group advisors are involved in 
the informal preparation of compromises. Their distinct role is tied to the 
notion that they are employed to represent and defend the interests of the 
party group. These interests, however, are a composite of the objectives 
and sensitivities present in the various national delegations that make up 
the group. What distinguishes group advisors is therefore closely related to 
the informal coordination process that occurs within and between the EP 
party groups. The empirical research revealed two distinct contributions in 
this respect. 
 
The first task that appears to be the exclusive domain of group advisors is 
the signalling function they fulfil in relation to intra-group coordination (as 
part of the Process Manager role, see chapter 4). Advisors are responsible 
for identifying potential problems that need to be addressed for the 
formation of a coherent group position. Most prominently, this signalling 
function is tied to the preparation of group meetings. This could, for 
example, involve one or several national delegations with specific concerns 
regarding a given file. Advisors then ensure that the group coordinator and 
rapporteur are aware of potentially divisive issues, and that they are tabled 
for discussion at MEP level. Advisors furthermore closely monitor whether 
 
 
 
the (shadow) rapporteur represents the majority group line. During the 
preparation of the voting list, advisors identify inconsistent or conflicting 
amendments in the position of the group, or in relation to previously 
adopted positions. They also work with their colleagues in other 
parliamentary committees in order to avoid opposing positions. This is 
particularly delicate when it concerns competing policy interests in two or 
several committees. For example, the files for which the AGRI committee is 
responsible often have a regional component, and are linked to 
environment, health or food safety issues. Such files are therefore usually 
also considered by the REGI and ENVI committees. Advisors make the 
group’s coordinator in committee aware of any potential problems in order 
to ensure that a group debate takes place.  
 
The second distinctive activity is the Broker role of group advisors. In 
addition to signalling potential conflicts or incoherence, advisors attempt to 
actually mediate within the group. Nearly all the advisors in the study claim 
to be involved in intra-group coordination. Only one EFD survey respondent 
and three interviewees (EFD and Greens/ EFA) did not bring up this activity. 
Advisors coordinate positions internally either by talking directly to the 
MEPs concerned or by addressing their respective assistants. It is the 
advisor’s role to take as much controversy out of the way as possible. Only 
when a solution cannot be found through this type of mediation is an issue 
tabled for a group discussion (i.e. at MEP level). Advisors thus enjoy a great 
deal of discretion in signalling and solving internal differences, which is 
chiefly explained by a need for efficiency. Particularly in the larger groups, 
there are many different views and considering all for each file that passes 
through Parliament would simply take up too much time. Correspondingly, 
the findings demonstrated that advisors from the ALDE, EPP, and S&D 
groups attach relatively more weight to intra-group coordination than their 
counterparts in the other groups.  
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In their Broker role, advisors also pre-negotiate compromises with their 
counterparts in the other groups. All but two interviewees brought up the 
common practice of ‘pre-negotiating’ at staff level, following which they 
brief their MEPs prior to the actual negotiations. The survey found that 90 
per cent of the respondents negotiate compromises on behalf of the group. 
The data presented in 7.1.2 demonstrated that these compromises are 
prepared among staff. The EP RoP do not stipulate who can represent the 
group in shadows’ meetings and the empirical data suggest advisors may 
do so. The qualitative data furthermore revealed that ahead of the shadows’ 
meeting group advisors meet, or contact one another informally, to probe 
the acceptability or level of support for certain amendments, and form 
alliances on certain issues. The survey confirmed that advisors meet their 
counterparts very regularly: a majority of respondents reported to interact 
on a daily or weekly basis (respectively 49% and 44%, see figure 5.1a). 
 
Considering the role of advisors in intra- and inter-group coordination, the 
study has confirmed the expectation that group advisors are – to greater 
extent than other staff – involved in the preparation of compromises in the 
EP. Although their role becomes more constrained once political discussions 
have taken place in the group, and a group line has been formed, advisors 
coordinate the negotiations backstage. As such they have an influence on 
the direction of political decisions, which was elaborated in the previous 
section. 
 
The focus of the study was on the internal coordination mechanisms of the 
EP, and thus on in-house political advice. Three major internal sources of 
advice are at the disposal of MEPs for their legislative activities: i.e. their 
personal assistants, EP officials, and group advisors. The empirical findings 
corroborate the hypothesis that all three sources of assistance operate in 
the mixed sphere of activity. Despite some encountered exceptions of 
competition or wariness among staff, generally a pragmatic sense of making 
 
 
 
things work appears to prevail. Previous studies revealed diverging findings 
in respect of the (preferred) principal assistance offered to rapporteurs (e.g. 
Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011; Egeberg et al, 2013; Pegan, 2015; see 
3.1.2). In line with these findings, the empirical analysis showed that the 
source of assistance varies and the MEP in charge selects the support he or 
she desires. Apart from the two distinct contributions of group advisors set 
out above, EP officials and MEP assistants can thus perform the other roles. 
The findings demonstrated that both EP officials and group advisors can 
take care of the groundwork for decision-making, i.e. making sure the 
overall coordination process runs as smooth as possible (Process Manager 
role). Conversely, MEPs’ assistants tend to concentrate on specific or 
sensitive details that are important to his or her MEP. At the discretion of 
the rapporteur, EP officials in the Secretariat, group advisors, and MEP 
assistants can be involved in the drafting process (Policy Expert). All three 
types of supporting staff also engage in information management. MEP 
assistants and group advisors are found to predominantly liaise with third 
stakeholders, while EP officials form the main link to the other EU 
institutions. As a general rule, the preparation of plenary votes is considered 
‘group business’ for which advisors prepare briefings and voting indications. 
In the committee stage, personal assistants may take over these tasks, 
depending on their expertise.  
 
In sum, the research has confirmed that group advisors are – to greater 
extent than other staff – involved in the preparation of intra- and inter-
group compromises. The findings demonstrate that, apart from the distinct 
contributions of group advisors through the Process Manager and Broker 
roles, the division of labour occurs at the discretion of the (shadow) 
rapporteur. The next section considers the circumstances that affect the 
likelihood that political advice is acceptable to MEPs. 
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8.4 The pro-active behaviour of advisors  
The previous sections presented the central empirical findings regarding the 
role of EP group advisors. This section reflects on the discretion of advisors 
to contribute to decision-making. It considers what guides advisors’ 
activities and how different circumstances affect the likelihood that pro-
active behaviour is acceptable to MEPs. The empirical data have revealed 
that advisors act without a clear mandate for the large majority of their 
activities and therefore have to improvise. This argument is elaborated in 
the first sub-section. In light of this finding, the second sub-section 
considers the possible implications of advisors’ pro-active behaviour for the 
democratic legitimacy of EP decision-making. The section concludes with a 
discussion of the factors that enable or restrict the pro-active behaviour of 
group advisors.  
 
Improvisation as a strategy to deal with unknown or uncertain outcomes 
The framework that is presented in chapter 2 posits that activities are either 
guided by a clear mandate (instructions) or by the advisor’s interpretation 
and judgement (improvisation) when no explicit instructions are provided. 
The political dimension of the role becomes more prominent as the advisors 
have more room to improvise. The chances for improvisation mainly lie in 
the early stages of decision-making, prior to any political debates on the 
issue (see figure 8.2). At this time, no clear demands or priorities that can 
serve as guidance have been formulated at the political level.  
 
The research demonstrated that advisors work closely together with 
(shadow) rapporteurs, the group’s coordinator of the parliamentary 
committee in question, and MEP assistants (see figure 5.1a). It was found 
that political instructions are most likely to emanate from this interaction. 
However, a large majority of advisors acknowledged that in carrying out 
their daily tasks they are not explicitly told what to do. To fulfil their duties 
 
 
 
advisors need to improvise, i.e. apply their judgement to anticipate the ideal 
outcome for the group and the means to achieve such an outcome. In fact, 
improvisation is the advisor’s strategy to deal with uncertain or unknown 
outcomes. The key activities that advisors fulfil in this regard have been 
summed up in section 8.2. High levels of improvisation (pro-active mode) 
are encountered for each of the roles prior to the stage at which political 
debates are held. Following such debates, advisors can base their input on 
the political priorities and views expressed during the deliberations (reactive 
mode). In some of the process management and brokering activities, low 
levels of improvisation were encountered (routine mode) given that 
advisors are bound by a rather strict mandate (see 8.2).  
 
Implications for the democratic legitimacy of EP decision-making 
In light of the findings presented above, and in connection to the normative 
debate on EU governance, it is important to consider the possible 
implications of group advisors’ pro-active behaviour for the legitimacy of 
decision-making in the EP. The research has revealed that the large 
majority of their actions are not based on explicit instructions from the 
elected representatives. Although some exceptions were encountered of 
advisors (accused of) chasing personal gain, the characterisation of the 
advisor as a Rasputin with undesirable influence on political outcomes does 
not ring true in light of the empirical findings. It was found that advisors 
can only effectively operate in the political sphere when they base their 
actions on what is in the interest of the party group. The basic finding that 
led to this conclusion is that group advisors are guided by, and thus pursue, 
the political agenda of the party group. They devise their actions and 
behaviour within the scope of these objectives. The qualitative data reflect 
that advisors are (perceived to be) successful when the group is successful. 
Therefore, they construct their role according to what they believe will 
advance the position of the group. It is only under these circumstances that 
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their pro-active behaviour is accepted by the MEP. Conversely, findings 
show that actions that are unfavourable to the (collective) interest of the 
group are not accepted. 
 
The findings hence offer a nuanced assessment of the input by staff in the 
EP decision-making process, demonstrating that the impact of advice on 
decision-making is not necessarily normatively questionable. The rationalist 
politics-administration dichotomy is premised on the notion that the actions 
and behaviour of non-elected advisors is strictly monitored or controlled by 
elected representatives (e.g. Arnold, 1987; Moe, 2005). The extensive 
empirical research conducted does not find any evidence for such a 
restriction of the advisor’s room for manoeuvre. Rather, the findings 
support the logic of appropriateness theory, showing that advisors 
determine the required activities based on what they deem to be line with 
the political aims of their superiors. 
 
The context determines whether pro-active behaviour is acceptable to MEPs 
The objective of the thesis was to explore and explain the circumstances 
that enable or restrict a political role by group advisors in the EP. In addition 
to the conclusions set out above, the analysis identified that the following 
factors stimulate the capacity of advisors to effectively improvise and the 
likelihood that such pro-active behaviour is acceptable to MEPs:  
 
 Political sensitivity is found to be an indispensable asset for the 
provision of effective political advice. The added value lies in the 
advisor’s ‘awareness’ or ‘feel for the game’. This sensitivity allows them 
to forecast and empathise with the various positions and needs for 
assistance that MEPs might have. The stimulating effect was 
encountered for each of the four roles and closely relates to the finding 
 
 
 
that advisors can only manifest pro-active behaviour in pursuit of the 
interests of their group. 
 
 Complexity increases the overall need for support, yet can pose 
a challenge to political direction. Generally, MEPs have a greater 
need for advice in their dealings with complex files. In this respect, the 
research revealed a positive effect on the adoption of the Information 
Manager and Policy Expert roles. Complexity obscures the explicit needs 
and objectives, which means that the advisor has to improvise. However, 
at the same time, MEPs’ involvement is likely to decrease in complex 
files, which impairs advisors’ ability to obtain political direction for their 
actions. For that reason, complexity is found to have a restricting effect 
on pro-active process management (signalling potential problems and 
guiding the intra-group deliberations), and on the ability of advisors to 
negotiate compromises with their counterparts. This follows from the 
finding that it is difficult for the advisor to act or speak on behalf of an 
‘absent’ MEP.  
 
 Trust increases the likelihood that advisors’ pro-active behaviour 
is accepted by MEPs and that advice is followed. Trusted advisors 
have the ‘ear’ of the MEP in charge and his or her personal assistant. 
This interaction determines whether the provided input or 
recommendations are followed. 
 
From the research it can be concluded that in order to explain advisors’ 
potential to shape political decisions a combination of factors needs to be 
considered. The general prerequisites are that the advisor demonstrates 
political sensitivity and is trusted. However, the context in the end 
determines whether pro-active behaviour is acceptable to MEPs. The 
empirical analysis demonstrated that in order to predict the pro-active 
behaviour of advisors the parliamentary procedure is an important 
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indicator. In fact, the qualitative data suggest that the nature of the file 
(legislative or non-legislative) affects the three contextual levels identified 
from the literature: i.e. substance matter (complexity), mandate (political 
direction), and political landscape (politicisation). Complexity is found to be 
perceived higher in legislative files. Political direction is considered to be 
clearer for political resolutions and politicisation then is generally stronger. 
Overall, MEPs attach greater importance to legislative procedures compared 
to political resolutions. The data suggest that the need for and value of 
assistance is also bigger in legislative files. This in particular affects the 
Broker and Information Manager roles. Legislative files usually require 
intricate compromise building. Intelligence of the manifold positions forms 
an important basis for formulating policy positions and brokering deals with 
the other groups. The need for these activities decreases in political 
resolutions since the political delineations are usually clear-cut. The 
provision of policy expertise, on the other hand, is more likely to be 
delegated to advisors with respect to the formulation of political resolutions, 
while EP officials are often involved in the drafting of legislative texts. In 
summary, legislative procedures appear to strengthen the Information 
Manager and Broker roles whereas the Policy Expert role is stronger in 
political resolutions.  
 
Two additional factors were found to increase the likelihood of delegation to 
group advisors over other supporting actors, namely the stage of decision-
making and the experience of the MEP and his or her assistant. Signalling 
potential problems for group cohesion and pre-negotiating compromises 
with counterparts have been identified as the core business of group 
advisors, while EP officials and MEP assistants might adopt the other 
functions (see 8.3). The empirical research found that the division of labour 
occurs at the discretion of the (shadow) rapporteur. Notwithstanding, the 
data suggest that in this choice the stage of decision-making matters. The 
findings have revealed that the preparation of plenary votes is primarily 
 
 
 
considered ‘group business’. During this stage of the decision-making 
process, their role is less likely to be taken over by MEP assistants than 
during the committee stage. Group advisors take the lead in the 
preparations of the plenary session. They provide MEPs with briefing notes 
and voting indications as to how to vote on amendments and which votes 
are important. These ‘voting lists’ are drafted and circulated by the group 
advisor. Finally, the experience of the MEP and his or her assistant also 
matters for the division of labour among staff actors. In this regard, the 
research shows that the need for political advice is higher among 
newcomers at the start of the parliamentary term. Similarly, experienced 
assistants can take care of much of the work that could also be delegated 
to group advisors.  
 
To conclude, this section reflected on the discretion of advisors to contribute 
to decision-making. For the large majority of their activities, advisors have 
to improvise, as they cannot rely on explicit instructions or guidance. In 
doing so, they base their advice on what they deem to be line with the 
political aims of their superiors. The assessment of the personal factors 
concluded that the general prerequisites for the provision of political advice 
are that the advisor demonstrates political sensitivity and is trusted. In 
respect to the contextual factors, it was found that the type of 
parliamentary procedure, the stage of decision-making, and the experience 
of MEPs and their personal assistants matter considerably. This, however, 
requires further investigation (see 8.6). Moreover, the study exposed that 
the importance attached to a role, as well as the likelihood that advisors 
take up a certain role is strongly linked to the group they represent. In this 
regard, the next section presents three different orientations of advice that 
have been identified from the empirical findings. 
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8.5 Three orientations of advice: compromise-oriented, 
policy-oriented, and procedure-oriented  
The previous sections presented the key empirical findings regarding the 
role of EP group advisors, reflected on their discretion to contribute to 
decision-making, and on the factors that affect the likelihood that pro-active 
behaviour is acceptable to MEPs. The analysis has demonstrated that the 
importance attached to a role, as well as the likelihood that advisors take 
up a given role is strongly linked to the group they represent. The EP party 
groups’ participation in the legislative process appears to differ, which 
affects the role of advisors. The data furthermore suggest that the cohesion 
and ideological objectives of a group determine the focus of advice. Based 
on the findings, three different orientations of advice have been identified 
that are closely linked to the framework’s typology: (i) the compromise-
oriented approach (ALDE, ECR, EPP, S&D), (ii) the policy-oriented approach 
(ECR, Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL), and (iii) the procedure-oriented approach 
(ECR, EFD, GUE/NGL). The ECR and GUE/NGL groups show mixed 
orientations as evidence for each of these (ECR) and two of these 
(GUE/NGL) approaches was encountered in the qualitative data. The most 
apparent differences are related to the compromise-oriented and policy-
oriented approaches, and respectively affect the intra-group Broker and 
Policy Expert roles. EFD advisors do not adopt the former, and GUE/NGL 
advisors only marginally act as intra-group Brokers. ALDE, EPP, S&D 
advisors, on the other hand, designate intra-group brokering as their core 
responsibility. For the Greens/EFA advisor this constitutes the Policy Expert 
role.  
 
Before further presenting the three different approaches, the overall 
findings in respect to what advisors perceive as their most important 
responsibility are considered. In response to an open-ended survey 
question, 43 per cent of respondents identified brokering activities as their 
 
 
 
key role. The vast majority (40%) consider the coordination function to be 
their core task (see 7.1.2). Another 23 per cent pointed to tasks that may 
be labelled as process management (see 4.1.2). Process management is 
most prominently tied to the overall coordination of the intra-parliamentary 
legislative process. In relation to the other types of advice, policy expertise 
is only identified by 14 per cent of the respondents as their most important 
task. Although the qualitative data demonstrate that policy expertise is 
considered a valuable attribute of the advisor (all but three interviewees 
discuss the importance of policy expertise), only the Greens/EFA advisors 
recognise it as their chief role (see 6.1.2). Finally, it was found that 
information management serves an auxiliary function and forms the basis 
for the adoption of the other roles (see 5.1.2). In the survey, only 13 per 
cent of advisors reported it as their core responsibility. Nonetheless, the 
qualitative evidence showed that they use and rely on information for most 
of their tasks.  
 
The compromise-oriented approach 
A compromise-oriented approach applies to groups that fit the following 
criteria: heterogeneous policy interests and pursuit of a mainstream 
agenda. The ALDE, EPP, and S&D are evidently compromise-oriented. To a 
lesser degree, this approach is also pursued by the ECR group. The 
empirical analysis found that the perceived core responsibility differs per 
group. The empirical findings show that advisors of the large, mainstream 
groups (ALDE, EPP and S&D) perceive the Broker role as their most 
important responsibility. The qualitative data confirm that coordination 
activities take centre stage in these groups and that the overall orientation 
of the group is aimed at reaching agreement. The findings also reflect that 
these groups, in comparison to the other groups, pay more attention to 
intra-group coordination because they comprise a multitude of national 
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delegations, each having specific interests or sensitivities.155 Accordingly, 
coordination mechanisms are more structured and ALDE, EPP and S&D 
advisors underline their contribution to coordinating a group line between 
the national delegations. The ECR, Greens-EFA, and GUE-NGL advisors also 
assume such a mediating function but the activities are less substantial. 
Based on the accounts of EFD survey respondents and interviewees, it was 
concluded that no intra-group coordination on substance occurs and that 
advisors’ intra-group activities are thus of a technical nature. 
 
The policy-oriented approach 
The two features that characterise the policy-oriented approach are: aligned 
policy interests, and pursuit of an activist agenda. The survey and interview 
findings imply that in particular the Greens/EFA, and to a lesser extent the 
ECR and GUE/NGL groups qualify for this orientation. It is found that the 
extent to which a group’s ideological or policy interests are aligned affects 
the (focus of the) role and the mandate of the advisor. In a relatively 
homogeneous group like the Greens the focus lies on shaping policy and 
legislation (policy-oriented approach). Furthermore, the (implied) mandate 
is rather straightforward for advisors of the groups that have aligned policy 
interests (ECR and Greens/EFA). The same applies to advisors who 
primarily deal with one MEP (EFD and GUE/NGL groups). The ideological 
scope is clearly defined in these cases, which increases their ability to 
improvise. Conversely, in groups that have to take into account multiple, 
possibly competing, policy views the advisor’s mandate is more elusive 
(ALDE, EPP and S&D). 
  
                                   
155 In comparison, the EPP during the 7th parliamentary term comprised 45 national 
delegations compared to 21 in the Greens/EFA and only 10 in the ECR group. See table 
1.3 for a complete overview. 
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Accordingly, Greens/EFA advisors ascribe relatively more weight to the 
Policy Expert role. They report that they are more closely involved in 
content-related matters and known for their policy expertise. Their 
counterparts not only consider them as ‘experts’ but also as ‘activist’ in their 
approach, pushing the Green agenda forward and ‘playing hard ball’. In line 
with these findings, Greens/EFA advisors play a stronger (more pro-active) 
role in the coordination of amendment submission (guiding function process 
management).  
 
The procedure-oriented approach 
The three main characteristics that sum up this orientation are: large 
degree of autonomy of national delegations, no or a reduced demand for 
intra-group coordination, and a Eurosceptic stance. The survey and 
interview findings imply that the ECR, EFD, and GUE/NGL groups fit these 
criteria. The empirical analysis suggests that ECR and EFD, compared to the 
other groups, attach greater value to process management. This outcome 
may be interpreted in light of the nature of these groups. Internal 
ideological differences are small in the ECR and national delegations have a 
large degree of autonomy. This reduces the need for intra-group 
coordination. Like the ECR, the EFD group is dominated by several large 
national delegations. Moreover, it does not formally coordinate its positions 
and its Eurosceptic stance appears to make the group’s members less 
inclined to contribute to legislation.  
 
In sum, the motives and ideological objectives related to forming a group 
appear to affect the (focus of the) role of advisors. Mainstream party groups 
take a compromise-oriented approach, groups that pursue a more extreme, 
or activist agenda concentrate on influencing policy positions, and anti-
establishment or Eurosceptic groups are basically not interested in either 
approach. As Brack’s elaborate study (2015) of the behaviour of Eurosceptic 
 
 
 
MEPs shows, and as stressed by several interviewees, anti-establishment 
or Eurosceptic party groups are characterised by their limited (or lack of) 
involvement in the traditional aspects of parliamentary activities. Their 
focus is rather on the denunciation of EU integration. From the qualitative 
data, this lack of interest in the legislative process appears to particularly 
relate to the EFD group. Not surprisingly, therefore, the brokering and policy 
functions seem less relevant to these advisors. The cooperation with EFD 
advisors remains rather absent in the interview accounts, although some 
advisors marked the relationship as problematic. Another related issue that 
was raised in the interviews is the EFD practice of hiring advisors on 
Assistant-level contracts. This might be connected to the lower importance 
attached to participating in the intra-parliamentary process.  
 
8.6 Future research agenda 
The thesis contributes to uncovering the informal practices in the EP and 
has shed light on the key functions of political advice. These findings have 
brought to light several issues that raise further questions and deserve 
attention in future studies. In this respect, five research avenues are 
proposed: (i) exploration of the perception of other actors on the political 
role of advisors, (ii) exploration of the combined effect of contextual factors 
through case studies, (iii) exploration of the scope of the ‘political role’ of 
EP officials and MEP assistants, (iv) exploration of the role of political 
advisors in other institutional settings, and (v) exploration of external 
influences on in-house political advice. Each is considered below.  
 
Exploration of the perception of other actors on the political role of advisors  
The study focused on the intra-EP coordination process and unravelled the 
role of group advisors in this context. These actors, up until now, have only 
received marginal scholarly attention. As part of the thesis, therefore, the 
profile and background of group advisors has been extensively portrayed. 
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This was deemed necessary for the operationalisation of the theoretical 
concepts (see 3.2). An important next step would be to further verify the 
findings by exploring the perception of other actors, both inside and outside 
the EP, on the political role of advisors. At the start of the project six 
exploratory interviews were held with (former) MEP assistants and EP 
officials (see Appendix V). Due to time limitations, only two ‘triangulation 
interviews’ could be conducted. The outcomes of the empirical analysis, and 
most notably the conclusion that advisors lay the groundwork for 
compromises, call for further investigation. Studies in this respect could 
more extensively explore how MEPs, their assistants, and EP officials 
perceive the role of group advisors. Such examinations could also include 
the views of representatives of the other EU institutions that may cooperate 
with group advisors in the technical trilogues.  
 
Another interesting follow-up question to the findings presented in the 
thesis could be which of the four roles, if any, poses the greatest threat to 
legitimacy. The large-scale empirical research that was conducted did not 
conclusively determine that political advice poses a threat to democratic 
decision-making. The data suggest that advisors can only successfully 
operate in political processes when they act in pursuit of the interests of 
their group. In this regard, it would be interesting to learn how MEPs, and 
their assistants, characterise the mandate of group advisors and their room 
for manoeuvre.   
 
Exploration of the combined effect of contextual factors through case 
studies 
The thesis has found that a combination of factors needs to be considered 
in order to explain advisors’ potential to shape political decisions. It has 
concluded that the context in which advice is provided determines whether 
pro-active behaviour is acceptable to elected representatives. The empirical 
 
 
 
data have suggested that the nature of the file (legislative or non-
legislative) affects the three contextual levels identified from the literature: 
i.e. substance matter (complexity), mandate (political direction), and 
political landscape (politicisation). Furthermore, the research demonstrated 
that the stage of decision-making and the (in)experience of the MEP and 
his or her assistant are also factors that can affect the division of labour 
among staff actors. 
 
Future qualitative and quantitative studies could build on these findings and 
further uncover the nuances of political advice in intra-parliamentary 
decision-making. This may be done through in-depth case studies that set 
out to explain the combined effect of several contextual factors on the 
provision of political advice. The framework could be used for case studies 
that for example probe the impact of the contextual factors in one or several 
specific legislative files, and then compare these to one or several non-
legislative files. A similar exercise is conceivable for the comparison of the 
different stages of decision-making: assessing the contextual factors in the 
committee versus the plenary stage. Another avenue could be to evaluate 
the impact of the experience of MEPs, or their assistants, on the provision 
of advice. This could be done by way of comparing the role of advice in a 
file with an experienced MEP to a file for which a ‘newcomer’ to the 
Parliament is appointed.  
 
Exploration of the scope of the ‘political role’ of EP officials and MEP 
assistants 
Three major internal sources of advice are at the disposal of MEPs for their 
legislative activities: their personal assistants, EP officials, and group 
advisors. The thesis has corroborated the hypothesis that all three sources 
of assistance operate in the ‘mixed sphere of activity’ and may thus adopt 
a political role. Two distinct contributions of group advisors were identified 
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in this thesis: (i) the signalling function they fulfil in relation to intra-group 
coordination, as part of the Process Manager role; and (ii) their involvement 
in the coordination of intra- and inter-group compromises, as part of the 
Broker role. However, indications have been found in the data that EP 
officials and MEP assistants can also adopt the Information Manager and 
Policy Expert roles, as well as certain aspects of the Process Manager role.  
 
In line with previous findings (e.g. Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011; 
Egeberg et al, 2013; Pegan, 2015; see 3.1.2), the empirical data suggest 
that the source of assistance varies and the MEP in charge selects the 
support he or she desires. The thesis focused on the role of group advisors 
but it would be interesting to further explore the division of labour among 
staff actors. A comparative study between the three types of supporting 
staff could for example assess their involvement in the various roles of the 
framework by way of a survey. Alternatively, or in addition to such an 
exercise, interviews and case studies may be used to further uncover the 
scope of the political role of EP officials and MEP assistants. It would be 
valuable to learn the extent to which, and the circumstances under which, 
these staff actors indeed assume the Process Manager, Information 
Manager and Policy Expertise roles, and how their activities differ to those 
performed by group advisors.  
 
In future studies of this kind, it is important to take into account the 
previous point regarding the contextual factors. In particular, the stage of 
decision-making (committee or plenary) and the (in)experience of MEPs and 
their assistants were identified as factors that may affect the division of 
labour among staff actors.   
 
  
 
 
 
Exploration of the role of political advisors in other institutional settings  
The thesis construed political advice as advice offered to politicians by non-
elected actors. The literature review showed that previous studies regarding 
the role of staff emphasised on officials who are deemed to fulfil a neutral 
or administrative role. The ‘political advisor’ forms a distinct type of actor 
who can neither be classified as a civil servant nor as a political actor. These 
advisors form part of a larger phenomenon: non-elected actors who are 
employed to assist in articulating and securing political positions. In this 
role, they negotiate with other actors (political and non-political) regarding 
these positions. The ‘political role’ of advisors differentiates them from the 
‘neutral’ officials or civil servants that are expected to serve the general 
interest of the institution. In addition, these advisors as a rule do not work 
for one specific politician, which sets them apart from personal advisors 
who may also perform political roles. Although the analysis centres on 
advisors working within the EP party group secretariats, the developed 
framework is designed in such a way that it allows for the application to 
other legislator-advisor relationships.  
 
Until now, this particular group of actors has remained rather eclipsed in 
the academic debate. Future studies could use the analytical framework to 
verify whether the findings of the thesis hold true for political advisors in 
different institutional settings. This may be done, for example, by way of a 
comparative study of political advice in various EU Member State 
parliaments. As the literature review in the introduction pointed out, hardly 
any empirical evidence exists regarding the role of political advisors in 
national parliaments. Another avenue for future research would be to 
compare the role of political advisors in different institutional settings: e.g. 
in one or several national parliaments and in the European Parliament.  
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Exploration of external influences on in-house political advice 
A final avenue for future research that is proposed is the study of external 
influences on the provision of in-house advice. The empirical analysis 
showed that advisors have regular contact with external stakeholders to 
appreciate the various views and interests of the field. In their Information 
Manager capacity, they pre-select the issues or information brought to the 
attention of MEPs. Only a small minority of respondents (4%) reported that 
they never gather information in this way. Respondents stated that they 
regularly interact with interest groups (74%) and industry representatives 
(72%). These findings raise the expectation that external stakeholders may 
try to use advisors for their benefit. This could be an angle to consider in 
future studies addressing the impact of lobby and interest representation 
on EU decision-making. The data suggest that the interaction with third 
parties differs across the groups and across policy areas. Insight into if and 
how external actors attempt to influence decision-making through in-house 
advisors would be valuable to further appreciate informal governance. 
Other conceivable external influences may come from external events or 
crises that could affect the role of advice in decision-making. For example, 
future studies about the EP could assess the impact of the (impending) 
Brexit on the roles and division of labour between in-house advisors: has 
the division of labour among staff shifted compared to the period before the 
UK referendum to leave the EU? Studies could also explore the extent to 
which external events – like animal disease outbreaks in the EU or the 
immigration crisis – have increased or decreased the reliance on in-house 
advice. It would be interesting to learn whether, at the break of a crisis, 
politicians turn to their ‘trusted’ advisors or look for ‘expert’ advice outside 
of the Parliament.   
 
 
 
 
8.7 Final remarks 
The thesis has built on the literature regarding the relationship between 
elected and non-elected actors, the role of staff in decision-making, and the 
functioning of EU decision-making more generally. The framework adds to 
the academic debate by shedding light on the, until now, unseen ‘political 
role’ of advisors. This novel approach allows for a process-oriented 
approach, which offers a new way of explaining how political coordination 
takes place at the everyday level. The empirical analysis demonstrated that 
advisors lay the groundwork for compromises. A deeper understanding of 
how the decision-making process is prepared is crucial to fully appreciate 
political negotiation and compromise building. Moreover, the findings offer 
a more nuanced perspective on the normative debate regarding the role of 
non-elected actors. The extensive empirical research that was conducted 
concluded that the implications of political advice for decision-making are 
not necessarily normatively questionable. The thesis has argued that 
advisors can only successfully manifest pro-active behaviour when they act 
in pursuit of the interests of their group. Therefore, they devise their actions 
within the scope of the group’s political objectives. These findings also point 
the way to a wider research agenda, as put forward in the previous section. 
 
The societal relevance of the thesis is tied to the insights that are offered 
about the intra-parliamentary preparations of EU decisions. Generally, 
these practices remain undocumented and take place outside of public and 
political scrutiny. The empirical findings contribute to uncovering how 
political decisions are prepared in everyday practice, which provides a 
valuable contribution to the wider public debate on politics and democracy. 
In addition, this practical knowledge is crucial for teachers and students and 
should be included in future education and training programmes on public 
administration. Studies have shown that the lack of transparency and public 
involvement in EU decision-making is problematic for the democracy and 
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deteriorates public trust (see e.g. Reh, 2012, 2014). Informal processes 
that take place behind the scenes are untraceable. Intransparency affects 
public scrutiny and dilutes political contestation and public-opinion 
formation as policy choices remain unclear. To strengthen the democratic 
nature of EU decision-making we need to increase the general 
understanding of how things work.  
 
The conducted research has demonstrated that advisors lay the groundwork 
for compromises in the EP and do not operate on the basis of clearly defined 
instructions. This important role can on the one hand be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the influential back-stage role of non-elected actors. And 
fulfilling such a role may further feed the public distrust of political systems 
and expertise. However, on the other hand, the research has shown that 
extensive coordination and deliberation systems are in place. These 
processes are crucial to the functioning of a democratic system and the 
findings show that coordination and deliberation are significantly facilitated 
by non-elected actors. Moreover, the findings suggest that their activities 
are guided by the political ideology and aims of the group they represent. 
In that way, they are like the ‘oil’ in the legislative machinery, coordinating 
different views and working towards broad agreement both within and 
between the groups. Without their contribution, the intra-parliamentary 
coordination process would probably be less comprehensive given time and 
resources constraints of elected representatives.  
 
These considerations do not only apply to the case of the EP, or of the EU 
for that matter. The added value for society, outlined above, thus illustrates 
why it is important that future studies consider these findings and use the 
developed framework for the examination of the political role of advice in 
other legislative settings.  
  
  
 
deteriorates public trust (see e.g. Reh, 2012, 2014). Informal processes 
that take place behind the scenes are untraceable. Intransparency affects 
public scrutiny and dilutes political contestation and public-opinion 
formation as policy choices remain unclear. To strengthen the democratic 
nature of EU decision-making we need to increase the general 
understanding of how things work.  
 
The conducted research has demonstrated that advisors lay the groundwork 
for compromises in the EP and do not operate on the basis of clearly defined 
instructions. This important role can on the one hand be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the influential back-stage role of non-elected actors. And 
fulfilling such a role may further feed the public distrust of political systems 
and expertise. However, on the other hand, the research has shown that 
extensive coordination and deliberation systems are in place. These 
processes are crucial to the functioning of a democratic system and the 
findings show that coordination and deliberation are significantly facilitated 
by non-elected actors. Moreover, the findings suggest that their activities 
are guided by the political ideology and aims of the group they represent. 
In that way, they are like the ‘oil’ in the legislative machinery, coordinating 
different views and working towards broad agreement both within and 
between the groups. Without their contribution, the intra-parliamentary 
coordination process would probably be less comprehensive given time and 
resources constraints of elected representatives.  
 
These considerations do not only apply to the case of the EP, or of the EU 
for that matter. The added value for society, outlined above, thus illustrates 
why it is important that future studies consider these findings and use the 
developed framework for the examination of the political role of advice in 
other legislative settings.  
  
388
 
 
 
Brack, N. (2015). The Roles of Eurossceptic Members of the European Parliament 
and their implications for the EU. International Political Science Review, 36(3): 
337–350. 
Brack, N. and Startin, N. (2015). Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the 
margins to the mainstream. International Political Science Review, 36(3): 239–
249. 
Brack, N., & Costa, O. (2018). The European Parliament at a crossroads: 
introduction, The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 1-10. 
Brack, N. and Costa, O. (2018a). Democracy in parliament vs. democracy 
through parliament? Defining the rules of the game in the European Parliament, 
The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 51-71.  
Brandsma, G.J. (2012). The effect of information on oversight: The European 
Parliament’s response to increasing information on comitology decision-making. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78(1): 74-92. 
Brandsma, G. J. (2015). Co-decision after Lisbon: The politics of informal 
trilogues in European Union lawmaking, European Union Politics, 16(2): 300-319. 
Bressanelli, E., Koop, C., & Reh, C. (2016). The impact of informalisation: Early 
agreements and voting cohesion in the European Parliament. European Union 
Politics, 17(1): 91-113. 
Burks, S.W. and Cole R.L. (1978). Congressional Staff Personnel Role 
Orientations: An Empirical Examination. Politics & Policy 6(2): 17-38. 
Burns, C. (2013). The European Parliament. In: European Union Politics, eds. 
Cini, M. and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N., 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Busby, A. (2013). The everyday practice and performance of European politics: 
An ethnography of the European parliament (Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Sussex). 
Busby, A. (2013a). Bursting the Brussels Bubble: using ethnography to explore 
the European Parliament as a transnational political field. Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, 14(2): 203-222. 
Busby, A. and Belkacem, (2013). Coping with the Information overload: An 
exploration of Assistants’ backstage role in the everyday practice of European 
Parliament politics. European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 17(2): 1-28. 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adler-Nissen, R. (2009). The diplomacy of opting out: British and Danish stigma 
management in the EU (Doctoral dissertation, University of Copenhagen). 
Almond, G. A. (1965). A developmental approach to political systems. World 
Politics, 17(2): 183-214. 
Arnold, R. D. (1987). Political control of administrative officials. Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization, 3(2): 279-286. 
Barbieri, J. (2018). “Trust Me! I'm Not an Expert!" The ABC of Post-Truth: 
Avoiding Risks, Biases, Clicks. St Antony's International Review, 13(2): 24-47. 
Benedetto, G. (2005). Rapporteurs as legislative entrepreneurs: the dynamics 
of the codecision procedure in Europe's parliament. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 12(1): 67-88. 
Bergman, T. and Strøm, K. (2011). The Madisonian turn: Political parties and 
parliamentary democracy in Nordic Europe. University of Michigan Press. 
Blischke, W. (1981). Parliamentary staffs in the German Bundestag. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 6(4): 533-558. 
Blom, T. (2014). The Politics of Information: An Organization-Theoretical 
Perspective. In: The Politics of Information. The Case of the European Union, eds. 
T. Blom and S. Vanhoonacker. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Blom, T. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2014). The Politics of Information: A New 
Research Agenda. In: The Politics of Information. The Case of the European Union, 
eds. T. Blom and S. Vanhoonacker. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bovens, M., Curtin, D., and Hart, P. T. (Eds.). (2010). The real world of EU 
accountability: What deficit? Oxford University Press. 
Bowen, G.A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. 
Qualitative Research Journal, 9(2): 27-40. 
Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. (1995). The Organizing of the European Parliament: 
Committees, Specialization and Co-Ordination Author(s). British Journal of Political 
Science, 25(2): 219-243. 
Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. and Katz, R. S. (1999). Party discipline and 
parliamentary government. The Ohio State University Press. 
REFERENCES
389
References
R
 
 
 
Brack, N. (2015). The Roles of Eurossceptic Members of the European Parliament 
and their implications for the EU. International Political Science Review, 36(3): 
337–350. 
Brack, N. and Startin, N. (2015). Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the 
margins to the mainstream. International Political Science Review, 36(3): 239–
249. 
Brack, N., & Costa, O. (2018). The European Parliament at a crossroads: 
introduction, The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 1-10. 
Brack, N. and Costa, O. (2018a). Democracy in parliament vs. democracy 
through parliament? Defining the rules of the game in the European Parliament, 
The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 51-71.  
Brandsma, G.J. (2012). The effect of information on oversight: The European 
Parliament’s response to increasing information on comitology decision-making. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78(1): 74-92. 
Brandsma, G. J. (2015). Co-decision after Lisbon: The politics of informal 
trilogues in European Union lawmaking, European Union Politics, 16(2): 300-319. 
Bressanelli, E., Koop, C., & Reh, C. (2016). The impact of informalisation: Early 
agreements and voting cohesion in the European Parliament. European Union 
Politics, 17(1): 91-113. 
Burks, S.W. and Cole R.L. (1978). Congressional Staff Personnel Role 
Orientations: An Empirical Examination. Politics & Policy 6(2): 17-38. 
Burns, C. (2013). The European Parliament. In: European Union Politics, eds. 
Cini, M. and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N., 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Busby, A. (2013). The everyday practice and performance of European politics: 
An ethnography of the European parliament (Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Sussex). 
Busby, A. (2013a). Bursting the Brussels Bubble: using ethnography to explore 
the European Parliament as a transnational political field. Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, 14(2): 203-222. 
Busby, A. and Belkacem, (2013). Coping with the Information overload: An 
exploration of Assistants’ backstage role in the everyday practice of European 
Parliament politics. European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 17(2): 1-28. 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adler-Nissen, R. (2009). The diplomacy of opting out: British and Danish stigma 
management in the EU (Doctoral dissertation, University of Copenhagen). 
Almond, G. A. (1965). A developmental approach to political systems. World 
Politics, 17(2): 183-214. 
Arnold, R. D. (1987). Political control of administrative officials. Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization, 3(2): 279-286. 
Barbieri, J. (2018). “Trust Me! I'm Not an Expert!" The ABC of Post-Truth: 
Avoiding Risks, Biases, Clicks. St Antony's International Review, 13(2): 24-47. 
Benedetto, G. (2005). Rapporteurs as legislative entrepreneurs: the dynamics 
of the codecision procedure in Europe's parliament. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 12(1): 67-88. 
Bergman, T. and Strøm, K. (2011). The Madisonian turn: Political parties and 
parliamentary democracy in Nordic Europe. University of Michigan Press. 
Blischke, W. (1981). Parliamentary staffs in the German Bundestag. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 6(4): 533-558. 
Blom, T. (2014). The Politics of Information: An Organization-Theoretical 
Perspective. In: The Politics of Information. The Case of the European Union, eds. 
T. Blom and S. Vanhoonacker. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Blom, T. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2014). The Politics of Information: A New 
Research Agenda. In: The Politics of Information. The Case of the European Union, 
eds. T. Blom and S. Vanhoonacker. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bovens, M., Curtin, D., and Hart, P. T. (Eds.). (2010). The real world of EU 
accountability: What deficit? Oxford University Press. 
Bowen, G.A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. 
Qualitative Research Journal, 9(2): 27-40. 
Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. (1995). The Organizing of the European Parliament: 
Committees, Specialization and Co-Ordination Author(s). British Journal of Political 
Science, 25(2): 219-243. 
Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. and Katz, R. S. (1999). Party discipline and 
parliamentary government. The Ohio State University Press. 
390
References 
 
 
Campbell, S. and Laporte, J. (1981). The staff of the parliamentary assemblies 
in France. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 6(4): 521-531. 
Christiansen, T. (2002). Out of the shadows: the General Secretariat of the 
Council of Ministers. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 8(4): 80-97. 
Christiansen, T. (2013). Governance in the European Union. In: European Union 
Politics, eds. Cini, M. and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N., 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Christiansen, T. and Neuhold, C. (2013). Informal Politics in the EU, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 51(6): 1196-1206. 
Christiansen, T., Högenauer, A. L. and Neuhold, C. (2014). National 
parliaments in the post-Lisbon European Union: Bureaucratization rather than 
democratization? Comparative European Politics, 12(2): 121-140. 
Christiansen, T. (2016). After the Spitzenkandidaten: fundamental change in 
the EU’s political system? West European Politics, 39(5): 992-1010. 
Corbett, R. (2002). A Very Special Parliament: The European Parliament in the 
Twenty-First Century. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 8(2): 1-8.  
Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. and Shackleton, M. (2011). The European Parliament, 
8th edition, John Harper Publishing. 
Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. and Neville, D. (2016). The European Parliament, 9th 
edition, John Harper Publishing. 
Couper, M.P., Traugott, M.W. and Lamias, M.J. (2001). Web Survey Design 
and Administration. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65: 230-253. 
Creswell, J.W. and Plano Clark, V.L. (2011). Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research. Sage Publications. 
DeGregorio, C. (1994). Professional Committee Staff as Policy-Making Partners 
in the US Congress. Congress & The Presidency, 21(1): 49-66. 
De Ruiter, R., & Neuhold, C. (2012). Why Is Fast Track the Way to Go? 
Justifications for Early Agreement in the Co-Decision Procedure and Their Effects. 
European Law Journal, 18(4): 536-554. 
De Wilde, P., Leupold, A., & Schmidtke, H. (2016). Introduction: The 
differentiated politicisation of European governance. West European Politics, 
39(1): 3-22. 
 
 
 
Dinan, D. (2005). Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration, 
3rd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Dobbels, M. (2013). The European Parliament. A giant with feet of clay? 
(Doctoral dissertation, Maastricht University). 
Dobbels, M. and Neuhold, C. (2013). The roles bureaucrats play. The input of 
European Parliament administrators into the Ordinary Legislative Procedure: A 
Case Study Approach. Journal of European Integration, 35(4): 375-390. 
Dobbels, M. and Neuhold, C. (2014). Who Selects What and How? How the 
European Parliament Obtains and Processes Information for Policy-Making. In: The 
Politics of Information. The Case of the European Union, eds. T. Blom and S. 
Vanhoonacker. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Earnshaw, D. and Judge, D. (2002). No simple dichotomies: lobbyists and the 
European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies, 8(4): 61-79. 
Earnshaw, D. and Judge, D. (2003). The European Parliament, Palgrave. 
Egeberg, M., Gornitzka, A., Trondal, J., and Johannessen M. (2013). 
Parliament Staff. Backgrounds, Career Patterns and Behaviour of Officials in the 
European Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(4): 495-514. 
Eichengreen, B. (2018). Is Renewed EU Optimism Justified? Intereconomics, 
53(1): 47-48. 
European Commission (2017a). White Paper on the Future of Europe. 
Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025. COM(2017)2025, 1 March 2017. 
European Commission (2017b). State of the Union Address. Catching the Wind 
in our Sails. September 2017. 
EPRS (2014). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 542.150, November 2014. 
EPRS (2016). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 573.919, March 2016.  
EPRS (2017). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 599.256, March 2017. 
EPRS (2018). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 614.733, April 2018. 
European Parliament (2000). Comparison of organisational and administrative 
arrangement in EU national parliaments. BUDG110 EN 12-2000. 
European Parliament (2008). Code of Conduct for negotiating in the context of 
the ordinary legislative procedures, as approved by the Conference of Presidents 
on 18 September 2008, Annex XX of European Parliament Rules of Procedure. 
391
References
R
 
 
 
Campbell, S. and Laporte, J. (1981). The staff of the parliamentary assemblies 
in France. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 6(4): 521-531. 
Christiansen, T. (2002). Out of the shadows: the General Secretariat of the 
Council of Ministers. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 8(4): 80-97. 
Christiansen, T. (2013). Governance in the European Union. In: European Union 
Politics, eds. Cini, M. and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N., 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Christiansen, T. and Neuhold, C. (2013). Informal Politics in the EU, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 51(6): 1196-1206. 
Christiansen, T., Högenauer, A. L. and Neuhold, C. (2014). National 
parliaments in the post-Lisbon European Union: Bureaucratization rather than 
democratization? Comparative European Politics, 12(2): 121-140. 
Christiansen, T. (2016). After the Spitzenkandidaten: fundamental change in 
the EU’s political system? West European Politics, 39(5): 992-1010. 
Corbett, R. (2002). A Very Special Parliament: The European Parliament in the 
Twenty-First Century. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 8(2): 1-8.  
Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. and Shackleton, M. (2011). The European Parliament, 
8th edition, John Harper Publishing. 
Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. and Neville, D. (2016). The European Parliament, 9th 
edition, John Harper Publishing. 
Couper, M.P., Traugott, M.W. and Lamias, M.J. (2001). Web Survey Design 
and Administration. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65: 230-253. 
Creswell, J.W. and Plano Clark, V.L. (2011). Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research. Sage Publications. 
DeGregorio, C. (1994). Professional Committee Staff as Policy-Making Partners 
in the US Congress. Congress & The Presidency, 21(1): 49-66. 
De Ruiter, R., & Neuhold, C. (2012). Why Is Fast Track the Way to Go? 
Justifications for Early Agreement in the Co-Decision Procedure and Their Effects. 
European Law Journal, 18(4): 536-554. 
De Wilde, P., Leupold, A., & Schmidtke, H. (2016). Introduction: The 
differentiated politicisation of European governance. West European Politics, 
39(1): 3-22. 
 
 
 
Dinan, D. (2005). Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration, 
3rd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Dobbels, M. (2013). The European Parliament. A giant with feet of clay? 
(Doctoral dissertation, Maastricht University). 
Dobbels, M. and Neuhold, C. (2013). The roles bureaucrats play. The input of 
European Parliament administrators into the Ordinary Legislative Procedure: A 
Case Study Approach. Journal of European Integration, 35(4): 375-390. 
Dobbels, M. and Neuhold, C. (2014). Who Selects What and How? How the 
European Parliament Obtains and Processes Information for Policy-Making. In: The 
Politics of Information. The Case of the European Union, eds. T. Blom and S. 
Vanhoonacker. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Earnshaw, D. and Judge, D. (2002). No simple dichotomies: lobbyists and the 
European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies, 8(4): 61-79. 
Earnshaw, D. and Judge, D. (2003). The European Parliament, Palgrave. 
Egeberg, M., Gornitzka, A., Trondal, J., and Johannessen M. (2013). 
Parliament Staff. Backgrounds, Career Patterns and Behaviour of Officials in the 
European Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(4): 495-514. 
Eichengreen, B. (2018). Is Renewed EU Optimism Justified? Intereconomics, 
53(1): 47-48. 
European Commission (2017a). White Paper on the Future of Europe. 
Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025. COM(2017)2025, 1 March 2017. 
European Commission (2017b). State of the Union Address. Catching the Wind 
in our Sails. September 2017. 
EPRS (2014). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 542.150, November 2014. 
EPRS (2016). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 573.919, March 2016.  
EPRS (2017). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 599.256, March 2017. 
EPRS (2018). Facts & Figures Briefing, PE 614.733, April 2018. 
European Parliament (2000). Comparison of organisational and administrative 
arrangement in EU national parliaments. BUDG110 EN 12-2000. 
European Parliament (2008). Code of Conduct for negotiating in the context of 
the ordinary legislative procedures, as approved by the Conference of Presidents 
on 18 September 2008, Annex XX of European Parliament Rules of Procedure. 
392
References 
 
 
European Parliament (2013). ‘Parliamentary democracy in action. Summary 
comparison studies, EP Secretary General, March 2013. 
European Parliament (2015). ‘Strategic Planning for the Secretariat General of 
the European Parliament’, EP Secretary General, PE 539.927 version 2.0, March 
2015. 
European Parliament Establishment Plan (2014). 
European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2014). Rules of Procedure 7th 
parliamentary term, March 2014. 
European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2016). Rules of Procedure 8th 
parliamentary term. Online, consulted August 2016. 
European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2017). Rules of Procedure 8th 
parliamentary term. Online, consulted March 2018. 
European Parliament, Council, European Commission (2007). Joint 
declaration on practical arrangements for the Co-decision Procedure, Official 
Journal of the European Union 145, 30 June 2007. 
European Union Staff Regulations (2014). Staff regulations of Officials of the 
European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the 
European Union, Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC). 1962 (2014 amended). 
Faas, T. (2003). To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group 
pressures on MEPs and their consequences for party group cohesion in the 
European Parliament. European Journal of Political Research, 42(6): 841-866. 
Farrell, H. and Héritier, A. (2004). Interorganizational Negotiation and 
Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision Making Early Agreements Under 
Codecision and Their Impact on the European Parliament and Council. Comparative 
political studies, 37(10): 1184-1212. 
Fouilleux, E., Maillard, J. D. and Smith, A. (2005). Technical or political? The 
working groups of the EU Council of Ministers. Journal of European Public Policy, 
12(4), 609-623. 
Fox, H. W., & Hammond, S. W. (1977). Congressional staffs: The invisible force 
in American lawmaking. Free Press. 
Georgakakis, D. and Rowell, J. (2013). The Field of Eurocracy: Mapping EU 
Actors and Professionals. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
 
 
Gerring, J. (2001). What is a Case Study and What is it Good For? American 
Political Science Review, 98(2): 341-354. 
Greene, J.C. (2007). Mixed methods in social inquiry, Volume 9, John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Greenwood, J. (2011). Interest Representation in the European Union, 3rd 
edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gailmard, S. and Patty, J. W. (2012). Formal models of bureaucracy. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 15: 353-377. 
Häge, F. M. and Kaeding, M. (2007). Reconsidering the European Parliament’s 
legislative influence: Formal vs. informal procedures. European Integration, 29(3), 
341-361. 
Hague, R. and Harrop, M. (2010). Comparative government and politics. An 
Introduction, 8th edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press. 
Hammond, S. W. (1984). Legislative staffs. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9(2): 
271-317. 
Hammond, S. W. (1996). Recent research on legislative staffs. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 21(4): 543-576. 
Häge, F. M. and Naurin, D. (2013). The effect of codecision on Council decision-
making: Informalization, politicization and power. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 20(7): 953-971. 
Hanké, B. (2010). Intelligent Research Design: A guide for beginning researchers 
in the social sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heisenberg (2005). The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union: Formal 
versus informal decision-making in the Council. European Journal of Political 
Research, 44(1): 65-90. 
Héritier, A. (2012). Institutional Change in Europe: Co-decision and Comitology 
Transformed. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(s1): 38-54. 
Héritier, A. and Reh, C. (2012). Codecision and its discontents: Intra-
Organisational Politics and Institutional Reform in the European Parliament. West 
European Politics, 35(5): 1134-1157. 
Hermansen, S. S. L. (2018). (Self-) selection and expertise among decision-
makers in the European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 24(1): 148-
172. 
393
References
R
 
 
 
European Parliament (2013). ‘Parliamentary democracy in action. Summary 
comparison studies, EP Secretary General, March 2013. 
European Parliament (2015). ‘Strategic Planning for the Secretariat General of 
the European Parliament’, EP Secretary General, PE 539.927 version 2.0, March 
2015. 
European Parliament Establishment Plan (2014). 
European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2014). Rules of Procedure 7th 
parliamentary term, March 2014. 
European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2016). Rules of Procedure 8th 
parliamentary term. Online, consulted August 2016. 
European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2017). Rules of Procedure 8th 
parliamentary term. Online, consulted March 2018. 
European Parliament, Council, European Commission (2007). Joint 
declaration on practical arrangements for the Co-decision Procedure, Official 
Journal of the European Union 145, 30 June 2007. 
European Union Staff Regulations (2014). Staff regulations of Officials of the 
European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the 
European Union, Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC). 1962 (2014 amended). 
Faas, T. (2003). To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group 
pressures on MEPs and their consequences for party group cohesion in the 
European Parliament. European Journal of Political Research, 42(6): 841-866. 
Farrell, H. and Héritier, A. (2004). Interorganizational Negotiation and 
Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision Making Early Agreements Under 
Codecision and Their Impact on the European Parliament and Council. Comparative 
political studies, 37(10): 1184-1212. 
Fouilleux, E., Maillard, J. D. and Smith, A. (2005). Technical or political? The 
working groups of the EU Council of Ministers. Journal of European Public Policy, 
12(4), 609-623. 
Fox, H. W., & Hammond, S. W. (1977). Congressional staffs: The invisible force 
in American lawmaking. Free Press. 
Georgakakis, D. and Rowell, J. (2013). The Field of Eurocracy: Mapping EU 
Actors and Professionals. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
 
 
Gerring, J. (2001). What is a Case Study and What is it Good For? American 
Political Science Review, 98(2): 341-354. 
Greene, J.C. (2007). Mixed methods in social inquiry, Volume 9, John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Greenwood, J. (2011). Interest Representation in the European Union, 3rd 
edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gailmard, S. and Patty, J. W. (2012). Formal models of bureaucracy. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 15: 353-377. 
Häge, F. M. and Kaeding, M. (2007). Reconsidering the European Parliament’s 
legislative influence: Formal vs. informal procedures. European Integration, 29(3), 
341-361. 
Hague, R. and Harrop, M. (2010). Comparative government and politics. An 
Introduction, 8th edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press. 
Hammond, S. W. (1984). Legislative staffs. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9(2): 
271-317. 
Hammond, S. W. (1996). Recent research on legislative staffs. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 21(4): 543-576. 
Häge, F. M. and Naurin, D. (2013). The effect of codecision on Council decision-
making: Informalization, politicization and power. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 20(7): 953-971. 
Hanké, B. (2010). Intelligent Research Design: A guide for beginning researchers 
in the social sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heisenberg (2005). The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union: Formal 
versus informal decision-making in the Council. European Journal of Political 
Research, 44(1): 65-90. 
Héritier, A. (2012). Institutional Change in Europe: Co-decision and Comitology 
Transformed. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(s1): 38-54. 
Héritier, A. and Reh, C. (2012). Codecision and its discontents: Intra-
Organisational Politics and Institutional Reform in the European Parliament. West 
European Politics, 35(5): 1134-1157. 
Hermansen, S. S. L. (2018). (Self-) selection and expertise among decision-
makers in the European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 24(1): 148-
172. 
394
References 
 
 
Hix, S. and Lord, C. (1997). Political parties in the European Union. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
Hix, S. (2002). Parliamentary Behavior with two principals: Preferences, Parties, 
and Voting in the European Parliament. American Journal of Political Science, 
46(3):688-698. 
Hix, S., Kreppel, A. and Noury, A. (2003a). The party system in the European 
Parliament: Collusive or competitive? Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(2): 
309-331. 
Hix, S., Raunio, T, Scully, R. (2003b). Fifty years on: Research on the European 
Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(2): 191-202. 
Hix, S., Noury, A. G. and Roland, G. (2007). Democratic politics in the 
European Parliament. Cambridge University Press. 
Hix, S. and Noury, A. (2009). After enlargement: Voting patterns in the sixth 
European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 34(2): 159-174. 
Hix, S. (2009). What to Expect in the 2009-14 European Parliament: Return of 
the Grand Coalition? Sieps European Policy Analyis, 8: 1-12. 
Hobolt, S. B. (2014). A vote for the President? The role of Spitzenkandidaten in 
the 2014 European Parliament elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10): 
1528-1540. 
Högenauer, A. L., & Neuhold, C. (2015). National parliaments after Lisbon: 
Administrations on the rise? West European Politics, 38(2), 335-354. 
Huber, K. and Shackleton, M. (2013). Codecision: a practitioner's view from 
inside the Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(7): 1040-1055. 
Iarossi, G. (2006). The Power of Survey Design: A User’s Guide for Managing 
Surveys, Interpreting Results, and Influencing Respondents. Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank. 
Jensen, T. and Winzen, T. (2012). Legislative negotiations in the European 
Parliament. European Union Politics, 13(1): 118-149. 
Johnson, R.B., Onwuegbuzie, A.J., and Turner, L.A. (2007). Toward a 
definition of mixed methods research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research 
1(2):112-133.  
 
 
 
Judge, D. and Earnshaw, D. (2011). ‘Relais actors’ and co-decision first reading 
agreements in the European Parliament: the case of the advanced therapies 
regulation. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(1): 53-71. 
Kettl, D. F. (2000). Public administration at the millennium: The state of the 
field. Journal of public administration research and theory, 10(1): 7-34. 
King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry. 
Princeton University Press. 
Kleine, M. (2013). Informal governance in the European Union: How 
governments make international organizations work. Cornell University Press. 
Kohler-Koch, B. and Rittberger, B. (2007). Debating the Democratic 
Legitimacy of the European Union. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Kreppel, A. and Tsebelis, G. (1999). Coalition formation in the European 
Parliament. Comparative Political Studies, 32(8): 933-966. 
Kreppel, A. (2002). The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: 
A study in institutional development. Cambridge University Press. 
Kreppel, A. (2018). Bicameralism and the balance of power in EU legislative 
politics. The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 11-33. 
Lord, C. (2018). The European Parliament: A working parliament without a 
public? The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 34-50. 
Manley, J.F. (1968). Congressional Staff and Public Policy-Making: The Joint 
Committee on International Revenue Taxation. The Journal of Politics, 30(4): 
1046-1067. 
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international 
political orders. International organization, 52(4): 943-969. 
Marks, G. and Steenbergen, M.R. (2004). European Integration & Political 
Conflict. Cambridge University Press. 
Marshall, D. (2012). Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? 
Indirect lobbying via the European Parliament’s committee secretariat. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 19(9): 1377-1395. 
Mayes, B. T. and Allen, R. W. (1977). Toward a definition of organizational 
politics. Academy of management review, 2(4): 672-678. 
McElroy, G. and Benoit, K. (2012). Policy positioning in the European 
Parliament. European Union Politics, 13(1): 150-167. 
395
References
R
 
 
 
Hix, S. and Lord, C. (1997). Political parties in the European Union. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
Hix, S. (2002). Parliamentary Behavior with two principals: Preferences, Parties, 
and Voting in the European Parliament. American Journal of Political Science, 
46(3):688-698. 
Hix, S., Kreppel, A. and Noury, A. (2003a). The party system in the European 
Parliament: Collusive or competitive? Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(2): 
309-331. 
Hix, S., Raunio, T, Scully, R. (2003b). Fifty years on: Research on the European 
Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(2): 191-202. 
Hix, S., Noury, A. G. and Roland, G. (2007). Democratic politics in the 
European Parliament. Cambridge University Press. 
Hix, S. and Noury, A. (2009). After enlargement: Voting patterns in the sixth 
European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 34(2): 159-174. 
Hix, S. (2009). What to Expect in the 2009-14 European Parliament: Return of 
the Grand Coalition? Sieps European Policy Analyis, 8: 1-12. 
Hobolt, S. B. (2014). A vote for the President? The role of Spitzenkandidaten in 
the 2014 European Parliament elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10): 
1528-1540. 
Högenauer, A. L., & Neuhold, C. (2015). National parliaments after Lisbon: 
Administrations on the rise? West European Politics, 38(2), 335-354. 
Huber, K. and Shackleton, M. (2013). Codecision: a practitioner's view from 
inside the Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(7): 1040-1055. 
Iarossi, G. (2006). The Power of Survey Design: A User’s Guide for Managing 
Surveys, Interpreting Results, and Influencing Respondents. Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank. 
Jensen, T. and Winzen, T. (2012). Legislative negotiations in the European 
Parliament. European Union Politics, 13(1): 118-149. 
Johnson, R.B., Onwuegbuzie, A.J., and Turner, L.A. (2007). Toward a 
definition of mixed methods research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research 
1(2):112-133.  
 
 
 
Judge, D. and Earnshaw, D. (2011). ‘Relais actors’ and co-decision first reading 
agreements in the European Parliament: the case of the advanced therapies 
regulation. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(1): 53-71. 
Kettl, D. F. (2000). Public administration at the millennium: The state of the 
field. Journal of public administration research and theory, 10(1): 7-34. 
King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry. 
Princeton University Press. 
Kleine, M. (2013). Informal governance in the European Union: How 
governments make international organizations work. Cornell University Press. 
Kohler-Koch, B. and Rittberger, B. (2007). Debating the Democratic 
Legitimacy of the European Union. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Kreppel, A. and Tsebelis, G. (1999). Coalition formation in the European 
Parliament. Comparative Political Studies, 32(8): 933-966. 
Kreppel, A. (2002). The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: 
A study in institutional development. Cambridge University Press. 
Kreppel, A. (2018). Bicameralism and the balance of power in EU legislative 
politics. The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 11-33. 
Lord, C. (2018). The European Parliament: A working parliament without a 
public? The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 34-50. 
Manley, J.F. (1968). Congressional Staff and Public Policy-Making: The Joint 
Committee on International Revenue Taxation. The Journal of Politics, 30(4): 
1046-1067. 
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international 
political orders. International organization, 52(4): 943-969. 
Marks, G. and Steenbergen, M.R. (2004). European Integration & Political 
Conflict. Cambridge University Press. 
Marshall, D. (2012). Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? 
Indirect lobbying via the European Parliament’s committee secretariat. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 19(9): 1377-1395. 
Mayes, B. T. and Allen, R. W. (1977). Toward a definition of organizational 
politics. Academy of management review, 2(4): 672-678. 
McElroy, G. and Benoit, K. (2012). Policy positioning in the European 
Parliament. European Union Politics, 13(1): 150-167. 
396
References 
 
 
Michon, S. (2008). Assistant parlementaire au Parlement européen : un tremplin 
pour une carrière européenne.  Sociologie du travail, 50(2), 169-183. 
Michon, S. (2014). Les équipes parlementaires des eurodéputés: entreprises 
politiques et rites d'institution. Primento. 
Moe, T. M. (2006). Political Control and the Power of the Agent. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 22(1): 1-29. 
Naurin, D. (2010). Most common when least important: deliberation in the 
European Union Council of Ministers. British Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 31-
50. 
Neuhold, C. (2001). The “Legislative Backbone” keeping the Institution upright? 
The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process. 
European Integration Papers Online, 5(10): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-
010a.htm.  
Neuhold, C. and Settembri, P. (2007). The role of European Parliament 
committees in the EU policy-making process. In: The Role of Committees in 
the Policy-Process of the European Union, eds. T. Christiansen, T. Larsson. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Neuhold, C. and Dobbels, M. (2014). Paper-keepers or policy shapers? The 
conditions under which EP officials impact on the EU policy process. Comparative 
European Politics, online publication DOI 10.1057/cep.2014.7. 
Neuhold, C., Vanhoonacker, S. and Verhey, L. (Eds.). (2013). Civil servants and 
politics: a delicate balance. Springer. 
Neunreither, K. (2002). Elected legislators and their unelected assistants in the 
European Parliament. The journal of legislative studies, 8(4): 40-60. 
Olsen, J.P (2006). Maybe it is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 16(1): 1-24. 
Page, E.C. and Jenkins, B. (2005). Policy Bureaucracy: Government with a cast 
of thousands. Oxford University Press. 
Page, E.C. (2010). Bureaucrats and expertise: Elucidating a problematic 
relationship in three tableaux and six jurisdictions. Sociologie du travail, No. 52(2): 
255-273. 
Parlameter (2017). Eurobarometer survey commissioned by the European 
Parliament.  
 
 
 
Patterson, S. C. (1970). The professional staffs of congressional committees. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 15(1): 22-37. 
Pegan, A. (2015). An Analysis of the Legislative Assistance in the European 
Parliament (Doctoral dissertation, University of Luxembourg). 
Pegan, A. (2017). The role of personal parliamentary assistants in the European 
Parliament. West European Politics, 40(2): 1-21. 
Peters, B. G. (2009). Still the century of bureaucracy? The roles of public 
servants. Public Policy and Administration, 30: 7-21. 
Peters, B.G. (2013). Politicisation: What is it and why should we care? In: Civil 
Servants and Politics: A delicate balance, eds. C. Neuhold, S. Vanhoonacker, and 
L. Verhey. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Pollack, M.A. (2009). The new institutionalisms and European integration. In: 
European Integration Theory, 2nd edition, eds. A.Wiener and T. Diez. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Price, D. E. (1971). Professionals and “entrepreneurs”: Staff orientations and 
policy making on three senate committees. The Journal of Politics, 33(02): 316-
336. 
Pridham, G. and Pridham, P. (1981). Transnational party co-operation and 
European integration: The process towards direct elections. London: Allen & 
Unwin. 
Radaelli, C. M. (1999). The public policy of the European Union: Whither politics 
of expertise? Journal of European public policy, 6(5): 757-774. 
Rasmussen, A. (2011). Early conclusion in bicameral bargaining: Evidence from 
the co-decision legislative procedure of the European Union. European Union 
Politics, 12(1): 41-64. 
Rasmussen, A. and Reh, C. (2013). The consequences of concluding codecision 
early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 20(7): 1006-1024. 
Raunio, T. (1999). The challenge of diversity: Party cohesion in the European 
parliament. In: Party discipline and parliamentary government, eds. S. Bowler, 
D.M. Farrell and R.S. Katz. The Ohio State University Press. 
397
References
R
 
 
 
Michon, S. (2008). Assistant parlementaire au Parlement européen : un tremplin 
pour une carrière européenne.  Sociologie du travail, 50(2), 169-183. 
Michon, S. (2014). Les équipes parlementaires des eurodéputés: entreprises 
politiques et rites d'institution. Primento. 
Moe, T. M. (2006). Political Control and the Power of the Agent. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 22(1): 1-29. 
Naurin, D. (2010). Most common when least important: deliberation in the 
European Union Council of Ministers. British Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 31-
50. 
Neuhold, C. (2001). The “Legislative Backbone” keeping the Institution upright? 
The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process. 
European Integration Papers Online, 5(10): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-
010a.htm.  
Neuhold, C. and Settembri, P. (2007). The role of European Parliament 
committees in the EU policy-making process. In: The Role of Committees in 
the Policy-Process of the European Union, eds. T. Christiansen, T. Larsson. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Neuhold, C. and Dobbels, M. (2014). Paper-keepers or policy shapers? The 
conditions under which EP officials impact on the EU policy process. Comparative 
European Politics, online publication DOI 10.1057/cep.2014.7. 
Neuhold, C., Vanhoonacker, S. and Verhey, L. (Eds.). (2013). Civil servants and 
politics: a delicate balance. Springer. 
Neunreither, K. (2002). Elected legislators and their unelected assistants in the 
European Parliament. The journal of legislative studies, 8(4): 40-60. 
Olsen, J.P (2006). Maybe it is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 16(1): 1-24. 
Page, E.C. and Jenkins, B. (2005). Policy Bureaucracy: Government with a cast 
of thousands. Oxford University Press. 
Page, E.C. (2010). Bureaucrats and expertise: Elucidating a problematic 
relationship in three tableaux and six jurisdictions. Sociologie du travail, No. 52(2): 
255-273. 
Parlameter (2017). Eurobarometer survey commissioned by the European 
Parliament.  
 
 
 
Patterson, S. C. (1970). The professional staffs of congressional committees. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 15(1): 22-37. 
Pegan, A. (2015). An Analysis of the Legislative Assistance in the European 
Parliament (Doctoral dissertation, University of Luxembourg). 
Pegan, A. (2017). The role of personal parliamentary assistants in the European 
Parliament. West European Politics, 40(2): 1-21. 
Peters, B. G. (2009). Still the century of bureaucracy? The roles of public 
servants. Public Policy and Administration, 30: 7-21. 
Peters, B.G. (2013). Politicisation: What is it and why should we care? In: Civil 
Servants and Politics: A delicate balance, eds. C. Neuhold, S. Vanhoonacker, and 
L. Verhey. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Pollack, M.A. (2009). The new institutionalisms and European integration. In: 
European Integration Theory, 2nd edition, eds. A.Wiener and T. Diez. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Price, D. E. (1971). Professionals and “entrepreneurs”: Staff orientations and 
policy making on three senate committees. The Journal of Politics, 33(02): 316-
336. 
Pridham, G. and Pridham, P. (1981). Transnational party co-operation and 
European integration: The process towards direct elections. London: Allen & 
Unwin. 
Radaelli, C. M. (1999). The public policy of the European Union: Whither politics 
of expertise? Journal of European public policy, 6(5): 757-774. 
Rasmussen, A. (2011). Early conclusion in bicameral bargaining: Evidence from 
the co-decision legislative procedure of the European Union. European Union 
Politics, 12(1): 41-64. 
Rasmussen, A. and Reh, C. (2013). The consequences of concluding codecision 
early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 20(7): 1006-1024. 
Raunio, T. (1999). The challenge of diversity: Party cohesion in the European 
parliament. In: Party discipline and parliamentary government, eds. S. Bowler, 
D.M. Farrell and R.S. Katz. The Ohio State University Press. 
398
References 
 
 
Reh, C. (2012). Informal Politics: The normative challenge. In: International 
Handbook on Informal Governance, eds. T. Christiansen and C. Neuhold. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Reh, C., Héritier, A., Bressanelli, E., & Koop, C. (2013). The informal politics 
of legislation: Explaining secluded decision-making in the European Union. 
Comparative Political Studies, 46(9): 1112-1142. 
Reh, C. (2014). Is informal politics undemocratic? Trilogues, early agreements 
and the selection model of representation. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 21(6): 822-841. 
Rhodes, R.A.W., ‘t Hart, P. and Noordegraaf, M. (2007). Observing 
Government Elites. Up Close and Personal, Basingstoke: Pallgrave Macmillan. 
Ringe, N. (2010). Who decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy 
Choice in the European Parliament. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ripoll Servent A (2012). Playing the co-decision game? Rules’ changes and 
institutional adaptation at the LIBE committee. Journal of European Integration 
34(1): 55–73.  
Ripoll Servent, A. (2018). The European Parliament. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. E-book version. 
Risse, T. and Kleine, M. (2010). Deliberation in negotiations, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 17(5): 708-726. 
Risse, T. (2009). Social constructivism and European integration. In: European 
Integration Theory, 2nd edition, eds. A.Wiener and T. Diez. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rittberger, B. (2003). The Creation and Empowerment of the European 
Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(2): 203-225. 
Rittberger, B. (2012). Institutionalizing Representative Democracy in the 
European Union: The Case of the European Parliament. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 50(1): 18-37. 
Rittberger, B. (2014). Integration without representation? The European 
Parliament and the reform of economic governance in the EU. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 52(6): 1174-1183. 
Roederer-Rynning, C., & Greenwood, J. (2015). The culture of 
trilogues. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(8): 1148-1165. 
 
 
 
Roederer-Rynning, C., & Greenwood, J. (2017). The European Parliament as 
a developing legislature: coming of age in trilogues? Journal of European Public 
Policy, 24(5): 735-754. 
Romanyshyn, I. and Neuhold, C. (2013). The European Parliament’s 
Administration: Between Neutral and Politicised Competence. In: Civil Servants 
and Politics: A delicate balance, eds. C. Neuhold, S. Vanhoonacker, and L. Verhey. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Romzek and Utter (1997). Congressional staff: Professionals or Clerks? 
American Journal of Political Science, 41(4): 1251-1279. 
Ryle, M.T. (1981). The Legislative Staff of the British House of Commons. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 6(4): 497-519. 
Sager, F. and Rosser, C. (2009). Weber, Wilson and Hegel: Theories of Modern 
Bureaucracy. Public Administration Review, 69(6): 1136-1147. 
Settembri, P. and Neuhold, C. (2009). Achieving Consensus Through 
Consensus: Does the European Parliament Manage? Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 47(1): 127-151. 
Shackleton, M. (2000). The politics of codecision. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 38(2): 325-342. 
Shackleton, M., & Raunio, T. (2003). Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory 
for institutional innovation and change. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2): 
171-188. 
Smismans, S. (2013). Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union. In: 
European Union Politics, eds. M. Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N., 4th edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Strøm, K., Müller, W. and Bergman, T (2006). Delegation and accountability 
in parliamentary democracies (eds.). Oxford University Press. 
Tallberg, J. (2004). The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and 
Distribution in EU negotiations. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(5): 999-
1022. 
Tsebelis, G., Jensen, C.B., Kalandrakis, A. and Kreppel, A. (2001). 
Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis. British 
Journal of Political Science, 31(4): 573-599. 
399
References
R
 
 
 
Reh, C. (2012). Informal Politics: The normative challenge. In: International 
Handbook on Informal Governance, eds. T. Christiansen and C. Neuhold. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Reh, C., Héritier, A., Bressanelli, E., & Koop, C. (2013). The informal politics 
of legislation: Explaining secluded decision-making in the European Union. 
Comparative Political Studies, 46(9): 1112-1142. 
Reh, C. (2014). Is informal politics undemocratic? Trilogues, early agreements 
and the selection model of representation. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 21(6): 822-841. 
Rhodes, R.A.W., ‘t Hart, P. and Noordegraaf, M. (2007). Observing 
Government Elites. Up Close and Personal, Basingstoke: Pallgrave Macmillan. 
Ringe, N. (2010). Who decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy 
Choice in the European Parliament. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ripoll Servent A (2012). Playing the co-decision game? Rules’ changes and 
institutional adaptation at the LIBE committee. Journal of European Integration 
34(1): 55–73.  
Ripoll Servent, A. (2018). The European Parliament. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. E-book version. 
Risse, T. and Kleine, M. (2010). Deliberation in negotiations, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 17(5): 708-726. 
Risse, T. (2009). Social constructivism and European integration. In: European 
Integration Theory, 2nd edition, eds. A.Wiener and T. Diez. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rittberger, B. (2003). The Creation and Empowerment of the European 
Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(2): 203-225. 
Rittberger, B. (2012). Institutionalizing Representative Democracy in the 
European Union: The Case of the European Parliament. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 50(1): 18-37. 
Rittberger, B. (2014). Integration without representation? The European 
Parliament and the reform of economic governance in the EU. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 52(6): 1174-1183. 
Roederer-Rynning, C., & Greenwood, J. (2015). The culture of 
trilogues. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(8): 1148-1165. 
 
 
 
Roederer-Rynning, C., & Greenwood, J. (2017). The European Parliament as 
a developing legislature: coming of age in trilogues? Journal of European Public 
Policy, 24(5): 735-754. 
Romanyshyn, I. and Neuhold, C. (2013). The European Parliament’s 
Administration: Between Neutral and Politicised Competence. In: Civil Servants 
and Politics: A delicate balance, eds. C. Neuhold, S. Vanhoonacker, and L. Verhey. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Romzek and Utter (1997). Congressional staff: Professionals or Clerks? 
American Journal of Political Science, 41(4): 1251-1279. 
Ryle, M.T. (1981). The Legislative Staff of the British House of Commons. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 6(4): 497-519. 
Sager, F. and Rosser, C. (2009). Weber, Wilson and Hegel: Theories of Modern 
Bureaucracy. Public Administration Review, 69(6): 1136-1147. 
Settembri, P. and Neuhold, C. (2009). Achieving Consensus Through 
Consensus: Does the European Parliament Manage? Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 47(1): 127-151. 
Shackleton, M. (2000). The politics of codecision. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 38(2): 325-342. 
Shackleton, M., & Raunio, T. (2003). Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory 
for institutional innovation and change. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2): 
171-188. 
Smismans, S. (2013). Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union. In: 
European Union Politics, eds. M. Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N., 4th edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Strøm, K., Müller, W. and Bergman, T (2006). Delegation and accountability 
in parliamentary democracies (eds.). Oxford University Press. 
Tallberg, J. (2004). The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and 
Distribution in EU negotiations. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(5): 999-
1022. 
Tsebelis, G., Jensen, C.B., Kalandrakis, A. and Kreppel, A. (2001). 
Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis. British 
Journal of Political Science, 31(4): 573-599. 
400
References 
 
 
VoteWatch Europe (2015). Who holds the power in the new European 
Parliament? Analysis of the MEPs’ votes and activities in the first 6 months of the 
2014-2019 term. VoteWatch Europe Special Report, 27 February 2015. 
Warntjen, A. (2010). Between Bargaining and deliberation: decision-making in 
the Council of the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5): 665-
679. 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 
eds. G. Roth, and C. Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff et al, Vol. 2. University of California 
Press.  
Weiss, R.S. (1994). Learning from Strangers. The art and Method of Qualitative 
Interview Studies. The Free Press. 
Westlake, M. (2018). Conclusions: The European Parliament – coming of age. 
The Journal of legislative studies, 24(1): 173-178. 
Whitaker, R. (2011). The European Parliament’s Committees: National Party 
Influence and Legislative empowerment. Taylor & Francis. 
Wiener, A and Diez, T (2009). European Integration Theory, second edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Winzen, T. (2011). Technical or Political? An Exploration of the Work of Officials 
in Committees of the European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies, 17(1): 
27-44. 
Winzen, T. (2014). Bureaucracy and Democracy: Intra-Parliamentary Delegation 
in European Union Affairs. Journal of European Integration, 36(7): 677–95. 
Wlezien, C. (2005) On the salience of political issues: the problem with ‘most 
important problem’. Electoral Studies 24: 555–79. 
Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse of politics in action: Politics as usual. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Yordanova, N. (2013). Organising the European Parliament. The Role of 
Committees and their legislative influence. ECPR Press. 
 
 
 
VALORISATION ADDENDUM 
I. Introduction 
This valorisation addendum aims to illustrate how the findings presented in 
my dissertation can be informative for and used by various target groups, 
both within academia as well as in the public arena. 
  
“Knowledge utilisation is the process of making scientific knowledge suitable 
and available for use outside of the academic world and/or use within other 
scientific disciplines. This is not a linear process but a continuous exchange 
between research and practice.” (NWO, Manual Knowledge Utilisation in the 
social and behavioural sciences, September 2014). 
 
One of the reasons for starting this research project was the aim to further 
connect the theoretical discussions on the functioning of the European 
Parliament to everyday practice. Scholarly discussions on the role of non-
elected actors in decision-making processes tend to focus on the 
perspective of the elected representatives and the way in which they can or 
should control the behaviour of their staff. In the public debate, the EU’s 
said backroom politics is one of the popular arguments that spark the 
polity’s negative image. A (potential) political role of advisors thus raises 
important questions about the legitimacy of decision-making, both in the 
eye of the academic world as well as in the eye of the public.  
 
One of the objectives that this dissertation has pursued is to show how 
advice works in practice. In fact, the connection and translation between 
the academic theory and everyday practice has been the driving force 
behind the chosen approach in which the focus lies on how advisors deal 
with delegated responsibilities. The dissertation provides two key 
contributions in this sense. First, a link is made between the theoretical and 
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practical perspectives by providing an analytical tool to enable the separate 
assessment of the political and technical dimensions. Second, the large-
scale empirical study of EP group advisors sheds light on how advisors 
operate in EP negotiations. The implications of these contributions are 
elaborated in this valorisation addendum. The following sections 
consecutively discuss the potential for knowledge utilisation (section II), the 
interested parties and the way in which the knowledge can be usable and 
made available to these target groups (section III). 
 
II. Relevance: the potential for knowledge utilisation 
The potential knowledge utilisation of the conducted research resides in the 
manner in which the findings presented in this dissertation can inform and 
feed into broader discussions on the EU’s democratic legitimacy, and more 
generally, into discussions regarding the role of advice in the coming about 
of legislation.  
 
For years, the democratic quality of the decision-making processes that 
result in EU laws has been subject to academic and public criticism. As a 
supranational polity, the EU faces several democratic ‘challenges’ in relation 
to transparency and popular support. The empowerment of both the EP and 
national parliaments in EU decision-making has been one of the responses 
to this critique (see Introduction). In this context, the role of ‘back-stage’ 
advisors has given rise to a normative debate regarding their influence or 
capacity to have an impact on EU policymaking. The research findings have 
demonstrated that key stages of the decision-making process are informal, 
and thus generally provide no access to observers. The trend towards 
informal decision-making raises the value of political advice and elevates 
the importance of understanding the intra-institutional preparatory 
dynamics. The informal stages take place behind the scenes and prior to 
the ‘actual’ decision-making in parliamentary committees or in the plenary. 
 
 
 
Not only does this mean that these stages take place outside of public and 
political scrutiny, they can also be difficult to follow for societal and other 
stakeholders. Moreover, the lack of information and insight regarding 
crucial aspects of certain compromises means that outcomes can be difficult 
to comprehend for the wider public. 
 
The societal relevance of the thesis is tied to the insights that are offered 
about the informal intra-parliamentary preparations of EU decisions. A 
deeper understanding of how the decision-making process is prepared is 
crucial to fully appreciate political negotiation and compromise building. In 
my opinion, media reports more often than not lack nuance and fall short 
in addressing the details of how things work. The findings presented in this 
dissertation may contribute to a more nuanced public debate of how 
decisions come about in practice. The empirical findings contribute to 
uncovering how political decisions are prepared, which provides a valuable 
contribution to the wider public debate and opinion-formation on EU politics 
and democracy and may inspire similar discussions in relation to national 
legislatures.  
 
Studies have shown that the lack of transparency and public involvement 
in EU decision-making is problematic for democracy and deteriorates public 
trust. Informal processes that take place behind the scenes are untraceable. 
Intransparency affects public scrutiny and dilutes political contestation and 
public-opinion formation as policy choices remain unclear. It is necessary 
to increase the general understanding of how things work in order to 
strengthen the democratic nature of EU decision-making. Increased insight 
into the informal stages that result in compromises can assist opinion-
formation on EU policies. This may be helpful for national, regional, and 
local policymakers, the media, and the general public. Similarly, the 
unravelling of the internal machinery of the EP may be beneficial to interest 
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representation. These are just a few of the interested parties for whom the 
research findings can be useable. This is further discussed in section III.  
 
The conducted research has demonstrated that group advisors lay the 
groundwork for compromises in the EP and do not operate on the basis of 
clearly defined instructions. Their important role can on the one hand be 
interpreted as an affirmation of the influential back-stage role of non-
elected actors. And fulfilling such a role may further feed the public distrust 
of political systems and expertise. However, on the other hand, the research 
has shown that extensive coordination and deliberation systems are in 
place. These processes are crucial to the functioning of a democratic system 
and the findings show that coordination and deliberation are significantly 
facilitated by non-elected actors. Moreover, the findings suggest that 
activities carried out by advisors are guided by the ideology and aims of the 
political group they represent. In that way, they are like the ‘oil’ in the 
legislative machinery, coordinating different views and working towards 
broad agreement both within and between the EP party groups. Without 
their contribution, the intra-parliamentary coordination process would 
probably be less comprehensive given time and resources constraints of 
elected representatives.  
 
Gaining a better understanding of the politics of advice is increasingly 
significant against the backdrop of a changing public policy landscape. The 
advent of post-factual politics and the emergence of populist right-wing 
parties as mainstream have created a crisis of trust. Under the banner of 
‘alternative facts’, the fading trust in expertise or objective knowledge 
substitutes rational proof with emotional appeals. This development is 
illustrated by the election of President Trump in the United States, the Brexit 
vote in the UK, Russian propaganda, and the electoral success of populist 
movements across Europe. These examples furthermore demonstrate a 
deteriorating sense of trust in the political establishment and a rise of anti-
 
 
 
EU sentiments. On the one hand, they raise the importance of the legitimacy 
of advice, while on the other hand, internal resources that cater to the 
politician’s information needs become ever more important for the 
navigation through a complex arena. The latter is illustrative of the trade-
off between efficiency and legitimacy that characterises EU decision-making 
(see Introduction).  
 
A negative image, lack of understanding or disinterest in the EU’s 
functioning, and thus the added value of the polity, are among the causes 
for the low turnout in EP elections. The findings have the potential to better 
inform policymakers, opinion leaders, media, and the general public. A well-
informed and more nuanced public debate on the European Parliament is 
necessary to improve the attention for and participation in EU democracy. 
The upcoming EP elections form an opportune moment to test and shape 
this potential. This is further discussed in the next section. 
 
III. Target groups & implementation 
The previous section discussed the potential knowledge utilisation of the 
conducted research. This section specifies the interested parties in respect 
to the definition and typology of political advice that are advanced in the 
thesis, as well as to the presented findings about how decisions are 
prepared by advisors. It suggests how the research may be used by the 
various target groups and offers possible avenues to make the conducted 
research available and suitable for future knowledge utilisation. 
 
First of all, both the conceptual approach and the analysed empirical 
material are valuable to scholars working on the EP, informal politics in the 
EU, and the politics of expertise in the EU. More generally, the conceptual 
framework may be employed to assess power structures in other 
legislatures or institutions and tease out the political dimensions of activities 
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carried out by advisors. Academic discussions on political delegation tend 
to focus on the perspective of the elected (why do politicians delegate, how 
do they try to control their advisors, etc.). The framework offers a novel 
approach to take into account both the personal and contextual 
perspectives for the assessment of the discretion of advisors. In this way it 
enables the connection between theory and practice. Moreover, advisors 
serving a collective of political superiors (e.g. a political party) form a 
distinct group of actors that have so far only received marginal scholarly 
consideration. The findings demonstrate how advisors operate in everyday 
practice which can inform and inspire future studies on EP staff, their 
cooperation, division of labour, and the possible influence of external 
stakeholders or events on their activities. Furthermore, the conducted 
research can be used as a starting point for the study of political advisors 
in other legislative settings (see chapter 8.6 for a more detailed description 
of the future research agenda).  
 
Second, the knowledge and insight regarding the practice of decision-
making rendered by the thesis is crucial for teachers and students. It could 
be included in future education and training programmes on European 
studies, public administration, or political science. Several propositions for 
dissemination are proposed below.  
 
Third, politicians and opinion leaders can use this practical knowledge to 
prepare for public debates, the campaign leading up to the 2019 EP 
elections, or for upcoming national elections in which EU integration may 
be on the agenda.  
 
Fourth, the findings can be informative and instructive for a variety of 
professionals involved in interest representation. Representatives of 
national, regional, and local governments, interest groups, lobbyists, and 
consultants could benefit from the information that the thesis offers on the 
 
 
 
functioning of the informal stages of decision-making. During these early 
preparations and negotiations, the need for policy input will be the highest 
among politicians and their advisors. Thus, this stage in the decision-
making process provides the best opportunity for influencing legislation. 
 
Fifth, the leadership and human resource managers of the EP party groups 
can use the findings to gain insight into the performance of their advisors. 
In the dissemination proposal below, an instrument is suggested that could 
be developed for the evaluation of the performance and/or the recruitment 
of (successful) group advisors.  
 
Journalists are the sixth target group that can benefit from the research 
conducted. The findings presented in this dissertation may contribute to a 
more nuanced public debate of how decisions come about in practice. The 
empirical findings contribute to uncovering how political decisions are 
prepared, which provides a valuable contribution to the wider public debate 
and opinion-formation on EU politics and democracy and may inspire similar 
discussions in relation to national legislatures. 
 
Finally, as implied earlier, the findings have an important potential 
contribution to informing the general public. Several suggestions to engage 
are proposed below and the upcoming 2019 EP election campaign is 
considered to provide the right momentum.  
 
The abovementioned target groups may be reached through various 
channels. The following avenues are proposed for future dissemination of 
the research results: 
  
(i) Instrument for the performance assessment of EP group advisors, 
and/or recommendations to the leadership of the EP party groups. 
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(ii) Infographic about the various activities that take place during the 
early and informal stages of EP decision-making. 
(iii) You tube video that explains the various activities that take place 
during the early and informal stages of EP decision-making. 
(iv) (Digital) toolkit for teachers providing information about the 
practice of decision-making. Topical examples of files progressing 
through Parliament could be used to give students practical 
assignments. 
(v) Handbook targeting students of political science, public 
administration or governance, and European studies. 
(vi) Guest lectures for students and professionals (e.g. teachers, civil 
servants, public affairs managers). 
(vii) Participation in the public debate to increase the general public’s 
knowledge of this subject: e.g. through newspaper articles and 
reaching out via social media. The upcoming EP elections provide 
momentum to raise awareness of how things work in practice, and 
why that matters.  
(viii) Other forms of dissemination could be achieved through co-
publications or events with societal stakeholders (e.g. local and 
regional authorities trying to reach their citizens, the 
representation of the EP and/or EC in The Hague). 
 
In sum, the knowledge and insights that this research project have 
generated are useful and can be made available to a variety of stakeholders. 
This is something that I, and hopefully others with me, will continue to 
pursue from this moment onwards.   
  
 
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Het overkoepelende thema van deze dissertatie is de rol van advies in 
politieke besluitvormingsprocessen. Het onderzoek richt zich in het 
bijzonder op interne advisering in het Europees Parlement (EP). De vraag 
die in dit kader onder de loep wordt genomen, is onder welke voorwaarden 
fractieadviseurs in het EP een politieke rol kunnen vervullen. De dissertatie 
beoogt inzicht te bieden in de voorbereiding van politieke besluitvorming. 
Een diepgaand en meer genuanceerd beeld van de totstandkoming van 
besluiten is fundamenteel voor een goed begrip van hoe 
onderhandelingsprocessen verlopen en compromissen gesloten worden. 
Deze processen vinden over het algemeen achter de schermen plaats, 
zonder publieke of politieke verantwoording. Bovendien kennen zij een hoog 
informeel gehalte, wat betekent dat zelfs interne belanghebbenden (de 
wetgevers en hun adviseurs) niet allemaal over dezelfde informatie 
beschikken. De dissertatie legt de interne dynamiek waar dit mee gepaard 
gaat bloot. Aangetoond wordt dat de voorbereidingen, getroffen door 
fractieadviseurs, de bouwstenen vormen voor de compromissen bereikt 
door de wetgevers.  
 
Het EP heeft zich de afgelopen decennia significant ontwikkeld in termen 
van politieke autoriteit en wetgevende machten. Sinds de inwerkingtreding 
van het Verdrag van Maastricht (2009) is het medewetgever op vrijwel alle 
beleidsterreinen. Deze uitbreiding van verantwoordelijkheden en invloed 
heeft gevolgen voor de interne organisatie. Vanuit een streven naar meer 
transparantie en het opbouwen van expertise op nieuwe beleidsterreinen, 
heeft de instelling zich recentelijk ingezet voor de verdere ontwikkeling en 
professionalisering van het administratieve ondersteuningsapparaat. In de 
voorbereiding van standpunten op wetgeving of beleid kunnen 
Europarlementariërs een beroep doen op drie interne adviesbronnen: (1) 
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  het Secretariaat-Generaal dat ten dienste staat van de instelling als geheel, 
(2) de secretariaten van de verschillende transnationale fracties die de 
ideologische belangen van de fractie behartigen (3) de persoonlijke 
assistenten die zich voor de agenda van individuele Europarlementariërs 
inzetten. In de literatuur over het functioneren van het EP blijft de rol van 
fractieadviseurs onderbelicht en lag de focus tot nu toe op de andere twee 
bronnen van advies. EP-fracties staan centraal in het besluitvormingsproces 
omdat de interne structuren en de werkverdeling op basis van deze fracties 
bepaald worden. De verwachting was daarom dat fractieadviseurs in 
grotere mate dan andere adviseurs in het EP bijdragen aan de voorbereiding 
van politieke compromissen.  
 
De rol van het EP als medewetgever, alsmede het gebruik om de 
onderhandelingen tussen de EU-instellingen (in de zogenaamde trilogen) 
informeel te starten in een vroeg stadium, vergroten de relevantie van 
onderzoek naar de interne coördinatiemechanismes van het EP. De 
toegenomen inter-institutionele dialoog politiseert EU-besluitvorming maar 
gaat gepaard met zorgen over ‘achterkamertjespolitiek’ waarbij slechts een 
handvol Europarlementariërs is betrokken. De bevindingen van de 
dissertatie werpen licht op het coördinatieproces dat hieraan voorafgaat in 
het EP. 
 
Voor de beantwoording van de onderzoeksvraag is het in de eerste plaats 
nodig om ‘politiek advies’ te conceptualiseren, een fenomeen dat tot nu toe 
onderbelicht is gebleven in de literatuur. Hiertoe is een theoretisch kader 
ontwikkeld dat ‘politiek advies’ definieert als een gemengde ‘activiteitsfeer’ 
waarin administratieve en politieke functies overlappen en complementair 
zijn aan elkaar. De dissertatie bouwt voort op de theorieën van het sociaal 
constructivisme en de ‘logica van gepastheid’ (logic of appropriateness). 
Beargumenteerd wordt dat om wetgevers van geschikt advies te voorzien 
het onvermijdelijk is dat adviseurs een politieke bijdrage leveren. Voor het 
 
grootste deel van hun activiteiten opereren adviseurs niet op basis van 
expliciete instructies of input van de Europarlementariër (proactieve rol). 
Zij anticiperen de wensen en prioriteiten van de wetgever en beoordelen 
vervolgens zelf wat er nodig is om die te vervullen. Voortbouwend op 
bestaande theorieën over de interactie tussen politieke en niet-politieke 
actoren zijn vier categorieën van politiek advies ontwikkeld, die zich in de 
volgende vier rollen laten vertalen: (1) procesmanager (Process Manager), 
(2) informatiemanager (Information Manager), (3) beleidsexpert (Policy 
Expert) en (4) tussenpersoon (Broker).   
 
De empirische analyse is gebaseerd op een online enquête onder 
fractieadviseurs (N=99) en 30 interviews met (voormalig) betrokkenen bij 
het EP-besluitvormingsproces. De bevindingen laten zien dat 
fractieadviseurs in het EP bovengenoemde vier typen van advies verlenen. 
Het belang dat adviseurs aan een rol hechten, evenals de mate waarin zij 
een rol vervullen, hangt af van de fractie die zij vertegenwoordigen. Uit de 
resultaten zijn drie oriëntaties voor advies gedistilleerd. In de grote, 
mainstream fracties van de Christen-Democraten (EPP), Liberalen (ALDE) 
en Sociaal-Democraten (S&D) ligt de nadruk op het bemiddelen van interne 
compromissen aangezien deze fracties vele, verschillende nationale partijen 
verenigen (compromise-oriented approach). Bij de Groenen (Greens/EFA), 
en in mindere mate bij de Conservatieven (ECR) en de linkse fractie 
GUE/NGL, ligt de nadruk op het aanreiken van beleidsgerichte expertise 
aangezien de ideologische belangen binnen deze fracties redelijk 
overeenstemmen (policy-oriented approach). Procesbeheersing is het 
meest van belang bij fracties die gekenmerkt worden door een grote mate 
van autonomie van de nationale partijen en een zekere euroscepsis 
(procedure-oriented approach). Dit geldt voor de ECR, de rechtse fractie 
EFD en de linkse fractie GUE/NGL.  
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Het onderzoek toont verder aan dat de rol van fractieadviseurs in de 
onderhandelingen die binnen en tussen de EP-fracties plaatsvinden hen 
onderscheidt van andere interne adviseurs. Hoewel de Europarlementariër 
de uiteindelijke taakverdeling bepaalt, worden de volgende taken 
beschouwd als het exclusieve domein van de fractieadviseur: (i) signaleren 
en identificeren van potentieel conflicterende of inconsistente posities 
binnen de fractie (onderdeel van de procesmanager rol); (ii) afstemmen 
van standpunten binnen de fractie (interne tussenpersoon rol); en (iii) 
onderhandelen met de andere fracties (externe tussenpersoon rol). De 
rollen van informatiemanager en beleidsexpert kunnen daarentegen ook 
door medewerkers van het EP-secretariaat of door de persoonlijke 
assistenten van Europarlementariërs worden vervuld.  
 
De analyse demonstreert dat adviseurs alleen proactief gedrag kunnen 
vertonen mits zij in hun activiteiten de belangen en politieke agenda van 
de fractie nastreven. Onmisbare factoren voor het vervullen van een 
proactieve rol zijn een vertrouwensrelatie met de Europarlementariër en 
diens persoonlijke assistent en het vermogen om zich in de 
Europarlementariër te kunnen verplaatsen (politieke sensitiviteit). 
Daarnaast bepaalt de context in hoeverre proactief gedrag door adviseurs 
acceptabel is voor Europarlementariërs. Uit de bevindingen wordt 
geconcludeerd dat de parlementaire procedure, de fase van besluitvorming 
en de ervaring van Europarlementariërs beslissende indicatoren zijn voor 
de voorspelling van proactief gedrag door adviseurs.  
 
De proactieve rol is het meest omvangrijk gedurende de vroege fase van 
besluitvorming. De adviseurs hebben dan de meeste kans om de 
uitkomsten van politieke standpunten en compromissen vorm te geven. De 
mogelijkheden om initiatief te nemen worden minder naarmate een 
wetgevend voorstel de verschillende stappen van besluitvorming doorloopt. 
De bijdrage van de adviseur wordt dan beperkt door de politieke debatten 
 
die plaatsvinden binnen de fracties (reactieve rol). Ten slotte vervullen 
adviseurs ook taken die gebonden zijn aan strikte instructies van de 
Europarlementariër, vastgestelde procedures of mandaten (routine rol). 
Deze activiteiten hebben weinig of geen impact op de vormgeving van 
politieke standpunten. 
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APPENDIX I. DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
EP online sources and papers 
Data/ information analysed 
 
Use 
EP website (consulted August 
2016) 
− Composition of Parliament (1.1.3) 
− Amount of accredited MEP assistants 
(3.1.1) 
EP website (consulted March 
2018) 
Functioning and services of the EPRS (3.1.1) 
EP party group websites 
(consulted January 2014) 
Staff distribution and estimation number of 
group advisors/ target population (2.5.3, 
3.1.1, 3.2.1). 
EP party group websites 
(consulted August 2016) 
Internal organisation structures of the 
group (1.2.2). 
EP party group websites 
(consulted April 2017) 
Function titles group advisors (3.1.1). 
EP Working Paper ‘Comparison 
of organisational and 
administrative arrangement in 
EU national parliaments’ 
(2000) 
Comparative data about the role of 
parliamentary staff in the Member States, 
the US Congress, and the EP (introduction, 
2.2, 3.1, and 3.3). 
EP paper ‘Parliamentary 
democracy in action. Summary 
comparison studies’ (2013) 
− Assessment of EP in-house support 
(3.1.1) 
− Insight into the EP’s strategy to deal 
with its evolving workload (3.1 and 3.3) 
Report from the EP Secretary 
General, ‘Strategic Planning for 
the Secretariat General of the 
European Parliament’ (2015) 
Insight into the EP’s strategy to deal with its 
evolving legislative powers, and most 
significantly its role in the inter-institutional 
dialogue (1.1.1, 1.3.3). 
EP Establishment Plan (2014) − EP staff distribution (2.4, 3.1) 
− Staff allocations per group (3.2) 
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EP Rules of Procedure, 7th 
parliamentary term (2014) 
Understanding of the EP structures and 
functioning, as well as the key actors 
(chapter 1). EP Rules of Procedure, 8th 
parliamentary term (2016) 
EP Rules of Procedure, 8th 
parliamentary term (2017) 
EP Code of Conduct for 
negotiating in the context of 
the ordinary legislative 
procedures (2008) 
Functioning of inter-institutional trilogues 
and internal preparations of the EP (1.3.3). 
ALDE Rules of Procedure (2009) The groups’ Rules of Procedure rendered 
information about their internal organisation 
(1.2.2). 
Greens/EFA Statutes (2009) 
EPP Rules of Procedure (2013) 
S&D Rules of Procedure (2014) 
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2014) 
− Understanding of the key parliamentary 
structures and actors therein (1.2) 
− Understanding of the various stages of 
the intra-parliamentary coordination 
process (1.3) 
− Average duration of concluded first-
reading agreements (1.3) 
− Insight into the trend of early 
agreements (introduction, chapter 1) 
− Insight into the legislative activity of EP 
committees (1.2.3) 
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2016) 
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2017)  
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2018) 
 
Other sources 
Data/ information analysed 
 
Use 
EU Staff Regulations (2014) − Article 5: General and special conditions 
of employment (3.2) 
 
 
 
− Conditions of employment of other 
servants of the EU, including those of 
temporary staff, Title II, Articles 8-56: 
Conditions of employment and 
recruitment of temporary staff (3.2.1) 
− Title III, article 8 and Annex IA: 
Employment status of temporary staff 
(3.2.2) 
EPSO website (consulted 
August 2016) 
− Employment status of group advisors 
(3.2.1) 
− Required levels of education and 
experience of temporary staff (3.2.2) 
Joint declaration of the 
European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on 
practical arrangements for the 
Co-decision Procedure (2007) 
Functioning of inter-institutional trilogues 
(1.3.3) 
 
Vacancy notices 
Data/ information 
analysed 
 
Use 
See the selection of notices 
below (2011-2016)  
The analysis of vacancy notices was used for 
the operationalisation of the framework to the 
specifics of the EP (chapter 3) and the design 
of the survey (Appendix II). It yielded data 
apropos the following topics: 
Employment status (3.2.1) 
− General employment criteria and special 
conditions (3.2.2) 
419
Appendix 
 
 
EP Rules of Procedure, 7th 
parliamentary term (2014) 
Understanding of the EP structures and 
functioning, as well as the key actors 
(chapter 1). EP Rules of Procedure, 8th 
parliamentary term (2016) 
EP Rules of Procedure, 8th 
parliamentary term (2017) 
EP Code of Conduct for 
negotiating in the context of 
the ordinary legislative 
procedures (2008) 
Functioning of inter-institutional trilogues 
and internal preparations of the EP (1.3.3). 
ALDE Rules of Procedure (2009) The groups’ Rules of Procedure rendered 
information about their internal organisation 
(1.2.2). 
Greens/EFA Statutes (2009) 
EPP Rules of Procedure (2013) 
S&D Rules of Procedure (2014) 
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2014) 
− Understanding of the key parliamentary 
structures and actors therein (1.2) 
− Understanding of the various stages of 
the intra-parliamentary coordination 
process (1.3) 
− Average duration of concluded first-
reading agreements (1.3) 
− Insight into the trend of early 
agreements (introduction, chapter 1) 
− Insight into the legislative activity of EP 
committees (1.2.3) 
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2016) 
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2017)  
EPRS, Facts & Figures Briefing 
(2018) 
 
Other sources 
Data/ information analysed 
 
Use 
EU Staff Regulations (2014) − Article 5: General and special conditions 
of employment (3.2) 
 
 
 
− Conditions of employment of other 
servants of the EU, including those of 
temporary staff, Title II, Articles 8-56: 
Conditions of employment and 
recruitment of temporary staff (3.2.1) 
− Title III, article 8 and Annex IA: 
Employment status of temporary staff 
(3.2.2) 
EPSO website (consulted 
August 2016) 
− Employment status of group advisors 
(3.2.1) 
− Required levels of education and 
experience of temporary staff (3.2.2) 
Joint declaration of the 
European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on 
practical arrangements for the 
Co-decision Procedure (2007) 
Functioning of inter-institutional trilogues 
(1.3.3) 
 
Vacancy notices 
Data/ information 
analysed 
 
Use 
See the selection of notices 
below (2011-2016)  
The analysis of vacancy notices was used for 
the operationalisation of the framework to the 
specifics of the EP (chapter 3) and the design 
of the survey (Appendix II). It yielded data 
apropos the following topics: 
Employment status (3.2.1) 
− General employment criteria and special 
conditions (3.2.2) 
420
Appendix 
 
 
− Desired competencies: Linguistic skills, 
general knowledge and skills, qualities 
deemed most important (3.2.3) 
− Indication of key activities (3.3) 
 
Source Overview key findings 
ECR, EFD(D), EPP, 
Greens/EFA, and GUE/NGL 
notices* 
− General conditions of employment are the 
same for all political group staff. The notices 
refer to article 12(2) of the Conditions of 
Employment of Other Servants of the 
European Communities, and to article 28 of 
the EU Staff Regulations 2014 
− Linguistic requirements are tied to a specific 
language group and vary per vacancy. 
Additional requirements most commonly 
include English, French, German 
 
ECR, EFD(D), EPP, 
Greens/EFA, and GUE/NGL 
notices* 
Requirements encountered in all studied 
vacancy notices (although formulated slightly 
different in the GUE/NGL notices): 
− A ‘very good knowledge of the functioning 
of the European Union Institutions and of 
the political systems within the EU’ 
− Great availability (e.g. irregular working 
hours, frequent travel to Strasbourg) 
− Flexibility 
− Judgment 
− Methodological approach, 
− Discretion 
− Adaptability to varying workloads 
− Capacity for teamwork in an international 
environment 
− Capable of grasping wide-ranging problems 
 
 
 
− Respond rapidly to changing circumstances 
− Communicate effectively 
 
ECR, EFD(D), and EPP 
notices 
As of 2014, these groups use the same 
standard vacancy text. For all the AST and AD 
vacancies, groups are in search of temporary 
agents. In addition, several notices for 
contractual agents were encountered. The 
following ‘standard’ tasks are expected of 
group advisors: 
− ‘Fulfil a supranational function’ within the 
group 
− ‘Participate’ in the legislative work of the 
parliamentary committees 
− Provide ‘political advice’ 
− Draw up ‘politically and technically coherent’ 
parliamentary positions 
− Manage, organise, and follow up on 
meetings 
− Information and communication tasks  
− Any other activity necessary for the 
successful operation of the group 
 
GUE/NGL notices:  GUE/NGL also seeks to employ temporary 
agents. The group uses a different text. The 
main differences encountered are: 
− Affinity with the ideology of the group is 
required 
− Special conditions in relation to professional 
experience in relation to the policy content 
of the parliamentary committee that the 
vacancy notice concerns 
July 2011 AD5 (Dutch) 
Dec. 2016 AD5 (Dutch) 
Oct. 2016 AD5 (Spanish) 
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− Drafting of reports, amendments, 
resolutions, voting lists, and briefing notes 
are explicitly included as duties of the 
advisor 
− The advisor is expected to fulfil an 
‘intermediate function’ vis-à-vis the other 
political groups, the EP General Secretariat, 
NGOs and the national press 
− Additional duties are ‘research tasks’ and 
‘representing and coordinating the work of 
the national delegation in the political 
secretariat of the GUE group’ 
− The advisor ensures that ‘views and 
requirements are anticipated and reflected 
in draft resolutions or decisions prepared by 
the political secretariat’ 
 
EFD(D) notices: − Special conditions in relation to educational 
background, professional experience and/or 
the policy content 
− Higher requirements regarding professional 
experience 
− Knowledge of the political activities of the 
group 
Jan. 2012 AD7 (Dutch) − At least five years of working experience 
within the EP is required 
− Specific mentioning of the required field of 
expertise, i.e. Law, European Studies 
Jan. 2013  AST3 (English) − Both notices elaborately describe the 
recruitment process and indicate that those 
included on ‘the list of suitable candidates’ 
will be eligible for recruitment as the need 
arises in the group 
Oct. 2014 AST2 (Italian) 
 
 
 
− Tasks/duties are standardised and the same 
as those for AD candidates 
− Special conditions are set in relation to 
educational background and professional 
experience 
Oct. 2014 AD5 (Italian) − At least ten years of professional working 
experience, of which at least five in 
international environments, in particular in 
EU institutions 
− Specific mentioning of the required field of 
expertise, i.e. EU research and innovation 
policy 
− Degree in International Relations or Law 
− Knowledge of the political activities of the 
EFDD group and its members 
Oct. 
2014a 
AD6 (Italian) − At least three years of working experience 
within the EP is required, preferably 
concerning the BUDG and ECON committees 
− Knowledge of the political activities of the 
EFDD group and its members 
− Degree in Economics, Politics, and 
International Relations would be an asset 
Oct. 
2014b 
AD6 (Italian) − A minimum of five years of professional 
working experience 
− Previous professional experience in the 
European Parliament is required 
− Knowledge of the political activities of the 
EFDD group and its members 
− Proven experience in the organization of 
public events 
− Degree in Economics is an asset 
Oct. 2014 AD7 (Italian) − A minimum of 15 years of professional 
working experience 
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− Previous working experience in the 
European Parliament, especially in DG 
  External Policies would be an asset 
− Experience in internal policies 
(Environment, Public Health,  Consumers' 
protection) would be an asset 
− Degree in Law 
− Knowledge of the political activities of the 
EFDD group and its members 
 
ECR notices: Special conditions ‘in the interest of the 
service’:  
− Proven ability to carry out conceptual 
analytical work 
− Knowledge of the political activities of the 
ECR Group and its members; and 
sometimes ‘committed supporter’ 
Jan. 2013 Contractual 
agent  
The following tasks are described: 
− Following the work of two parliamentary 
committees 
− Preparing summaries, position papers, and 
minutes of meetings 
− Drafting amendments and preparing 
possible voting lists 
− Ensuring the group’s objectives are pursued 
throughout the a legislative or 
parliamentary process 
− Working with counterparts in other groups 
to advance the objectives of the group, 
under supervision of the relevant members 
July 2012 AST2 (Czech) − Notices elaborately describe the recruitment 
process and indicate that those included on 
‘the list of suitable candidates’ will be 
Nov. 2012 AST4 (Italian) 
Nov. 2012 AST4 (English) 
 
 
 
Sept. 
2014 
AST1 (Croatian/ 
English) 
eligible for recruitment as the need arises in 
the group. The list is valid for one year and 
can be extended 
− Tasks/duties are standardised and similar to 
those for AD candidates 
− The AST1 and AST2 notices are an 
exception and only include the following 
tasks: Assistance at Group meetings; 
preparation of parliamentary work 
− In the AST4 (English) notice, at least two 
years of professional experience within the 
EP is demanded 
Oct. 2014 AST4 (Danish) 
Sept. 
2014 
AD5 (Finnish) No specifics encountered. 
Sept. 
2014 
AD5 (Greek) 
Sept. 
2014 
AD6 (Spanish) Two years of professional working experience 
required. 
Sept. 
2014 
AD7 (Italian) Six years of professional working experience 
required. 
 
EPP notices:  
Jan. 2012 AD5 (Italian) Two years of professional working experience 
required. 
May 2012 AD5 (Latvian) − Two years of professional working 
experience required 
− Specific mentioning of the required field of 
expertise, i.e. Economics or Finance 
March 
2012 
Contractual 
agent 
At least two years of secretarial experience 
required. 
 
Greens/EFA, 2016, 
contractual agent 
The following tasks are described: 
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− Advising MEPs in the JURI committee in 
close cooperation with a senior advisor 
− Take part in the preparation of 
parliamentary work 
− Attend committee members 
− Assure close contact to EP secretariat 
− Follow up outcomes of committee reports 
after adoption in plenary and of political 
priorities of the group in this field 
− Liaise and prepare trilogue negotiations 
− Research for policy papers 
− Organise conferences 
− Networking with NGOs and stakeholders in 
the field 
− Contribute to campaign material 
Among the additional requirements are: 
− Educational background in line with the 
function 
− Familiarity with Green positions 
 
*NB – No vacancy notices encountered for the ALDE and S&D groups in this period. 
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APPENDIX III. SURVEY RESPONSE 
Survey response per EP party group (Q14) 
Political 
group 
Population* Respondents Response 
rate 
EPP 62 13 21% 
S&D 58 14 24% 
ALDE 41 19 46% 
ECR 30 12 40% 
GREENS/EFA 47 22 47% 
GUE/NGL 37 13 35% 
EFD 33 6 18% 
Total 308 99 32.14% 
* Number of group advisors as published on the websites of the EP party groups 
(consulted, January 2014) 
 
Response across parliamentary committees (Q1) 
Responses obtained: 99 
Advisors could select multiple committees. 
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Amount of professional working experience (Q2) 
Responses obtained: 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time in current position (Q3) 
Responses obtained: 99. See table 3.2.1b (pag 157). 
 
 
Prior experience (Q4) 
Responses obtained: 95. See figure 3.2.2 (page 161). 
 
Degrees obtained (Q17) 
Responses obtained: 85. Highest obtained degrees: PhD (11%), MA (82%), 
BA (7%). Most frequent fields of study: Law (23%), Political Science (19%), 
European Studies (15%), Economics (15%), International Relations (10%), 
Other (18%). See table 3.2.2 (page 159). 
 
 
 
 
Type of contract (Q18) 
Responses obtained: 88 
 
 EPP S&
D 
ALD
E 
Greens/ 
EFA 
ECR GUE
/ 
NGL 
EFD Total 
Temp agents         
AD level 8 7 11 8 4 1 0 39 
AST level 1 0 1 6 4 6 3 21 
Fonctionnaires         
AD level 3 3 0 4 0 1 1 12 
AST level 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Contract 
agents 
        
AD level 0 2 3 0 1 1 0 7 
AST level 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 7 
        88 
Career aspirations (Q19) 
Responses obtained: 79 
 
 Career aspirations 
inside the EU 
institutions 
EPP 70% 
S&D 50% 
ALDE 37% 
Greens/EFA 45% 
ECR 17% 
GUE/NGL 46% 
EFD 50% 
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Membership of national political parties (Q15) 
Responses obtained: 88. 66% are member of a national political party, 
mostly GUE/NGL (91%), S&D (80%), and EPP (70%) respondents. 
 
 
Membership of European political parties (Q16) 
Responses obtained: 87. Only 18% are member of a European political 
party.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Linguistic skills (Q13) 
Responses obtained: 88. More than three quarters of respondents claimed 
that they speak at least four languages. These numbers include their 
mother tongue, and the languages in which they say to have full or 
intermediate professional proficiency. Moreover, nearly a quarter of 
respondents claim to be a native speaker in multiple languages. 
 
Number of 
languages 
Two Three Four Five Six Seven 
or more 
EPP 0 3 5 4 0 0 
S&D 0 0 6 2 2 2 
ALDE 1 5 4 3 2 0 
Greens/EFA 1 1 12 4 2 1 
ECR 3 2 4 2 0 0 
GUE/NGL 1 1 3 1 5 0 
EFD 1 2 1 1 0 1 
 7 14 35 17 11 4 
 
Most important skills, knowledge, or characteristics (Q5) 
Responses obtained: 99. See figure 3.2.3 (page168). 
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Distinguishing features of an ‘excellent advisor’ (Q6) 
Responses obtained: 87. Categorised responses per political group (open-
ended question) 
LABELS 
EPP 
 
S&D 
 
ALDE 
 
GREENS-
EFA 
ECR 
 
GUE/ 
NGL 
EFD 
 
TOTAL 
 
Political sensitivity 9 6 11 10 3 4 3 32 
Negotiation 5 4 7 8 2 4 1 31 
Understand group 
position 4 3 7 6 4 3 1 28 
Policy expertise 4 3 5 7 3 5 1 28 
Network EP 4 2 5 7 2 1 2 23 
Network external 4 2 1 7 2 2 1 19 
Strategic 
behaviour 4 2 3 4 2 2 2 19 
Analytical skills 3 3 3 5 1 1 2 18 
Defend group line 1 1 8 5  2 1 18 
Find group line 3 1 6 5  2  17 
Intelligence   6 7  1 2 16 
EP procedures 4 2 4 2 1 1 1 15 
Social skills 3 3 2 4    12 
Conviction   3 5 1  1 10 
Flexibility 2 3  3 1 1  10 
Loyalty 4 1 2 2   1 10 
Compromise-
oriented 2  2 3 1  1 9 
Initiative 2  2 3 1 1  9 
Language 2 2 1 3  1  9 
Institutional 
memory 2  1  3  1 7 
Work under 
pressure 2 2 1 2    7 
Media relations   1 3  1 1 6 
Information 
processing    3 1  1 5 
Creativity 1 1 1    1 4 
Helicopter view 1 1  1   1 4 
Shadow MEPs 1   1 1 1  4 
Solution-oriented  1 1    1 3 
Trust 1   1 1   3 
Writing skills  1 1     2 
Motivation  1      1 
 
 
 
Activities of the group advisor (Q7-10) 
 
Indicated time spent on activities (Q7) 
Responses obtained: 90 
Answer options Never Monthly Weekly Daily Total 
response 
Drafting reports, opinions, 
resolutions, amendments 
2 33 45 10 90 
Providing specialist policy 
advice 
1 9 38 42 90 
Providing political advice 0 3 31 56 90 
Filtering and analysing 
information 
0 2 17 71 90 
Preparing voting lists 0 38 49 3 90 
Attending Group meetings 0 44 44 2 90 
Attending shadows meetings 
(on behalf of your MEP) 
3 20 54 13 90 
Participating in technical 
trialogues 
3 20 54 13 90 
Coordinating interests and 
positions within your political 
group 
1 27 36 26 90 
Coordinating interests and 
positions within your political 
group 
3 16 44 27 90 
Gathering information from 
external stakeholders 
4 21 41 24 90 
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Estimated division of time on activities (Q8) 
Responses obtained: 90 
 
 
 
% of time 
Parliamentary 
work  
National 
delegation work 
Political Group 
activities 
Other 
10% 1 31 16 3 
20% 1 13 32 6 
30% 7 5 19 2 
40% 9 6 11 1 
50% 12 1 3 1 
60% 11 2 0 0 
70% 12 0 1 0 
80% 25 0 1 0 
90% 9 0 0 0 
100% 3 0 0 0 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Most important responsibility of the group advisor (Q9) 
Responses obtained: 97 
 
 
Number of respondents that agree with the following statements 
(Q10) 
 Disagree Agree 
-- - + ++ 
I am an expert in a specific policy area 19 68 
 3 16 37 31 
I am a generalist 20 69 
 3 17 50 19 
I coordinate different interests and positions 6 83 
 1 5 40 43 
I safeguard group’s objectives or group line 5 84 
 1 4 37 47 
I weigh different policy options and present them 7 81 
 1 6 47 34 
I am an information manager 27 62 
 4 23 49 13 
I negotiate compromises on behalf of the group 9 80 
 1 8 45 35 
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What advisors need to fulfil their role (Q11) 
Responses obtained: 70. 60 respondents identified the most important 
factor(s). Others only pointed to their most important task(s). 48 
respondents identified one single most important factor and 12 respondents 
mentioned several factors. 
Factor Political 
sensitivity 
Network Trust Political 
direction 
Single most important 23 8 5 4 
Mentioned in 
combination with other 
factors 
8 9 6 1 
 
Factor Institutional 
memory 
Motivation Time Other 
Single most important 0 3 1 5 
Mentioned in 
combination with other 
factors 
1 0 2  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Advisors’ contacts (Q12) 
Responses obtained: 80 
 
Answer options Never Monthly Weekly Daily Total 
response 
(Shadow) Rapporteurs within your 
political group 
2 7 35 36 80 
(Shadow) Rapporteurs outside your 
political group 
7 31 36 5 79 
Political coordinators within your 
political group 
4 3 32 40 79 
Political coordinators outside your 
political group 
18 28 32 1 79 
Other MEPs within your political 
group 
1 12 28 39 80 
Other MEPs outside your political 
group 
12 29 33 6 80 
MEP assistants within your political 
group 
0 1 13 66 80 
MEP assistants outside your political 
group 
2 20 44 14 80 
Colleague group advisors 1 5 10 62 78 
Counterparts (advisors) from other 
political groups 
1 5 34 38 78 
Secretary General of your political 
group 
9 34 29 7 79 
General Secretariat staff 6 19 34 21 80 
EC staff 9 37 28 6 80 
Council staff 23 44 12 0 79 
Interest Groups or NGOs 5 38 27 10 80 
Industry representatives 22 37 18 3 80 
European political party 34 34 10 1 79 
National political party 21 35 16 6 78 
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APPENDIX IV. INTERVIEW DESIGN  
# Questions Follow-up What do I want to learn 
1 a) Can you introduce your 
tasks, responsibilities, and 
explain how you see the 
role of group advisors in 
the EP? 
b) As to your role: 
What makes a good 
advisor? What (attributes 
are) is necessary to be a 
good political advisor? 
Could you describe a 
day in the life of a 
group advisor? 
 
With whom do you 
collaborate/ talk to 
on a regular basis, 
etc. 
 
What do they do? How do 
they perceive their role?  
What is their mandate/ how 
do they receive instructions? 
How strict is this mandate? 
Who are their main points of 
contact? 
What is necessary to 
effectively fulfil that role? 
2 Could you tell me a bit 
more about the internal 
coordination process within 
your group: 
a) How do coordinated 
group positions come 
about? 
b) the negotiations 
between your group and 
the other groups? 
c) and the trilogues and 
preparation of these 
trilogue meetings (at 
technical level)? 
What happens in the 
committee phase? 
What happens in the 
plenary phase? 
Who does what? 
Do your activities/ 
responsibilities differ 
in each of these 
stages? 
 
 
How does the coordination 
process (intra and inter 
group) work and what is the 
role of advisors in this 
process? 
What is their mandate/ how 
do they receive instructions? 
How strict is this mandate? 
How does this differ across 
the groups?  
 
 
 
3 How do you see your role 
in relation to the 
committee secretariat?  
And to the MEP assistants? 
How and when do 
you collaborate with 
the Secretariat? – 
and MEP assistants? 
In your view, in what 
type of activities 
does the added value 
of group advisors lie? 
 
Insights into the 
(collaborative/ competing) 
relationships between the 
different types of supporting 
staff in the EP. 
What is typically the domain 
of the group advisor? And 
what isn’t? 
 
 
 
APPENDIX V. INTERVIEWEES 
Exploratory interviews  
February 2012 and October 2013 
Political group representation: EPP (2), S&D (2) and ALDE (1). 
 
I.01. Former accredited parliamentary assistant, February 2012  
I.02. Accredited parliamentary assistant, February 2012 
I.03. Former accredited parliamentary assistant, February 2012 
I.04. Former political group advisor, February 2012  
I.05. National delegation advisor, October 2013 
I.06. EP official committee secretariat, October 2013 
 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews 
November 2013 – June 2014 
Political group representation: Greens/EFA (6), ALDE (5), EPP (4), 
S&D (3), ECR (2), GUE/NGL (1), EFD (1).  
Parliamentary committee representation: AFET (5), ECON (4), 
IMCO (3), ITRE (3), LIBE (2), INTA (2), ENVI (1), FEMM (1). 
  
I.1. Head of unit political group secretariat and former group 
advisor, 6 November 2013 
I.2. Group advisor, 2 December 2013 
I.3. Group advisor, 18 December 2013 (SR67) 
I.4. Group advisor, 20 January 2014 
I.5. Group advisor, 20 January 2014 (SR48) 
I.6. Group advisor, 21 January 2014 
I.7. Group advisor, 21 January 2014 
I.8. Group advisor, 27 January 2014 
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I.9. Group advisor, 27 January 2014 (SR39) 
I.10. Group advisor, 28 January 2014 (SR53) 
I.11. Group advisor, 28 January 2014 
I.12. Group advisor, 28 January 2014 (SR17) 
I.13. Group advisor, 29 January 2014 (SR52) 
I.14. Group advisor, 21 February 2014 (SR49) 
I.15. Group advisor, 4 March 2014 
I.16. Group advisor, 4 March 2014 
I.17. Group advisor, 18 March (SR99) 
I.18. Group advisor, 24 March 2014 
I.19. Group advisor, 24 March 2014 (SR6) 
I.20. Group advisor, 23 May 2014 (SR73) 
I.21. Group advisor, 10 June 2014 (SR97) 
I.22. Group advisor, 11 June 2014 (SR25) 
 
Triangulation 
Spring 2018 
I.23. Former EP committee secretariat official, 4 April 2018 
I.24. Former EP committee secretariat official, 15 May 2018 
 
 
 
